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ABSTRACT 
Emerging conflicts emanating from or involving a region bound together through an overarch-
ing International Organization in most cases bring with them an implicit call on the latter to 
act in one way or the other. The intended and unintended impact of International Organiza-
tions’ actions and omissions thus precipitated transform the conflict in question as a conse-
quence. This dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the conflict transformation history of 
the Organization of American States (OAS) on the one, and of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the other hand. Whereas the OAS’s approach proved to be pre-
dominantly formal, legalistic, and factual, ASEAN followed a more indirect, albeit overall more 
holistic course. 
While the OAS was mostly confronted with disputes between two of its members and devel-
oped various tools it tasked with bringing clarification and thus hoped-for de-escalation to the 
various conflicts, ASEAN abstained from claiming responsibility for handling mainly bilaterally 
conceivable conflicts but instead sought to integrate into its realm regional as well as extra-
regional countries that were likely to cause serious controversies. 
Over the decades both IOs changed the strategy and general security policy they pursued. In 
the case of the OAS, the status human rights and democracy enjoyed among its members 
were increasingly seen as factors playing a significant role in the development of many con-
flicts. Hence, various bodies and legal documents were established with the aim to monitor 
and safeguard democratic governance and the protection of human rights in the western 
hemisphere. 
In contrast the ASEAN realized that regional and global confrontations are best averted by 
engaging the countries with considerable interests in the southeast Asian area. Thus ASEAN 
pursued a twofold approach: it undertook to establish a number of cooperation platforms with 
the goal to create increasing confidence among its participants located in- and outside of the 
Association; internally, ASEAN fervently endeavoured to speed up the realization of its found-
ing-father’s original vision of One Southeast Asia, bringing all countries under its fold; this 
despite considerable worldwide criticism to such moves. 
While both regional entities showed a predictable inclination to ameliorate conflictive situa-
tions, each of them evolved a distinct style of tackling approaching disputes. As elaborated the 
mode and methods developed were – at least partly – conditioned on the Organizations’ un-
derlying normative and ideational structures. Shared ideas and knowledge as well as overlaps 
in identities play a critical role if it comes to establish what constitutes a threat in the first 
place or how security is to be defined. Such understandings about the world and about oneself 
then feed directly into the way IOs react to a given conflict situation. As was demonstrated, 
constructivist thought applied to the unfolded conflict transformational performance delivers 
valuable insights which go well beyond those derived from traditional concepts of balance-of-
power and rational interest pursuance policies. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Entstehende Konflikte mit Ursprung in oder unter Beteilung einer Region, welche durch eine 
internationale Organisation zusammengehalten wird, tragen einen impliziten Handlungsappell 
an letztere in sich. Beabsichtigte sowohl als auch unbeabsichtigte Auswirkungen von Hand-
lungen als auch Unterlassungen internationaler Organisationen, welche auf diese Weise aus-
gelöst wurden, wirken sich umgestaltend auf den gegenständlichen Konflikt aus. Diese Dis-
sertation analysiert eingehend die Konflikttransformationsgeschichte der Organisation 
Amerikanischer Staaten (OAS) auf der einen Seite, sowie jener der Assoziation Südost-
asiatischer Staaten (ASEAN) auf der anderen. Während der Zugang durch die OAS ein über-
wiegend formaler, legalistischer und faktischer war, verfolgte die ASEAN eine vielmehr in-
direkte, jedoch stärker holistisch geprägten Kurs. 
Die OAS entwickelte unterschiedliche Werkzeuge, um den meist zwischen zwei ihrer Mitglieder 
entstehenden Konflikten zu begegnen, diese aufzuklären und so auf eine De-eskalation hinzu-
wirken. Demgegenüber hat die ASEAN nie den Anspruch auf Verantwortlichkeit über die 
Schlichtung von überwiegend bilateral ausgerichteten Konflikten erhoben; stattdessen zielte 
sie darauf ab die Länder inner- sowie außerhalb der Region, welche dazu dispositioniert 
schienen, Konflikte zu verursachen, verstärkt zu integrieren. 
Im Laufe der Jahrzehnte änderten beide Organisationen die von ihnen verfolgte Strategie und 
Sicherheitspolitik. Für die OAS gewann die Frage, welchen Status ihre Mitglieder Demokratie 
und Menschenrechte zugestanden insofern an Bedeutung, als dieser Umstand zunehmend als 
Faktor mit Konfliktrelevanz eingeschätzt wurde. Dies führte schließlich dazu, dass die OAS 
verschiedene Entitäten und gesetzliche Grundlagen zum Zwecke der Beobachtung und des 
Schutzes von Demokratie und Menschenrechten auf dem amerikanischen Kontinenten schuf. 
Im Gegensatz dazu erkannte die ASEAN, dass sie regionale sowie globale Konfrontationen am 
besten dadurch vermeidet, indem sie Länder mit erheblichen Interessen in Südostasien ver-
stärkt einbindet. Dazu verfolgte die Assoziation einen zweifache Zugang: einerseits rief sie 
zahlreiche Plattformen ins Leben, mit dem Ziel das unter den daran teilnehmenden Staaten 
von inner- und außerhalb der Region, entstehende Vertrauen zu erhöhen. In Hinblick auf Süd-
ostasien selbst, verfolgte die ASEAN eifrig eine beschleunigte Umsetzung der von ihren 
Gründungsvätern ersonnen „Ein Südostasien“-Vision, indem sie darum bestrebt war alle 
Länder der Region als Mitglieder zu gewinnen, und dies trotz weltweit geäußerter Kritik an 
dieser Politik. 
Und obgleich beide Organisationen eine vorhersehbare Neigung zeigten, Konfliktsituationen 
einzudämmen, so entwickelten sie unterschiedliche Stile, mit denen sie herannahenden Dis-
puten begegneten. Wie ausgeführt, sind die hierbei zur Anwendung gelangenden Methoden 
und Modi bedingt durch die, den Organisationen zugrundeliegenden normativen und ideellen 
Strukturen. Gemeinsame Ideen und gemeinsames Wissen als auch Identitätsüberlappungen 
sind entscheidende Kriterien in Hinblick auf Fragen wie, was eine Bedrohung grundsätzlich 
überhaupt ausmacht, oder wie Sicherheit zu definieren ist. Das zugrundeliegende Verständnis 
über die Welt und über sich selbst beeinflussen direkt wie Internationale Organisationen auf 
eine gegebene Konfliktsituation reagieren. Auf die sich entfaltenden Konflikttransformations-
erfolge angewandte konstruktivistische Konzepte erlauben, wie gezeigt wurde, wertvolle Ein-
sichten, welche über jene die auf die klassischen Erklärungsansätze von Machtbalance und 
Interessenpolitik zurückführbar sind, hinausgehen. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
I decided to write my master’s thesis on the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), picking the subject due both to my interest in the region as such and in international 
organizations understood as ‘declarations of intent’ to transcend narrow national political interests, 
on the other.  I only realized in the process of research that this institution – although originally 
having been created with the main aim of furthering regional economic integration – brought to 
bear its utmost significance only in times of conflict. The widespread violence of the war first in 
Liberia and later in Sierra Leone prompted remarkable activity of this otherwise almost unknown 
and colourless International Organization (IO). Innumerable diplomatic initiatives endeavouring to 
resolve the extraordinarily brutal and seemingly uncontrollable developments were undertaken by 
ECOWAS. When ultimately the resolution appeared to be at hand, ECOWAS also reinforced its ini-
tiative with military resources as well and sent in its peacekeepers. Although the forces’ reputation 
was far from immaculate, their presence and actions nevertheless helped to bring the violence to 
an end. Studying ECOWAS’ transformation what caught my attention, curiosity, and finally scien-
tific interest was the impact it was able to exert on conflict developments – notably contrasting to 
its erstwhile low-key performance during its early years of existence. 
As has variously been observed regional organizations have generally gained a more pronounced 
and prominent role with regard to security policy after the end of the Cold War [CABALLERO-
ANTHONY 2002:528]. I soon realized that the approaches taken varied considerably from IO to IO 
and between various regions. That is how I arrived at the idea to look into the activities of IOs in 
times of conflict and to compare and/or contrast them. For that purpose I chose two organizations 
that originally were conceived as general regional organization without subject specification: the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It 
indeed turned out to be a fascinating task to elucidate the so very different paths taken. However, 
their activities –although officially always portrayed to be taken in good faith – not automatically 
contributed to the conflicts’ resolution. Be it due to hidden agendas of decisive actors, or due to 
insufficient or the wrong choice of the type and breadth of resources, some interventions finally 
turned out to prolong, institutionalize, or temporarily aggravate conflicts. In some cases the IO in 
question – owing to various circumstances and conditions – was quite unable to maintain an unbi-
ased position, but instead took sides – be it overtly or more subtly so. 
However, only the complete record of the analyzed IO allows for an overall evaluation, that is why 
I chose not to constrict my study to efforts deemed successful at resolving a particular conflict.  
The purpose of this dissertation then is to illuminate which role both IOs have played when con-
fronted with conflicts. In order to be able to evaluate their activities and impacts it will be neces-
sary to thoroughly study their past record in this regard and moreover to look into the relevant 
cases of experienced conflict transformation with detail.  
However, I do not intend to ascertain or pin down the ultimate output of the two organizations 
regarding conflict transformation. Being only one – and in most instances – not among the most 
important actors and intervening variables in cases of conflict, it would appear to be too simplistic 
and reductionist an endeavour to measure such an effect. I rather intend to deliver a broad and 
comprehensive picture of their approaches taken. It will be revealed that the means and ways 
taken, the security definitions utilized, and the aims pursued have witnessed considerable modifica-
tions and adaptations over time. The insights thus gained permit to judge the organizations’ pecu-
liar over-all performance, as well as their constraints and restrictions. In the end this added under-
standing will enable researchers to arrive at more validated assessments with increased expec-
tancy probability and predictive power. 
1.2 Sources 
To find the most appropriate theoretical approach the relevant literature will be assessed and here-
after corresponding explanatory routes distilled with which to approximate the research agenda 
most effectively. The (theoretical) literature will also lend support with regard to the various requi-
site definitions. 
For the purpose of analyzing the two organizations use will be made of their primary sources, i.e. 
their founding documents, resolutions, statements, annual reports, etc.  
However, in order to get a more comprehensive picture of their activities in concreto I will utilize a 
vast array of news media. Among them will be daily newspapers (e.g. New York Times, Asia Wall 
Street Journal, Washington Post), news agencies (e.g. Reuters, Associated Press) and magazines 
(for example Far Easter Economic Review, Economist). It has proven valuable to sometimes use 
more than one account of an event, allowing for a more thorough and comprehensive grasp. Gen-
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erally, preference is given to English-language media that are located closer to the region, although 
in some instances geographic proximity not necessarily influences positively the quality of report-
ing. 
On top of such news media other publications with a more pronounced claim to offer analysis (for 
example Oxford Analytica, Economist Intelligence Unit) have been consulted as well. 
A natural companion of my research is the substantial number of relevant scholarly works. Among 
them monographs, anthologies, and of course journals and articles, analyzing and clarifying various 
aspects of the subjects under scrutiny. The scholarly journals dominate in this regard; they vary 
largely, encompassing rather general ones like International Organization or Global Governance as 
well as more focused ones like American Journal of International Affairs or Pacific Affairs. 
 
1.3 Definitions 
The term 'International Organization' (IO) will be used as to mean basically the two discussed 
entities, the OAS and ASEAN - but also extending to a broader meaning covering other comparable 
institutions. Such IOs are commonly also subsumed in the category of Intergovernmental Organi-
zations (IGOs), since they are established by governments which conceptualize themselves as the 
organizations’ principal actors1
The term 'conflict transformation' in this thesis is not indicating an activity which is designed to 
'truly overcome' conflicts, addressing the underlying causes of it, as other scholars understand it 
[compare REIMANN 2004:51]. The reason why I deliberately chose this word combination, how-
ever, concerns the all-inclusiveness that it brings along. A conflict may well be changed, but this 
act might not necessarily bring its resolution any closer. There might be cases in which activities 
modify the physiognomy and/or dynamic of the conflict without moving into the direction of its 
. 
One further distinguishing feature of IOs, or IGOs, is their peculiar legal status within international 
law: 
Legal personality is principally an acknowledgement that an entity is capable of exercising 
certain rights and being subject to certain duties on its own account under a particular 
system of law [MARTIN & LAW 2006:ILP]. 
For the sake of limiting redundancies IOs are defined and discussed in more detail in the chapter 
dealing with the theoretical localization below.  
 
The term 'conflict' in this study describes a situation in which two or more parties are in manifest 
disagreement about a given subject and are heading to potentially destructive forms of pursuing 
their respective interests. The conflict researcher Friedrich GLASL has offered the following defini-
tion: 
 
Accordingly, a (social) conflict is an interaction between actors (individuals, groups, or-
ganizations etc.), in which at least one actor recognizes incompatibilities in thought, imag-
ining, perception and/or feeling and/or wanting with another actor (other actors) in such a 
way, that the realization is witnessing impediments by another actor (other actors) [qtd. 
in: MICHAL-MISAK 2000, my translation]. 
Obviously, it would be an unrealistic endeavour to include all instances of conflicts between the 
members of the organization. Not having the intention to be all-encompassing I focus on conflicts 
which cross the threshold of being a simple difference of interest/position, resolvable through tradi-
tional (diplomatic) means and channels. I consider it most fruitful to concentrate upon such con-
flicts which go beyond that scope and hold the potential of spiralling into negatively disrupting 
forms. 
I include conflicts regardless of them occurring between two or more members of the relevant IO, 
between intra- and extra-organizational actors, or between domestic actors of member states. The 
yardstick I made use of for deciding if a conflict is to be included in the thesis or not, was condi-
tioned on the fact if the conflict triggered observable and traceable reaction by the IO. 
 
                                                 
1 BARNETT & FINNEMORE and others have underlined the fact that nowadays most IOs are not created by 
states, but by other IOs [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 1999:704 FN 19; see also ALVAREZ 2006:325 FN 9]. 
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settlement; in other instances the effected change might even be of aggravating quality2. Thus 
'conflict transformation' scores with its pure indeterminacy. The term is comprehensive and neu-
tral, carrying no normative baggage of what actors (and researchers3
There are various way to describe, map, and diagnose a conflict
) might desire - most proba-
bly its peaceful and sustainable resolution. 
Social-psychology endeavours to draw the dividing line between desirable and undesirable conflicts 
in so far as it distinguishes conflicts into those it considers functional and in others it terms dys-
functional. Accordingly, functional dimensions of conflicts are revealing latent problems, are dis-
crediting misleading self-impressions, are triggering solutions, and may be the starting point for 
necessary changes, which in turn may ultimately lay the foundation for distributive justice. In con-
trast, dysfunctional dimensions of conflicts frequently make use of violence, result in destructive 
consequences, are triggering disintegration and long-term polarization as well as general waste of 
resources [FISCHER & WISWEDE 2002:624; compare also DEUTSCH 1973 passim]. However, the 
usefulness of the concept is somewhat in doubt as implicitly indicated and conceded by adding the 
word ‘dimensions’, since most conflicts will most probably show functional and dysfunctional di-
mensions at the same time, depending among other variables on the very vantage point chosen for 
observation. 
4
At this point I want to underline that IOs are limited in their possibilities and are not – at least as 
matters concerning their competencies, features, and endowment currently stand – to be expected 
to lastingly transform and in further consequence possibly even resolve deep seated conflicts on 
their own and without the cooperation of concerned parties. Although they very well can support 
 – however, it would go beyond 
the scope of this thesis to look into the corresponding approaches, since I focus not so much on the 
conflicts themselves, but rather on how IOs acted when confronted with them. 
LEDERACH developed a concept which comprehensively demonstrates how multi-faceted the proc-
ess of conflict transformation is: 
Transformation implies a deliberate process of embedding or „nesting“ changes in a con-
flict’s manifestation at the personal, relational, structural, and cultural levels (Lederach 
forthcoming, 127-30). At the personal level, a transformational approach focuses on 
changes in perceptions of and attitudes toward the conflict, and in the conditions reflecting 
individuals’ physical, psychological, and spiritual well-being. This suggests an intervention 
strategy designed to lessen immediate suffering and other psychologically destructive ef-
fects of the conflict. At the relational level, improvements in interaction and communica-
tion can increase mutual understanding and reduce fear and stereotyping, forcing parties 
to confront the terms of mutual interdependence and make difficult decisions regarding 
the extent to which they can redefine such social transactions. Transformation concerns 
not only psychological aspects of group relations but social, economic, political, and mili-
tary relations as well. 
The structural dimension focuses on the social environment necessary to fulfill basic hu-
man needs; access to religious, economic, political and administrative resources; and op-
portunities to participate in decision-making procedures. It also refers to developing or 
enhancing mechanisms for change in structural inequities along the lines of the peace-
building concept. | The cultural dimension refers to the deeply embedded values and be-
liefs that support the mechanisms and patterns of sociopolitical interaction within a soci-
ety. Transformation at the cultural level is about identifying and reshaping the patterns 
that contribute to increased incidents of violent conflict and promoting the indigenous re-
sources and mechanisms that are effective in responding constructively to disputes and 
conflict. [RASMUSSEN 1997:42-43] 
                                                 
2 Friedrich GLASL points to this a priori openness of influencing conflict with his differentiation between preven-
tive intervention, curative intervention, de-escalating intervention, and escalating intervention [GLASL 
1997:148-151]. 
3 The general problem of implicit bias is rarely accommodated by scholars. One of the few exceptions is AR-
CHAYA who notes that parts of the constructivist literature deems global norms as ‚good‘ and hence more desir-
able than localized norms [ACHARYA 2004:242]. However, in another section of his article scholars are cited 
who assert that local civilizations witness ‚upgrading‘ to a ‚higher type‘ by localizing new (extra-local) norms 
without ACHARYA qualifying those statements similarly [ACHARY 2004:252]. 
4 For instance, GLASL devised conflict diagnosing which focuses on parties, relations between the parties, con-
flict target, conflict chronology, and attitudes of the parties toward the conflict [GLASL 2002]. The Hocker-
Wilmot Assessment Guide, on the other hand, suggests the following eight points of questions to be asked in 
order to receive a useful impression of the conflict: characterization of the conflict, style of the conflict, power, 
goals, tactics, assessment, self-regulation and tried solutions. Another approach is presented by the Wehr Con-
flict Mapping Guide that starts with a summary description of the conflict, looks into the conflict history, its 
context and its parties, considers the issues, dynamics and alternate routes to solutions, as well as the conflict 
regulation potential [for further details on the last two approaches see: 
http://spot.colorado.edu/~wehr/40GD1.HTM, retrieved on 07.01.2008]. 
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and facilitate such endeavours, they are - taking only their inherently over-arching and as such 
partly abstract structure and considerable conflict-distance into account – not the appropriate ac-
tors for such efforts. Still, IOs are in the position to impact on conflicts, and as will be demon-
strated, did it many times in the past. 
For my purpose neither the term ‘conflict resolution’ nor ‘conflict settlement’ nor even the more 
flexible ‘conflict management’ contain all the aspects which I intend to look at. As already indicated 
earlier the first two are describing activities which are clearly headed in one direction. Thus, in-
stances of intervention with (unintended) destructive consequences for a conflict, e.g. its escala-
tion, are – strictly taken – not covered by them. As regards the latter, conflict management, I con-
sider the phrase not to be suitable as applied to political conflicts. Management is a term coming 
from the economic language and originally carries the notion of administering and leading an entity 
or process with the aim of this entity's or process' (economic) success. To apply 'management' to 
'conflicts' seems to me to be quite misleading, since this would necessarily be an endeavour that 
would keep the conflict alive. 
1.4 Theoretical Landscape 
Instead of delving too deep into drawing up the already well known main schools of theories of 
international relations - described in much detail and with considerable depth in innumerable books 
and articles - I will only sketch the theoretical landscape. Nevertheless it is fair to say that I con-
sider their explanatory power as varying in accordance with the chosen chronological position (least 
to most) in the following sections. But first of all, ABBOTT and SNIDAL shall be quoted to underline 
the general need for a multi-theoretical requirement5
…[R]ealist, constructivist, and rational-regime arguments come together in consideration 
of the role of IOs … Although some might prefer to find a singular “winner” among the 
three explanations, we believe each explains a significant part of the episode and that any 
unidimensional explanation would be incomplete [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:29]
 the issue in question asks for, a view I totally 
agree with: 
6
1.4.1 Realism 
. 
For the purpose of this study a short recollecting snapshot of the major assumptions cultivated by 
Realists shall suffice. Realism is basing its explanatory power on the following main claims: 
 
• states are the only significant actors in the international system; 
• states are guided by their self-interest, deducible from the states’ material characteristics 
and the objective conditions it faces; 
• equality of states is limited to their sovereignty; 
• states continuously try to advance in the over-all hierarchy which is defined by the share of 
states’ power and their successful ‘self-help’ in an otherwise anarchically structured sys-
tem; 
• the distribution of power explains how states act [RASMUSSEN 1997:24-25; HATHAWAY 
2005:479]. 
 
Since states as principal units of the system perceive themselves as competitors for the same 
goods, even in cases of common interests, their readiness to cooperate is severely hampered. Con-
sequently, IOs are not assigned the ability to alter the reigning anarchy between states [GRIECO 
1988:485], but instead are considered to be only ‘epiphenomenal’ in nature [SIMON 2008:266]. 
                                                 
5 Compare also STEINBERG & ZASLOFF 2006:86-87, on that scholars are increasingly hybradizing the theories 
they make use of. In another article ABBOTT reviews some recent studies which all – more or less -  champion 
moving beyond the ‘paradigm war’ as a fruitful and necessary route [ABBOTT 2005:18-21]. Also RUGGIE dis-
cards the claim of superiority of the main International Relations theories over the others [RUGGIE 1998:882-
885]. 
Also among politicians the insight that both material (realist claim) and immaterial factors (constructivist claim) 
have to be taken account of seems to take hold. Thus, Britain floated a proposal in spring 2009 of a ‘solidarity 
force’ for NATO which was to satisfy two positions. On the one hand the force was to be made up of small con-
tingents from several NATO members and thus signifying the political message of unity, herby soothe fears of 
ex-Soviet and newly independent  countries; at the same time the force’s limited military prowess was to as-
suage Russia’s assertiveness [ECONOMIST 28.03.2009a]. 
6 This approach seems to gradually gain in currency among various social science scholar [among them e.g. 
SIMON 2008:268 or NGUYEN VU TUNG 2007:497, passim]. 
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Anarchy means in this context “there is no overarching authority to prevent others from | using 
violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them” [GRIECO 1988:497-498, original 
emphasis] - entailing the danger to their very existence. It follows that states seek to attain rela-
tive gains compared to their peers [GRIECO 1988:498], and perceive that self-help is their most 
trustworthy strategy [ABBOTT 2005:13]. And since all states vie for the most essential resource – 
power – international relations are characterized by competition and conflict [BUZAN 2003]. 
This is impeding cooperation, while principally holding great gains, and will be eschewed unless a 
state may not answer favourably the question on how the gain obtained will ultimately be distrib-
uted [GRIECO 1988:499] and only if the risk of being cheated in the process is minimized. But 
HATHAWAY, underlining the lack of explanatory power of realism, justifiably questions: 
Human rights and environmental treaties, for example, impose substantial sovereignty 
costs on states in return of collective goods of human dignity and healthier world envi-
ronment. In a world where self-interest is the central motivating force of state action, why 
would states waste time and energy creating treaties that yield little obvious individualized 
benefit? And why would they ever abide by them? [HATHAWAY 2005:479] 
1.4.1.1 Evaluation 
In this study's context a clear deficiency of this school of thought lies in its non-recognition or at 
least under-valuation of contributions by other actors than states. Although this shortcoming of 
grasp concerns foremost the significance attributable to IOs, the big picture of the world today will 
generally be incomplete if the activities of NGOs, transnational corporations, civil society networks, 
and many more are by and large not adequately appraised. 
Here is not the space or appropriate context to achieve some sort of synthesis of the school of 
thoughts in general. Otherwise, interesting commonalities might easily be discerned; as for exam-
ple the notion of one of the most prominent realist proponents, Hans Morgenthau, that the ration-
alist perspective sometimes is to be enriched with the underlying moral order. This assertion is 
echoing the significance of normative orders, which are treated as almost irrelevant by most realist 
scholars. The same openness marks another of MORGENTHAU’s arguments: that human nature 
dictates the laws of politics, which in turn would make room for the significance of identity; that 
again being an insight most thoroughly accommodated by constructivism [CALHOUN 2002c; SALEM 
2006:13-14]. 
1.4.2 Institutionalism 
The counterpart of realism originally had been idealism/liberalism which later developed i.a. institu-
tionalism and its variants. Representatives of this school of thought agree on the importance of 
other actors – like IOs - while still upholding the significance, if not centrality of the state [STER-
LING-FOLKER 2000:104]. 
Institutionalism, moreover, rejects the realist view that states are unitary and rationalist actors; 
instead, a decentralization of power is clearly deemed discernable. Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER formu-
lated three basic institutionalist assumptions: 
 
• fundamental actors in politics are members of domestic society; as such they are individu-
als and privately constituted groups longing to further their interests; 
• governments represent some segment of domestic society; their interests are mirrored in 
the state policy 
• the behaviour of states, that is their tendency to cooperation or conflict on the international 
stage, reflects the nature of state preferences [STEINBERG & ZASLOFF 2006:81]. 
 
Anarchy is not considered to be the sole force shaping states' actions; knowledge, welfare-
orientation etc. are additional intervening factors [GRIECO 1988:494]. GRIECO further argues that 
institutionalists consider that the alternative of war as a route of obtaining one's goals has become 
prohibitively costly with the advent of nuclear weapons; on top of that increased economic interde-
pendence furthers actors’ view to perceive themselves as friends rather than foes [GRIECO 
1988:489-490]. 
Cooperation through International Organizations is considered to yield reciprocal aggregate bene-
fits for all, which is bearing more significance than the question on how those are eventually dis-
tributed (as relative gains) [SIMON 2008:266]. 
1.4.2.1 Cooperation 
Institutionalism argues that faced with the difficulty of obtaining certain aims unilaterally, states 
decide to cooperate, since this is expected to produce more favourable results. The so-called 'pris-
oner's dilemma' helps illustrate the said conditions: 
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Two inmates (A & B) are questioned individually about a crime and are potentially facing the fol-
lowing punishments as years of imprisonment: 
 
Both prisoners – unable to communicate with each 
other – are told the following: 
 
 if both confess, each will face a medium 
punishment (five years); 
 if both deny, each will receive a relatively 
mild punishment for another crime (two 
years); 
 if one of the prisoners is confessing, while 
the other is denying, the first will go free, 
while the other will face the most severe 
punishment (ten years). 
 
Thus, if both prisoners are acting according to their 
own individual rationality, both would confess in 
order to avoid the maximum penalty; however, 
this would yield suboptimal results only - that is a 
medium prison term. Only if both decided to coop-
erate - that is both go for denial - would they be 
able to reach the best overall results [SCHMIDT 
1995:333], while giving up the chance going com-
pletely free. AXELROD has demonstrated that it-
eration has the potential to solve the dilemma, 
since repetition leads to cooperative behaviour 
[STEINBERG & ZASLOFF 2006:79]. 
1.4.2.2 Regimes 
To capture the ensuing cooperation states are will-
ing to enter into, the approach of 'regimes' as de-
veloped i.a. by KRASNER has been suggested. 
Regimes are defined as: 
Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expec-
tations converge in a given area of interna-
tional relations. 
And KRASNER substantiates: 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions 
for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and imple-
menting collective choice7
• reduction of transaction and verification costs, providing an organizational and normative 
institutional framework for reaching agreements; 
. [KRASNER 1982:186] 
Regimes and/or international institutions fulfil various functions which make them attractive as 
cooperation vehicles for states. Among those functions are: 
 
• creation of iterativeness; 
• establishing guides for behaviour which reduces insecurity and enhances trust; 
• provision of equal information for all which constitutes the basis for agreements – making 
decisions more transparent; 
• creating ways to punish cheaters; 
• reinforcing reciprocity and as such delegitimize defection; 
                                                 
7 HAFTENDORN distinguishes between procedural rules which establish how decisions are arrived at and behav-
ioural rules that regulate the behaviour of the regime members [HAFTENDORN 1997:19]. 
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• pooling of assets, expertise8
• enhancing the opportunity for issue linkage and package deals; 
; 
• resolving other collective action problems [GRIECO 1988:495; KOHLER-KOCH 1989:23, 43; 
ALVAREZ 2006:330; ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998]. 
 
The same authors highlight the somewhat unexpected self-restrictions displayed by some powerful 
states when deciding to go for participating in international cooperation: “[a]s always, powerful 
states exert disproportionate influence over norm elaboration and structure legislative processes to 
ensure their influence. Here, too, however, protection for weaker states may be the price of their 
participation, and the effective | ness of an established rule-making procedure requires that power-
ful states respect those arrangements” [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:15-16]. 
 
Since conflicts – at least potentially – hold the possibility of one states' extinction in case of failure, 
'security regimes' are different from regimes covering other issue areas. 
 
Rober JERVIS detailed the characteristics which distinguish security regimes from other regimes. 
The so-called 'security dilemma' points to the relativity of gains made in the security field: in-
creases in one's own security, inadvertently constitute decreases of the security of the others. Mili-
tary build-ups, for instance, are only of value if other states are not following suit, making for the 
gains equalization9
1.4.2.3 Institutionalization 
. What follows is a tendency to arms races, making the overall environment 
even more volatile than before [HAFTENDORN 1997:13]. 
Therefore JERVIS argues that: 
Security regimes are thus both especially valuable and especially difficult to achieve – 
valuable, because individualistic actions are not only costly but dangerous; difficult to 
achieve, because the fear that the other is violating or will violate the common under-
standing is a potent incentive for each state to strike out on its own even if it would prefer 
the regime to prosper [JERVIS 1982:358]. 
Security immanently is the 'most highly valued goal', and failures are often irreversible and may 
decide about existence or non-existence of actors. 
Additionally, security policy as issue area is marked by an extraordinary high degree of opacity and 
unpredictability. No one knows who will be its foe in the future, and moreover outcomes of military 
conflicts are not foreseeable 'thus increasing the pressure on statesmen to be less restrained' 
[JERVIS 1982:359]. 
Although all international organizations are regimes the same is not true the other way round. 
While regimes do not necessarily require permanent structures, IOs do, although their extent can 
vary remarkably, depending on shape and depth of their institutionalization.  
RITTBERGER provides the following definition of IOs: 
International Organizations are understood as social institutions, which can perform as 
single actor vis-à-vis their environment. Internally they are characterized through behav-
ioural patterns based on inter-governmentally agreed norms and rules, which fix behav-
ioural roles for states and their (governmental) representatives in recurring situations and 
which again lead to an approximation of mutual behavioural expectations (...) [RITTBER-
GER 1994:27, my translation] 
Institutionalization can materialize i.a. in the form of secretariats, regular assemblies, and/or ex-
ecutive organs. Moreover, there is a general trend discernable that issue areas, procedures, and 
behaviour are subjected to rules, or -  to capture it with a neologism - are gradually witnessing 
'rulification' (German: Verrechtlichung) [ALVAREZ 2006:324; HAFTENDORN 1997:14-15]. Other 
authors, moreover, find that voting rules as well as differentiated representations at work in IOs 
                                                 
8 Especially IOs’ ability to generate neutral information, free of any national interests, has been identified as an 
ingredient for making compliance among members more likely [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:20]. It this context it 
is also essential that such neutral and objective information is used as the basis for subsequent enforcement 
action [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:26]. 
9 Thus, a comment offered by the ECONOMIST on the arms race observable in the mid 1990s for the Southeast 
Asian region the ECONOMIST  is illustrative: „As a small state surrounded by larger neighbours, Singapore is 
determined to keep its technological edge in military weaponry. The Thais do not expect to go to war with the 
Malaysians; but neither do they feel they can ignore a build-up in their neighbour's air force.” [ECONOMIST 
27.07.1994] 
INTRODUCTION | THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE 
8 
are equivalent to ‘constitutionalizeing’ balances of states’ power [ABBOTT & SNIDAL1998:10]. 
Whereas some scholars distinguish between ‘organization’ as to refer to the formal apparatus, and 
institution to encompass all regulative and cognitive features (like rules or shared believes 
[GOODMAN & JINKS 2004:647 FN 93]), I consider both aspects to be covered by the term IO. 
1.4.2.4 Evaluation 
As has been shown institutionalism is attributing a degree of significance to IOs. In comparison to 
realism, institutionalism draws the spotlight on why states in fact do cooperate and more specifi-
cally what means they use for that purpose. However, institutionalist scholars in that endeavour 
remained overwhelmingly constrained to a rationalist type of thinking, regarding cooperation by 
and large as a prolongation of the states’ pursuit of self-interest, albeit in a refined way – strug-
gling to cope with problems otherwise not resolvable at all or only sub-optimally so for individual 
states. 
Another limitation of institutionalism has been underlined by SHAW; she underlines the inability of 
this school to explain the internal functioning of IOs, as for instance in case of disagreement be-
tween members [SHAW 2000:8]. 
The shortcomings of institutionalism are also coming to the fore if one is to explain more subtle 
qualities and abilities of IOs, for example inducting and hereby socializing (new) members. Sociali-
zation constitutes a function which has a direct effect on conflict transformation, since actors with 
some familiarity with each other are more likely to be in a position to sort out their differences in a 
mutually acceptable way. Such and similar explanatory deficiencies and inadequacies constructiv-
ism sought and seeks to address. 
1.4.3 Constructivism 
Constructivism10
In this dissertation’s context the scientific grasp of constructivism goes farther than institutional-
ism. Although institutionalism, while looking well beyond realism in recognizing IOs’ importance, 
nevertheless views them as rather passive tools for states to further their goals [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 
1998:7] - even if conceding that IOs  might bring about a particular sort of added value which is 
otherwise not obtainable at all. However, constructivism
 is basically understood as a “doctrine according to which perceptions, memories, 
and other complex mental structures are actively assembled or built by the mind, rather than being 
passively acquired” [COLMAN 2006]. This implies that each actor is likely to hold distinct estimates 
of the world from other actors. This entails that there is a natural ‘disjuncture’ between those esti-
mates / constructs of the world and the “real” world. JOHNSTON thus concludes: 
If this disjuncture can exist, then, in principle, the “real world” has less independent, pre-
dictable effects on actor behavior. As such the “realities” of anarchy, relative material 
power imbalances, and so forth are no longer so determinative [JOHNSTON 2001:489]. 
11
                                                 
10 Today the term ‚constructivism‘ is felt by some scholar’s to be too general, and in need of further qualification 
(e.g. postmodernist constructivism), as for example as regards state-centrism [compare: SALEM 2006:32ff.]. 
11 The term constructivism was traced to Nicolas G. ONUF who used the expression in 1989; however, works of 
Max WEBER, Karl DEUTSCH, or Emile DURKHEIM much earlier dealt with issues and perspectives later summa-
rized under 'constructivism' [BRUNNÉE & TOOPE 2000:26]. Compare also RUGGIE’s derivation of the concept to 
almost the same sources [RUGGIE 1998:857-862] or the corresponding tracking of the term by KARBER [KAR-
BER 2000:189 FN 1]. 
RUGGIE differentiates three variants of constructivism: neo-classical constructivism, postmodernist constructiv-
ism, and naturalistic constructivism [RUGGIE 1998:881-882]. 
 delves even deeper and claims that IOs 
have some autonomy and power in their own right.  
Expectedly, constructivists arrive at a much broader definition of institutions (among them IOs), 
than regime theorists:  
In a general way, an “institution” can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of prac-
tices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situa-
tions. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of in-
terpretations that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules 
associated with them. Practices and rules are also embedded in resources and the princi-
ples of their allocation that make it possible for individuals to enact roles in an appropriate 
way and for a collectivity to socialize individuals and sanction those who wander from 
proper behavior [MARCH & OLSEN 1998:948]. 
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However, their type of power often turns out to be a side effect of their modus operandi. At the 
outset a rational decision12
IOs can affect the interests and values of states in ways that cannot be fully anticipated 
[ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:25]
 of the would-be members is to be made:  
The creation and development of IOs often represent deliberate decisions by states to 
change their mutually constituted environment and, thus, themselves.  
However, as soon as IOs have seen the light of day this holds also the probable possibility of unin-
tended effects: 
13
RUGGIE cites the reputable sociologist Max WEBER to spell out the main characteristic of the con-
structivist approach: “we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a de-
liberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance” [RUGGIE 1998:856, original empha-
sis]. This very ability of human beings makes them able to create so-called ‘social facts’, among 
them linguistic practices, religious beliefs, moral norms, and other ideational factors
. 
14
• human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; 
 (for instance 
money or sovereignty). Such social facts are assembled to complete worldviews and life-worlds. 
Delimited to them are ‘observational facts’ like rivers or gravity, which are independent of an inter-
subjective agreement on their existence. Human beings are living in communion and not isolated 
from each other. Both, social facts as well as observational facts influence social behaviour [RUG-
GIE 1998:856, 858]. This is one of the main constructivist insights which is broadly disregarded by 
the other two schools of thought which are finding their judgments by using strongly materialist 
and rationalist vantage points. 
One further strength of constructivism is that human beings are principally conceived in context 
with their social environment the corresponding collectively shared systems of meaning. What an 
individual believes is thus not singular and unique because the components of those beliefs are 
‘representations and enactments of social and intersubjective culture’ [RISSE 2000:6]. 
In an attempt at generalizing, scholars subsumed the following basic constructivist assertions: 
 
• the most important ideational factors are widely shared or “inter-subjective” beliefs, which 
are not reducible to individuals; and 
• these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors [FINNEMORE 
& SIKKINK 2001:392-393]. 
1.4.3.1 Norms, other ideational Structures, and Behaviour 
That is to say that constructivism claims that interests and identity (sense of self) are not – as the 
other schools of thought uphold – real, solid, and driven by material considerations. Instead, they 
are constructed socially in the form of shared subjective understandings and as such can also be 
re-defined [STEINBERG & ZASLOFF 2006:82; HATHAWAY 2005:481; ABBOTT 2005:14]. In this 
process identity formation takes place prior to interest formation [BRUNNÉE & TOOPE 2000:20]. 
Moreover, actors usually construct and maintain a multiplicity, in some cases overlapping, of identi-
ties15
                                                 
12 However, preceding this decision is a cognitive change as regards the mental furnishings of actors imagining 
political community, as RUGGIE has outlined [see CLUNAN 2001:349].  
13 SHAW argues likewise when she elaborates on regimes acquiring autonomy which ‘allows them to impact 
states in unanticipated and uncontrollable ways’ [SHAW 2000:8]. 
14 On the importance of ideas in the constructivist approach see WIENER 2003:261-262. 
15 RUGGIE has conditioned the development of a post-modern international society to the ability of actors to 
identify not only with one entity – their nation state – but with several entities [see CLUNAN 2001:341].  
. 
Much more than realists or institutionalists, constructivism emphasizes the dynamic force at play in 
international relations. Identities, norms, or interests are the object of constant change, as are the 
underlying hierarchies of those constructs. Behaviour, then, is also informed by a learning process 
– which is in turn nurtured i.a. by past experiences or new insights. But although normative sets 
influence the behaviour “[c]ollective understandings, such as norms, are not sufficient cause for 
actions” as ADLER holds. For that threshold to be exceeded, single agents need to take actions in 
line with the corresponding norms [ADLER cited in CLUNAN 2001:354]. 
As regards identities, WENDT has distinguished between two categories. ‘Type identities’ are cate-
gories of actors that share some characteristics, for example the form of government. Additionally, 
actors maintain ‘role identities’, existing only in relation to others and defining the others as 
friends, rivals, and the like [FINNEMORE & SIKKING 2001:399]. 
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RISSE highlights the two-pronged functionality of socially shared ideas – as on the one hand con-
stituting identities and on the other hand regulating behaviour: 
The norm of sovereignty, for example, regulates the interactions of states in international 
affairs and also defines what a state is [RISSE 2000:5]. 
Although identities and interests are mutable [RUGGIE 1998:863-864], they show a degree of con-
sistency which in turn allows for some predictability [BRUNNÉE & TOOPE 2000:30]. Norms16
• first degree internalization: norms will be followed only through threat or use of force; 
 - un-
derstood as standards for proper behaviour [FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 1998:891] - inform identities, 
interests, and behaviour. But norms are not only those standards which actors are consciously 
aware of, but frequently have witnessed differing degrees of internalization. 
WENDT holds that norms may be internalized to various extents: 
 
• second degree internalization: motivation to act according to the norm is based on instru-
mental calculation of self-interest; 
• third degree internalization: actors consider the norm as legitimate and have the will to fol-
low them [HARRISON 2004:526]. 
 
However, here WENDT seems to regard internalization as a conscious process, leaving no room for 
unobservable processes. 
When actors (states and/or other actors) interact with each others, social structures are built in the 
process. Such structures, immaterial as they are, subsequently on the one hand constrain and on 
the other enable other types of action [BRUNNÉE & TOOPE 2000:28-31].  
Generally, constructivism claims that social structures, primarily ‘ideational structures of meaning 
and value’ are more influential than actors are [ABBOTT 2005:15], whereas realists and institu-
tionalism argue that ‘states and the system of states simply are’ [RUGGIE 1998:863], and thus 
implicitly are disregarding their historicity: 
From a constructivist perspective, international structure is determined by the interna-
tional distribution of ideas. … Norm shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in 
the balance of power are to the realist [FINNEMORE & SIKKING 1998:894]. 
Human interaction and consequently human relationality shapes individuals’ behaviour: 
… in terms of "identity" it is sufficient to differentiate the "self" from "others" in terms of 
passive perception; but when the "others" act in ways that impact on the "self" this cre-
ates "expectations" or anticipations about future acts. At an increased level of intensity, 
these anticipations begin symbolically arousing the recipient to reaction. To the extent 
that they "demand" a response--a form of communication called "speech acts"--these 
symbolic exchanges, or interactive events, cover the spectrum of human activity--from 
shared identity (Cultural commitment), to shared benefits (Utilitarian or Economic coop-
eration), to unshared costs (Political coercion). Each type of influence produces a different 
type of normative subscription, or "Ruling Channel," unique in their constitutive nature 
and controlling effect. ... 
Subsequently, interaction and cooperation make for added complexity of such processes, ultimately 
leading to structuration17
                                                 
16 It has been pointed out that norms stand for single standards, while in sociological understanding ‘institu-
tions’ capture concepts – for example ‘sovereignty’ -  which encompass a variety of standards [FINNEMORE & 
SIKKINK 1998:891]. 
WIENER reviewed constructivist contributions and came to the following conclusion, arguing that two exclusive 
approaches have developed on norms: “On the one hand, (social) norms are constitutive and regulative of 
behavior. On the other hand, they are conceptualised as evolving through social interaction and interrelated 
with a particular context” [WIENER 2003:267]. 
17 Structuration as a social theory was developed by Anthony GIDDENS: “Central to structuration is the notion 
of the duality of structure. All social action consists of practices, located in time–space, which are the skilful, 
knowledgeable accomplishments of human agents. However, this ‘knowledgeability’ is always ‘bounded’ by 
unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action. Duality of structure therefore attempts to 
convey the idea that structure is both the medium and outcome of the practices which constitute social sys-
tems” [BURNHAM 2003]. 
: 
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... "[i]nstitutionalization" occurs when one "ruling channel" is coupled with another in the 
creation, interpretation, or execution of rules, which enable and control the "flow" of 
channeled activity. Institutional dominance over the interactive "demand" process in-
creases in proportion to the combination that all three forms of "influence" --authority 
recognition, exchange efficiency and coercive power--are available in an organization. The 
greater the number of channels, the more complex the organization. The more that differ-
ent channels are mutually supportive, the deeper the pattern of interaction -- a process 
called "structuration" when extended over time with self-reinforcing functionality. [KAR-
BER 2000:190 FN 9] 
Norms, that is 'shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors' 
FINNEMORE qtd. in SALEM 2006:43] are taken to be major bearers of explanatory power by con-
structivists. It is illustrative and helps to demonstrate the significant difference of approach be-
tween constructivists and realists if one of the one of the latter’s most cherished tenets, the state 
of anarchy of the international system, is scrutinized. For constructivists this axiom is simply an 
inter-subjectively constructed idea, which was hereafter widely learned and accepted18
In order to understand how (new) norms get more popular and find their way to be incorporated in 
behavioural guides of international actors, FINNEMORE and SIKKINK developed their notion of a 
‘life cycle
; but it is far 
from being accepted as an inherent attribute of the international system. This logic makes also for 
explaining IOs’ potential to undermine such (venerable) realist parameters [ABBOTT 2005:15]. 
19 of norms’, encompassing three stages20
In the first stage – during ‘norm emergence’
:  
21 – norm entrepreneurs22 use techniques of persua-
sion to turn states into norm supporters23
In the second stage such states, as soon as their number has reached a critical mass (tentatively 
set to encompass around one third of all states), help to enlist other states until the cascading 
norm reaches a tipping point
. For that purpose they make use of organizational plat-
forms, i.a. NGOs, Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), or International Organizations and in 
the process employ various techniques, like symbolic politics or the strategic use of information. In 
order to reach the next stage, norms not necessarily but ideally undergo a sort of institutionaliza-
tion into sets of international rules. This process directly promotes the norm’s movement towards 
cascading, since it makes for the norm’s clarification, also specifying what behaviour constitutes 
violation and how such norm breaking shall be answered.  
24
As regards the life-cycle concept’s assumption outlined for the first stage, fails to cast light on 
situations in which states themselves (the political elite, or parts thereof) are the very agents push-
ing for norm changes and are in this role also i.a. dependent on the acceptability the norm in ques-
tion enjoys among domestic players
. 
Consequently the norm becomes widely internalized in stage three and acquires a ‘taken for 
granted quality’. However, not all new norms are inevitably reaching this stage [ABBOTT 2005:28; 
HARRISON 2004:527-528]. 
25
                                                 
18 CLUNAN argues that the challenge constructivist thinking poses to rationalist scholars consists in „unpacking 
the assumptions that rationalists make about what interests actors have and how world politics is structured“ 
[CLUNAN 2001:358]. 
. 
19 If not otherwise indicated the norm life cycle approach is taken from FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 1998:895-905 
and FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 2001 passim. 
20 HAACKE cites Alastair Iain JOHNSTON to explain what constructivism is all about, echoing a comparable ap-
proach to the norm life cycle: constructivists „are interested in how norms are produced at time t, diffused at 
t+1, internalized at t+2, and then reproduced or changed through the practice of states at t+3“ [qtd. in 
HAACKE 2003:58, original emphasis]. 
WENDT has suggested the process of ‘cultural selection’ or social learning for explaining changes in behaviour – 
as well as  the preceding and corresponding changes of normative outfits [see CLUNAN 2001:350]. 
21 Drawing on comparative politics, it has been stressed that what makes for a likely change of predominating 
norms are rather periods of severe crisis or the accumulation of anomalies contradicting current expectations 
[FINNEMORE & SIKKING 2001:406-407]. 
22 The more the norm entrepreneur’s values conform to those he addresses, the higher his rate of success with 
norm diffusion will tend to be [JOHNSTON 2005:1020; 1016 FN 6 referring to MORAVCIK].  
23 Other scholars prefer to distinguish between what they call ‚norm takers‘ and ‚norm makers‘ [compare for 
example ACHARYA 2004 passim]. 
24 Although FINNEMORE and SIKKINK place the tipping point in their figure of the norm life cycle as separating 
the first two stages, the tipping point ultimately is discussed and elaborated in the text as forming part of stage 
two [FINNEMORE & SIKKING 1998:896 and 902]. 
25 JOHNSTON drawing on SCHIMMELFENNIG has noted that weak political mobilization of the domestic society 
may generate insufficient bottom-up pressure on politicians to accept or discard normative changes urged by 
IOs [JOHNSTON 2005:1027]. However, societies with under-average mobilization principally leave more room 
to manoeuvre to the political elite on deciding to integrate or repudiate norms/normative changes. Still, the 
ones occupying positions of power are more likely to try to maintain the status quo.  
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By providing a relatively abstract approach the life-cycle concept of norms in general, however, 
seems to tantalize scholars into neglecting the fact that norms determinative for behaviour are 
already in existence at any point in time. Although being subjected to constant change the govern-
ing order of norms and other ideational structures held at a given time has to be understood as 
continuum. This continuum then is certainly and permanently witnessing additions, subtractions, 
and alterations. Thus, when states for example set out to jointly create a multilateral institution 
this undertaking is necessarily co-determined by the norm collection those would-be members cur-
rently entertain. Thus, the widely shared concept of sovereignty led to the one-state-one-vote pro-
cedural principle becoming constitutive for the modus vivendi of the OAS, despite the tremendous 
(power) differences between the eventual member states. 
ACHARYA takes account of the fact that emerging norms always enter into given sets of ideational 
structures. Based on that insight he elaborated the concept of ‘norm localization’: 
I define localization as the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and 
cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing 
significant congruence with local beliefs and practices [ACHARYA 2004:245]. 
The following conditions significantly impact on localization: 
 
• if key norm-takers regard outside norms as a means to enhance their legitimacy and au-
thority without impinging on their identity; 
• new norms will have to undergo prior localization if they touch on strong and ‘deeply in-
grained’ given norms, since outright norm-replacement is unfeasible;  
• the existence of credible local actors matching or outperforming global norm entrepreneurs 
who are easily perceived as ‘foreign agents’; 
• if norm-takers’ sense of identity is rooted in the belief of being ‘unique’ in terms of held 
values and interactions; and 
• the emerging norm needs to “lend itself to some pruning, or adjustments that make it 
compatible with locals beliefs and practices” [ACHARYA 2004:248-250]. 
 
ACHARYA suggests several ‘catalysts’ for understanding amplified norm changeover: major crisis 
could lead to heavy borrowing of new norms since the existing foundations have been shaken; 
systematic changes, like dynamics in the distribution of power (end of Cold War); and domestic 
political changes, like the transition from an autocracy to a democracy [ACHARYA 2004:247]. 
Sociologists’ comparative analyses found that there is a general trend towards isomorphism re-
garding many norms on the international stage, as for instance those associated with ‘sovereignty’ 
or ‘market exchange’. This finding in turn is taken as indicating that states’ behaviour over time will 
probably ever more approximate [FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 1998:904-905]. 
Endeavouring to predict the most likely course of action constructivists use other formulas than 
interest-based and rationalist approaches would. The latter argue that states follow the ‘logic of 
expected consequence’, doing what they expect brings objective reward26
… actions are seen as rule-based. Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associ-
ate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for 
action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more 
general concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and 
matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation. The pursuit of pur-
pose is associated with identities more than with interests, and with the selection of rules 
more than with individual rational expectations [MARCH & OLSEN 1998:951]
. Hereby, the actors sup-
posedly choose among various alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for their objec-
tives, being aware that other actors do that likewise. Hence, behaviour is conceived as largely stra-
tegic and instrumental in nature. Contrary to that, constructivism on the other hand, assert that 
states act in accordance with the ‘logic of appropriateness’, basing their actions not on objective 
rewards only, but being heavily influenced as well by internalized norms, partly embodied by at-
tendant commitments [MARCH & OLSEN 1998:949; HATHAWAY 2005:476-477; ABBOTT 2005:15; 
JOHNSTON 2001:492; RISSE 2000:3-4]. The ‘logic of appropriateness’ is specified as: 
27
                                                 
26 CLUNAN, for example,  has underlined that history continued to be a determining factor in Russia’s identity 
formation (perceiving itself to still be a major power), although that is contrary to what rationalist scholars 
would expect, given that they consider cost-benefit calculations as the primary behavioural guide [CLUNAN 
2001:344-345]. 
27 RISSE finds that MARCH‘s and OLSEN’s approach argues as if behaviour in its entirety is to be taken as a 
conscious process, pointing toward a conceptual weakness of their framework [RISSE 2000:6]. 
. 
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It follows that, compared to rationalist approaches, to which realism and institutionalism both be-
long, constructivism holds that actors as products of structures have far less leeway to act than 
rationalism would suggest. Instead they are constrained by conforming to their identities, values, 
and norms which they have internalized in the first place [ABBOTT 2005:15; compare also FIN-
NEMORE & SIKKINK 1998:913] and norms which they acquire, transform, or drop during their 
whole lifetime.28
1.4.3.2 Constructivism and International Organizations 
 
Given their quality of being socially constructed norms impact on interests and thus indirectly influ-
ence IOs as well. However, this is not a one-way street, since IOs also influence norms [SALEM 
2006:45; 47] and other actors. SALEM summarized the sources of IOs’ norms: 
 
• formally stated prescriptions in basic documents like charters, declarations, and treaties; 
• non-binding recommendations, functioning as coordination equilibria; 
• symbolic decisions without requiring immediate action but instead testing “how opinions 
are aligned”; 
• products of the organizational culture or ideology; and 
• normatively infused expectations based on patterned behaviour which subsequently lead to 
usage [SALEM 2006:45-46]. 
 
To that list is to be added also the organizational structure, voting procedures etc. which imman-
ently hold and prescribe certain norms. 
Additionally, International Organizations through their mere existence generally and through their 
actions (and how they are performed) in particular, are potentially constructing collective identities, 
if their role and significance so permits. 
 
With regard to the (materially conceived) power of IOs, ALVAREZ argues that they clearly tran-
scend the more traditional idea propagated by realists and liberalists/institutionalists. Instead, im-
pact may well emanate also for instance from subunits, like single organs, or from IOs’ 
staff/bureaucracy [ALVAREZ 2006:334]. ALVAREZ elaborates: 
 
Although some may prefer to describe them as merely "arenas" of lawmaking action, IOs 
– whether traditional or not – are for all practical purposes a new kind of lawmaking actor, 
to some degree autonomous from the states that establish them. IOs can now be seen not 
only as capable of concluding treaties with other international legal person (other IOs or 
states) but as vehicles for the forms of regulation associated with the executive branches 
of government or national administrative agencies ... this aspect also bears on issues of 
"high politics", as through the fertile acts of improvisation that have transformed the 
Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter to permit the contracting out of the use of force, 
diverse types of multilateral sanctions, and peacekeeping/peace enforcement actions or 
determinations by | the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with respect to arms 
control [ALVAREZ 2006:333-334]. 
 
IOs exercise various forms of authority, which in turn endows them with various degrees of auton-
omy [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 2004:22-24]: 
 
Delegated authority: at first sight delegated authority might be perceived as IOs’ mere catering to 
the interests of its member states. But given the fact that frequently tasks are delegated for which 
the states are lacking the necessary knowledge and capability gives as sense of the scale of discre-
tion this entails. It is the staff of IOs, which then will eventually implement the delegated assign-
ments and it hereby inevitably shapes this very process. On top of that the inexperience and lack 
of know-how of states for various tasks necessitates that mandates are formulated flexibly; thus 
IOs will have to interpret them.  
                                                 
28 RISSE added to the logics of consequences and appropriateness, the logic of arguing, whereby actors are in a 
process of establishing the truth in order to achieve common understanding on the basis of reasoned consen-
sus. However, RISSE maintains that behaviour is often following all three formulas to various degrees [RISSE 
2000 passim;3;4]. However, the logic of arguing is insofar limited as it is confined to communicative processes. 
But it highlights another environmental quality provided by IOs: setting the stage for communicative situations 
for a very distinct set of dialogue components, i.a. providing actors with a strictly pre-defined and delimited 
selection of types of audiences. In general, arguing seems to be rather the lubricant with which the two other 
logics are traded between different actors, than a ‘logic’ in its own right. 
INTRODUCTION | THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE 
14 
Indeed, IOs must be autonomous actors in some ways simply to fulfill their delegated 
tasks. One important reason states delegate to IOs in the first place is precisely that they 
want some other actor to take charge of a problem and sort it out. At some level, delega-
tion creates autonomy precisely because being autonomous is the mandate. [BARNETT & 
FINNEMORE 2004:22, original emphasis] 
By way of their characteristic as supposedly unbiased and rational actors IOs are often used for 
laundering purposes. Such laundering occurs when ‘activities that might be unacceptable in their 
original state-to-state form become acceptable when run through an independent, or seemingly 
independent, IO’ as ABBOTT & SNIDAL [1998:18] have explained. However, factual neutrality fre-
quently is elusive to attain: 
Yet IOs confront the recurring problem that neutrality is often, probably always, impossi-
ble. Bureaucracies always serve some social purpose or set of cultural values, even when 
they are shrouded in myths of impartiality or value-neutral technocracy. Further, there of-
ten is no neutral stance one could take in many of the situations IOs confront, yet IOs 
need to find one in order to maintain the claim that they are impartial and are acting in a 
depoliticized manner [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 2004:21]. 
Moral authority: the raison d'être of IOs in many cases is one heavily charged with moralistic pos-
ture. Subsequently, they tend to represent those values which are often associated with the com-
munity's interests, notably contrasting themselves to self-serving particularistic state interests. 
Again, the accompanying claim by IOs, that they are above politics, engenders a perceived authori-
tative stance. To anchor IOs to particular norms located at a higher moral plane, brings along a 
degree of legitimation which in turn sustains the power of IOs [HAFTENDORN 1997:21]. 
SALEM holds that especially the top-bureaucrats (exemplified by the UN Secretary General) are in 
an outstanding position to make their actions felt [SALEM 2006:41-42] due to the usually high 
degree of reputation, prestige, and popularity they enjoy. 
 
Expert authority29
IOs can use their positions of authority in other ways to regulate behavior. They can col-
lect some data and information, but not others. They can use their institutional authority 
: highly specialized knowledge creates leeway and authority for IOs' activities, 
since they are able, up to a point, to create and maintain a knowledge and information monopoly 
which is beyond the direct reach of single states: 
Expertise not only makes IOs authoritative but also shapes the way these organizations 
behave. Just as IOs authorized by a moral principle must serve that principle and make 
their actions consistent with it to remain legitimate and authoritative, so too must IOs au-
thorized by expertise serve that specialized knowledge and make their actions consistent 
with it [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 2004:24]. 
 
Knowledge and its framing and presentation is rarely neutral, and as such knowledge is powerful 
force of social construction [FINNEMORE & SIKKING 2001:402]. Elsewhere it was also pointed out 
that IO staff frequently overlap with sections of epistemic communities. In this way they are con-
tributing to introducing new concepts and identities. And since IOs’ as environments are in turn 
socializing this (epistemic) staff, this naturally makes for a two way street of influence [ABBOTT & 
SNIDAL 1998:17; MARCH & OLSEN 1998:963]. 
 
Some ways through which IOs exert their influence are rather subtle in nature - that is why until 
now it was so easily possible for theorists to ignore their autonomous power. From the outside it 
might indeed be difficult to discern what type of processes are taking place inside IOs between the 
input of states (and other actors or forces) and the final output. For instance, submitted resolution 
drafts are always redrafted, sometimes by specifically tasked (technical) committees before being 
approved [SHAW 2000:26]. ALVAREZ highlights another fact, hardly recognized for its impact. 
Frequently IOs' are crucial in deciding on which entities (e.g. NGOs, other IOs) will be conceded 
observer or consultative status. IOs may also lift the status of other actors indirectly (for example 
citing their reports). Such acts are significant and sometimes decisive, since by them those actors 
are strengthened or disempowered [ALVAREZ 2006:333]. 
There are other instances holding the possibility of IOs to co-decide which action is taken and how: 
                                                 
29 This notion was also captured by ABBOTT & SNIDAL: 'IOs provide neutral, depoliticized, or specialized forms 
more effectively than almost any informal or decentralized arrangement' [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:19]. 
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to set the agenda so that some items are discussed and not others. They can invite some 
actors to participate in the decision-making process and exclude others. In these and 
other ways, IO staff can use their institutional and expert authority to regulate behavior, 
guiding it in a direction that is consistent with their preferences and with existing rules 
and mandates [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 2004:30]. 
BARNETT & FINNEMORE [1999:710-713] map out three (ideational) types of IOs' power: norm 
diffusion, classification, and the fixing of meanings: 
One main function of IOs considered by constructivists as being essential is the development, 
elaboration, transmission, and diffusion of norms, values, ideas, and rules [GOODMAN & JINKS 
2004:649; BARNETT & FINNEMORE 1999:712-713]. As has already been explained, norms, values 
etc. have the capacity to change interests and identities of state actors [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 
1998:14], and subsequently the actions taken. 
IOs' bureaucracies, moreover, classify and organize information and knowledge, shifting and shap-
ing consequently its characteristics, definition, and contexts: ‘to classify is to engage in an act of 
power’ [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 1999:711].  
The third IO power is to be seen in 'fixing the meanings'30
The concrete influence mechanisms by which states are made to change their behaviour
, that is naming and labelling and there-
fore setting the parameters of acceptable action, “because actors are oriented toward objects ... on 
the basis of the meaning they have for them, being able to invest situations with a particular 
meaning constitutes an important source of power” [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 1999:711]. In this 
regard MORADA, reviewing the constructivist literature, underlines that certain meanings have to 
be shared between potential members of an organization to make cooperation possible and desir-
able in the first place. This is conceived as a pre-condition for prompting the eventual establish-
ment of corresponding institutional settings [MORADA 2002:24]. 
RISSE draws particular attention to other aspects, important in connection of staging international 
talks. During pre-negotiation phases, for example, IOs will be involved in determining the circum-
stances for ‘getting to the table’ and in devising the talks’ agenda. On top of that IOs are important 
when deciding on the ‘rules of the game’ that are to govern the discussions ahead as well as by 
establishing what is to be regarded as ‘common knowledge’ among the participants [RISSE 
2000:20]. 
 
31
Persuasion. This process aims to making the state to be influenced internalize new norms, beliefs, 
and rules of appropriate behaviour. The actor in question shall ultimately be consciously convinced 
that they are true and valid and that in consequence the state undergoes redefinition of its inter-
ests and identity correspondingly
 have 
been identified to be coercion, persuasion, and acculturation [if not otherwise indicated taken from 
GOODMAN & JINKS 2004:636-656; 670]: 
Coercion. The behaviour of states is influenced by threatening acts that either would increase the 
costs of eventual non-compliance or increase the benefits in case of compliance. The behavioural 
change, however, is not to be traced to a re-evaluation of preferences, but merely to an adjusted 
cost-benefit calculation and as such is the very route realists view as the most important and 
promising. 
32
'Cuing'
. 
One technique of persuasion is 'framing': “the persuasive appeal of a counterattitudinal message 
increases if the issue is strategically framed to resonate with already accepted norms” [GOODMAN 
& JINKS 2004:636]. Framing works by calling attention to issues or even by creating issues 
through using naming, interpreting, and dramatizing specific subjects [FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 
1998:897], and thus also highlighting the linkages between new norms with pre-existing ones 
[ACHARYA 2004:243 referring to FINNEMORE and SIKKINK]. 
33
                                                 
30 RUGGIE states that meaning is created by collective intentionality [RUGGIE 1998:870]. 
31 Alastair Ian JOHNSTON finds that states’ behaviour toward cooperation is driven first by material rewards and 
punishments; second by changes in the domestic distribution of power, and thirdly by socialization processes 
[JOHNSTON 2001:487]. 
32 Compare also the concept of ‘rhetorical knowledge’ as used by BRUNÉE and TOOPE. This constitutes knowl-
edge which is created through dialogue and “employed in practical reasoning”. The use and application of new 
ideas acquired in this form my lead to changes in identity and interests and in consequence alter behaviour and 
self-perception [BRUNÉE & TOOPE 2000:71]. Alternatively or additionally for that matter, see FINNEMORE & 
SIKKINK’s notion of persuasion as “the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become 
norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective” [FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 1998:914]. Similarities to 
BRUNNE & TOOPE can also be found in the ‘logic of arguing’ as advocated by RISSE 2000 passim. 
33 For cuing see also JOHNSTON 2001:496-497. 
 constitutes another persuasion technique and is based on the fact that the introduction of 
new information triggers cognitive processes that might necessitate a profound examination and 
defence of positions which in turn might result in a rethink; cuing frequently operates like 'teach-
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ing' and is particularly effective in addressing inadvertent or uninformed non-observance of stan-
dards. Some scholars claim that international institutions not only teach norms to states and Non-
State Actors (NSAs), but also instruct them on what they should want [ABBOTT 2005:31]. 
FINNEMORE and SIKKINK argue that apart from reason also other factors are effective in the act of 
persuasion: 
Affect, empathy, and principled or moral beliefs may also be deeply involved, since the ul-
timate goal is not to challenge the “truth” of something, but to challenge whether it is 
good, appropriate, and deserving of praise. [FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 1998:900]. 
JOHNSTON elaborates the conditions which are particularly conducive for persuasion to be effec-
tive: 
 
• when the actor is highly cognitively motivated to analyze counter-attitudinal information 
(for example in a novel environment [see also JOHNSTON 2005:1024-1025]); 
• when the persuader is a highly authoritative member of a small, intimate, high-affect in-
group34
• when the actor has few prior, ingrained attitudes that are inconsistent with the counter-
attitudinal message; 
 to which the persuade also belongs or wants to belong; 
• when there is a high degree of autonomy for the agent vis-à-vis the principal; 
• when the agent is repeatedly presented with counter-attitudinal information over time 
[JOHNSTON 2001:498-499; see also JOHNSTON 2005:1023-1024]. 
 
Acculturation/Socialization35. Constituting a process of adopting the beliefs and behavioural pat-
terns of the surrounding culture by way of pressures imposed through others36 or by the self to 
assimilate. Micro-processes of acculturation include orthodoxy, mimicry37, identification, and status 
maximization38. Acculturation can be driven by 'cognitive pressures' to conform. Such internal 
pressures consist of social-psychological costs on non-conformity (e.g. dissonance associated with 
behaviour that is inconsistent with a state's identity) and social-psychological benefits of conformity 
(e.g. 'cognitive comfort' of belonging to a perceived in-group). Acculturation moreover is propelled 
by social (be they real or imagined) pressures39. Generally, social-psychological costs are repre-
sented as lowering the perceived status40
However, acculturation, since based on external pressures, often leads to public compliance in the 
absence of private acceptance of social norms. Thus, acculturation predicts that “pressure to con-
form will produce a particular form of defection: decoupling, in which structural adherence to glob-
 of a state and includes shaming or shunning; social-
psychological benefits, on the other hand, are taking the form of public approval. In the case of IOs 
this effect is accentuated by their very raison d'être which is rooted in the members’ proclaimed 
willingness and commitment to cooperation [JOHNSTON 2001:506]. 
                                                 
34 In another article JOHNSTON made some interesting observations about the peculiar pressure and techniques 
members of in-groups are likely to put on possible defectors or carriers of ‘liminal traits’ if associated in ques-
tioning the current norm structure [JOHNSTON 2005:1016; 1026]. 
35 GOODMAN and JINKS limit their elaboration to the term of acculturation. However, acculturation and sociali-
zation are involving similar processes while not being identical. Melville HERSKOVITS laid out that while accul-
turation captures learning based on conscious processes of adaptation to social change involving contacts be-
tween cultures, socialization is embodied by formal systems of social integration, such as education [CALHOUN 
2002a] or in our case multilateral institutions. In concreto socialization describes processes through which val-
ues, beliefs, and norms (mainly synthesized into roles) of the surrounding society are internalized by an indi-
vidual in order to learn to function as one of its members [CALHOUN 2002b]. 
36 JOHNSTON gives some insights on how the nature of those others (level of identification, associated author-
ity, etc.) as perceived by the self impacts on their influence-potential [JOHNSTON 2001:501]. 
37 For details on the function of mimicking see JOHNSTON 2005:1021-1023. 
38 Status incentives may be reaped by the sole joining of an organization, a phenomenon reported for example 
for various smaller countries regarding their membership in the Commonwealth: “veterans of Commonwealth 
summitry say the mix of informality and royal glamour is a heady experience for the leaders of small countries 
who rarely tread the world stage” [ECONOMIST 23.11.2007]. Also JOHNSTON (with reference to CIALDINI) 
underscores this motivation, highlighting consequences and the significance of “the sense of comfort that 
comes from interacting with others with whom she/he is perceived to share traits (social liking) leads to an 
increased willingness to comply with the requests of friends” [JOHNSTON 2001:500]. 
39 Certain ideas even gain worldwide dominance of such magnitude (for example ‚deregulation‘) that nations are 
having to cope with the implied compelling restrictions on their behavioural choices (compare GARVIE’s review 
of GREWAL’s book elucidating globalization’s dynamics [GARVIE 2009]. 
40 On a definition of status and the motivation behind status maximisation intentions see JOHNSTON 2001:500-
501. 
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ally institutionalized models does not correspond to actual state practices on the ground” [GOOD-
MAN & JINKS 2004:670]41
The fact that actors who – as in our case – are inducted into international organizations – have at 
that time been already subjected to various preceding organizational inductions (or are still in the 
process thereof), leads to degrees of ‘hybridization’, although the effect of recency might mitigate 
the socialization impact of earlier inductions
. 
In this context it is noteworthy that only those actions that are open to observation and tracking by 
the social environment will result in corresponding benefits or costs [JOHNSTON 2001:502]. What 
follows furthermore, is that the basis to make presumption of the underlying guiding norms is im-
manently incomplete, given the inability to monitor and taking into account of the full spectrum of 
an actor’s behaviour. 
 
Also FINNEMORE and SIKKINK capture comparable processes to acculturation in their elucidation of 
socialization via peer pressure. The authors differentiate between three motivational sources: le-
gitimation, conformity, and esteem, driving actors. International legitimation entails reputation, 
trust, and credibility “the presence of which have been amply documented to contribute to Pareto-
improving effects from intrastate interaction”; however, also domestic legitimation plays its role 
which in turn is partly fed by international legitimation [FINNEMORE & SIKKING 1998:903]. As 
regards conformity the authors utilize AXELROD’s approach: “[b]y conforming to the actions of 
those around us, we fulfill a psychological need to be part of a group” [qtd. in: FINNEMORE & SIK-
KING 1998:903]. Finally, it is argued that esteem goes somewhat deeper than either legitimation 
or conformity: actors follow norms because they want to be positively perceived by others and also 
want to think good of themselves. In this context also other authors have pointed out the signifi-
cance of IOs’ ability to enhance reputational incentives to abide by commitments or conversely to 
‘mobilize shame’ [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:26-27]. 
Socialization and acculturation have their strongest effect on novices. Entrants which are subjected 
to such induction processes into social systems/regimes are usually expected to ultimately think, 
feel, and act as the other members do. Hence, they will ultimately have to undergo a process in 
which ‘intersubjective understandings’ (norms) are internalized to such a degree as to acquire a 
taken-for-granted quality [JOHNSTON 2001:494-495]. 
42
As has already been mentioned constructivism considers also other forms than crude carrot and 
stick policies as significant in enforcing compliance. Alongside decisions and sanctions, an IO has 
 [JOHNSTON 2005:1019]. 
The effectiveness of socializations in IOs is moreover determined by their institutional design. 
JOHNSTON refers to ROGOWSKI for a possible typology: 
 
Membership: e.g. small and exclusive vs. large and inclusive. 
Franchise: e.g. equal or unequal allocation of authoritativeness. 
Decision rules: e.g. unanimity, consensus, majority. 
Mandate: e.g. providing information, deliberation & resolve or negotiation & legislation. 
Autonomy: low or high agent autonomy from principal [JOHNSTON 2001:510]. 
 
JOHNSTON extrapolates that persuasion will be most powerful in an IO that has a small member-
ship, when a couple of group members has more authoritativeness than the rest, when the man-
date is deliberative, and when the agents enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Social influences, on 
the other hand, can be expected to impact strongest when the membership is large, franchise is 
equally allocated, when decision rules are majoritarian, when the mandate involves negotiations 
about the distribution of benefits, and when the agents’ autonomy is low [JOHNSTON 2001:510]. 
Another feature of IOs, namely their form and degree of specialization, also has an effect on tran-
spiring socialization. While some issue-focused IOs might rather promote a common ideological 
approach or a certain problem-solving technique (for example in the case of human rights organi-
zations), others might tend to buttress identification with a particular geographic region [JOHNS-
TON 2005:1020]. OAS as well as ASEAN belong to the second group, thus having as all-purpose 
bodies the potential to make their socialization impact felt on all those subject matters they decide 
to delve into. 
 
                                                 
41 JOHNSTON subsumes the acculturation concept under the term ‘social influence’. Corresponding micro-
processes like back-patting, opprobrium etc. reward ‘pro-norm’ behaviour (or punish contra-norm behaviour 
one would have to add) from a reference group with which the actor thinks to share a degree of identification 
[JOHNSTON 2001:494; 499-506]. 
42 That said, JOHNSTON himself in another section of his article mentions the fact that early experience and 
information might have ‘primacy effects’, i.e. having and retaining out-of/proportion significance compared to 
those encountered later [JOHNSTON 2005:1024]. 
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also the possibility to influence members by way of monitoring and reporting43
It has been argued that compliance and allegiance increases with the legitimacy attributed to the 
rules
, by publishing best 
practices, or by explicitly or implicitly criticizing non-conforming actors [GOODMAN & JINKS 
2004:687] Thus, international institutions are in a position to establish fora which allow and facili-
tate the assessment of members’ compliance [JOHNSTON 2001:502 FN 22 referring to KEOHANE]. 
But also unenforced norms, for instance exemplified by unheeded legal opinions, exert authority, 
do shape norms, and as such indirectly influence state behaviour [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:25]. 
 
Enforcement can be formally delegated to IOs, increasing their means of making states comply: 
… IOs play an important role as managers of enforcement, authorizing and giving meaning 
to retaliation, thus ensuring that enforcement activities are not excessively disruptive to 
the larger international community. … When an IO legitimates retaliation, states are not 
vigilantes but upholders of community norms, values, and institutions [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 
1998:27]. 
44
• generality of rules; 
 and norms. The so-called 'internal morality', as suggested by Lon. L. FULLER, is constituted 
by eight components: 
 
• promulgation of rules; 
• by limiting cases of retroactivity; 
• through clarity; 
• by avoiding contradictions; 
• via not asking the impossible; 
• through constancy over time; and 
• by congruence of official action with underlying rules [BRUNÉE & TOOPE 2000:70]. 
 
One part of alignment with ‚internal morality‘ might be to ascertain how fair compliance/non-
compliance is. The fairness theory argues that obligations perceived to be fair are exerting a ‘com-
pliance pull’. Comparably, the ‘managerial legal process’ explains that not incentives or disincen-
tives are responsible for compliance, but one’s own prior commitment to comply generates an ‘ob-
ligation of obedience’ [HATHAWAY 2005:482]. 
HATHAWAY, in an attempt to present an ‘integrated’ approach of realist and constructivist con-
cepts, outlines the variables [HATHAWAY 2005:497-511] which determine if state behaviour tends 
toward compliance or to non-compliance: 
 
Legal enforcement, subdivided into: 
• Transnational legal enforcement; among it is the application of sanctions, initiated rather 
by IOs, or if the regulation foresees it so, by member states in the scope of reciprocity. 
• Domestic Legal Enforcement; the internalization of international legal requirements and 
compliance with them depends on the extent to which those outside the government can 
be expected to act to enforce the state’s international legal commitments against the gov-
ernment [HATHAWAY 2005:497] 
If a state has a strong domestic enforcement mechanism, entailing i.a. an independent ju-
diciary, the protection of civil rights etc., domestic enforcement is more probable to occur. 
Domestic individuals and groups are in such a case furnished with the possibility to exert 
pressure on a state to meet its international obligations. 
Collateral consequences (positive as well as negative ones), again subdivided into: 
                                                 
43 If the requirement of national reporting is going unheeded this alone might easily be understood as to indi-
cate improper state behaviour [ABBOTT & SNIDAL 1998:27]. 
44 RUGGIE differentiates between constitutive rules – that “define the set of practices that make up a particular 
class of consciously organized social activity” – and he cited among them territorial states, systems of states, or 
multilateral organizing principles among others. On the other hand there exist regulative rules which are in-
tended to have causal effects, for example regulating behaviour. Realism and institutionalism – RUGGIE claims 
– completely disregard constitutive rules [RUGGIE 1998:871, 874]. 
FINNEMORE and SIKKINK prefer to categorize norms into prescriptive and evaluative ones, arguing: “…precisely 
the prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of ‘oughtness’ that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules. Because 
norms involve standards of “appropriate” or ‘proper’ behavior, both the intersubjective and the evaluative di-
mensions are inescapable when discussing norms. We only know what is appropriate by reference to | the 
judgement of a community or a society. We recognize norm-breaking behavior because it generates disapproval 
or stigma and norm conforming behaviour either because it produces praise, or, in the case of a highly internal-
ized norm, because it is so taken for granted that it provokes no reaction whatsoever” [FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 
1998:891-892]. 
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• Domestic collateral consequences; they may effect compliance if the actors that pushed for 
commitment in the first place, sustain their vigilance and if they are able to influence those 
who determine compliance, finally possibly translating into domestic political support45
• Transnational collateral consequences are to be expected from other states, NGOs, inves-
tors etc. Compliance or non-compliance sends signals to those actors and they in turn may 
augment or harm a country’s interests in various ways. 
. Ul-
timately, it depends also on the fact if compliance is easily observable. 
 
Regarding the appearance of IOs as perceived by others, they are not automatically seen as uni-
tary actors, since in fact they are made up of a number of members, namely states. This fact has 
to be accommodated in relation the underlying ideational structures. RUGGIE, for instance, has 
elaborated what he calls ‘collective intentionality’: although intentionality necessarily remains in 
individual heads, collective intentionality takes the form of ‘we intend’ and ‘I intend only as part of 
our intending’ within those individuals [RUGGIE 1998:869-870]. When there is ‘collective inten-
tionality’, there is the possibility as well of an evolving ‘collective identity’, if the IO generates the 
necessary impact. 
WENDT argues that four ‘master variables’ are capable to drive collective identity: 
 
Interdependence:  if networks of interdependence are sufficiently dense, this not only affects the 
tactic of strategic bargaining, but moreover influences the actors’ identities. 
Common fate:  identity is formed by the perception of an external common threat. 
Homogeneity:  it reduces the number and severity of ‘corporate’ conflicts and fosters collec-
tive grouping. 
Self-restraint:  only by overcoming the fear of being engulfed by others with whom they iden-
tify, can collective identity formation proceed [HARRISON 2004:527]. 
 
To those variables can be added the degree and form of exclusiveness a collective identity can 
claim and in how far are members put under pressure to adjust, devalue, or even renounce pre-
existing identities in favour of the (new) collective identity. Put differently, are members allowed to 
reconcile their prior identities (and concomitant attitudes, inclinations, dispositions etc.) with the 
collective one, since there is a sufficient measure of compatibility between them.  
1.4.3.3 Evaluation 
I regard the constructivist approach due to its reach and depth as the most promising one. What 
distinguishes it most from the other two discussed theories is the fact that it considers the human 
factor adequately. The international system, however complex and abstract its components are, is 
a product of human beings. States, NGOs, IOs, and many other actors, are ultimately made up of 
human beings and the structures and processes humans chose for them. It follows that decision-
taking by these actors necessarily is based on the way humans evaluate options and arrive at deci-
sions. Social sciences have widely accepted that human beings are no pure rationalist actors. They 
have not the capacity to grasp and subsequently choose among all theoretically available options. 
This is because they can impossibly be aware of all potential routes one could take, partly due to 
perceptive and cognitive limitations. Moreover, as has been shown above, norms, traditions, be-
lieves, needs – to cite only a handful – are additional variables that shapes (and also considerably 
constrains) human action.  
Neither realism nor institutionalism accommodate these conditions adequately which in turn ulti-
mately makes their grasp insufficient. However, again without delving too deep into the theoretical 
debates, it has to be conceded that even constructivism’s explanations are frequently not satisfy-
ing. Although elucidating processes and variables until then hardly taken into consideration at all, it 
fails to explain satisfactorily why and when which ideational structures are prioritized, and is con-
sequently at a loss as regards appropriate accounting for the role material interests play as such 
and in relations, comparison, and contrast to ideational factors. Another deficiency integral to con-
structivism is the difficulty of convincingly operationalizing the determining variables (norms, iden-
tity, etc.). SALEM, for instance, highlighting the difficulty of testing and verifying IOs adherence to 
its norms and principles, finds that 
...the repertoire or pool of principles and norms for any international organization is usu-
ally rich enough to justify normatively all its decisions [SALEM 2006:48]. 
                                                 
45 For instance, in the ongoing discussion of an enlarged engagement of NATO in Afghanistan, Norway sug-
gested as a first step to visibly  re-focus on home (inside or close to NATO countries) missions in order to sub-
sequently boost support among the publics for far-away missions [ECONOMIST 28.03.2009a]. 
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The same author underlines constructivism’s failure to provide an understanding regarding the 
preference of certain norms over others [SALEM 2006:49-51]. On top of that norms and the be-
havioural and other consequences derived from them can easily be interpreted quite differently. 
JOHNSTON adds to this that observable behaviour in many cases is not representative of underly-
ing norms and their attendant preferences, but instead might form mainly a part of particular 
strategies pursued. The same author takes account of the fact that “what is observed as the nor-
matively motivated behaviour ... may be the aggregation of the strategic behaviour of many subac-
tors at a lower level” [JOHNSTON 2001:507, 491]. These theoretical weaknesses naturally reduce 
the accompanying explanatory power of the approach in general. 
This criticism of the constructivist approach is partly due to both the lacking maturity of the theory 
proper, and on the inevitable circumstance that many aspects of human beings and their motiva-
tions are immanently  non-transparent (and hopefully will always remain so). Human beings neces-
sarily will have to be understood as ‘black boxes’ (for the outside world; but also for themselves as 
regards many unconscious and subconscious processes). And while this is a far reaching concession 
for a theory that aims to explain social behaviour, it is as well fair to demand that dynamics as 
observable in social groups, which show – up to a point – regularity and as such promise some 
predictability, be paid much more attention to. Why not apply social-psychological insights to group 
action – since decisions on the international stage are almost always decisions of more than on 
single individual or unitary actor. All that said, as of today, constructivism still seems to me the 
most fruitful approach, while – as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter – utilization of other 
theories should not be entirely discounted if it delivers otherwise missing explanatory value added. 
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2 The Organization of American States 
The Organization of American States is the oldest existing regional organization. That is true for 
both: it’s formal establishment in 1948 as well as its history of origin reaching back to the 19th 
century46. First remarkable attempts to unite the American states were undertaken by Simon 
Bolívar [GEROLD 1971:15ff.]. In 1826 Bolívar promoted the ‘Treaty of Union, League, and Perpet-
ual Confederation’ in order to institutionalize the Inter-American process of cooperation. Bolívar’s 
endeavours did not come to their envisaged fruition during his lifetime; however, the Latin Ameri-
can nations started to meet regularly to discuss matters of common interest47
• solidarity against aggression; 
. Those conferences 
and the resulting treaties, although reached at from newly independent states, mirror security 
relevant principles which sill claim validity today. According to BELT [2002:3-6] they are comprised 
of: 
 
• peaceful settlements of disputes; 
• non-intervention; 
• inviolability of national territory; and 
• the principle of ‘uti possidetis juris’ (according to which the national boundaries of former 
colonies correspond to the earlier administrative borders of the colonies [WCD, 1992; MAR-
TIN, 2002b]). 
 
2.1 Inter-American Diplomacy Materializes 
Finally, in 1889/90 the ‘First International American Conference’48 took place with the participation 
and on the initiative of the United States49. The Conference established the ‘International Union of 
American Republics’50
• the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) 1947; 
 – GEROLD [1971:16] calls it  ‘…die Geburtsstunde der amerikanischen Re-
gionalorganisation’ (‘...hour of birth of the American regional organization’, my translation). 
The following ‘International American Conferences’ produced some security and conflict related 
treaties but their impact remained limited due to their incomplete ratification. This period of coop-
eration was especially marked by a considerable degree of informality; thus, when a 1928 effort at 
basing the inter-American system on legal foundations failed ‘this did not in any way impede the 
functioning of the existing system’ [FENWICK 1951:335]. 
World War II marked a turning-point in the hemisphere and in 1945 the American nations met in 
Mexico to hold the ‘Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace’. This conference laid 
the ground for the three constituent treaties of the OAS: 
 
• the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS Charter) 1948; and 
• the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotà) 1948 [KÖRBS 1997:206f.]. 
 
Apart from WW II another reason for establishing a lasting organizational framework can be de-
tected in the highly dynamic – not to say fickle - and informal fashion of inter-American diplomacy 
since its very beginning. As KUNZ– in stark contrast to FENWICK’s opinion mentioned above - ex-
plains: 
The constant creation, shifting and fading away of Pan-American organs – many only of 
temporary character – and their growing number and complexity, led to uncertainty, con-
                                                 
46 SHAW identifies four pre-OAS phases the inter-American system went through: 1. 1820s-1889 the inter-
American system as a exclusively Latin American movement; 2. 1889-1923 characterized by the USA’ domi-
nance; 3. 1923-1933 the Latin nations reasserted themselves; and 4. 1923-1948 unifying, cooperative period 
laying the foundations for the OAS [SHAW 2000:54-55]. 
47 For more details on the conferences in that period until 1890 see BELT [2002:1-3]. 
48 SHAW underlines that political controversial matters where largely absent at this conference, except the gen-
eral need for the promotion of arbitration for settling disputes [SHAW 2000:57]. 
49 The US had aired the idea of an American congress already in 1881. However, political instability in South 
America led to the conference’s postponement. It was not until 1888 that the US renewed its initiative and 
issued invitations to the ‘First International American Conference’ [BELT 2002:7f.]. 
50 FENWICK [1956a:19] points to the differing meaning of the term ‘union’ at that time: “The new International 
Union of American Republics formed in 1890 was still a „union“ in the sense of that day, that is, a group of 
states co-operating for a specific object, not an organization with broad objectives such as the term „union“ 
may imply today.” 
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fusion, duplication, vague definitions of competences, inadequate financial foundation, in-
efficiency and, in some cases, to an existence on paper only. There was, further, a com-
plete lack of interrelation, coördination, integration, and centralization. The need for a 
complete reorganization made itself strongly felt in recent years [KUNZ 1948b:569]. 
The OAS was officially founded with the adoption of the Charter of the OAS (COAS) during the 
‘Ninth International Conference of American States’ held in Bogotá in 1948. It was decided that the 
OAS was to be the successor in law of the Union of American Republics [FENWICK 1954c:464]. The 
OAS encompassed at that time 21 states51
2.2 The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and 
Peace
 [EUROPA PUBLICATIONS 2002:893; BRACKER 1948].  
52
The ‘Conference of Chapultepec’ was convoked as a reaction to critical world events (WW II) taking 
place that made it desirable for the American nations to reach consensus on various issues. Promi-
nent among those was the future of the inter-American system and its position toward the univer-
sal international organization – later to be known as the United Nations Organization - the estab-
lishment of which was at that time in the making
 
53
• cooperative measures for the prosecution of the war effort
. World War II which was still raging put pres-
sure on the governments to make decisions on continental security and defence [CANYES 
1945:504-505]. The Latin American nations moreover felt passed over when they were not asked 
to take part at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions (between August and October 1944), where the 
US negotiated about the envisioned world organization with the USSR, the United Kingdom and the 
Republic of China. Alarmed that Latin nations might become subordinated in the future world or-
ganization, the need was felt that the Conference of Chapultepec should be the venue to consoli-
date their position in that regard [FENWICK 1956a:23]. 
The agenda of the ‘Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace’ accordingly con-
tained the following items: 
 
54
• social and economic problems; 
; 
• the Dumbarton Oaks proposals55
• the reorganization of the inter-American System [KUNZ 1945:527]. 
; and 
 
Various resolutions were adopted by the participants. Resolution VIII on collective security was 
entitled Act of Chapultepec56
2.2.1 Act of Chapultepec
 and is to be reviewed in some detail: 
57
In the Act of Chapultepec general declarations of American solidarity and principles are followed by 
Part I as the focus of the document, declaring all sovereign States as ‘juridically equal amongst 
themselves’ and Part I, Paragraph 3 states: 
That every attack of a state against the integrity or the inviolability of territory, or against 
the sovereignty or political independence of an American state, shall … be considered as 
an act of aggression against the other states that sign this declaration. 
 
                                                 
51 Following are the founding members of the OAS: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,  
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, 
the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela [CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, 2002:130]. 
52 The Conference was held in the Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City, from 21st February to 8th March 1945 
[CANYES 1945:505]. 
53 For a broad analysis of the establishment of the United Nations and its relation towards regional organizations 
see KÖRBS 1997. 
54 Compare CIANFARRA [1945] reporting for the New York Times and illustrating how overwhelmingly this topic 
dominated the conference. 
55 Those proposals were reached at in Washington D.C. in 1944 by representatives of China, the USSR, the 
United Kingdom and the United States and constituted the basis of the negotiations about the future Charter of 
the United Nations held in San Francisco in 1945. 
56 According to RESTON 1945b the Act of Chapultepec was originally introduced by Colombia. WELLES [1945] 
claims that the governments of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina initiated the Act. 
57 Printed in: AJIL Supplement of Documents Vol. 39 No. 2; pp. 108-111; 1945. 
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Acts of aggression are not comprehensively defined except for the case of invasions by armed 
forces of one state into the territory of another, ‘trespassing boundaries established by treaty and 
marked in accordance therewith’ [Part I, 3]. In case such acts of aggression take place or it can be 
assumed that such are prepared by an American state, the signatory states shall consult and agree 
upon advisable measures [Part I, 4]. Most of those measures are defensive in nature, save the last 
one. They are listed as: 
 
• recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; 
• breaking of diplomatic relations; 
• breaking of consular relations; 
• breaking of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, radio-telephonic relations; 
• interruption of economic, commercial and financial relations; and finally 
• use of armed force to prevent or repel aggression [Part I, 5]. 
 
Whereas on the one hand the document states that “any attempt on the part of a non-American 
State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, sovereignty or political independence of 
an American State” constitutes an act of aggression against all American States58. But the signato-
ries on the other hand restrict themselves to consult only in case of acts of aggression committed 
by an American state. This was the very first time that a fellow American State could be identified 
as an aggressor against whom steps might have to be taken. This provision was presumably di-
rected against Argentina59, the only American republic not taking part in the conference and allied 
to the Axis Powers60
The so-called Argentine Question
. This marks a turning away from the traditional security concept that saw 
former colonial powers (primarily Europe) as the actor the American nations felt the need to guard 
themselves against, toward a more nuanced, individualized assessing of friends and foes. 
The New York Times development went somewhat against the firmly upheld principle of non-
interference. In its opinion the Act of Chapultepec furthermore 
… marked the end to a century old tradition that the power of the United States should be 
kept north of the Rio Grande … [RESTON 1945b] 
61 was later resolved when the Government of Argentina pro-
claimed adherence to the Final Act of Chapultepec62
Nevertheless, most Latin American states fought hard to keep the inter-American system as 
autonomous as possible
 and also declared war against the Axis Powers 
[CANYES 1945:516]. 
The Act of Chapultepec took into account the results of the San Francisco conference. There, 
agreement had been reached that regional arrangements should engage themselves in the peace-
ful settlement of disputes while refraining from taking enforcement action. This privilege should be 
reserved to the Security Council of the world body.  
63 in matters of settlement of disputes, wary as they where of extra-
hemispherical nations’ meddling in their affairs. They demanded that as long as the regional sys-
tem is able to handle the conflict, the international world body should not interfere [CANYES 
1945:506]64
We hope that the San Francisco Conference may construct a world organization on the 
same principles reached here. Within that framework, looking towards peace and security 
of the entire world, we are giving – by our action now – courage and hope to the advo-
cates of security and peace the world over. [qtd. in CANYES 1945:511] 
. The wish for extended autonomy was a result of the colonial history of the Americas. 
More than a century the former European colonial masters have been strictly kept out of the hemi-
sphere.  
The Act of Chapultepec was widely viewed as a model for the world organization. Tom Conally, the 
then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate which approved the 
Act by acclamation, stated: 
                                                 
58 That commitment had been formulated already earlier, at the ‘Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs’  
in 1940 in Havana [RESTON 04.03.1945] 
59 Compare RESTON 03.03.1945. 
60 The Axis Powers were composed of Germany, Italy and Japan and fought in World War II against the Allied 
Powers composed inter alia of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States.  
61 For the partial text of the resolution on Argentina adopted at the Chapultepec Conference see NYT 
09.03.1945. 
62 Argentina signed the Act on 20.04.1945 [NYT 05.04.1945] 
63 For the Latin American sponsored proposal circulated at the San Francisco conference see RESTON 
09.05.1945. 
64 Similarly GEROLD 1971:62; the contrary is claimed by KÖRBS 1997:412. 
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In the same vein the Los Angeles Times questioned: 
If the nations of this hemisphere, where there is little sound reason for bickering over 
boundaries or for serious political disputes, cannot set an example for peace …  how can 
we expect success for a world organization for peace? [LAT 04.03.1945] 
The Act calls for the conclusion of a formal treaty to establish procedures to meet acts of aggres-
sion [Part II] ‘… following the establishment of peace …’ and so to lend to them permanence. KUNZ 
[1945:531] specifies, referring to the above recommendation, that the agreement was designed 
only for the duration of the war. Similarly CANYES [1945:509] understands the Act as an ‘emer-
gency measure’ which took effect immediately upon signing [CSM 05.03.1945]. 
2.2.2 Resolution XI – Institutionalizing the Inter-American System 
Next to the Chapultepec Act the conference in Mexico City produced a number of resolutions, rang-
ing inter alia from economic, social, and cultural questions, and also encompassing the relations 
with Argentina and Canada [NYT 1945b]. Resolution XI about the ‘Reorganization, Consolidation 
and Strengthening of the Inter-American System’ is regarded as comparable in importance to the 
Act65
Resolution XI contains explicit provisions and a framework
. 
66
2.3 The Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance - 
Rio Treaty 
,  putting the inter-American System 
on a more solid footing. It held that the ‘Governing Council’ of the Pan-American Union (PAU) will 
be drafting a Charter to be approved at the Ninth International Conference of American States, 
scheduled to take place in Bogotá the following year. That Charter was meant to be accompanied 
by two Declarations; one on the Rights and Duties of States and the second on the International 
Rights and Duties of Man.  
CANYES [1945:512] identifies another goal of the Resolution: 
In addition to reorganizing the inter-American system, the project is intended to coördi-
nate and improve the existing inter-American instruments for the prevention and pacific 
solution of controversies. [CANYES 1945:512] 
The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MCMFA) – a diplomatic platform that 
had been convoked already earlier on various occasions  -  was henceforth to meet annually to 
formulate general inter-American policy; and it was to meet in a consultative fashion whenever 
disputes would arise which might disturb the peace in the hemisphere [CANYES 1945:512]. 
Generally, it can be claimed, that Resolution XI is the nucleus of the OAS Charter, which was 
agreed upon in explicit accordance with it. 
 
2.3.1 The Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and 
Security 
The proposed conclusion of a treaty following the end of World War II was originally scheduled by 
the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union (PAN) for October 1945. Political tensions with 
Argentina resulted in two postponements. It was not before 1947 that the conference could take 
place [KUNZ 1948a:111]. Finally, the conference was held between 15th August and 2nd  Septem-
ber 1947 in Rio de Janeiro. The conference was organized around the following general Commis-
sions: the Central Commission, the Credentials Commission, and the Commission of Redaction and 
Coordination. Apart from those, three further Commission were charged with drafting the text of 
the treaty: 
 
                                                 
65 See CANYES [1945:505]: Resolution XI and the Act of Chapultepec “… stand out because they represent 
particularly far-reaching undertakings”. 
66 CANYES opines: “This resolution embodies many provisions which not long ago might have met with insur-
mountable opposition, but which at Mexico were enthusiastically approved because they were deemed essential 
to make Pan-Americanism more dynamic and more in keeping with new world conditions” [CANYES 1945:512]. 
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• Commission I:   preamble, principles, general articles; 
• Commission II:  measures to be taken in case of threat or acts of aggression; 
• Commission III: procedures and organs [KUNZ 1948a:112]. 
 
2.3.2 The Rio Treaty67
The OAS today regards the principles and procedures established at the Inter-American Conference 
for the Maintenance of Peace
 
68
After the establishment of the OAS the Rio Treaty turned out to be the legal tool most countries 
invoked in cases of dispute and conflict
 (1936) alongside the instruments adopted at the Eight International 
Conference of American States (1938), at the Second Meeting of Consultation (1940), and at the 
Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (1945) as the ‘direct background’ of the 
Rio Treaty [OAS PC 2000b]. 
69
The treaty stipulates in its first article that the contracting parties renounce from the use or threat 
of force in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
. The Rio Treaty went into effect on 3rd  December 1948 
[PAINTER 1987].  
70. Article 2 gives priority to the inter-
American system, later to be described as ‘Try-OAS-first’ principle71
2.3.2.1 Procedure of the Organ of Consultation 
 which holds that the settle-
ment of controversies between the signatory states shall be submitted first to inter-American pro-
cedures before referring it to the organs of the United Nations. Accordingly, PAINTER concluded: 
The Rio treaty established a permanent inter-American regional security mechanism 
within the framework of the UN Charter. [PAINTER 1987] 
The treaty differentiates between the regular [Art. 11] and the provisional Organ of Consultation 
[Art. 12]. As mentioned above, Article 11 in conjunction with Article 12 declares the Meetings of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics which have ratified the treaty as the regular 
Organ of Consultation. Before this body meets, the Governing Board of the PAU72
The measures to be agreed on are almost identical
 may act ‘provi-
sionally as organ of consultation’. This is the one and only time the phrase ‘organ of consultation’ is 
written without capital letters, probably signifying its subordinate position vis-à-vis the regular 
Organ of Consultation. 
73
• recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; 
 to the ones foreseen in the Act of Chapulte-
pec. They include [Art. 8]: 
 
• breaking of diplomatic relations; 
• breaking of consular relations; 
• partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and 
• use of armed force. 
 
                                                 
67 The following American states signed and ratified the Rio Treaty: Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, USA, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
[http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-29.html retrieved on 12.02.2004]. However, the document entitled 
Collective Security in the Organization of American States adopted by the Committee on Hemispheric Security 
of the Permanent Council of the OAS leaves out the ratification of the Bahamas, done in 1982 [OAS PC 2000b], 
possibly by mistake. 
68 The OAS document erroneously cites the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental 
Peace and Security (1947) instead of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace which took 
place 1936. 
69 Mirroring the integral importance of the Rio Treaty Ecuador suggested at the Inter-American Conference in 
December 1964, which discussed the modalities for admission of new members to the OAS, that aspirants 
should sign the COAS alongside the Rio Treaty [KURZMAN 17.12.1964]. 
70 See Article 2,4 Charter of the United Nations. 
71 GEROLD traces the term to Cabot Lodge [GEROLD 1971:64]. 
72 After the OAS had been established, the Governing Board of the PAU was replaced with the Council of the 
OAS [GEROLD 1971:34]. 
73 Interruption of commercial and financial relations are left out in the Rio Treaty. The same goes for the restric-
tive phrase concerning the use of armed force ‘to prevent or repel aggression’. 
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Every state that signed and ratified the Rio Treaty can address the Governing Board of the PAU to 
initiate ‘consultations’ (without indication as to what organ will be called upon) [Art. 13]. Voting 
rights are confined to those states which signed and ratified the treaty [Art. 14]. An absolute ma-
jority of members entitled to vote is necessary for deciding on the initiation of consultations [Art. 
16]. If agreement is reached that consultations shall begin, the Organ of Consultation decides by a 
vote of two-thirds of the entitled states [Art. 17]. However, for both voting procedures [Art. 16 + 
17] it is mandatory that in cases of “a situation or dispute between American States, the parties 
directly interested shall be excluded from the voting” [Art. 18], in order to keep the system able to 
function. To constitute a quorum in consultative meetings, Art. 19 states that it shall be necessary 
that the number of states present shall be at least equal to the number of votes necessary for the 
taking of the decision. 
Agreed measures as listed in Article 8 [see above] shall have binding effect for the signatory states 
that have ratified the treaty – with the sole exception that no state ‘shall be required to use armed 
force without its consent’ [Art. 20]. 
2.3.2.2 Provisions for Collective Self-Defence in Case of an armed Attack 
The comparison of the Act of Chapultepec with the Rio Treaty shows that with the later the degree 
of differentiation increased. Whereas the Act of Chapultepec stipulates that every ‘attack’ of a 
‘state’ against an American state, is to be understood as an ‘act of aggression’ against all signatory 
states [Part I, 3], the Rio Treaty describes an ‘armed attack’ of ‘any State’ against an American 
state, shall be considered as an ‘attack’ (vs. act of aggression) against all American states (vs. all 
signatory states) [Art. 3,1]. The wording shall be quoted here in its entirety:  
The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an Ameri-
can State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, conse-
quently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the at-
tack in the exercise of the individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
Here the treaty limits the case of collective responsibility to assist in self-defence to armed attacks. 
Both texts describe all states – whether inside or outside of the hemisphere – as potential attack-
ers. Whereas the Act restricts the range of collective responsibility to the contracting parties but 
the Rio Treaty extends it to cover all American states.  
Article 3,1 converts the right to collective self-defence into a duty, as GEROLD] points 
out74[GEROLD 1971:77, since the contracting parties undertake to assist in meeting the attack in 
the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence – a ‘double duty’ [KUNZ 
1948a:115] – pursuant to Art. 51 of Charter of the United Nations75. Individual assistance is de-
pendent on the request of the attacked state76 and limited to the period which draws to a close as 
soon as the collective body, the Organ of Consultation, meets. It is laid down that the Organ of 
Consultation shall meet ‘without delay’, shall examine those individual measures, and decide on 
measures of a collective nature [Art. 3,2]. However, the Organ of Consultation, in its collective 
duty to assist in self-defence, is not bound to wait for the request of the attacked state77
                                                 
74 Compare also KUNZ [1948:115]. 
75 Article 51 of the UN Charter reads: „Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Secu-
rity Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.” 
76 A case in point was USA’s support for Costa Rica in November 1954. Rumours made the rounds that armed 
attackers would land in Costa Rica and force the president to resign. The US sent six jet fighter planes to the 
region as a ‘precautionary move’, as well as a shipment of arms. Several weeks earlier Ambassador Antonio 
Facio of Costa Rica had made a corresponding inquiry. The US then had assured Costa Rica that it stands ready 
at all times to fulfil its Rio commitments [CDT 21.11.1954; CDT 09.01.1955]. For further details see the discus-
sion of the case further below. 
77 GEROLD  argues that the consent of an attacked American state which is not a contracting party to the col-
lective assistance in self-defence is nevertheless required, since there exists only the right but not the duty to 
defend oneself. He concludes that the explicit consent of a signatory state, however, is not necessary [GEROLD 
1971:81-82]. 
. 
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All those measures of self-defence in turn may only be taken until the SCUN has taken the ‘meas-
ures necessary to maintain international peace and security’78
The application of the provisions of Article 3 is geographically restricted [Art. 3,3] to attacks taking 
place in a demarcated region [Art. 4]
 [Art. 3,4], leaving intact the overrid-
ing authority of the world body. 
79
2.3.2.3 Provisions for nnarmed Attacks, extra- and intra-Continental Con-
flict and armed Attacks outside of the Region 
 or in the territory of an American state. 
Principally, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately if a ‘fact or situation might endanger’ 
the peace of the continent [Art. 6]. Such is the case if unarmed aggressions as well as extra- or 
intra-continental conflict occur. Unarmed aggression80
2.3.2.4 Provisions for Conflicts between two or more American States 
 takes place if the ‘inviolability or the integ-
rity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State’ is affected 
by it.  
The Organ of Consultation on the one hand takes measures to assist the victim of the aggression 
and on the other hand measures which are to be taken for the common defence and the mainte-
nance of peace and security of the continent. It is supposed that in cases of unarmed attack there 
is limited urgency, compared to armed attacks. That is why no provisions are made guiding actions 
taken by states individually [FENWICK 1956a:26]. 
As Art. 3,3 makes clear, the above provision [Art. 6] shall also be applied if an armed attack is 
taking place outside of the demarcated region [Art. 4] or not on a territory of an American state. 
After some years of existence and application of the Rio Treaty and its Art. 6 FENWICK  comes to 
the following conclusion: 
But vague as are the terms of Article 6 they have in fact proved to be just the sort of pro-
cedure needed to meet inter-American controversies for which the traditional bilateral 
procedures of investigation, arbitration and judicial settlement were inadequate. The prac-
tical effect of the article has been to create a court of summary jurisdiction, able to act 
promptly and to take decisions without delay and without the obstruction of a veto by the 
United States or any other member of the regional group. [FENWICK 1956a:26] 
In cases of intraregional conflicts81
2.3.2.5 Coming into Effect, Denunciation 
 – without prejudice to the right of self-defence according to Art. 
51 Charter of the United Nations – the contracting parties shall meet in consultation [Art 7]. Al-
though the phraseology to ‘meet in consultation’ seems to indicate a different procedure than that 
making use of the Organ of Consultation, Article 11 makes clear that ‘consultations to which this 
Treaty refers shall be carried out by means of the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs…’, to be 
known as ‘Organ of Consultation’. 
However, the contending parties are to be called upon to suspend hostilities and to restore matters 
to the status quo ante bellum (state of affairs before the war [OEDUSM 2001]). Additionally, the 
contracting parties shall take the necessary measures for reestablishment or maintenance of inter-
American peace and security as well as for the resolution of the conflict by peaceful means. 
The rejection of that ‘pacifying action’ will help the ‘consultative meeting’ in agreeing on the meas-
ures to be applied and on determining the aggressor. 
The Rio Treaty comes into effect for the states which ratify it as soon as two thirds of the signatory 
states have deposited their ratification [Art. 22]. That was the case as of 12th  March 1948.82
                                                 
78 For a discussion about who is to decide if the SCUN took the ‘necessary measures’ see GEROLD [1971:83-
84]. 
79 For a description of the region see KUNZ [1948:116]. 
80 During the phase of charges and counter-charges between Cuba and the US in the early 1960s some Latin 
American nations studied the possibility of including ‘internal subversion’ among acts of aggression as a means 
to react to the Cuban-inspired subversions [SZULC 01.10.1961]. 
81 It seems that Art. 6 misleadingly mentions ‚intracontinental’ conflicts although the provision for such are to 
be found in Art. 7.  
82 For complete and up-to-date information on the signatories and ratifications see the OAS homepage: 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-29.html retrieved on 12.03.2004. 
 
The treaty remains indefinitely in force. In case a contracting party denounces the Rio Treaty by a 
written notification to the PAU, two years have to elapse before the treaty ceases to be in force for 
that very state [Art. 25]. 
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2.3.2.6 Application 
As its title indicates the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance) was originally 
designed as a treaty on mutual assistance. Nevertheless, the application of the Rio Treaty demon-
strates that it was primarily used for the peaceful settlements of conflicts – as denoted in Article 7. 
Hence GEROLD  argues that the Rio Treaty was ‚misappropriated’ (zweckentfremdet) [GEROLD 
1971:31]. Contrary to what the letter of the treaty suggests, the ‚provisional organ of consultation’ 
(and not the ‘regular Organ of Consultation’ as might justly have been expected) was active in the 
majority of cases [see also PAINTER 1987]: 
The Council conceived as provisional organ of consultation, has become the decisive body 
for settling disputes. The basis heretofore was a ‘trick’. In case a conflict was judged by 
the Council to meet the conditions of article 6 of the Rio Treaty, but a meeting of Foreign 
Ministers seemed not to be warranted, the Council only called the meeting in pro-forma 
fashion, that is to say without fixing venue and time, and declared itself to be the provi-
sional organ of consultation. In this capacity it handled the disputes under its own respon-
sibility; it ordered investigations in situ; it formulated recommendations for the parties 
and successfully appointed mediating commissions. This procedure is somewhat beyond 
legality. Al- |-though the Council as provisional organ of consultation has undoubtedly the 
same rights as the Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Still, this procedure of the Council has 
prevailed in such a way and was accepted by the member states, as to constitute an al-
teration through customary law. [GEROLD 1971:40-41, my translation]  
The following pattern of procedure83
As soon as the Governing Board of the Pan American Union (later replaced with the (Permanent) 
Council of the OAS [PAINTER 1987]) established itself as provisional Organ of Consultation, it was 
agreed to set up a committee for investigating the current conflict [e.g. NYT 1955]. The parties to 
the conflict were usually asked to refrain from acts which might deteriorate the situation further. 
The committee investigated the case on the spot provided that the concerned parties agreed to 
that. The committee could consult military experts. The initiation of the investigation was intended 
to give the conflict parties the opportunity for objectification and de-escalation of the situation. 
Usually, the committee draws up a report, including recommendations. In most cases the provi-
sional Organ of Consultation adopted those recommendations [GEROLD 1971:41-43; compare also 
FENWICK 1965:317, see also SHAW 2000:79 who provides an illustrative depiction of the proce-
dure]
 was established in the years following the coming into force of 
the Rio Treaty: 
84
                                                 
83 For the first application of the Rio Treaty and of this pattern of procedure see FENWICK 1949:330. 
84 For discussion of the question of competence of the Council of the OAS in matters of settling disputes see 
FENWICK 1949c. 
. 
 
Analyzing the procedure applied in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1955 (see 
below), FENWICK  opines: 
The successful conclusion of the case would seem to suggest that the provisional powers 
of the Council of the Organization of American States are adequate to serve as procedure 
of summary jurisdiction in specific situations not admitting of delay, reserving perhaps to 
the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers questions of principle in respect to which 
decisions can be taken of a constructive character looking to the avoidance of future diffi-
culties. [FENWICK 1955:238] 
Reviewing the overall-application of the Rio Treaty some years later the same author delivers a 
qualified analysis: 
In none of the applications of the Rio Treaty to date is there anything to suggest that the 
provisions of the treaty would warrant collective action beyond the protection of the state 
against an armed attack or an act of aggression short of an armed attack by the removal 
of the conditions giving rise to the complaint. Rather the inferences are all the other way. 
[FENWICK 1959: 875] 
In later years a shift to the regular Organ of Consultation, i.e. the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs away from the provisional Organ of Consultation, i.e. Council/Permanent Council was ob-
servable, due partly to the Charter Amendment of 1967 that had brought about an increase of re-
sponsibilities for the Council [SHAW 2000:119]. 
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Although the Treaty’s Organ of Consultation has the power to make decisions which obligate all 
member states, it has been observed that non-compliance did not meet with enforcement of the 
obligation [BARLIANT 1969:1159]. A case in point was the increasing non-compliance of various 
member states with the sanctions levied on Cuba in 1964. When an initiative to rescind those sanc-
tions failed to acquire the necessary 2/3 majority of votes, the prospect of ever more countries 
ignoring the 1964 resolution questioned the effectiveness of the Rio Treaty [USDSB 1975:13]. 
The non-utilization of the Pact of Bogotá (see further below) led to the Rio Treaty’s frequent appli-
cation – although it was originally conceived primarily as a mechanism for the defence against ex-
ternal aggression [BERNDT 1995:24]. 
Most prominent was the Rio Treaty’s invocation on occasion of the terrorist attack in the US in Sep-
tember 2001. Despite principal objections to the Treaty by Mexico, the Rio Treaty was activated by 
acclamation [DEYOUNG 20.09.2001]. Mexico’s opposition was articulated and aired in early Sep-
tember 2001, when Mexico’s President, Vicente Fox, suggested on a trip to the United States to 
scrap the Rio Treaty85 in favour of a more cooperative approach aimed at threats like drug traffick-
ing and environmental degradation and committed to the mutual defence of human rights. Mexico’s 
delegate to the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the PCOAS had had voiced this opinion as 
early as March 200086
2.3.3 Amendment of the Rio Treaty 1975
 [OAS PC 2000d]. However, in September 2001 the initiative was aimed at 
meshing with the then planned adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter [SMITH 
07.09.2001]. 
87
The amendment goes back to a decision by the General Assembly of the OAS (GAOAS) of April 
1973 to conduct a critical study of the functioning of the inter-American system (AG/RES. 127 (III-
O/73) [OAS PC 2000b]. When the then 25 members of the OAS (among those 21 signatory states 
to the Rio Treaty) met in San Jose, Costa Rica, in July 1975 they intended to reform the Rio Treaty. 
At that time the lifting of sanctions on Cuba was a hotly discussed issue, and it was planned to vote 
on that subject too. The amendment should have made it easier to lift sanctions. Instead of a two-
thirds majority a simple majority should suffice to lift sanctions. The imposition of sanctions, how-
ever, would continue to require a two-thirds majority [BINDER 1975; WR 1975; GOODSELL 
16.07.1975]. 
Following are the other modifications brought about by the amendment: 
 
 
• a redefinition of ‘aggression’ is included in the amendment as well as some examples of 
acts which qualify as aggression are listed (Art. 9); 
• the amendment differentiates cases of attacks according to their territorial origin. Now Art. 
3, 2 deals with attacks committed by American States and Art. 3, 3 addresses armed at-
tacks of extra-hemispheric origin. This differentiation corresponds more closely with the 
concept of traditional pacts of mutual assistance; 
• the amendment narrows its geographic area of applicability and limits itself to member 
states instead of all American states; and 
• the preamble reiterates the principle of non-intervention as well as the right of all states to 
‘choose freely their political, economic and social organization’. Furthermore, it is stated 
that peace and security is also to be guaranteed through collective economic security for 
the development of the Member States [PAINTER 1987], signalling a change of the under-
lying security concept. 
 
On the whole the amendment was designed to make the treaty more flexible; however, the US 
delegate, William S. Maillard, held that the changes were ‘not highly significant’ [qtd. in BINDER 
1975]. 
Although the amendment was signed by 21 states on 26th July 1975 it has been ratified until today 
by only 7 instead of the 14 required to enter into force88
                                                 
85 Fox is said to have called the Rio Treaty ‘anachronistic, obsolete, untrustworthy and useless’ according to an 
editorial of the San Antonio Express-News [SAEN 01/10/2001]. Venezuela’s foreign minister, Jose Vicente 
Rangel, had used the same language (‘anachronistic and obsolete’) to characterize the Rio Treaty in November 
2000 and similarly had called for the modification of its objectives [EFE 14.11.2000]. 
86 Mexico deposited its instrument of denunciation to withdraw from the Rio Treaty on 6th September 2001 [OAS 
PC 2003:4], only a couple of days prior to the terrorist attacks of 11.09.2001. Mexiko was also the only country 
never to comply with the OAS’s crucial sanctions of 1964 levelled against Cuba which it had voted against [NO-
VITSKI 03.11.1974]. 
87 For the text of the amendment see OAS: Protocol of the Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance (RIO TREATY) at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-29(1).htm retrieved on 
11.12.2006. 
. 
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2.4 The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement – Pact of 
Bogotá 
The Pact of Bogotá arose from the strongly felt need for reorganizing the inter-American ‘peace 
machinery’ and goes back directly to a corresponding recommendation in Resolution XXXIX of the 
Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Chapultepec.; and the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee was to elaborate the project of an ‘Inter-American Peace System’ [KUNZ 
1948b:573]. 
The Pact of Bogotá89 was signed by 21 American states and was intended to replace various 
agreements90
If matters are within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, the procedures of the pact are not to be 
applied [OAS PC 2003:4], heeding the non-intervention/non-interference principle. 
 which were considered to be the inter-American peace system at that time 
[TURLINGTON 1948:608-609; compare also SHAW 2000:73]. 
The Pact lays down procedures of pacific settlement. The pact provides that the order of the proce-
dures established therein does not signify that the parties have no recourse to procedures that 
they consider most appropriate (Art. 3). However, according to Article 4, once any pacific proce-
dure has been initiated, no other procedure may be commenced until that procedure is concluded 
[OAS PC 2003:4]. The Pact envisages a period of five months in which good offices might be of-
fered by one or more American governments before other procedures should be resorted to. A 
Commission of Investigation and Conciliation is to be established which is supposed to deal with 
submitted controversies. The pact contains the obligation to recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ). In case the ICJ refuses to hear a dispute, provisions are laid down 
for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. The treaty provides for a Meeting of Consultations of 
Foreign Ministers if judicial decisions of the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal are not fulfilled [TURLINGTON 
1948:609-610]. 
Although the Pact went into force in May 1949 (it entered into force through the successive ratifica-
tion of the parties) its impact remained quite limited from the very beginning91. In 1954, when the 
10th Inter-American Conference took place in Caracas, the attending delegates agreed that the Pact 
was inoperative92 and needed revision. Resolution XCIX was adopted urging the OAS members to 
ratify the Pact93 or else to explain their refusal and make recommendations for changes so that the 
Council of the OAS may call upon its technical agencies to formulate drafts ‘which may be expected 
to be accepted’ [AJIL 1954:130] and submit a report to the Eleventh Inter-American Conference 
[BREWER 21.03.1954; FENWICK 1954c:468]. But the initiative proved fruitless; thus, until today 
only 14 American States (out of 34) have ratified the Pact94
The states that ratified it (the Pact of Bogotá, my remark), however, made reservations 
that have a considerable impact on the validity and effectiveness of this instrument
. Its relevance is especially limited 
given the refusal of the United States to ratify it. As the PCOAS has itself pointed out: 
95
In the same vain GEROLD [GEROLD 1971:26], overseeing the first 20 years of its existence - simi-
lar to FENWICK [FENWICK 1965:318] some years earlier - concludes that the Pact is a complete 
failure. The latter points out that the Rio Treaty has to some extent filled the vacuum left by this 
failure [FENWICK 1965:318]. BERNDT judges that the main deficiency of the Pact was that instead 
of regulating the mutual settlement of the dispute in question, its focus was placed on the dispute 
. 
Those made by some countries are so extreme that clearly they nullify for those countries 
the most important provisions of the system for peaceful settlement under the Pact [OAS 
PC 2000c].  
                                                                                                                                                        
88 For up-to-date information on signatories and ratifications see: OAS: 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-29(1).html retrieved on 11.12.2006. 
89 The text of the treaty is available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/A-42.doc  
90 Those agreements are listed in TURLINGTON 1948:608-609. 
91 For a discussion of controversial provisions of the Pact and reservations made by signatory states see FEN-
WICK 1954a. 
92 In the early years the prospects for the Pact to be useful in future conflict resolution seemed to be intact as 
the amity pact between Costa Rica and Nicaragua testifies. After witnessing a conflict in 1948 both countries 
agreed to resort to the Pact should similar incidents re-occur [FENWICK 1949:331]. 
93 At that time the following countries had ratified the Pact of Bogotá: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic [FENWICK 1954a:123]. 
94 For up to date information on signatories and ratifications see: OAS: 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-42.html. 
95 The OAS’ Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) points to the same deficiency of the Pact of Bogotá in 
its 2003 study about conflict prevention and resolution [OAS PC 2003:4]. 
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decision. That is why the OAS members preferred more informal procedures compared to the Pact 
to resolve their disputes and conflicts [BERNDT 1995:24].  
And BARLINGTON draws attention to the lack of a collective right to initiate settlement: 
...the pact contains no self-starting mechanism; that is, it depends for its implementation 
on the parties to the disputes, none of whom, for reasons of tactics or national pride, 
might want to take the first step toward resolution of the matter. [BURLINGTON 
1969:1160 FN 22] 
Up to 1998 the Pact had never ever been employed [PECK 1998:141]. Thus SHAW arrives at the 
following conclusion: 
The Rio Treaty and OAS Charter, but not Pact of Bogotá as intended, created a new re-
gional security regime unlike any other that existed at the time. [SHAW 2000:74] 
Small wonder then, that most signatory states recommend modification if not replacement of the 
Pact of Bogotá [OAS 2002:5-10]. 
2.5 The Charter of the Organization of American States 
The Charter of the OAS96
• to strengthen the peace and security on the continent [a]; 
 (COAS) is the third cornerstone of the inter-American system. It was 
finalized alongside the Pact of Bogotá at the Ninth International Conference of American States, 
held at Bogotá, Colombia, from 30th March to 2nd May 1948. FENWICK  refers to the long history of 
inter-American cooperation when he classifies the signing of the COAS as follows: 
Elaborate as are the provisions of the Charter, they made fewer substantial changes in the 
inter-American system than the form of the document might appear to indicate. Rather 
the Charter represents an attempt to co-ordinate the system that had developed over 
more than half a century, to clarify the principles upon which it was based, to improve the 
machinery through which it functioned and to define more carefully the relations of one 
organ to another. [FENWICK 1956a:26] 
And although it was not until 13th December 1951 that the Charter officially entered into force, 
FENWICK in another article underlined that: 
… the Conference at Bogotá had adopted a resolution that, pending the entry into force of 
the Charter by deposit of the ratifications of two-thirds of the signatory states, the provi-
sions of the Charter should go into practical effect and the organs of the existing Union 
should call themselves by the names they were to have when the Charter acquired legal 
force. 
For more than three years the Pan American system functioned precisely as if what was 
being done was done under the obligation of a treaty rather than in fulfillment of a resolu-
tion. So complete was the unity of purpose and of co-operation that the entry into force of 
the Charter might have been delayed still longer without any noticeable effect. As for the 
remaining states which have not as yet ratified the Charter, no change in their status can 
be observed, and it is a reasonable conclusion that in respect to them the provisions of 
the Bogotá resolution are still in effect. At any rate there is nothing to suggest that their 
rights and obligations as members of the Council of the Organization are any different 
from those of the states which are formally bound by the Charter. [FENWICK 1952:316]. 
THE COAS text contains a number of provisions dealing with disputes, mainly listed among the 
‘essential purposes’ of the OAS [Art. 4]; - the following thereof relate to conflicts: 
 
• to prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes 
that may arise among the Member States [b]; 
• to provide for common action on the part of those States (seeming reference to [b], my 
remark) in the event of aggression [c]; and 
                                                 
96 The text of the current version of the COAS is available at: www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html - for 
the original version (1948) which entered into force in December 1951 see: AJIL Supplement 1952. or the Ava-
lon project’s homepage: avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad062.asp retrieved on 06.07.2009 
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• to seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that may arise among 
them [d]. 
 
This catalogue is merely supplemented with the promotion of cooperation in various fields. Thus, 
judging by the ‘purposes’ the OAS defined for itself, one subsequently can conclude that the fur-
therance of peace and security in the region and the prevention of conflict escalation, was a crucial 
factor behind the Organization’s establishment if not its raison d’être. This assessment is also con-
firmed by the conflict relevant principles, laid down in Art. 5, even if those are not legally binding, 
but mere general expressions of policy [KUNZ 1948b:572]: 
 
• international law is recognized as the standard of conduct among the member states [a]; 
• sovereignty and independence of states is to be respected [b]; 
• ‘war of aggression’ is to be condemned [e]; 
• an act of aggression against one American state is an act of aggression against all the 
other American States [f]; 
• international controversies shall be settled by peaceful procedures [g]. 
 
FENWICK also categorizes the avoidance or peaceful regulation of conflicts as the overriding pur-
pose of the OAS, when he opines: 
Foremost among the functions of the new organization in the field of regional law is the 
maintenance of the peace and security of the continent [FENWICK 1965:318]. 
An additional principle [h] – prima facie only indirectly connected to conflicts and their transforma-
tion – makes reference to the political structure of the member states: ‘The solidarity of the Ameri-
can States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those 
States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy’. As will be shown democ-
racy acquired an ever more important position for the OAS during the years and as such also came 
to bear direct effect on various (domestic) conflict situations. 
The text of the COAS makes abundantly clear that among those ‘high aims’ the strengthening of 
peace and security ranks as a top priority. 
 
2.5.1 OAS Organs with Competences in Security Matters 
The main organ formally concerned with security matters is the Inter-American Conference (1967 
replaced by the General Assembly) as the supreme organ of the OAS. But since the General As-
sembly meets only once a year for a couple of days only it is limited in its effective handling of 
conflicts which usually require immediate attention97
Thus, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs [Art. 39-47] as well as the Council 
[Art. 48-62] (1967 replaced with the Permanent Council of the OAS) have been more intensively 
involved in dealing with cases of disputes and in matters of security
.  
98
                                                 
97 BARLINGTON, reviewing the first 20 years of this organ and outlining its inactivity, calls it an ‚anachronism‘ 
[BARLINGTON 1969:1162]. 
98 Today the OAS has the following organs at its disposal implementing its objectives: the General Assembly, the 
MCMFA, the Councils, the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, the General Secretariat, the Specialized Conferences, and the Specialized Organizations. 
. 
The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MCMFA) is to serve as either Meeting of 
Consultation or as the Organ of Consultation as foreseen in the Rio Treaty (see above). When con-
stituting as Meeting of Consultation it is acting as a diplomatic body, being only in the position to 
make recommendations; however, when acting as Organ of Consultation it can make use of its 
enforcement powers [BARLIANT 1996:1165]. 
MCMFA meetings shall be held to consider ‘problems of an urgent nature’ and of common interest. 
Every member state is entitled to request a Meeting of Consultation. The Council will decide by an 
absolute majority if a meeting is to take place. In cases of armed attack the Meeting of Consulta-
tion is to be held without delay, the Chairman of the Council is supposed to call it immediately. 
The Organ of Consultation has at its disposal an Advisory Defense Committee. It is to be called if 
problems of military cooperation in matters of collective security do arise. 
While the texts of the COAS and the Rio Treaty make clear the primacy of the ‘regular’ Organ of 
Consultation i.e. of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the regular Organ of 
Consultation was frequently superseded by the Council in its function as the provisional Organ of 
Consultation, as elaborated earlier. 
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2.5.2 Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Chapter IV) 
Chapter four contains the concrete means by which arising disputes shall be peacefully settled.  
Article 20 outlines that international disputes are to be submitted to the peaceful procedures of the 
COAS, before being referred to the SCUN – the so-called Try-OAS-first principle. Article 21 lists the 
following as peaceful procedures: 
 
• direct negotiation; 
• good offices; 
• mediation; 
• investigation and conciliation; 
• judicial settlement; 
• arbitration; and 
• those procedures which the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time. 
 
Article 22 reiterates the commitment of the American states to resort to peaceful means in the 
event that a dispute arises between them. Finally, Art. 23 refers to the establishment of a special 
treaty for the pacific settlement of disputes. The Pact of Bogotá is to be viewed as such a special 
treaty [KUNZ 1948b:573], notwithstanding its eventual non-observance. 
2.5.3 Collective Security 
Collective security as outlined by the Rio Treaty (see above) is dealt with in Articles 24 and 25. 
Those mainly summarize the principles on collective security agreed to in the Rio Treaty. 
Of significance is Article 19 which reads: 
Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing 
treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 [non-
intervention, my remark] and 17 [territorial inviolability, my remark]. 
Herewith the almost sacrosanct principles of non-intervention and territorial inviolability are weak-
ened in favour of collective security. This is a significant concession which partly infringe on the 
sovereignty of the member states. It is quite remarkable that such far-reaching accordance was 
inserted in the very first version of the founding document of the oldest regional organization. 
2.5.4 Amendment of the Charter with the Protocol of Buenos Aires 
196799
Plans to amend the COAS were already voiced in 1964. The organization, it was claimed, showed 
signs of wear, tear and malfunction. For example the Inter-American Conference as supreme organ 
of the OAS although supposed to meet every 5 years, had in 1964 not met for the past ten years 
[NYT 09.11.1964]. Back then a conference was envisioned for March 1965. The following items
 
100
• establishment of an annual Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to discuss outstanding 
political and juridical questions; 
 
for discussion circulated at that time: 
• empowering the OAS Council, whose power so far had been circumscribed by the Inter-
American Conferences and the MCMFAs; 
• creation of a Committee with the function of promoting democracy [KURZMAN 
09.10.1964]. 
 
However, the conference for considering these matters had to be postponed due to the crisis in the 
Dominican Republic at the time [FINNEY 13.05.1965]. 
 
When the Second Special Inter-American Conference101 convened, the participating states102
                                                 
99 The Protocol of Buenos Aires entered into force on 27th February 1970 [LAGOS 2001:72; WP 28.02.1970]. 
100 For the position of the then Secretary General of the OAS, José A. Mora Otero, on the amendment see 
SZULC 20.10.1964. 
101 For the text of the resolutions see AJIL 1966. 
 
signed the Act of Rio de Janeiro. The Act stated that a Special Committee, composed of representa-
102 Venezuela did not attend the Conference since it opposed the assumption of extraordinary powers and the 
banning of political parties in Brazil, were the Conference took place. Venezuela acted according to the so-called 
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tives of each member state, was to work out a draft of the amendments and some guidelines for 
those were outlined (e.g. retaining the MCMFA, annual meetings of the Inter-American Conference, 
5-year term of SGOAS). The revisions should be presented at the Third Special Inter-American 
Conference which was scheduled to take place in July 1966 (this date was several times post-
poned; e.g. NYT 04.08.1966). The Second Special Inter-American Conference in resolution III de-
cided to hold MCMFAs on an annual basis ‘to consider common problems and activities of the inter-
American system’. It was to be convoked in accordance with the pertinent COAS provisions that - 
depending on the circumstances. Furthermore, resolution XIII requests the Special Committee, 
drafting the COAS amendments, to 
strengthen the capacity of the Organization to give the member states effective aid in the 
peaceful settlement of their disputes, assigning the necessary powers to the Council of the 
Organization of American States103
US plans to create a permanent Hemisphere Peace Force along the lines of the Inter-American 
Peace Force, deployed in the Dominican Republic at that time, could not gain the necessary sup-
port
. [AJIL 1966:456] 
104
With the amendment of the Charter
 [OLSEN 24.11.1965]. Later considerations circulated to strengthen the Inter-American De-
fense Board (IADB) instead of creating a permanent force [CSM 03.12.1966]. A proposal of Argen-
tina to make the IADB a permanent part of the OAS with special powers in dispute resolution was 
seen as a backdoor initiative for creating a permanent force. The proposal was consequently voted 
down 11 to 6 (support came from Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay; the US, 
although in favour of the idea abstained, as did Bolivia and Panama) [GOODSELL 25.02.1967]. 
 
105 finally agreed to in February 1967 at the Third Special Inter-
American Conference, the competences of the Council – now Permanent Council – as regards the 
peaceful settlement of conflicts, were strengthened106
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Betancourt doctrine’, under which no hemispheric government not constitutionally elected is to be recognized 
[CT 10.11.1965]. 
103 SGOAS, José A. Mora, had urged the member states in advance of the Second Special Inter-American Con-
ference to give the OAS a greater role in peace-keeping activities, describing the existing procedures as too 
cumbersome [NYT 11.11.1965]. 
104 Only Brazil, Paraguay, Haiti ‘and possibly one or two other Latin delegations are the least bit interested’ in 
the creation of a permanent peace-force, as the WP reported [KURZMAN 24.11.1965]. 
105 For the text of the ‘Protocol of Buenos Aires’ see AJIL Vol. 64 No. 4, pp. 996-1021 1970. 
106 At least insofar as security/conflict issues are concerned. Commentators judged that the overall power of the 
Permanent Council was curtailed, obviously because the Latin American states deemed it to be too heavily in-
fluenced by the United States [AdG 19.05.1967:13175] This power reduction was mirrored i.a. in the revocation 
of budgetary competencies [GEROLD 1971:59]. DIAZ points out that the former Council was fragmented 
through the amendment: “The single, powerful OAS Council was divided into three co-equal councils, each with 
authority over a different self-contained sphere | (Article 68 Rev.).” alluding to the creation of Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council and to the Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture [DIAZ 
1994:138-139]. 
. The Permanent Council was assigned the 
task of keeping “vigilance over the maintenance of friendly relations among the Member States, 
and for that purpose shall effectively assist them in the peaceful settlement of their disputes” [Art. 
82]. The Permanent Council thus was to be much more proactively involved in the resolution of 
disputes. In order to fulfil that obligation an Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement 
(replacing the IAPC, see below) was to be created and was to act as subsidiary organ of the Council 
[Art. 83]. 
Parties to a dispute could resort to the Permanent Council to obtain its good offices. In such a case 
the Permanent Council shall have the authority to assist and to recommend suitable peaceful pro-
cedures to settle the dispute. If the parties to the conflict so wish, the Chairman of the Council 
shall refer the dispute directly to the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement [Art. 84]. 
The Permanent Council may ascertain the facts in the dispute, and insofar as the governments 
concerned agree, do so on site [Art. 85]. 
Parties to a dispute may appeal to the Permanent Council for it to take cognizance of a dispute if 
none of the peaceful procedures listed in Art 20 (new: Art. 24) (see above), are being followed. 
The Committee on Peaceful Settlement is supposed to act like the Permanent Council in the pre-
ceding article [Art. 86]. 
In case that one of the concerned parties refuses the services of the Committee on Peaceful Set-
tlement the latter will limit itself to informing the Permanent Council [Art. 87]. Hereafter the Per-
manent Council may make suggestions for bringing the parties to a dispute together and if neces-
sary may urge the parties to refrain from aggravating the dispute. If one of the parties still refuses 
the good offices of the Council or of the Committee on Peaceful Settlement, the Council will restrict 
itself to submitting a report to the General Assembly [Art. 88]. 
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As GEROLD [1971:59] has pointed out, the amendment gave a legal basis to the activities of the 
Council as ‘provisional’ Organ of Consultation. It was the intention to limit the application of the Rio 
Treaty to serious conflicts between states. The new competencies of the Permanent Council and of 
the Committee on Peaceful Settlement resembled those codified in the statute of the Inter-
American Peace Committee (IAPC, see further below) in 1956, which had significantly reduced the 
activities of IAPC [GEROLD 1971:60-61]. The IAPC was eliminated through the  Buenos Aires 
amendments [DIAZ 1994:140]. 
However, the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement turned out to be no success story. 
No single case was brought before the organ and it was finally abolished with the Charter amend-
ment of 1985 [BELT 2002:15-16]. The former OAS assistant secretary for management, Ronald 
Sherman, has judged the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement with a view to its 
flaws to be ‘the world's finest legal and worst political instrument’ [qtd. in: LAWR 1986]. 
The Buenos Aires amendment also replaced the Inter-American Conferences with the General As-
sembly, scheduled to meet once a year [GEROLD 1971:58]. 
Finally, with Art. 112 the OAS established the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR), a body that was to prove its relevance in future disputes (for details see the chapter on 
the IACHR below). 
2.5.5 Amendment of the Charter with the Protocol of Cartagena de 
Indias 1985107
The Fourteenth Special Session of the OAS’ General Assembly in December 1985 amended COAS 
was for a second time. With the Protocol of Cartagena the commitment to democratic representa-
tion, later to be made a cornerstone of OAS policy, is strengthened. To the preamble is added that 
the American states are convinced: 
… that representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and 
development of the region 
The signatory states with this statement obviously wanted to underline their conclusion that peace 
– i.e. the absence of conflicts settled/transformed with violent means – is interdependent with the 
form of government. Representative democracy is believed to be the adequate formula to guaran-
tee peace and stability of the region. Beforehand the COAS had made mention of the interdepend-
ence between peace and democracy only indirectly. With the Protocol of Cartagena the OAS makes 
clear that democracy is to be regarded as ‘indispensable condition’ of stability and peace of the 
region. Additionally, the following purpose [Art. 2, b] was added to the Charter: 
To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle 
of non-intervention. 
Among the purposes of the OAS there was also included the following paragraph [Art. 2, g]: 
To achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to de-
vote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the 
Member States. 
Although this provision obviously addresses mainly to the poorer nations of the hemisphere, it can 
be seen as indirect commitment to lower the potential of arms races and in consequence of the 
likelihood of armed attacks among the signatory states. At least its symbolic value will have to be 
conceded. 
 
The amendment also extended the principles of the COAS to include [Art. 3, e]: 
Every State has the right to choose, without external interference, its political, economic, 
and social system and to organize itself in the way best suited to it, and has the duty to 
abstain from intervening in the affairs of another State. Subject to the foregoing, the 
American States shall cooperate fully among themselves, independently of the nature of 
their political, economic, and social systems. 
 
                                                 
107 The Protocol of Cartagena de Indias became effective on 16th November 1988 [LAGOS 2001:72]. 
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This addition has to be viewed in light of the anti-communist drive, mainly promoted by the United 
States against regimes it deemed to be supportive of its then arch-rival USSR. As will be demon-
strated below, the Cuban government in particular had been ostracized. However, as more and 
more Latin American states softened their stance and re-established diplomatic ties with Cuba, the 
above clause was obviously intended to rehabilitate communist and socialist regimes on the conti-
nent to a certain extent. The newly inserted principle reiterates moreover the continued validity of 
the non-interference norm, after having been severely compromised on numerous occasions by US 
activities. 
 
In Art. 23 (formerly 20) the emphasis on the priority of the OAS as instrument to settle disputes 
peacefully compared to the SCUN was dropped; a remarkable shift of position regarding the self-
conception of the OAS and its relations to the world body. 
Article 26 (formerly 23) – referring to the Pact of Bogotá - was adapted. Whereas the former para-
graph read: 
A special treaty will establish adequate procedures for the pacific settlements of disputes 
and will determine the appropriate means for their application, so that no dispute between 
American States shall fail of definitive settlement within a reasonable period. 
the new article included some differences, but nevertheless seems not to change it in a substantial 
manner: 
A special treaty will establish adequate means for the settlement of disputes and will de-
termine pertinent procedures for each peaceful means such that no dispute between 
American States will remain without definitive settlement within a reasonable period of 
time.” 
The competencies in case of an armed attack were shifted. Formerly, a Meeting of Consultation of 
Foreign Ministers was to be ‘held without delay’. The Protocol of Cartagena de Indias makes that 
Meeting of Consultation optional. The Chairman of the Permanent Council is obliged to immediately 
“call a meeting of the Council to decide on the convocation of the Meeting of Consultation” without 
prejudice to the Rio Treaty with regard to the state parties to that instrument [Art. 63, originally 
Art. 43]. 
With the new amendment the powers of the Secretary General of the OAS (SGOAS) in security 
matters is enhanced108
2.5.6 Amendment of the Charter with the Protocol of Washington 
1992
. The SGOAS may “bring to the attention of the Permanent Council or the 
General Assembly any matter which in his opinion might threaten the peace and security of the 
hemisphere” [Art. 116]. Besides endowing herewith the SGOAS with a sort of watch-dog compe-
tence, PECK additionally has opined that this provision has “been interpreted as an informal au-
thority for the secretary-general to offer his good offices” [PECK 1998:143], strengthening his 
power of initiative. 
As has been mentioned above, the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement was abol-
ished with this amendment. Art. 83 states that the Permanent Council may establish ‘ad hoc com-
mittees’. The establishment as well as the mandate of these ad hoc committees, however, are 
made dependent upon the consent of the parties to the dispute. This new strongly constrains the 
OAS powers, since no party to a conflict can be forced to accept unwelcome settlement initiatives. 
109
The Protocol of Washington inserted the following principle [Art. 3, f]: 
The elimination of extreme poverty is an essential part of the promotion and consolidation 
of representative democracy and is the common and shared responsibility of the American 
States 
 
                                                 
108 The most recent strengthening of relevant competencies of the SGOAS occurred with the approval of the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter (see below) which holds that the SGOAS, for instance, is to arrange visits or 
other actions if a country considers its democracy to be at risk. Additionally, it is the SGOAS who takes the 
initiative on requesting an immediate PCOAS meeting in the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the con-
stitutional regime [LAGOS & RUDY 2004:300-301]. 
109 The Protocol of Washington [see OAS PW] entered into force on September 25 1997 [OAS PW Sig]. 
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This principle emphasizes the causality between poverty reduction and the authentic democratic 
representation, and concludes that every truly democratic government is committed to act for the 
promotion of the welfare of its people. 
 
The main innovation of the Protocol of Washington, however, is the introduction of the option to 
suspend a member, in case that it’s democratically constituted government is overthrown by force 
[Art. 9]. Two thirds of the General Assembly (GAOAS) may exercise that power after initiatives to 
restore representative democracy have been unsuccessful. This provision applies in cases were 
internal conflicts erupt. It sends a signal to national opposition forces to refrain from gaining power 
by illegal means or to incumbents to refrain from holding on to power without the repeated legiti-
mization of the electorate. It thus supports the settlement of conflicts within the existing political 
system and as such aims at avoidance of conflict escalation. Although the effect is primarily con-
fined to internal conflicts, situations can arise where foreign governments may plan to overthrow 
an undesirable but democratically legitimized regime (see US interventions). 
2.5.7 Amendment of the Charter with the Protocol of Managua 
1993110
The amendment agreed to at the 19th Special Session of the General Assembly of the OAS in Ma-
nagua, Nicaragua, affects basically the Inter-American Council for Integral Development and does 
not change any provisions concerning security issues. 
 
2.6 The Inter-American Peace Committee 
The Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) was established at the second Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. The Meeting provided for this body in 
resolution XIV when they met in Havana, Cuba between 21st and 30th July 1940. Thus, its existence 
reaches farther back than the formal creation of the OAS. This organ functioned originally under 
the term ‘Inter-American Committee on Methods for the Peaceful Solution of Conflicts’111
The mandate, as delineated in resolution XIV is lavish both with regard to the surveillance task 
including the corresponding duty to report to other organizational entities, as well as to the right to 
suggest the method to tackle a given dispute. The provisions allow for considerable autonomy of 
the Committee by giving it the prerogative of initiative, instead of making its activation contingent 
on a submitted request. The leverage provided in this way, however, is open also to abuse, espe-
cially given a permanent membership. The probability that conflicts in which Committee members 
were involved would be reported in an equitable fashion was constrained. Likewise, the Committee 
 and was 
renamed ‘Inter-American Peace Committee’ on 6th July 1949 [UN Com] and again re-labelled via 
the Charter Amendment of 1967 as ‘Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement’ [LÉGER 
1974:2]. 
Looking back at the time of its creation, resolution XIV, entitled ‘The Peaceful Solutions of Con-
flicts’, recommended the organization of a committee composed of five countries. 
… a committee composed of representatives of five countries, which shall have the duty of 
keeping constant vigilance to insure that States between which any dispute exists or may 
arise, of any nature whatsoever, may solve it as quickly as possible, and of suggesting, 
without detriment to the methods adopted by the parties or to the procedures which they 
may agree upon, the measures and steps which may be conductive to a settlement. 
The Committee shall submit a report to each Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
and to each International Conference of American States regarding the status of such con-
flicts and the steps which may have been taken to bring about a solution [OAS 1940:21-
22]. 
LÉGER points out that apart from the number of countries the future committee would be made up, 
nothing else was clearly delineated [LÉGER 1974:11], leaving room for flexibility and perhaps also 
showing the lack of knowledge on the part of the member states about how best such a body was 
to be designed. In December 1940 the Governing Board of the PAU decided that Argentina, Brazil, 
Cuba, Mexico, and the US be made its constituting members [LÉGER 1974:12]. While at first 
membership was conceived to be permanent, it was later decided that the OAS Council elect its 
member for a period of five (later reduced to four) years [LÉGER 1974:17]. 
                                                 
110 The Protocol of Managua entered into force on 29th January 1996, see OAS PM. 
111 According to LÉGER it was popularly known as ‘Havana Committee’ [LÉGER 1974:2]. 
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built along the lines outlined above, might well be susceptible to promoting its members’ (hidden) 
foreign policy agendas. 
As regards the body’s structural localization, GEROLD [GEROLD 1971:50-56] as well as FENWICK 
[FENWICK 1949b:770-772; 1954b:139] argue that this organ was ‘overlooked’ when the legal 
framework of the OAS was concluded112
2.6.1 Getting started 
. The Inter-American Committee on Methods for the Peace-
ful Solution of Conflicts was responsible not to the Council of the OAS but to the Inter-American 
Conferences. But FENWICK highlights the peculiar connection between functionality and legal basis 
of the IAPC: 
It is of interest to note that it appears to be the complete absence of any element of legal 
obligation in the relations of the Committee [IAPC my remark] with the parties to the con-
troversy that constitutes its effectiveness [1954c:469]. 
It was not until July 1948 and on the initiative of the Dominican Republic that the Committee was 
eventually set up – the delay being probably due to the raging of WW II [LÉGER 1974:12]. The 
Dominican Republic called upon the Council of the OAS to request the countries represented in the 
Committee to appoint their respective representatives so that the Committee might assist in a dis-
pute between the Dominican Republic and Cuba [FENWICK 1949b:770].  
Life was consequently breathed into the body when the US urged the OAS members to bring the 
turmoil of the late 1940s in the Caribbean region to an end. As a member of the IAPC the United 
States initiated the investigation of the situation in the Caribbean area [HINTON 04.08.1949] in 
August 1949. Thus, on 3rd August  1949 the United States summoned a meeting of the IAPC to 
consider the threat to the  peace in the Caribbean region [NYT 21.08.1949b]. The meeting resulted 
in a letter to the members of the OAS, asking their views and suggestions113
The New York Times reported on the role of the so called ‘Caribbean Legion’. This organization was 
composed of exiles planning to overthrow dictators. The Caribbean Legion was estimated to num-
ber at that time about 1.500 persons. However, since the treaties of the American states vowed to 
prevent such activities, it was upheld that the matter had to be subjected to an investigation [HIN-
TON 20.08.1949]. In September 1949 the IAPC appealed to the American republics to rid them-
selves of the Caribbean Legion or other armed revolutionary groups and to observe the principle of 
non-intervention [WP 20.09.1949]. At a session of the Council of the OAS in April 1950 a Special 
Committee for the Caribbean
. The initiative as 
such, as well as the secrecy the IAPC resorted to during the investigation, raised suspicions among 
the Latin American states [NYT 21.08.1949a]. Remarkable was the position of Cuba which explicitly 
opposed the investigations’ limitation to the Caribbean. Cuba made clear that such an inquiry 
would be tantamount to ‘tutelage of intervention’ in the affairs of the Caribbean countries [HINTON 
19.08.1949]. 
114
                                                 
112 Also LÉGER underlines the fact that none of the three basic documents establishing the OAS (Rio Treaty, 
COAS, Pact of Bogotá) mentioned the IAPC and holds that it remains an unanswered question if that was a 
deliberate act or not [LÈGER 1974:14]. TACSAN [1997:493] describes the Inter-American Peace Committee as 
an ‘informal instrument’. 
113 For the contents of the reply of the US as initiator see HINTON 03.09.1949. 
114 That Special Committee essentially comprised the members of the committee which investigated in the dis-
pute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic [see below]. 
 was set up to investigate the developments and the turmoil in the 
region. This watchdog committee was to make a report on the Caribbean situation within three 
months [SHELLABY 09.08.1950]. The report was issued on 30th June  1950. The Special Committee 
for the Caribbean stated its satisfaction with the developments having occurred in the meantime 
and recognized the measures taken by the respective governments in conformity with the recom-
mendations of the provisional Organ of Consultation [CSM 09.08.1950]. In May 1951 the watchdog 
committee finally dissolved itself after stating that the relations among the concerned states had 
become ‘favorable’ [NYT 15.05.1951]. The Washington Post opined on the occasion of the dissolu-
tion that: 
The dissolution of the Special Caribbean Commission of the Organization of American 
States marks a milestone in the political maturity of Latin America. … 
… the Organization of American States has demonstrated to the world that peace can be 
maintained if the threats to it are met forthrightly and not evaded. [WP 17.05.1951] 
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2.6.2 Clipping the IAPC’s Wings 
The IAPC had given itself its first statute on 24th May 1950. At the Tenth Inter-American Confer-
ence in 1954 at Caracas, Resolution CII was adopted, commending the work of the IAPC and call-
ing upon the Council of the OAS to draw up a new statute, based upon the draft of the IAPC [FEN-
WICK 1954c:469] and taking ‘into consideration the various amendments and observations submit-
ted by the governments’ [AJIL 1954:132]. Numerous cases were brought before the IAPC until in 
1956 the revised statute115
The new statute changed also the composition of the IAPC. Only countries directly affected by a 
dispute received the right to appeal to the IAPC, provided all other affected countries agree. This 
limited the impact of the Committee in such a way, that subsequently no more case was brought 
before the formerly busy body
 - approved by the Council of the OAS [Department of State 1958] - 
went into force which reduced its powers. The IAPC’s numerous successful interventions have been 
attributed to its toothless decisions/recommendations, leaving enough room for manoeuvre for the 
parties to a conflict [BERNDT 1995:26]. The new status held, however, that henceforth, the IAPC 
may take up a case ‘only with the prior consent of the parties’ [Art. 2,15] [qtd. in: DIL 1963:436]. 
116
2.6.3 Second Lease of Life 
 [GEROLD 1971:53]. It had been so frequently charged with con-
flicts in the early years of its existence that LÉGER called it “an agency of the inter-American sys-
tem destined to control and manage conflicts and maintain peaceful relations between its member 
states” [LÉGER 1974:3]. 
At the Fifth MCMFA in 1959 the IAPC was re-empowered and endowed with special competencies in 
the face of renewed virulent political tensions in the Caribbean and Central America. The Foreign 
Ministers resolved: 
1. To entrust to the Inter-American Peace Committee the study of the questions that were 
the subject of the convocation of this Meeting, without prejudice to the specific compe-
tency of other agencies, and to this end it shall examine: 
Methods and procedures to prevent any activities from abroad designed to overthrow es-
tablished governments or provoke instances of intervention or aggression … 
The relationship between violations of human rights or the nonexercise of representative 
democracy, on the one hand, and the political tensions that affect the peace of the hemi-
sphere, on the other; and 
The relationship between economic underdevelopment and political instability. 
2. In the performance of its duties the Committee may, at the request of governments or 
on its own initiative, take action in regard to the subject matter referred to in paragraph 
1, its action in either case being subject to the express consent of the states to investiga-
tions that are to be made in their respective territories. 
3. The Committee shall immediately initiate broad studies on the questions to which para-
graph 1 of this resolution refers, except in those situations governed by other international 
instruments, and it shall prepare a preliminary report so that the American governments 
may formulate their observations. This report shall be followed by a definitive report, 
which shall be presented at the Eleventh Inter-American Conference or, if so indicated, to 
the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, so that any pertinent decisions 
may be made. 
4. The new powers that this resolution grants temporarily to the Inter-American Peace 
Committee shall be effective until the close of the Eleventh Inter-American Conference, 
which shall make the decision as to their definitive inclusion in the statutes of the said 
Committee. [OAS 1959:7-8] 
The Fifth MCMFA was not only endowing the IAPC with special competencies but what was much 
more: 
It was this meeting that recognised the Inter-American Peace Committee for the first time 
as a permanent part of the structure of the organisation. [CALVERT 1994:163] 
At that time the IAPC comprised delegates of Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, El Salvador, and the US 
[AdG 18.08.1959; KENWORTHY 11.02.1960]. 
In accordance with the resolution the IAPC instructed a subcommittee to travel to the Caribbean 
and Central American region and investigate the nature and origin of the political tensions there 
                                                 
115 For a short description of the IAPC’s competencies under this statute see Department of State 1958. 
116 KENWORTHY [11.02.1960] describes the IAPC in the period between 1956 and 1959 as ‘dormant’ and ‘inac-
tive’ [KENWORTHY 09.06.1960]. 
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[NYT 20.12.1959]. It subsequently visited Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica [NYT 17.08.1960]. 
After 80 working sessions, interviewing government officials and exiles, the IAPC issued its first 
assessment on the matter in April 1960 and concluded that the tensions arose because of a lack of 
respect for human rights and representative democracy. Dictatorial regimes were causing citizens 
to go into exile abroad where they organize movements against their home governments. This 
again nurtures tensions between governments. In order to ease those tensions the IAPC suggested 
the following: 
 
• freeing of political prisoners; 
• permitting persons in diplomatic missions who received political asylum to leave the coun-
try; and  
• that governments take steps for greater respect for human rights and representative de-
mocracy [WP 16.04.1960; PHILLIPS 16.04.1960]. 
 
On 16th August 1960 the IAPC submitted a further report to the Sixth MCMFA, taking place in San 
José, Costa Rica. The IAPC stated that the situation in the Caribbean has changed during the last 
year. Whereas the tensions in 1959 were concerning military expeditions with the aim of over-
throwing governments of other nations in the hemisphere this threat had diminished clearly and 
the current situation was judged to be characterized by: 
 
• illegal flights by aircraft from one country over the territory of another for the purpose of 
dropping propaganda, transporting personnel engaged in political activities and causing 
property damage; 
• alleged abuse of diplomatic status and privileges; 
• improper treatment of diplomatic agents of American countries and hindering of their le-
gitimate activities; 
• systematic and hostile propaganda carried out by various governments against others with 
the means of government controlled media; 
• the increasing desire of the Soviet Union and other extra-continental powers to intervene in 
inter-American affairs. 
 
The subcommittee to investigate tensions in the Central American region found that as a result of 
the improved collaboration of the respective countries, tensions were in the process of subsiding. 
Still, the report condemns dictatorial and communist regimes and concludes:  
To the peoples of the Americas all forms of dictatorships are repugnant. The conflict be-
tween the authoritarian tendencies … and the democratic aspirations of the vast majority 
of the peoples of the American states lies at the very heart of recent international tensions 
in the Caribbean area. 
However the IAPC notes that it deems itself not in a position to present recommendations for the 
measures to be taken, but insists on the adherence to the inter-American principles of non-
intervention, solidarity in defending the hemisphere against extra-continental interventions, pro-
motion of effective democracy, and respect for human rights as well as collaboration in social and 
economic matters for the advancement of the peoples of the hemisphere [NYT 17.08.1960]. 
2.6.4 IAPC’s Guest Performance Terminated 
At the Second Special Inter-American Conference in 1965, the provisional extensions of powers of 
the Peace Committee granted in 1959 at the Fifth MCMFA were terminated and the OAS Council 
was tasked with consulting the member states on the question if the statute of the IAPC should be 
amended and if so, to amend them accordingly [AJIL 1966:457]. Also the 1967 amendment of the 
COAS, setting up the IAPC under the term Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement did 
nothing to restore any power to the weakened body, with the result that no further case was 
brought before it [BELT 2002]. Ultimately, the decision was made to abolish the Committee alto-
gether and to transfer its powers to the PCOAS with the amendment of the Charter in 1985 [BER-
ENSON 2002; BELT 2002]. 
Reviewing the activities of the IAPC the conclusion has been drawn that it was engaged mainly with 
low-level disputes. Conflicts of a seemingly greater scale and bigger threat potential – have usually 
been dealt with by procedures of the Rio Treaty [LÉGER 1974:86]. And even for the conflicts it 
actually dealt with, the IAPC was found to have merely ‚patched up‘ but not solved them, ignoring 
their fundamental causes [LÉGER 1974:196], although that can be said also of many other OAS 
resolution attempts. Comparably unsuccessful – LÉGER finds – was the body in regard of its as-
signment to further representative democracy, given the proliferation of military regimes during 
the entity’s lifetime. Its record of protecting human rights was qualified to be equally dismal 
[LÉGER 1974:197-198]. However, the IAPC’s activities, especially those during its rejuvenation 
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tenure, have undoubtedly and strongly inspired the establishment of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights in 1960.  
2.7 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
The first initiative creating an inter-American legal statement protecting human rights, goes back 
to the  approval of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Men117
a) to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America; 
, signed on 2 May 
1948 during the same conference (Ninth International Conference of American States) that also 
agreed on the COAS [SCHEMAN 1965:335-336]. This Declaration codifies general individual human 
rights and obligations. However, the Inter-American Juridical Committee ruled later that “it is obvi-
ous that the Declaration of Bogotá does not create a legal contractual obligation”, not least because 
it had only the form of a resolution [qtd. in: BUERGENTHAL 1975:829]. 
More than a decade had to elapse before the OAS took the step to create a body for the promotion 
of human rights. The Organization voted on the establishment of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) on 25 May 1960. The creation of the IACHR had originally been pro-
posed during the Fifth MCMFA in August 1959 by El Salvador, the US, Argentina and Brazil [UNNA 
26.05.1960] and was approved in Resolution VIII [AJIL 1962:609]. Twenty nations were in favour 
of the move; only the Dominican Republic abstained. The rights of the IACHR as laid down in the 
draft of its first statute, however, were limited due to lacking support and enthusiasm on the part 
of various OAS member states [NYT 25.03.1960]. The original but obviously over-ambitious ver-
sion of the statute would have permitted the IACHR to act on civil rights violations brought before 
it by individuals, rather than just by states. Furthermore the Commission would have been allowed 
to publicize its recommendations if states failed to act upon the findings. However, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and the Dominican 
Republic all abstained and the US as well as Bolivia voted against this clause. [UNNA 26.05.1960]. 
Art. 1 of the final statute constitutes the IACHR as an autonomous entity of the OAS [GEROLD 
1971:176]. Similar to the opaque legal anchorage of the IAPC, also the IACHR’s foundation was left 
ill-defined as SCHERMAN highlights in 1965: 
Being neither an “organ” of the system nor a Specialized Organization, its exact status 
under the O.A.S. Charter has never been resolved. [SCHERMAN 1965:336-337] 
With the COAS amendment of 1967 that situation was corrected and the IACHR was termed an 
‘organ’ of the OAS. 
The IACHR was to be made up of seven members elected as experts in their individual capacity and 
were expected to represent all OAS member states. They are appointed for four-year terms by the 
OAS Council. The IACHR meets for eight weeks a year [SCHERMAN 1965:336-337]. The powers of 
the Commission were listed as: 
 
b) to make recommendations to the governments of the member states in general, if it con-
siders such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in favour of human 
rights within the framework of their domestic legislation and, in accordance with their con-
stitutional precepts, appropriate measures to further the faithful observance of those 
rights; 
c) to prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the performance of its du-
ties; 
d) to urge the governments of the member states to supply it with information on the meas-
ures adopted by them in matters of human rights; and 
e) to serve the Organization of American States as an advisory body in respect of human 
rights [SCHERMAN 1965:337-338]. 
 
No enforcement power was among its competencies, but SCHERMAN concludes: 
The Commission’s influence is exercised through observations contained in published 
statements and presented to public opinion. This is the principal and not insignificant 
sanction118…[SCHERMAN 1965:340]119
                                                 
117 For the text see OAS 1948. 
118 As elaborated earlier, constructivism recognizes reporting and in the shaming or lauding which goes with it 
as one of IOs’ formidable powers.  
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The IACHR interpreted above given item b to empower it to make general recommendations to 
individual member states or to all of them. Based on this interpretation the Commission asserted 
the authority to study the human rights situation in various countries and formulate recommenda-
tions to governments that fragrantly violated human rights [BUERGENTHAL 1975:830-831]. 
The statute holds that the human rights to be furthered and protected are “… those set forth in the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man” [qtd. in: BUERGENTHAL 1975:830]. 
The reports of the IACHR summarize the gathered information through individual complaints about 
human rights violations. If the concerned governments forward an answer, this is incorporated into 
the report. It is usually made clear in those reports that the Commission can judge only by the 
information it received. But in various cases the governments denied information and/or coopera-
tion (Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua)120
2.7.1 Broadening the IACHR’s Mandate 
 [SCHERMAN 1965:341-343]. FENWICK is highly critical of the 
IACHR’s achievements in the field of human rights: 
…in spite of grievous violations of fundamental rights … no sanctions of any kind have 
been adopted to give effect to the declarations and resolutions. Doubtless the solution 
must remain for some time a matter of exhortation rather than of law. [FENWICK 
1965:319] 
After the Eight MCMFA which had asked the OAS Council to revise the IACHR statute – strengthen-
ing and broadening the faculties of the IACHR, in order to meaningfully further the respect for hu-
man rights in the Americas [OAS 1962:16], the Second Special Inter-American Conference, taking 
place in 1965, resolved i.a. the following: 
 
• to request the IACHR to conduct a continuing survey of the observance of fundamental 
human rights in each of the member states; 
• to authorize the IACHR to examine communication submitted to it and any other available 
information, so that it may address to the government of any American state a request for 
information deemed pertinent by the IACHR, and so that it may make recommendations, 
when it deems this appropriate, with the objective of bringing about more effective obser-
vance of fundamental human rights; 
• to request the IACHR to submit a report annually to the Inter-American Conference or 
MCMFA. This report should include a statement of progress achieved in realization of the 
goals set forth in the American Declaration, a statement of areas in which further steps are 
needed to give effect to the human rights set forth in the American Declaration, and such 
observations as the IACHR may deem appropriate on matters covered in the communica-
tions submitted to it and in other information available to the IACHR. 
 
As regards the functions set forth in the last two paragraphs, the IACHR shall first ascertain if do-
mestic legal procedures and remedies of member states have been duly pursued and exhausted 
[AJIL 1966:458-459]. In accordance with this resolution the statute of the IACHR was amended 
[AJIL 1966:460]. 
The achievements of the Commission in its first years of operation are ascertained by BUERGEN-
THAL who judges: 
The pre-1970 practice and achievements of the Commission gain in significance once it is 
remembered that prior to the revision of the Charter the inter-American human rights sys-
tem … owed its existence not to a treaty or other legally binding instrument but to OAS 
resolutions and pronouncements of uncertain authority. The entire system lacked a solid 
constitutional basis and seemed to be shrouded in legal and institutional ambiguities 
[BUERGENTHAL 1975:833]. 
With the COAS Amendment of 1967 the position of the IACHR as well as the significance hence-
forth to be attributed to the protection of human rights in general were enhanced. If one reviews 
the activities of the IAPC (and its variants)– ascertaining the facts and formulating various recom-
mendations, frequently with reference to human rights – one might argue, that the declining rank 
of the IAPC met with the simultaneous establishment and subsequent upgrading of the IACHR. 
                                                                                                                                                        
119 Compare also PECK 1998:146. 
120 For the IACHR country reports as well as for its annual reports as of 1970 see: 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../documents/eng/structure.asp retrieved on 
09.08.2005. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES | THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
43 
This argument is also supported by the fact that the IACHR in 1965 was finally granted the right to 
‘receive, examine and make decisions’ on individual petitions121
However, only in July 1978 did the Convention finally enter into force [OAS ACHR Sig]. It addition-
ally formulates civil and political rights
 from inhabitants of the hemisphere 
[CERNA 2004:197], provided that domestic remedies have been exhausted [CERNA 2004:200]. 
Thus, an idea suggested in the first draft of the statutes but later dropped, was eventually included 
among the Commissions powers. 
First and foremost the amended COAS conceives the IACHR as an ‘organ’ of the OAS [Art. 52]. The 
first part of Article 112 reads: 
There shall be an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, whose principal function 
shall be to promote the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a con-
sultative organ of the Organization in these matters. 
The 1967 Protocol of Buenos Aires made reference to a Convention to be adopted which will define 
the structure, competence, and procedure of the Commission. This document, entitled American 
Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San José, was agreed on in November 1969 and as such 
transformed the IACHR into a treaty-based organ. Additionally, this Convention established the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights,   hereby considerably strengthening the human rights-
machinery of the OAS (see below). 
122 and was complemented by the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the so-
called Protocol of San Salvador in 1988 which came into effect in 1999123
2.7.2 Revamping and Modernizing the IACHR 
 [BERRY 2005:249]. 
Already in the meantime the IACHR had acquired a revamped cachet as a co-decider in conflict 
situations. Thus, in when Costa Rica had turned to the OAS after Nicaragua had chased rebel on its 
territory, the IACHR was sent to Nicaragua for the purpose of investigating possible human rights 
violation by the Somoza regime. It published a devastating report detailing grave human rights 
violations [BERNDT 1995:73], thus contributing to the shaping of opinions inside the OAS. Thus the 
MCMFA in one of its corresponding resolution, calling for the removal of the Somoza government, 
contained the following paragraph: 
The inhuman conduct of the dictatorial regime governing the country, as evidenced by the 
report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, is the fundamental cause of 
the dramatic situation faced by the Nicaraguan people. [OAS 17. MCMFA] 
The Somoza regime was finally forced from office.  
In 2001 the IACR adopted new Rules of Procedures. Among the most important changes ranges 
rule 44 which provides that non-compliance of states with the IACHR’s recommendations are to be 
presented to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, except four Commission members object 
to this move. This rule has led to a considerable increase of cases transferred by the Commission 
to the Court [CERNA 2004:204]. 
 
In recent years the IACHR has established various rapporteurships to underline the protection of 
groups of people considered to be especially prone to human rights violations; among them are: 
 
• In 1994 the Special Rapporteurship on the Rights of Women was brought into being by the 
IACHR. The main initial task was to analyze the extent to which member states’ laws com-
plied with equality and non-discrimination. The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women 
since then published various thematic reports and assisted in the development of new ju-
risprudence124
                                                 
121 For details on the competencies regarding the such individual cases see CERNA 2004:199-200]. 
122 For the text of the Convention see http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html retrieved on 
25.09.2007. 
123 For the text of the Additional Protocol see http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html retrieved 
on 25.09.2007. Ratifications to be found at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html retrieved on 
25.09.2007. 
124 See requisite homepage: http://www.cidh.oas.org/women/mandate.htm retrieved on 09.02.2006. 
. 
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• In 1997 the Special Rapporteurship on Migrant Workers and Their Families was established. 
Its main responsibility is protecting the human rights of this especially vulnerable group of 
persons and to design appropriate recommendation to this end125
• In 1998 the IACHR established a Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. This Spe-
cial Rapporteur is mandated to support and promote the freedom of the Press [SNS 
05.11.2004] and releases annual and country reports. The Special Rapporteur for instance 
pointed to the infringement of the press during the run-up to the presidential elections in 
Peru in 2000 (see case below). 
. 
• In 2005 the Special Rapporteurship on the Rights of Persons of African Descent and on Ra-
cial Discrimination was established and tasked with creating corresponding awareness by 
the OAS member countries. It was furthermore to draft reports and formulate recommen-
dations to the IACHR for potential hearings on alleged violations of Afro-Latinos [USFN 
28.02.2005]. 
 
The power of the IACHR is mainly immaterial as compared to the advisory opinions of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. Although having no competence of sanctioning, the reports being 
published exert a certain amount of political pressure. Thus, when in April 1987 the IACHR accused 
the US of acting against the right to life and the right to equality before the law by executing juve-
niles for acts they committed below the age of 18, HAYS observed: 
Though the OAS cannot invoke any penalties against the United States, the commission's 
findings have symbolic weight. The report puts the United States in the company of such 
nations as Cuba, Paraguay, Chile and Nicaragua, which have been cited for human rights 
violations [HAYS 03.04.1987]. 
The issue of human rights over the years gained in importance, so that by November 1980 the 
General Assembly in a resolution felt compelled to call on six nations (Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, 
Haiti, Paraguay, and Uruguay) to improve their human rights record [CT 28.11.1980]. 
PECK regards the so called ‘precautionary measures’ as the most effective means in responding to 
complaints of individuals against state bodies. In serious cases and if all local remedies have been 
exhausted the Commission can issue an urgent request to governments to take immediately all 
necessary measures to protect the human rights of the group or individual concerned. This proce-
dure is usually confidential and only if government do not respond public attention is drawn to the 
matter in order to put pressure on it [PECK 1998:145]. 
SCHNABLY on the other side argues that the IACHR carries far lesser weight if compared to actions 
taken by member states themselves. Additionally, since the IACHR focuses on individual cases 
structural causes of systematic human rights abuses go usually unaddressed [SCHNABLY 
1994:412-418]. 
Working as professional staff of the IACHR, CERNA upholds that the IACHR’s main function in its 
first thirty years of existence were on-site visits and preparing comprehensive draft country re-
ports. After the coming into force of the American Convention on Human Rights and the creation of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights significance has shifted towards handling individual peti-
tions [CERNA 2004:198-199]. 
2.8 The Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
The American Convention on Human Rights establishing the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
originally had been adopted in 1969 but entered into force only in July 1979 after eleven countries 
had ratified it. The Court’s permanent seat was to be located in San José, Costa Rica [HOVEY 
27.05.1979]. The Court issued its first judgments not before 1987 [CERNA 2004:199]. The Court is 
made up of seven judges nominated and elected by the state parties to the Convention. 
The states to a case have the right to name an additional ad hoc judge, if no representative is pre-
sent among the seven regular judges [BUERGENTHAL 1982:235]. Art. 61 stipulates that only the 
state parties and the IACHR shall have the right to submit a case to the Court, but no individuals. 
Individuals have to address the IACHR, which in turn may transfer it to the Court. PECK has ob-
served that the IACHR usually tends to bring strong cases to the Court in which the plaintiff is likely 
to win. This is done in the hope to thus deter similar human rights abuses by other governments 
[PECK 1998:147]. The Court has also the possibility to issues advisory opinions [CERNA 
2004:199]. 
                                                 
125 See requisite homepage: http://www.cidh.oas.org/Migrantes/defaultmigrants.htm retrieved on 09.02.2006. 
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The state parties may declare that they recognize as binding the jurisdiction of the Court; however, 
recognitions may be qualified: a “declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of 
reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases”. It follows that the jurisdiction of the Court 
shall cover all cases concerning the application or interpretation of the American Convention on 
Human Rights ‘provided that the State Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such juris-
diction’ [Art. 62]. 
Art. 63 further outlines the Court’s assignments: 
1. If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this 
Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of this 
right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences 
of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be reme-
died and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 
2. In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable 
damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent 
in matters it has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the 
Court, it may act at the request of the Commission. 
As BUERGENTHAL [BUERGENTHAL 1982:241], himself acting at that time as judge on the Court, 
observes, the “Convention does not establish a formal procedure to enforce the rulings of the Court 
against recalcitrant states”. He concludes nevertheless that the Court has some power in this re-
gard, in view of article 65 which reads: 
To each regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States 
the Court shall submit, for the Assembly’s consideration, a report on its work during the 
previous year. It shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a state has not complied 
with its judgments, making any pertinent recommendations. 
This right is similar to the one granted to the IACHR, endowing both bodies with the ability to pil-
lory violating governments. 
As regards the advisory power of the Court it is quite extensive; again BUERGENTHAL highlights 
that broad competence, as formulated in Art. 63: 
[T]he scope of the advisory power it confers on the Court is more extensive than that en-
joyed by any international tribunal in existence today. Thus, first, standing to request an 
advisory opinion from the Court is not limited to the states parties to the Convention; it 
extends to any OAS member state. Second, the Court's advisory jurisdiction applies not 
only to the Convention but also to the interpretation of any other treaty "concerning the 
protection of human rights in the American states." Third, the right to seek advisory opin-
ions extends to all OAS organs, including the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the OAS General Assembly. Finally, all OAS member states may also request 
opinions from the Court regarding the compatibility of their domestic laws with the Con-
vention or with any of the human rights treaties to which Article 64 refers.  [BUERGEN-
THAL 1982:242] 
With reference to the political power of the Court BUERGENTHAL upholds the following: 
Although the Court's decision in a contentious case is binding, which is of course not true 
of an advisory opinion that distinction may not be of great practical significance. Compli-
ance and noncompliance by states with their international obligations depend less on the 
formal status of a judgment and its abstract enforceability than on the impact of the opin-
ion as a force capable of adding to or detracting from the legitimacy of specific govern-
mental conduct. This latter factor has an important bearing on the perception that | gov-
ernments have about the political costs of noncompliance. As a result, states may find it 
as difficult in some cases to disregard an advisory opinion as a binding decision. At the 
same time, it is easier for governments to comply with advisory opinions because such 
rulings do not stigmatize them as violators of human rights, which in turn diminishes the 
domestic political cost of compliance. The Court may therefore be able to play an impor-
tant role, even if its contentious jurisdiction is not widely accepted by the states parties, 
provided that its advisory jurisdiction is resorted to by OAS organs and by the member 
states [BUERGENTHAL 1982:244-245]. 
As constructivism underlines, it is among the formidable powers of IOs to cause social-
psychological costs and benefits for their members. This again has a bearing on the legitimation 
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enjoyed not only internationally, but domestically as well126
Later the Court adopted new Rules of Procedure which took effect in 1997
. Democratically constituted govern-
ments are especially vulnerable to resulting pressures, since they are wary of possible withdrawals 
of political support. 
127
• the payment of compensation to the relatives and lawyers, amounting to $ 779.000; 
. Henceforth victims 
were given the right to represent themselves, instead of being represented by the IACHR. This 
strengthens the victims’ status and frees the IACHR to feel urged to take sides. 
In order to gain an impression what type of decisions the Court takes, an example may be given. 
When in 2004 the Guatemalan state was found guilty of the murder of the researcher Myrna Mack 
in 1990, the sentence stipulate i.a.: 
 
• the publication of the sentence in Guatemala's official newspaper and an additional national 
newspaper; 
• the holding of a public ceremony in recognition of the state's responsibility in the murder 
and as an apology in memory of Myrna Mack; 
• the establishment of a scholarship in the name of Myrna Mack; 
• the naming of a street in the capital; 
• the inclusion of human rights training in the educational programs for police and armed 
forces; and 
• an investigation to find the perpetrators and masterminds of the crime [EFE 13.01.2004].  
2.9 Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MCMFA) was no new diplomatic get-
together; it existed well before the creation of the OAS in 1948 and dates back to 1936 and 
1938128
• First MCMFA, Panama, 23rd September – 3rd October 1939: adoption of a neutrality declara-
tion after the outbreak of WW II; 
. When the American countries came together for the Eight International Conference of 
American States in Lima, Peru, the world was faced with the threat of war. The Declaration of Lima 
provided for a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in events of threats to the peace. On three 
occasions before 1948 an MCMFA had been convoked: 
 
• Second MCMFA, Havana, 21st - 30th July 1940: the approved Act of Havana allowed the US 
to occupy the Dutch and French possessions in the Caribbean and South America after both 
countries had fallen to the Nazis in WW II; 
• Third MCMFA, Rio de Janeiro, 15th – 28th January 1942: approved a recommendation for 
the cutting of political and economic ties to the Axis powers after the Japan had attacked 
the US in Pearl Harbor [LAGOS 2001:29; FENWICK 1951:337]. 
 
The institutional framework of the OAS foresees three possibilities to call for an MCMFA: via the Rio 
Treaty (see above), via the Pact of Bogotá129, and by way of Art. 61 and Art. 62 COAS130
As has already been detailed, the MCMFA as Organ of Consultation in the framework of the Rio 
Treaty was frequently bypassed by the provisional Organ of Consultation. And also today the im-
portance of the MCMFA is on decline
. 
131
                                                 
126 See constructivist literature as for example FINNEMORE & SIKKING 1998 or GOODMAN & JINKS 2004. 
127 The rules are found at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/rule1-97.htm retrieved on 29.01.2008. 
128 In 1936 a convention was adopted stating that in case a menace to the peace of America should arise, the 
American governments would consult individually with one another in order to decide if a collective consultation 
is to take place. The declaration of Lima which was adopted in 1938 stipulated that consultations are to be held 
when the peace is threatened; it specified that those consultations were to be carried out by the Meeting of 
Consultations of Ministers of Foreign Affairs [FENWICK 1951:336]. 
129 Art. 50 reads: “If one of the High Contracting Parties should fail to carry out the obligations imposed upon it 
by a decision of the International Court of Justice or by an arbitral award, the other party or parties concerned 
shall, before resorting to the Security Council of the United Nations, propose a Meeting of Consultation of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs…” [qtd. in: LAGOS 2001:28]. 
130 Art. 62 states: “[a]ny Member State may request that a Meeting of Consultation be called. The request shall 
be addressed to the Permanent Council of the Organization, which shall decide by an absolute majority whether 
a meeting should be held.” An MCMFA is to be called in order to “consider problems of an urgent nature and of 
common interest to the American States, and to serve as the Organ of Consultation” according to art. 61 COAS 
(1993). 
131In the OAS’ recent evolution to a regime protecting democracy as embodies by the Inter-American Democ-
ratic Charter, the regular MCMFA was not assigned any role. LAGOS & RUDY regard this an ‚oversight‘ [LAGOS & 
RUDY 2004:302]. 
. LAGOS opines: 
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More Meetings of Consultation were held in the Organization’s early years than is true to-
day. Perhaps one reason for this change, besides the end of the Cold War, is the fact that 
the Permanent Council has taken on a more prominent role in the OAS and in hemispheric 
affairs. The Council is prone to meet frequently, perhaps once every other week if not 
more often, and Member States are represented at the ambassador or plenipotentiary 
level. Therefore, the need for high-level consultation among the American states often can 
be met by means of the Permanent Council [LAGOS 2001:27] 
In the past, however, the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting frequently offered the opportunity to arrive at 
important decisions which frequently did not fail to impact on ongoing conflicts and disputes. 
2.9.1 Fourth MCMFA 26th March to 7th April 1951 - Moving against 
Communism 
The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1951 was the first MCMFA held 
after the OAS’ establishment. This Meeting was sponsored by the US132. In a note from December 
1950 to the Chairman of the Council of the OAS, the US argued that under article 39 COAS133: 
“[t]he aggressive policy of International Communism, carried out to its satellites, has brought 
about a situation in which the entire free world is threatened”134
Thirty-one resolutions were adopted by the Meeting. The final act made numerous references to 
the activities of international communism, endangering liberty and democracy in the hemisphere 
and world-wide. The American republics vowed to act against threats emanating from international 
communism. It was declared that the United Nations is the most effective means of maintaining 
peace and security of the peoples of the world, qualifying the try-OAS-first principle to some de-
gree. The resolutions also included the commitment of the signatories to make available parts of 
their armed forces for the defence of the hemisphere as well as for service as United Nations units 
in accordance with the Uniting for Peace resolution of the UN
 [qtd. in KUNZ 1951:742]. Two 
days later the Council decided to hold the Meeting of Consultation in Washington from 26th March 
1951 onwards. [KUNZ 1951:742]. The program of this meeting was to encompass: political and 
military cooperation for the defence of the Americas, strengthening of the internal security of the 
American Republics, and emergency economic cooperation for defence and development [FENWICK 
1951:338]. The last agenda item was introduced on insistence of the Latin American nations which 
had argued that communism is most likely to prosper under conditions of poverty. Economic pros-
perity was judged to be a pre-condition for political stability [KUNZ 1951:744-745]. The US was at 
that time involved in the Korean War (1950-1953); there US troops fought against communist 
North Korea on the side of non-communist South Korea. The US was intending to gain support 
from its OAS partners, thus pursuing two aims: it wanted its OAS peers to contribute troops to the 
US contingents, which officially acted under the UN flag; and it was no longer ready to station tens 
of thousands of its troops in the hemisphere should the war eventually encroach to the continent as 
happened in WW II.  
135. The Inter-American Defense 
Board136
                                                 
132 On the position of the US concerning this Meeting see commentary of the Washington Post [WP 26.03.1951]. 
133 Art. 39 COAS (1948) states: “The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be held in 
order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve as 
the Organ of Consultation”. On the reasons why the US preferred to call the MCMFA under the COAS instead of 
the Rio Treaty see FENWICK 1951:337-338. 
134 KUNZ argues that the convocation referred to Article 40 COAS [1951:742]; FENWICK holds that Article 39 
COAS was the basis of the convocation [FENWICK 1951:337-338]. 
135 Resolution 377 of the UN General Assembly. This famous resolution was aiming at bypassing the UN Security 
Council. The essential paragraph reads: “Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of 
the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recom-
mendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggres-
sion the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security” [UN Unit-
ing for Peace]. 
136 The Inter-American Defense Board was created well before the establishment of the OAS in 1942 during 
World War II. On 30th March 1942 the Third Inter-American Foreign Ministers Conference in Rio de Janeiro 
[SKELLY 31.03.1957] assigned  the Inter-American Defense Board the task to gradually “prepare the American 
republics to defend the hemisphere, by conducting studies and recommending courses of action to this end” 
[OAS PC 2000a]. 
The activities of the Inter-American Defense Board may be classified in three categories: activities deriving from 
the function of preparing a legitimate defence against eventual aggressions from outside the hemisphere; ac-
tivities of military cooperation advisory services; and activities requested by organs of the OAS, and those 
which are referred to it by individual states [OAS PC 2000a]. 
 was to prepare the ‘military planning of the common defence’. The American countries 
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even went so far as to agree to examine their laws and adopt such changes as they consider “nec-
essary to insure that subversive activities of the agents of international communism” may be fore-
stalled and penalized. Although the Latin American countries exchanged their unanimous support 
for those aims with resolutions directed at economic development, the US definitely succeeded in 
transforming this international conference into a tool for pushing its very own foreign policy agenda 
[NYT 08.04.1951]. This fact was handsomely demonstrated when the MCMFA used the same lan-
guage as the US had done earlier when characterizing the situation (created by expanding commu-
nism) as ‘emergency’ [compare: DIL 1997:770]. 
Since every measure it proposed was approved, the US unsurprisingly judged the Meeting to have 
been a complete success [KUHN 06.04.1951]. Accordingly, KUNZ, writing in the American Journal 
of International Law came to the following (somewhat euphemistical) conclusion: 
It may well be that, despite the resolutions of this meeting, there will not be ideal per-
formances everywhere of a representative democracy; it may well be that, despite the 
resolutions of this meeting, not many Latin-American soldiers will be seen in Korea. It is 
certain that the economic resolutions of this meeting will need a strong degree of imple-
mentation. Yet the meeting must be valued as a reasonable success. It has maintained 
and strengthened the unity of the Americas as a co-operative organization of partners ... 
it has reaffirmed continental solidarity, and all that in the new world situation now prevail-
ing” [KUNZ 1951:745]. 
Also BARLIANT lauded the MCMFA as having “demonstrated the readiness and ability of the body 
[the MCMFA, my remark] to formulate inter-American policy and to direct OAS operations on a 
broad scale” [BARLIANT 1969:1165]. 
2.9.2 Fifth MCMFA 12th to 18th August 1959 - Re-empowering the 
IAPC, Creating human Rights’ Machinery, Strengthening De-
mocracy 
The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was requested by the US, Brazil, 
Uruguay, and Peru [AdG 18.08.1959] and was primarily called to discuss the political tensions in 
the Caribbean. During 1959 invasion attempts were made in Panama, Nicaragua, and the Domini-
can Republic (see further below). The OAS Council recommended the following items for the Fifth 
MCMFA: 
                                                                                                                                                        
In four thematic areas those activities are carried out – as identified by the Inter-American Defense Board: 
natural disaster preparedness and relief; demining; confidence- and security-building measures and education 
for peace [OAS PC 2000d]. 
The relationship between the Inter-American Defense Board and the OAS from the outset was highly ambiguous 
[compare e.g.: OAS PC 2000d]. On the one hand the Charter makes no mention of the Defense Board; on the 
other hand the budget of the Inter-American Defense Board is included in the program budget of the OAS [OAS 
PC 2000a]. 
However, with the Declaration on Security in the Americas the OAS member states entrust the Committee on 
Hemispheric Security (CHS) with completing ‘the analysis of the relationship between the IADB and the OAS’ 
[OAS DSA IV,49]. In early 2006 the Chairman of the CHS, Esteban Tomic, submitted draft statutes to the OAS, 
formalizing their relationship, and incorporating the first into the latter as its agency [USFN 01.03.2006; USFN 
14.03.2006]. During the 22nd Special Session in mid-March 2006 of the GAOAS the statutes were approved 
which emphasized the IADB's role as providing military and defence advise to the OAS and help create good 
military-civilian relations in order to contribute to an atmosphere of peace, progress, and respect for human 
rights. Moreover the statutes defined that the IADB “embodies in its structure and its operations the principles 
of civilian oversight and the subordination of military institutions to civilian authority”, in accordance with the 
IADC [text in: USFN 16.03.2006]. 
The Inter-American Defense Board is quite distinct from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, since it has no 
troops or weapons at its disposal. Its competence is rather located at the planning level, mainly formulating 
recommendations [SKELLY 31.03.1957]. Its importance is limited also on the grounds that not all OAS member 
states are participating in it; as Chile has pointed out until November 2000 only 25 OAS member states were 
also members of the Inter-American Defense Board and of those only 19 participated actively [OAS PC 2000e]. 
That is why its sceptics, for example Mexico, are arguing that the Inter-American Defense Board has been over-
taken by political developments [OAS PC 2000d]. Thus, US plans pursued in 2004 to enlarge the IADB's re-
sponsibilities to also cover 'security', understood as reaching from terrorism to disaster management, were 
rejected straightaway by Brazil [LABSCR 23.11.2004]. 
However, some other countries seem to consider the IADB as a forum with some usefulness, as was evidenced 
by the joining of Belize in 2004. The country explained its decision i.a. as being a measure of confidence build-
ing in regard of its rapprochement with Guatemala (also participating in the IADB), with which it had enter-
tained a border dispute [BBC MS 03.06.2004]. 
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• consideration of political tensions in the Caribbean area with the purpose of maintaining 
peace in the region; 
• means for making effective the obligations of the American republics to the principles of 
non-intervention and non-aggression; 
• methods for strengthening representative democracy and respect for the rights of the indi-
vidual; 
• improvements of inter-American procedures to prevent situations that disturb the peace 
and to find solutions for those that endanger peace [NYT 18.07.1959]. 
 
Although the OAS had to use the euphemism ‘political tension in the Caribbean’ to mask its en-
deavour to identify the perpetrators concerning the invasion charge of the Dominican Republic 
against Cuba and Venezuela (see below) [PHILLIPS 19.07.1959], the NYT  commented on the deci-
sion to convene the Fifth MCMFA thus: 
The talking may not result in unanimous agreement, but it is a proud boast of our hemi-
sphere that the regional organization through which the United States and the twenty re-
publics of Latin America work is the most effective and successful instrument for peace in 
any part of the world. [NYT 18.07.1959a] 
The Cuban premier, Fidel Castro, claimed that “[t]hey convoked it to deal with tensions because 
Trujillo [President of the Dominican Republic, my remark] asked for it”; Castro suggested that the 
MCMFA should instead consider the topics hunger, poverty, and underdevelopment in the Latin 
countries [qtd. in: WP 28.07.1959]. He and Venezuela had proposed that the principle of non-
intervention would not bar the overthrow of dictators (Trujillo). Such action would be permissible 
because Trujillo had violated COAS provisions on human rights and democracy. However, this no-
tion was not shared by their OAS counterparts. 
The tensions ran so high that during the MCMFA a Cuban and Dominican delegate shouted insults 
at each other [SZULC 14.08.1959]. In order to bring the MCMFA nevertheless to a success, seven 
Latin countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico) negotiated 
with Cuba, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua to find a compromise. It was agreed 
to change the statute of the IAPC and empower it with special competencies to act in cases of con-
flicts [ONIS 15.08.1959; CDT 16.08.1959; SZULC 19.08.1959]. The competencies of the IAPC were 
provisionally enlarged to cover conciliation on its own initiative or on the request of governments in 
cases of political tensions such as were prevalent during 1959. 
The Final Act of the Fifth MCMFA included the ‘Declaration of Santiago’ which made a broad com-
mitment to representative democracy. It underlined that “[t]he existence of anti-democratic re-
gimes constitutes a violation of principles on which the Organization of American States is founded, 
and a danger to united and peaceful relationships in the hemisphere”. The Declaration was directed 
against the permanent rule of unelected leaders in the hemisphere and made clear that 
“[p]erpetuation in power, or the exercise of power without a fixed term and with the manifest in-
tent of perpetuation, is incompatible with the effective exercise of democracy”. It was demanded 
that human rights and press freedom are respected. The other part of the trade-off was the re-
emphasis of non-intervention and the statement that democracy was to develop within a country, 
and should not be forced [MACDONALD 1964:368].  
Still, by instructing the Inter-American Council of Jurists to draft a Convention on Human Rights 
and by deciding in favour of establishing and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the OAS 
commitment to this policy area was lifted to a higher plain. The same is goes for the decision to 
entrust the OAS Council with the drafting of a convention on the effective exercise of representa-
tive democracy. 
Under the heading: Strengthening Peace and Perfection of American Solidarity it is acknowledged 
that political tensions existed in the hemisphere. The strict observance of the principle of non-
intervention and the “rigorous fulfillment of the obligations derived from those juridical instruments 
of American international law that are in force” are urged. The OAS Council was asked to prepare a 
draft instrument listing the greatest possible cases constituting violations of the non-intervention 
principle and to report on possible procedures to ensure the strict observance of the said principle. 
Resolution XII Reduction of Excessive Military Expenditures urges the member states to examine 
their military expenditures and in case they find it “excessive in relation to the requirements of the 
national and hemispheric defense, they may gradually and progressively reduce them”. 
Taken together the resolutions approved in regard of non-intervention and representative democ-
racy constituted a clear signal that although democracy is to be upheld as the preferred system of 
governance, invasions are not to be supported by other countries of the hemisphere [SZULC 
19.08.1959]. As the somewhat ambiguous pledges reveal, this exercise had resembled to a certain 
degree a walk on the tightrope.   
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2.9.3 Sixth MCMFA, 16th to 21st August 1960 – Sanctions against 
the Dominican Republic 
The main focus of the Sixth MCMFA revolved around the activities of the Dominican Republic’s re-
gime. In November 1959 Venezuela had brought charges before the IAPC and the OAS Council that 
the Dominican Republic was involved in an attempted assassination of the Venezuelan President 
and that it was supporting subversive activities against Venezuela. The Council resolved to convoke 
an MCMFA and appointed an investigating committee, whose findings turned out to substantiate 
the Venezuelan claims. 
The Sixth MCMFA, based upon findings of the investigative committee, condemned the Dominican 
Republic for various subversive acts, amounting to aggression and intervention against the state of 
Venezuela. For the first time the Rio Treaty was not merely invoked but also applied and sanctions 
imposed. The Foreign Ministers decided to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic 
and to impose limited economic sanctions, both measures falling under article 8 of the Rio Treaty, 
but also covered by Art. 19 of the COAS (1948). The levelling of sanctions indeed constituted a 
ground-breaking step in the history of the OAS, which had until then always underscored the sig-
nificance of the non-intervention principle. The eventual lifting of sanctions was contingent on a 
two-thirds vote of OAS Council members. 
In January 1961, however, the economic sanctions were even extended to also cover petroleum 
products, trucks, and spare parts. However, six countries had abstained and Brazil had directly 
opposed the extension, arguing that such would constitute a breach of the non-interference princi-
ple and bring about hardship for the Dominican population. In January 1962 the economic as well 
as diplomatic sanctions were finally lifted [DIL 1963:816-818; DIL 1971:458-463], but only after 
the Dominican president Trujillo had been assassinated [BARLIANT 1969:168-1169]. Trujillo’s son 
and acting chief of the armed forces137
2.9.4 The Seventh MCMFA, 22nd to 29th August 1960 – Rebuffing 
the USSR 
 had earlier offered to resign in exchange for the lifting of 
sanctions [BONAFEDE 29.10.1961]. 
The calling of the Seventh MCMFA was quite controversial. The controversy between the US and 
Cuba, pertaining to the latter’s cooperation with the USSR as the ideological arch-enemy of the US, 
was the primary reason for the Meeting. Cuba made its participation dependent on the site and the 
agenda of it. That is why the final agenda138
• inter-American cooperation, in accordance with the principles and standards set forth in the 
Charter of the Organization of American States, for the defence of the democratic American 
institutions against the subversive activities of any organization, government, or its agents, 
directed against the said institutions; 
 was formulated in very general terms but still met 
with the opposition of Cuba, which although subsequently taking part in the MCMFA, voted against 
the agenda items: 
 
• strengthening of continental solidarity and the inter-American system against threats of ex-
tra-continental intervention139
• considerations of the economic, social and factors that give rise to political instability in the 
hemisphere and the intensification of collective action to promote a raising of the standard 
of living of the underdeveloped regions of the Americas; and 
 that might affect them; 
• considerations of the international tensions existing in the Caribbean region, in order to as-
sure harmony, unity, and peace [OAS 1960b:2-3; SCHMIDT 09.08.1960]. 
 
The rift between the US and Cuba was not officially recorded to have given rise to the Meeting. 
Instead, the Meeting was formally requested by Peru to consider hemispheric partnership require-
ments, the defence of the regional system, and the democratic principles of the Americas against 
potential threats [OAS MCMFA:Minutes; NYT 28.08.1960]  
 
The dispute between Cuba and the US was dealt with in the ‘Declaration of San José’. Intervention 
by the Soviet Union, Cuba’s strong supporter, was ‘energetically’ condemned. Sino-Soviet attempts 
to destroy unity, peace, and security of the hemisphere are rejected. The commitment to democ-
                                                 
137 This offer was put into the context of Trujillo’s likes and dislikes by BONAFEDE, upholding that: „It is no 
secret that Trujillo Jr. ... prefers the pleasures of high international society to the monotony of public service.“ 
[BONAFEDE 29.10.1961]. 
138 For the previously proposed draft agenda see NYT 03.08.1960. 
139 Extra-continental intervention was an allusion to the announcement of the USSR to defend Cuba if need be. 
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racy (referring to the 5th MCMFA) and to the obligations arising from treaties of the inter-American 
system is reaffirmed [DIL 1963:437-438]. 
 
Resolution II refers to the establishment of an ad hoc Good Offices Committee (GOC). This GOC 
was to be composed of representatives of Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Costa 
Rica. Its creation was a consequence of the squabbles during the meeting [DIL 1971:798]. The 
Foreign Ministers assigned the following function to the GOC: 
This Committee at the request of the governments directly interested, will facilitate, by 
clarifying the facts and extending its good offices, the settlement of controversies between 
American governments and will report to the council of the Organization of American 
States. [OAS 1960b:5] 
This GOC informally met the following month on 15th September 1960 to consider the procedure to 
be followed in investigating Cuba’s charges against the US, [NYT 16.09.1960], and had its first 
session a week later. Cuba had accused the US of harbouring criminal Cuban nationals, of violating 
Cuban airspace and of threatening economic strangulation (US embargo on Cuban sugar). It re-
jected the committee’s activities [NYT 23.09.1960], since it perceived it to be biased in favour of 
the US. Hence, various attempts to activate the GOC remained unsuccessful, since the resolution 
constituting the body required that the conflict parties have to accept its services, before it can be 
set in motion [LAT 23.02.1961]. 
Resolution V entrusts the OAS Council with the preparation of a draft for an additional protocol to 
the Rio Treaty about economic assistance “with a view of strengthening continental solidarity and 
the inter-American system in the face of threats of intervention” [OAS 1960b:7]. 
Resolution VII recognizes the interdependence of political instability and economic underdevelop-
ment and resolution VIII (limitation of armaments) emphasizes that armament in the region should 
not go beyond the need of national and hemispheric defence, echoing Resolution XII approved by 
the 5th MCMFA one year earlier. 
2.9.5 Eighth MCMFA, 22nd to 31st January 1962 – Excluding the Cu-
ban Government, Establishment of the SCCS 
The Eighth MCMFA was again going back to a Peruvian request of October 1961 to the OAS Council 
to call such a meeting to consider charges against Cuba for – among other things – “Communist 
infiltration of other American countries for the purpose of instigating subversion and revolution 
against legitimately constituted governments and democratic institutions” [DIL 1971:464]. Conse-
quently, the IAPC was entrusted to study those accusations. While the IAPC’s investigation was still 
going on, Colombia in November 1961 requested a meeting of consultation pursuant to article 6 of 
the Rio Treaty since interventions by extra-continental powers were posing threats to the peace 
and political independence of the American states. The OAS Council decided in favour of this re-
quest in December 1961 [DIL 1971:464]. 
At the Eighth MCMFA140
To counter the influence and activities of communism, Resolution II establishes a Special Consulta-
tive Committee on Security (SCCS), composed of security experts “for the purpose of advising the 
member states that may desire and request such assistance”. The SCCS was instructed to submit 
 the present government of Cuba was excluded ‘from participation in the 
inter-American system’, since it had ‘placed itself outside’ of it. The resolutions were based on find-
ings of an IAPC report [DIL 1968:247-248]. However, this report was of questionable quality, since 
it presented no evidence. Instead, the IAPC noted the difficulty of obtaining information of subver-
sive activities and merely enumerated the instances in which Latin countries had accused Cuba of 
such [BARLIANT 1969:1174]. 
On top of accusations that Cuba was responsible for subversive acts in the hemisphere, the coun-
try’s close ties with the Soviet bloc were considered a reason for legitimately ostracising Cuba dur-
ing this hot phase of the Cold War. It was argued that the “attitude adopted by the present gov-
ernment of Cuba and its acceptance of military assistance offered by extracontinental communist 
powers breaks down the effective defense of the inter-American system” [both cited in: DIL 
1963:1054]. Trade in arms with Cuba was suspended. The Cuban government was furthermore 
excluded from the Inter-American Defense Board. Communism was also the theme in Resolution I 
entitled ‘Communist Offensive in America’. It states that communist activities are intensifying in 
the hemisphere and are endangering the hemisphere’s unity and the democratic institutions. In the 
face of this intensification the Foreign Ministers emphasize the principles of the inter-American sys-
tem (e.g. non-intervention). 
                                                 
140 Text of the Final Act see OAS 1962. 
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reports to those member states requesting its assistance. Express authorization must be obtained 
for publishing such a report about countries dealt with in the report. Until 1st May 1962 the SCCS 
was to submit an initial general report with recommendations as to which measures are to be 
taken.141
The SCCS later undertook a 10-month study on subversive activities of the Castro regime. The 
report concluded that as long as hemispheric states maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba
 
142
2.9.6 Ninth MCMFA 21st to 26th July 1964 – Isolating Cuba 
 
curbing its subversive activities would be next to impossible [WP 13.02.1963]. The study finds an 
‘increasing gravity’ of subversion in the region and that states this situation justifies reciprocal as-
sistance under the Rio Treaty. The SCCS recommended as initial steps to impose a total ban on 
travel and flow of money to and from Cuba [CT 23.02.1963]. 
In April 1963 the SCCS issued another, but this time secret report. The document stated that Sino-
Soviet intervention in the hemisphere, via Cuba, has increased in previous months and urged the 
OAS member states to maintain the utmost vigilance and exchange information on the matter. It 
martially recommended to the OAS states to ‘give battle’ to communism [CSM 20.04.1963]. Only 
days later, the OAS authorized SCCS investigations of communist subversion by Cuba anywhere in 
the member states, even without the consent of the respective government. The vote was 13 in 
favour and one – Brazil - against. Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia, Haiti, and the Dominican Re-
public had abstained [NYT 23.04.1963].  
In July 1964 the SCCS reported on the period between October 1963 and July 1964 about commu-
nist activities. It stated that Cuba remained the primary source for spreading communist subver-
sion but that overall the problem of communism seems to have subsided in the period covered 
[NYT 17.07.1964]. After many years of reporting the SCCS was finally abolished only in December 
1975 [WP 05.12.1975]. 
However, the ground-breaking resolution excluding the Cuban government was approved with the 
minimum requirement of two-thirds. Several Latin American nations had argued that the COAS 
contained no provision for excluding a member; this opinion was countered with the legalistic re-
sponse that not Cuba, but only its government had been excluded from further participation [BAR-
LIANT 1969:1173]. 
Resolution III reiterates the adherence to the principles of non-intervention and self-determination 
as ‘guiding standards’ of inter-American relations. The included commitment to democracy is set 
out rather vaguely: “[t]o urge that the governments of the member countries … organize them-
selves on the basis of free elections that express, without restrictions, the will of the people”. The 
same goes for Resolution IV ‘Holding of Free Elections’. The Foreign Ministers merely ‘recommend’ 
that the governments of the American states whose structure or acts are incompatible with the 
effective exercise of representative democracy, hold free elections. 
Resolution IX deals with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The OAS Council is 
asked to revise the statute of the IACHR with the aim of “broadening and strengthening the Com-
mission’s attributes and faculties to such an extent as to permit it effectively to further respect” for 
human rights in the hemisphere (see respective chapter) 
Referring to the controversial resolutions taken in regard of Cuba at the 8th MCMFA, BARLIANT 
opined: 
Failure of the Eighth Meeting to reach a common understanding about the legitimacy of 
collective action against Cuba weakened the consensus that is necessary to support any 
effective international organization. The measures taken by the meeting did not have a 
decisive impact on the spread of communism throughout Latin America; however, they did 
expose sharp lines of division among the non-communist American states. [BARLIANT 
1969:1176] 
The Ninth MCMFA, taking place in Washington, was convened on the request of Venezuela. In De-
cember 1963 the Council constituted itself as provisional Organ of Consultation and authorized the 
establishment of an investigation committee comprising representatives from Argentina, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Uruguay, and the US. In its long standing dispute with Cuba, Venezuela endeavoured 
to effect sanctions against its adversary for perpetrating subversive activities (for details see be-
                                                 
141 The SCCS was formally established in March 1962 [WP 09.03.1962]. The members of the SCCS were drawn 
from Brazil, El Salvador, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, and the US. In its report published on 2nd May 
1962, the SCCS points to the too casual way communist subversion was fought. Recommendations how to react 
to communist subversion and infiltration are formulated. The SCCS furthermore points to the need to be re-
tained on a permanent basis, in order to study communist activities [NYT 03.05.1062]. 
142 At that time only Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay still had diplomatic ties with Cuba [CT 
23.02.1963]. 
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low). After spending a week in Venezuela the investigating committee filed a report which con-
cluded the Cuban Government had sponsored terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare 
with the aim of overthrowing the Venezuelan government [BARLIANT 1969:1176]. 
After lengthy discussions at the Ninth MCMFA sanctions against Cuba were approved, based on a 
report of an Investigating Committee [OAS 1964:5]. 
In a vote 15 to 4 with Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay voting against, the present government 
of Cuba was condemned for those activities which were termed aggression ‘which affects all of the 
member states’ [OAS 1964:6]. Resolution I (3) contains the sanctions against Cuba: 
a. That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular rela-
tions with the Government of Cuba; 
b. That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, whether direct or 
indirect, with Cuba, except in food stuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be 
sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and 
c. That the governments of the American states suspend all sea transportation between 
their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons 
of a humanitarian nature [OAS 1964:6]. 
The severance of diplomatic ties was meant to be of a mandatory nature, although it was not clear 
if the states that voted against the resolution would abide by it [NYT 27.07.1964]. However, as 
SZULC made clear: 
The sanctions now voted were were [sic] not expected to produce any practical results in 
the sense weakening the regime of Premier Castro. They were primarily directed at isolat-
ing it even further as far as the hemisphere is concerned. [SZULC 26.07.1964] 
Also BARLIANT shares this opinion and underlines - especially regarding subversive activities - sim-
ple useful measures like controlling nationals travelling to and from Cuba or expelling its nationals 
in case the need is felt to prevent them from committing unwelcome and unlawful acts [BARLIANT 
1969:1180]. 
One country originally opposing the measures – Chile - broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in 
August 1964 and hinted that it was to follow up the other sanctions too; the Chilean President, 
Jorge Alessandri, declared: 
In accordance with the dispositions of the inter-American treaty of mutual defense, of Rio 
de Janeiro, once this type of resolution has been adopted by the required quorum, the 
resolutions are obligatory, even for countries voting against them143
Only some days later the Bolivian government followed suit and severed its diplomatic and eco-
nomic ties with Cuba, arguing similarly with the legally binding nature of the resolution taken
. [qtd. in: CT 
12.08.1964] 
144 
[RAYMONT 22.08.1964]. Uruguay acted on the sanctions in September 1964 and broke diplomatic 
and economic ties with Cuba [CT 09.09.1964]. Mexico remained the only country never to respect 
the resolution145
While not authorizing immediate use of armed force, this definition of self-defense could 
be used to justify a unilateral invasion of Cuba, without further consultation, in retaliation 
 [NOVITSKI 03.11.1974]. This move prompted GARCIA-AMADOR to judge that 
Mexico’s non-compliance initiated ‘the progressive decline of the system [of collective security 
based on the Rio Treaty, my remark]’ [GARCIA-AMADOR 1986:24]. 
Resolution I (5) warns the Cuban government, that if it should persist in its activities and conduct, 
that show qualities of aggression and intervention against an OAS member state, those states 
“shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either indi-
vidual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Or-
gan of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere”. [OAS 
1964:6]. BARLIANT calling that paragraph ‘unique and ominous’ notes: 
                                                 
143 Yet Chile severed only diplomatic relations with Cuba but declined to approve the economic sanctions, thus 
weakening the credibility of its argumentation [CT 09.09.1964]. 
144 Rumours, however, had it, that the US had threatened Bolivia with cutting its economic aid if it did not com-
ply with the resolution. Those allegations were denied by the US State Department [NYT 26.08.1964]. 
145 For Mexico’s position see BARLIANT 1969:1178-1179. 
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for nothing more than such subversive activities as those undertaken against Venezuela. 
[BARLIANT 1969:1177]146
2.9.7 Tenth MCMFA 1st May 1965 to 6th March 1970 - Inter-
American Peace Force 
 
The MCMFA also called on all nations, not members of the OAS, to show their solidarity in achieving 
the purposes of that resolution.  
Resolution II is addressed to the Cuban people, explains and justifies the actions taken, and pro-
fesses the solidarity with the ‘brother people of Cuba’ [OAS 1964:8]. 
 
It is noteworthy that the decisions taken were addressing a country, or more specifically a govern-
ment in power, which two years earlier had already been ‘excluded’ from the organization. 
The sessions of the Tenth MCMFA were convoked to consider the situation in the Dominican Repub-
lic. Two contending factions fought each other and the US had sent troops to the Dominican Repub-
lic (for details see below), a measure constituting a contravention of OAS’ principle of non-
intervention, to say the least. 
The meeting decided to send a Committee of Five to the country to investigate the situation on the 
ground and to offer mediation. The Committee was comprised of representatives from Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama. It succeeded in making the contending parties sign the 
Act of Santo Domingo, covering i.a. a ceasefire147
2.9.8 Eleventh MCMFA 24th January to 14th April 1967 – Strength-
ening economic Integration 
. Thereupon the MCMFA passed the resolution 
which established the Inter-American Peace Force. The IAPF was accorded the ‘sole purpose’ of 
“maintaining the security of its [the Dominican Republic’s, my remark] inhabitants and the inviola-
bility of human rights, and the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will 
permit the functioning of democratic institutions” [qtd. in: AKEHURST 1967:207].  
However, this step actually sanctioned the present US forces with a multilateral cover. This was not 
only underlined by the dominance of US troops, but also by the fact that while choosing as nominal 
Commander of the force a Brazilian, the national contingents came under its exclusive authority 
only in piecemeal fashion [AKEHURST 1967:209]. 
The MCMFA on 10th May transformed the Committee of Five into a Committee of Three, made up of 
the US, El Salvador, and Brazil and strengthened its mandate to include mediation in view of estab-
lishing a broadly based democratic government [AKEHURST 1967:209]. Including the US into the 
multilateral diplomatic mission as undoubtedly concerned and interested conflict party, was a ques-
tionable measure. 
The last troops of the IAPF left the country only in September 1966 [NYT 21.09.1966] after the 
OAS Foreign Ministers had found that the purposes of the 10th MCFMA had been achieved through 
election, conducted in June that year [NYT 25.06.1966]. 
The three sessions of the Eleventh MCMFA were held to vote solely on measures of economic inte-
gration (i.a. Alliance for Progress) [OAS 1971]. No decisions of security relevance were taken. 
2.9.9 Twelfth MCMFA 19th June to 24th September 1967 - Broaden-
ing Cuba’s world-wide Isolation 
The Twelfth MCMFA was convoked in accordance with the first part of Art. 39 and with Art. 40 of 
the COAS on the request of Venezuela, charging Cuba of subversive activities and intervention. In 
its first session the MCMFA agreed to appoint a fact finding Committee (Committee I) that was 
supposed to travel to Venezuela. The second session, taking place on 19th June decided to create 
another Committee (Committee II) for the purpose of reporting on events “related to the so-called 
Afro-Asian Latin American People’s Solidarity Conference”. The Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples’ 
Solidarity Organization of which Cuba was a member was described in the subsequent report to 
support armed subversive movements. This assumption was based i.a. on the Havana General 
Declaration, which proclaimed: 
                                                 
146 Compare on that issue also: GARCIA-AMADOR 1986:18-19. 
147 For the first report of the Committee and the text of the Act of Santo Domingo see: ILM 1965:557-577. 
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the right and the duty of the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and of the States of 
Progressive Governments of the world to make available materials and moral support for 
those people who fight for their liberty or who suffer direct or indirect aggression by impe-
rialist powers. [qtd. in: GARCIA-AMADOR 1986:20] 
At their final session the Foreign Ministers, after having received the reports of both Committees, 
condemned Cuba’s government for ”repeated acts of aggression and invention against Venezuela 
and for its persistent policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Bolivia and other American 
states”. Additionally, all countries not OAS members were urged to restrict trade and financial op-
erations as well as sea and air transport with Cuba conducted through state agencies. 
The countries taking part in the Afro-Asian Latin American Solidarity Organization were urged on to 
withdraw from it. 
Additionally the OAS members were encouraged to strengthen vigilance and control of coasts and 
borders in order to prevent the persons, weapons, or equipment from entering or exiting Cuba [DIL 
1971:842-846; OAS 1968]. This statement signalled that the quarantine had obviously not been 
observed to the utmost by all OAS member states. Thus, BARLIANT opines that the 12th MCMFA 
showed the ‘ineffectiveness of the sanctions imposed against Cuba’ [BARLIANT 1969:1180]. Such 
incomplete compliance may indicate that the measures were not perceived by one or the other 
OAS member to be ‘fair’ and thus failed to exert a sufficiently strong ‘compliance pull’ [HATHAWAY 
2005:482]. 
2.9.10 Thirteenth MCMFA 26th July 1969 to 17th November 1980 – El 
Salvador vs. Honduras148
Various border skirmishes – the first of which was reported by El Salvador on 23rd June 1969 - on 
both neighbours’ territory prompted accusations and counter-accusations. After a group of Central 
American representatives (from Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) had offered its mediation 
which consequently remained unsuccessful, El Salvador and the mediation group turned to the OAS 
with the request of convoking the Organ of Consultation. Thereupon the Council constituted itself 
as provisional Organ of Consultation and on 14th July 1969 established a Seven-Nation Special 
Committee [USDSB 1969:132] to study in situ the situation between both contending parties. Addi-
tionally, both countries were urged to refrain from acts with the potential to escalate the situation. 
When the Foreign Minister came together on 18th July 1969 they adopted a number of resolutions: 
 
 
• troops shall be withdrawn to the positions they occupied before 14th July 1969; 
• the Committee shall appoint observers to report on the situation; 
• to set up a system of vigilance supervising the applications of measures by both countries’ 
governments; 
• both parties are to guarantee the life and respect the property of each other’s nationals; 
and 
• both countries shall end the media campaigns designed to arouse the emotions of the re-
spective populations. 
 
While Honduras signalled its willingness to give the requested guarantees, El Salvador insisted that 
a troop withdrawal would be contingent on various assurances to be given by Honduras. The Coun-
cil took note of El Salvador’s refusal to comply. Before the following session of the MCMFA a con-
sensus was developing among the other OAS members that if El Salvador further objected to re-
store the situation to the status quo ante bellum sanctions should be adopted under Art. 8 Rio 
Treaty. The threat of sanctions made El Salvador to give in and it ultimately announced the troop 
withdrawal. 
Hereafter troops were in effect withdrawn, prisoners exchanged, communications and commercial 
transit re-established, and internees liberated [ILM 1969:1079]. The MCMFA met again on 30th July 
1969 and urged both nations to submit their differences to a pacific settlement procedure, be it 
under the Pact of Bogotá or to a procedure of arbitration.  
When the MCMFA met for another session in October 1969 they urged both countries to re-
establish diplomatic ties and to settle their boundary dispute [OAS 1984]. 
The rapprochement between the two countries continued, closely observed by the appointed Com-
mittee [ILM 1970:1148-1164]. However, due to various setbacks it took more than a decade that a 
peace treaty was signed and that the OAS could call back its observers and close the 13th MCMFA in 
November 1980 [OAS 1984]. 
                                                 
148 If not otherwise indicated, this chapter draws on the developments as reported in DIL 1971:846-853. 
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The 13th MCMFA was the first time after the Rio Treaty and the COAS had come into effect that an 
event of a conflict involving open armed attack had to be handled by the Inter-American system 
[ILM 1969:1079]. 
 
2.9.11 Fourteenth MCMFA 30th January 1971 - remaining open - Ec-
uador vs. US 
The 14th MCMFA was called because Ecuador opposed the fishing activities of US vessels in its terri-
torial waters. Ecuador had seized a number of vessels of the US tuna fleet [USDSB 1971:246]. The 
seizure of the vessels was prompted by the US’ suspension of military sales to Ecuador, pursuant 
to a law lately approved by the US Congress. Ecuador argued that this move touched Art. 19 
COAS: 
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political 
character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advan-
tages of any kind. 
The resolution adopted on 31st January 1971 repeats the Ecuadorian position and states that the 
country had set the extent of its territorial waters at 200 nautical miles without violating any inter-
national law. It follows that foreign vessels ought not to fish in this area, according to Ecuadorian 
law. However, also the US position is cited in the resolution, arguing that international law foresees 
an exclusive fishing jurisdiction for an area not extending beyond 12 nautical miles. 
The Foreign Ministers called on both countries to refrain from any escalating actions and to resort 
to negotiations in order to settle their dispute [LA 1971:321-322]. 
The US had opposed the calling of the MCMFA, arguing that the more adequate route would have 
been to turn to the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement. It also announced its will-
ingness to accept a binding decision of the ICJ [USDSB 1971:246-247]. US Under-Secretary Irwin 
had argued that the seizure and not the suspension of military sales, constituted economic coercion 
– and that the US merely had reacted to it149
2.9.12 Fifteenth MCMFA 8th to 12th November 1974 – Unsuccessful 
Venture to Lift Cuba’s Isolation 
 [USDSB 1971:249]. The controversy remained unre-
solved. 
Upon the request of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela the PCOAS constituted itself as Organ of 
Consultation. The three countries urged the rest of the OAS members to take into account the 
changes witnessed since 1964 when diplomatic and economic ties were suspended with Cuba (for 
details see Ninth MCMFA above) [OAS 1974]. The resolution presented aimed at rescinding the 
sanctions placed on Cuba as agreed on in Resolution I of the Ninth MCMFA [USDSB 1975:9]. Any-
way, the quarantine had been disregarded in previous years by several countries (i.a. Chile under 
Allende, Peru, Argentina, Panama) [NOVITSKI 03.11.1974]. The Costa Rican government warned 
that if this effort to lift the blockade fails, several more nations would rescind the sanctions on their 
own and ‘this would be to the further detriment of the inter-American system’ [qtd. in: NYT 
08.11.1974]. 
However, when the meeting took place in Quito between 8th and 12th November 1974, the required 
two-thirds majority of 14 votes was not mustered. Only 12 nations supported the lifting of the 
sanctions [TRUJILLO 13.11.1974]. The US was among the six abstaining countries and another 
three members voted against the resolution [USDSB 1975:9]. The NYT commented on the vote the 
following: 
The biggest loser of all, however, is the O.A.S. itself, whose relevance had already been 
sharply questioned by some member states. With some justice the twelve who voted for 
repeal called the requirement for a two-thirds majority ‘a procedural absurdity,’ and 
rightly branded the sanctions ‘anachronistic, ineffectual and irksome.’ Seven members 
have already ignored the O.A.S. embargo to restore relations with the Castro regime. The 
twelve supporters of the repeal resolution correctly asserted that its defeat at Quito ‘seri-
ously compromises’ the authority of the O.A.S. [NYT 14.11.1974] 
                                                 
149 US Under Secretary Irwin i.a. had stated: ‘In no way can assistance of any kind be considered as obligatory, 
timeless, and changeless, nor the flow of that assistance a constant’ [qtd. in: USDSB 1971:249]. 
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The assessment by the US Permanent Representative at the OAS, William S. Mailliard, reveals an-
other aspect of the intentions of the resolution’s sponsors, touching on the legitimacy of the Rio 
Treaty. During a press conference, when asked if the failure of the resolution was not to be seen as 
a setback for the OAS, Mailliard responded: 
The only reason this meeting [15th MCMFA, my remark] was held was because of the con-
cern of a number of countries that the binding obligations of the Rio Treaty appeared not 
be being observed, to the extent that several countries did not comply with their obliga-
tions under the treaty. ... So, I think if you are talking about the Rio Treaty alone and 
you’re going to be candid, you got to say that if now, even though the sanctions are not 
lifted, an appreciable number of other countries renew bilateral relations, then the Rio 
Treaty is to some extent weakened. [USDSB 1975:13] 
2.9.13 Sixteenth MCMFA 29th July 1975 – Abandoning Cuba’s Quar-
antine 
The failure to lift sanctions against Cuba the previous year motivated several countries to request 
anew a MCMFA on the matter in July 1975. Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Mex-
ico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela asked the Foreign Ministers to study the 
following matter: 
Freedom of action of the States Parties to the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assis-
tance to normalize or conduct their relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level and in 
the manner that each State deems advisable [qtd. in: OAS 1975]. 
While the principle of non-intervention was reaffirmed the meeting voted “to leave the State Parties 
of the Rio Treaty free to normalize or conduct their relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level 
and in the manner that each state deems advisable in accordance with each one’s national policy 
and interests” [qtd. in: OAS 1975].150
2.9.14 Seventeenth and Eighteenth MCMFA 21st September 1978 – 
14th December 1992 and 30th December 1978 - remaining 
open - Unseating Nicaragua’s Regime 
 Sixteen countries voted for the move, including the US. 
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile voted against it and Brazil as well as Nicaragua abstained [CT 
30.07.1975]. 
 
The resolution freeing the signatories of the Rio Treaty to conduct their relations with Cuba as they 
deem adequate was approved in light of the previous agreed amendment of the Rio Treaty, which 
foresaw that sanctions may be lifted with absolute majority, instead of two thirds. However, the 
amendment, as said earlier, has never entered into force. Thus this jump-the-gun decision under-
mined the many times reaffirmed commitment to the rule of international law in general and the 
significance of the Rio Treaty in particular. 
 
The 17th MCMFA was convoked upon a request by Venezuela and regarded the current situation in 
Central America as constituting a threat to the peace of the region. The backdrop to this request 
was the conflict then going on between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Costa Rica had allowed Nicara-
guan rebels fighting the Somoza regime to use its territory151. Thereupon the Nicaraguan authori-
ties fought those back, well into Costa Rican territory. Costa Rica, which had in 1948 dissolved its 
military, turned to the OAS after Somoza had announced that war might be an option in settling 
the issue152
                                                 
150 The difficulties confronted during the last MCMFA and the failure to lift the sanctions motivated the member 
states to redraft the relevant provisions of the Rio Treaty in order to make it easier to lift sanctions in the future 
[BINDER 17.07.1975]. 
151 Also Panama was thought to allow its territory to be used as training ground; Venezuela was also considered 
to give support to the rebels [BELNAP 17.11.1978]. 
152 For illustration of both countries‘ uneasy relationship see further below the description of the events for the 
conflicts in 1948 and 1955. 
 [BERNDT 1995:72-73]. 
However, later Nicaragua adopted a conciliatory attitude. Point 5 of the resolution approved on 23rd 
September read, that the MCMFA took note that: 
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[W]ithout prejudice to the full observance of the principle of nonintervention, the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua has stated that it is willing in principle to accept the friendly coopera-
tion and conciliatory efforts that several member states of the Organization may offer to-
ward establishing the conditions necessary for a peaceful settlement of the situation with-
out delay. [qtd. in: USDSB 1979:55] 
Even so the MCMFA was considered to have been a success for Somoza since it ruled out any con-
crete action [LAT 24.09.1978]. The resolution, however, foresaw to send a team of the IACHR to 
Nicaragua. In December 1978 the IACHR report detailed grave human rights violations [BERNDT 
1995:73]. 
Despite mediation supported by a commission with representatives from Guatemala, the Dominican 
Republic, and the US [BELNAP 26.11.1978] the violence inside Nicaragua worsened. 
In a clash of Nicaraguan national guardsmen with Costa Rican guardsmen, two Costa Rican nation-
als died. Thereupon both countries requested the PCOAS to establish an observer mission, which 
took up its task in January 1979 [BELNAP 02.02.1979]. In the meantime the Eighteenth MCMFA 
took place in late December 1978 on the request of Costa Rica which cited its fear that Nicaragua 
might put into reality its threat of an invasion. The Permanent Council acting as provisional Organ 
of Consultation urged Nicaragua to halt threatening its neighbour [LAT 29.12.1978; LAGOS 
2001:31]. 
Nicaragua’s political establishment, however, insisted to complete its term and rejected presented 
formulas for early elections. The US was in favour of replacing the regime and also of sending an 
OAS peace force; however the other OAS members opposed that idea [USDSB 1979:60]. Still, 
broad agreement about the undesirability of the current political establishment was manifesting 
clearly when the Foreign Ministers met in June 1979 and approved a resolution (17 in favour, 2 
against and five abstentions), which was in stark contrast to the non-intervention principle and 
hardly veiled that fact neither; it partly read: 
... [T]he solution of the serious problem is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the people 
of Nicaragua. 
That ... this solution should be arrived at on the basis of the following: 
1. Immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime. [text in: USDSB 1979:58] 
All members are urged to take steps “within their reach to facilitate an enduring and peaceful solu-
tion of the Nicaraguan problem” [text in USDSB 1979:58]. This move against an sitting president 
was ground-breaking and far-reaching. Justified with the miserable conditions for the population, 
this step constituted one early of the later so prominent cases of ‘humanitarian interventions’ that 
contradicted the sacred principle-duo of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
Under such pressure the Nicaraguan President resigned on 17th July 1979, heading to the US, to 
join his wife there [USDSB 1979:60-61]. 
2.9.15 Nineteenth MCMFA 2nd to 4th February 1981 – Ecuador vs. 
Peru 
The 19th MCMFA took place in February 1981 to discuss the Ecuadorian claim that Peruvian aircraft 
had attacked a frontier outpost [CT 29.01.1981]. Peru on the other hand maintained that Ecuador-
ian troops were on its territory. Although rapprochement was already underway – a ceasefire had 
been put in place – the MCMFA urged both countries to withdraw their troops and to dismantle the 
military operations.  
Especially Peru’s refusal to accept mediation other than through the guarantor countries of a 1942 
treaty between the two nations had rendered the OAS near to powerless in this case [OAS 1981]. 
Rejection by one conflict party also on other occasions rendered multilateral efforts useless, as the 
dispute about Bolivia’s sea access via Chilean territory has amply demonstrated over the past dec-
ades (for detail see case below). 
2.9.16 Twentieth MCMFA 26th April 1982 remaining open – Argen-
tine vs. Great Britain - Falkland/Malvinas War 
After Argentina had occupied the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, it faced a military confrontation with 
Great Britain, the island’s colonial power. Thereupon it called for the convocation of the Organ of 
Consultation. The PCOAS consequently decided to hold such a meeting on 26th April 1982.  
In the conflict the US had sided with Great Britain and also endeavoured to mediate, which is why 
it was opposed to the holding of a Meeting of Consultation 
The resolutions adopted i.a. cited the Rio Treaty and the herein defined security zone, which also 
covered the disputed islands and rejected the intervention by extra-continental and continental 
armed forces. Although also calling on Argentina to stop exacerbating actions, it explicitly urged 
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Great Britain to ‘cease the hostilities’ and to ‘refrain from any acts that may affect inter-American 
peace and security’.  
Most crucial, however, was the following paragraph: 
To urge those governments immediately to call a truce that will make it possible to re-
sume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict, taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the 
Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and the interests of the islanders. [text in: ILM 1982:670, 
emphasis added] 
The resolution was approved with 17 yes votes and four abstentions (US, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Chile, and Colombia). 
The military confrontation, nevertheless, escalated and on 29th May 1982 the Minister came to-
gether and agreed on the resolution entitled ‘Serious Situation in the South Atlantic’. The US’ mili-
tary support for Great Britain, as well as the application of sanctions on Argentina prompted con-
siderable concern among most OAS members. The resolution urged 
[The] Government of the United States of America to order the immediate lifting of the 
coercive measures applied against the Argentine Republic and to refrain from providing 
material assistance to the United Kingdom, in observance of the principle of hemisphereic 
[sic] solidarity recognized in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal assistance. [text in: 
ILM 1982:674] 
While asking the state parties to the Rio Treaty to support Argentina in a way ‘that each judges 
appropriate’ the Meeting was kept open. 
The Twentieth MCMFA’s resolutions did not succeed in carrying through its intentions. The UK won 
the war after several weeks. 
2.9.17 Twenty-first MCMFA 17th May 1989 – 14th December 1992 – 
Evaluating democratic Elections, Deploring US Invasion 
A disputed election in Panama prompted Venezuela to request the convocation of an MCMFA under 
article 60 of the COAS on the ‘the serious crisis in Panama in its international context’. The adopted 
resolution that charged the SGOAS together with Ecuador, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago of 
promoting: 
 conciliation formulas for arriving at a national accord that can bring about, through de-
mocratic mechanisms, a transfer of power in the shortest possible time, and with full re-
spect for the sovereign will of the Panamanian people [cit in: BELT 2002]. 
The mission held extensive talks with the Panamanian parties and visited the country five times in 
the following weeks. As the talks progressed and conciliation seemed only a step away, military 
strongman Noriega rejected the deal. This development prompted several OAS members to recall 
their ambassadors and to interrupt commercial relations. 
Although resistance increased even among the Panamanian Defence Forces, Noriega held on to 
power. On 20th December 1989 US troops eventually invaded Panama and arrested Noriega, who 
was subsequently tried and sentenced to 30 years in prison [BELT 2002]. 
On December 22 1989 the Foreign Ministers came together and expressed their deep ‘regret’ of the 
invasion. Without expressly naming the US the resolution calls for ‘the withdrawal of the foreign 
troops used for the military intervention’. Twenty members voted in favour; Costa Rica, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Antigua and Barbuda abstained, and the US voted against the 
resolution [text in: ALBERTS 1991:309-310]. 
2.9.18 Twenty-second MCMFA 9th January 1992 - cancelled 
This MCMFA was originally requested by Venezuela in order to consider measures to address the 
threat to the region’s democratic institutions from the resurgence of militaristic tendencies. How-
ever, the MCMFA did not take place153
                                                 
153 Information available at the following OAS homepage: 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/minutes.asp retrieved on 07.03.2008.  
. 
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2.9.19 Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth MCMFA 19th September  - 
remaining open – Unity in Confronting Terrorism 
The Twenty-third MCMFA was called after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11th Septem-
ber  2001 on the request of Costa Rica [AFP 15.09.2001]. Among calls to invoke the Rio Treaty 
Mexico made known its opposition to such a move, voicing its long-time scepticism toward the Rio 
Treaty and arguing that it was an inadequate tool to fight terrorism or other modern challenges to 
security [AFP 19.09.2001]. However, Mexico had aired this criticism already before the attacks had 
taken place. Also other diplomats questioned the applicability of the Rio Treaty since it was directed 
against states, and not against non-state actors. 
Those divergences seem to have caused the calling of two individual meeting; the MCMFA attended 
by all 34 member states was to be followed by a meeting of the 24 countries that were signatory 
states to the Rio Treaty [GONZALEZ 20.09.2001]. 
The 23rd MCMFA condemned the terrorist attacks, called on the entire international community not 
in any way to support terrorist activities, and instructed the PCOAS to prepare an Inter-American 
Convention against Terrorism154
Additionally, the 23rd MCMFA adopted a Declaration of Solidarity, pledging unity in confronting ter-
rorism and expressing condolences to the victims of the 9/11 attacks
. 
155
3. That the States Parties shall render additional assistance and support to the United 
States and to each other, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks, and also 
to prevent future terrorist acts.
. 
The 24th MCMFA held on the same day agreed by acclamation to activate the Rio Treaty, notwith-
standing Mexico’s general opposition [DeYOUNG 20.09.2001]. With this the treaty members fol-
lowed a US request, voiced earlier [AFP 20.09.2001], although the formal request had been sub-
mitted by Brazil. 
The resolution approved read: 
1. That these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks against 
all American states and that in accordance with all the relevant provisions of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the principle of continental soli-
darity, all States Parties to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to 
address such attacks and the threat of any similar attacks against any American state, 
and to maintain the peace and security of the continent.  
2. That, if a State Party has reason to believe that persons in its territory may have 
been involved in or in any way assisted the September 11, 2001 attacks, are harboring 
the perpetrators, or may otherwise be involved in terrorist activities, such State Party 
shall use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish those in-
dividuals. 
156
2.10 Cases 
 
Moreover the 24rd MCMFA decided to designate a committee made up of the state parties to the Rio 
Treaty “for the purpose of engaging in additional consultations and of taking measures in further-
ance of the foregoing”. 
While the review of the MCMFA’s provided a useful demonstration of the breath, procedures, and 
operation of this diplomatic tool for handling various disputes, the OAS has at its disposal various 
other means to act in the event of conflicts. In order to grasp the context of the individual conflicts 
and the range of actions taken by the OAS, it seems useful to look into them with much more de-
tail. This provides the opportunity to evaluate the overall performance of the OAS on a comprehen-
sive basis. In this endeavour I decided to present those cases which can be judged to have been 
seriously addressed by the OAS. This will help to gain an understanding of the Organization’s his-
torical record in conflict transformation. Some inescapable recurrences/redundancies with the 
chapter about the MCMFAs proved unavoidable. The year given always indicates the start of the 
                                                 
154 For the text of the resolution see: 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/Actas/23/RES%201%20ingles.doc retrieved 
on 10.08.2008. 
155 For the text of the Declaration see: 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/Actas/23/DEC%201%20ingles.doc retrieved 
on 10.03.2008. 
156 For the text of the resolution see: 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/Actas/24/RES%201%20ingles.doc retrieved 
on 10.03.2008. 
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conflict. In bold text the bodies engaged and the services/activities provided are given before the 
description of the conflict in question follows. 
2.10.1 Dominican Republic vs. Cuba 1948 
IAPC; investigation, good offices157
2.10.2 Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua 1948 
, reporting. 
In July 1948 the Dominican Republic called on the Council of the OAS to activate the Inter-
American Peace Committee (IAPC) to handle a controversy it had with Cuba. The complaint was 
directed against the unsatisfactory action Cuba had taken to curb an expedition aimed at invading 
the Dominican Republic and armed on Cuban shores [WP 22.09.1948]. After the IAPC had been 
constituted, it’s Mexican Chairman Luis Quintanilla, recommended direct negotiations between the 
conflict parties. Both countries agreed upon a formula for the solution of the problem [FENWICK 
1949b:770]. Nevertheless the issue was not resolved conclusively. In 1949 the Dominican Republic 
renewed the charge against Cuba [NYT 08.12.1949]. The parliament of the Dominican Republic 
granted its President Rafael Trujillo war powers. Cuba denied the charges and invited the IAPC for 
an on the spot investigation. Again the IAPC was activated to mediate; it urged the Dominican 
government to seek peaceful methods in settling the dispute [CDT 01.01.1950]. In July 1950 a 
report – commissioned by the OAS - was released, which investigated the situation in the Carib-
bean. It came to the conclusion that the concerned countries finally had convincingly ‘helped to 
establish an atmosphere of understanding and goodwill’ [qtd. in: NYT 21.07.1950]. 
Council of the OAS (POC), Investigating Committee, Military Observer Mission; investiga-
tion, border observation. 
In 1948 Costa Rica claimed that its territory was invaded by forces from Nicaraguan territory158
• to call a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to study the incident; 
. 
Nicaragua denied any involvement in the incident. Costa Rica asked for an immediate Meeting of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs to take steps to quell the disturbance. Further it asked for the closure of 
the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border and finally it urged the creation of a five-nation ‘watchdog’ 
committee to check on the sealing of the border [STANFORD 13.12.1948]. Costa Rica invoked Arti-
cle 6 of the Rio Treaty (see above) [WP 1948]. 
The Council of the OAS informed both parties in identical telegrams that “it will count on their full-
est cooperation to maintain order in the Americas and to collaborate for the effective carrying out 
of means that may be found necessary to preserve peace’”[qtd. in: LAT 13.12.1948]. The Council 
recessed for 48 hours, so that the members could learn the wishes of their respective govern-
ments. This delay was criticized by Costa Rica and Uruguay, since the Council had the right to in-
voke a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs without consulting the concerned governments 
[STANFORD 13.12.1948]. When the Council met again it decided:  
 
• to constitute itself as provisional Organ of Consultation until the foreign ministers can 
meet; 
• to appoint a commission to investigate the events on the scene; and 
• to request all American governments to cooperate fully. 
 
At the time of the meeting 15 American states159
The Chairman of the Council was to designate the members of the investigating body among the 
American States which had already ratified the Rio Treaty [WP 1948]. However, in the end the 
investigation
 had had ratified the Rio Treaty. As concerned 
parties to the disputes Costa Rica and Nicaragua did not vote. The vote ended with 12 to 0 favour-
ing the proposal of the Council with the Dominican Republic abstaining [WP 1948]. The Costa Rican 
Ambassador stated his satisfaction with the action taken [STANFORD 15.12.1948]. 
160
                                                 
157 Good offices is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Law as: “A technique of peaceful settlement of an inter-
national dispute, in which a third party, acting with the consent of the disputing states, serves as a friendly 
intermediary in an effort to persuade them to negotiate between themselves without necessarily offering the 
disputing states substantive suggestions towards achieving a settlement” [MARTIN & LAW 2006:GO]. 
158 The Costa Rican note to the Chairman of the Council of the OAS explicitly stated that ‘the territory of Costa 
Rica was invaded by armed forces proceeding from Nicaragua’ [qtd. in: FENWICK 1949:329-330]. 
159 Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Dominican 
Republic, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela [WP 1948; OAS RT Sig]. 
160 For some details on the work of the investigating body see LAT 1948b. 
 was to be carried out by representatives of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, United States 
and Peru. Peru had at time not yet ratified the treaty. The Peruvian representative happened to be 
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absent during a visit to the scene161
The commission issued a report to the Council after its investigation. Hereafter the Council passed 
a resolution based on that report. The resolution calls on the parties to the conflict to refrain from 
‘all kinds of hostile acts between them’. The resolution blamed Nicaragua for not taking adequate 
measures to prevent activities on its territory designed to overthrow the Costa Rican government. 
The resolution at the same time urged Costa Rica to take effective measures against organized 
military groups of its own citizens and foreigners on its soil who conspire against Nicaragua and 
other American governments. The resolution further appealed to both parties to observe the princi-
ples of non-intervention and solidarity. The Council decided to set up an international military 
commission of five members
 [LAT 1948b]. Another newspaper report claims that the body 
consisted only of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and the US [KUHN 1948].  
FENWICK, commenting on this first application of the Rio Treaty already observes the open ques-
tion of competence between the ‘provisional’ and the ‘regular’ Organ of Consultation: 
It was decided that the Council must first convoke a Meeting of the Ministers before it 
could act as a provisional organ of consultation. This was done; but the Council refrained 
from fixing a definite date of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, so that the convocation was 
for the time being no more than a technical justification for the assumption by the Council 
of the power to act as a provisional organ [FENWICK 1949:330]. 
FENWICK assumes that this ambiguity resulted from careless drafting of the Rio Treaty. As already 
pointed out, it later turned out to be the preferred procedure to assign the Council of the OAS in-
stead of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
162
The swift action of the Council of the OAS was hailed by the New York Times as a successful 
‘precedent’ [NYT 1948]. Similarly, the Washington Post judged the OAS action as proof that the 
OAS ‘is capable of decisive action that will be respected by the disputants’ [WP 27.02.19949]. Two 
month after the incident, in February 1949, Costa Rica and Nicaragua vowed to settle their dispute 
peacefully and signed an agreement in the form of an amity pact
. This military commission was charged with watching the frontier 
and with reporting any violation immediately [KUHN 1948]. This was the first time that the policing 
of a frontier was ordered by the American States combined under the umbrella of the OAS/Rio 
Treaty. 
163
2.10.3 Haiti vs. Dominican Republic 1949 
 at a formal session of the 
Council of the OAS [FENWICK 1949:331]. The then Chairman of the Council of the OAS, Enrique 
Corominas, called the arrangement ‘a triumph for peace in America’ [qtd. in: CSM 1949]. 
 
The OAS was able to provide the investigative and later supervisory services required to assuage 
the conflict parties and to halt the heated trading of claims and counter-claims. Obviously, the Or-
ganization and its missions were perceived by both countries as impartial (enough) to be trusted. 
It may be noted that at that time the COAS had not yet entered into force, however, the Rio Treaty 
had taken effect only some days before the incident had been reported. 
IAPC, Provisional Organ of Consultation, Investigating Committee, Compliance Commit-
tee; mediation, investigation, reporting. 
Haiti addressed the OAS Council in February 1949, charging the Dominican Republic with ‘moral 
aggression’, creating ‘a situation susceptible of endangering the peace’ [qtd. in: DIL 1963:766]. 
The Haitian representative claimed that Col. Astrel Roland, a former Haitian diplomat, was conspir-
ing with the Dominican President, Rafael Trujillo, with the aim to overthrow the Haitian govern-
ment. Haiti blamed Roland to have made radio broadcasts, insulting the Haitian President, after 
receiving a Dominican visa. Although Haiti protested to the Dominican government the broadcasts 
were not stopped. Haiti asked for an urgent Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ‘to examine the 
appropriate means for maintaining peace’ [qtd. in: NYT 17.06.1949]. Both countries some months 
                                                 
161 It was not clear what caused the absence. Members of the investigation claimed the Peruvian representative 
was ill; in Washington it was said that since Costa Rica had declined to recognize the new revolutionary gov-
ernment of Peru, its member did not participate [LAT 1948b]. 
162 The military commission comprised one representative of the US, Mexico, Paraguay, Colombia, and of Brazil 
[WP 29.12.1948] 
163 Both governments declared that ‘(1) the events which had been brought to the attention of the Council 
should not break the friendship between the two countries; (2) they would prevent repetition of similar events 
in the future; (3) they recognize their obligation to submit controversies between them to peaceful settlement, 
and to this end they agreed to give validity to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement known as the Pact of 
Bogotà; and (4) they agreed to reach an understanding upon the application of the Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife.’ [FENWICK 1949:331]. 
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earlier had concluded an agreement which foresaw that each nation takes measures in the event 
individuals or groups endeavour to threaten the internal peace; Haiti claimed that this agreement 
was violated by the radio broadcasts [DIL 1986:1027-1028]. 
The first reaction of the Council of the OAS was to adjourn the affair without taking any action [NYT 
17.06.1949]. A few days later the Council met again and decided to charge a committee to draft a 
resolution on the matter. The resolution, approved few days later stated that the Rio Treaty should 
not be applied in this dispute. The Council found that none of the situations referred to in Article 6 
(aggression that was no armed attack; an extra- or intra-continental conflict, any fact or situation 
that might endanger the peace of America) could be cited for that particular incident. Consequen-
tially the resolution abstained ‘under these circumstances’ to convoke the Organ of Consultation 
[FENWICK 1949:332].The text further expressed the hope that the good relations of the conflict 
parties could be strengthened. Both countries accepted the resolution [NYT 26.02.1949].  
The Council, however, took the step of sending a fact finding commission to Haiti and the Domini-
can Republic. The Chicago Daily Tribune claimed that during its visit Roland disappeared from the 
scene only to return after the investigating team had left [CDT 10.07.1949; WP 27.02.1949]. It is 
not entirely clear if this ‘fact finding’ body is synonymous with the IAPC. What is clear is that both 
countries where heard by the IAPC. Three members of the IAPC travelled to both countries to as-
certain the true nature of the issue [SHELLABY 06.01.1950, FENWICK 1949b:771]. On 10th June 
1949 representatives of the conflict parties as well as the IAPC signed a Joint Declaration. The Do-
minican Republic and Haiti vowed in that agreement that “neither country tolerated or would in the 
future tolerate activities which had as their purpose the disturbance of the domestic peace of its 
neighbour"[qtd. in: SHELLABY 06.01.1950]. 
A few weeks later the Chairman of the Council of the OAS visited Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
and conferred with the Presidents and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries. After his 
mission he was confident that there will be no further conflict between the parties [CDT 
23.03.1949]. 
This optimism turned out to be premature. Over the following months the situation deteriorated. 
On 3rd January 1950 Haiti sent a new request to the OAS. It claimed that the Dominican Republic 
had effectively participated in a plot to kill the Haitian president on 19th December 1949. Moreover, 
Haiti charged that the plotters had planned to set fire to its capital. Haiti referred to defence meas-
ures of article 6 and 9 of the Rio Treaty in its note to the OAS [SHELLABY 06.01.1950]. 
However, since the Dominican Republic – after presenting its counter-charges concerning acts of 
Caribbean governments against its territorial inviolability, sovereignty, and political independence – 
also demanded the convocation of the Organ of Consultation in pursuance to article 6 of the Rio 
Treaty, the Council decided at a formal meeting on 6th January 1950 to eventually invoke the Rio 
Treaty [SHELLABY 09.08.1950]. 
The provisional Organ of Consultation in a session on 11th January 1950 was decided to handle the 
Haitian (Case A) and Dominican (Case B) petitions separately. Furthermore the provisional Organ 
of Consultation appointed an Investigating Committee – not to be confounded with the IAPC - for 
on-the-spot fact finding purposes. [DIL 1963:768]. The committee comprised Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, the US, and Uruguay. The committee was instructed to take testimony wherever it saw it 
fit after notice to prospective governments. Its sessions were instructed to be private; the results 
would be considered by the Council of the OAS in order to decide on necessary measures [SHEL-
LABY 23.01.1950]. The visited countries cooperated fully; the committee inter alia interviewed 
prisoners without the presence of government officials [SHELLABY 09.08.1950]. 
 The report of the committee was published on 19th March 1950 and came to the following conclu-
sions: 
 
• Dominican government officials were guilty of aiding a plot of overthrowing the Haitian re-
gime the previous year; and 
• officials of the government of Cuba and Guatemala aided armed groups in their territories 
who planned to overthrow the Dominican government. 
 
The committee proposed that the Dominican Republic should take steps to prevent its officials from 
fomenting seditious movements against other governments. Hostile propaganda in Haiti and in the 
Dominican Republic against each other should be stopped. Guatemala and Cuba should be re-
quested to stop groups in their country from conspiring against other American countries and to 
prevent arms smuggling for that purpose [BURD 20.03.1950]. The committee further suggested 
that any repetition of the reported activities should be met with sanctions under the Rio Treaty 
[NYT 21.03.1950]. Cuba vehemently denied the charges [NYT 01.04.1950].  
The Council of the OAS met as provisional Organ of Consultation in April 1950 after having received 
the report. It adopted various resolutions, requesting i.a.: 
 
• that the government of the Dominican Republic takes measures to prevent its officials from 
tolerating, instigating, encouraging, aiding, or fomenting subversive movements against 
other governments; 
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• that the Dominican Republic and Haiti comply with the Joint Declaration reached in June 
1949; 
• the Guatemalan and Cuban governments to act against groups organized on a military ba-
sis with the aim of conspiring against the security of other countries; 
• the concerned governments of honouring the principle of non-intervention; and 
• the Dominican Republic and Haiti to settle their conflict, which if not accomplished would be 
submitted to a procedure as foreseen in the Pact of Bogotá. 
 
Moreover, a Special Committee of five members was established to facilitate compliance with the 
resolutions cited above. 
Finally, the Council decided to terminate its operation as provisional Organ of Consultation, since 
the measures taken have led to a situation no longer applicable for the emergency action as pro-
vided for in the Rio Treaty [DIL 1963:769; CSM 09.08.1950; WP 11.04.1950]. 
 
Although at first reluctant to deal with the submitted issue seriously, by later emulating similar 
procedures as foreseen by the Rio Treaty, it engaged both countries in a process of settlement. 
When tensions escalated the provisional Organ of Consultation had to be convoked. By handling 
the claims of both countries, each of the parties felt to have successfully presented their case, 
without making one of them seem to lose face. However, the early reluctance to tackle the matter, 
if left unrevised, would have revealed an inept and/or unwilling Organization to support conflict 
resolution at an early stage.  
2.10.4 Cuba vs. Dominican Republic 1951 
IAPC; mediation. 
In July 1951 the ship ‘Quetzal’ (under Guatemalan registry) was on its way from Cuba to Guate-
mala, transporting avocados. On the high seas the ship was intercepted by a Dominican war vessel 
and escorted into a Dominican port. There five Cuban and three Guatemalan crew members were 
tried for conspiracy against the Dominican Republic. They were sentenced to thirty years in prison. 
The action was grounded by the ship’s history. In 1947 the ‘Quetzal’ had been involved in an at-
tempt to invade the Dominican Republic from the Cuban base [NYT 04.01.1952] Cayo Confites, 
under the auspices of the Caribbean Legion164
2.10.5 Colombia vs. Peru 1953 
. 
After normal diplomatic procedures had failed, Cuba brought the case before the IAPC in December 
1951 [CARIGNAN 16.12.1951]. Cuba considered the Dominican action to be illegal and threatened 
with the severance of diplomatic ties and announced that the next step – in case the dispute is not 
settled – would be an appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations. This announcement 
made the IAPC to redouble its efforts [NYT 25.12.1951]. The IAPC, under the chairman of the 
Mexican Luis Quintanilla, undertook lengthy discussions with representatives of both countries. 
According to the NYT the Cuban member of the IAPC was not included in resolving this case [NYT 
04.01.1952]. 
However, the IAPC’s first success was the release of the Guatemalan crew members [NYT 
25.12.1951]. Finally, the negotiations ended with the pardoning of the Cuban citizens and with the 
signing of a good neighbour agreement between Cuba and the Dominican Republic before the IAPC 
[NYT 04.01.1952]. 
 
Once again the IAPC proved to be the appropriate body to look into a dispute among its members 
and even to facilitate its friendly resolution. However, once again the OAS machinery displayed 
some foot-dragging, having to be motivated by Cuba’s threat to turn to the world body.  
IAPC; making recommendations. 
In 1948 an uprising of supporters of the Peruvian politician Haya de la Torre, leader of the APRA 
party (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), resulted in severe repression and caused him to 
flee to the Colombian embassy asking for asylum in January 1949 [WH HT; NYT 23.12.1953]. 
There he lived for years like a prisoner. However, on 17th November 1953 Colombia made a re-
quest to the IAPC for mediation. Peru refused the involvement of the IAPC, referring to a reserva-
tion it had made on the occasion of the establishment of the IAPC. The Peruvian refusal made it 
unable for the IAPC to act, since the consent of all conflict parties is a requirement. The IAPC nev-
                                                 
164 The Caribbean Legion was loose collection of exiled politicians from various countries, who were at times 
able to coordinate their activities and those of their loyals, aiming at ousting autocratic regimes at home [GLEI-
JESES 1997]. 
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ertheless published a document recommending bilateral negotiations. Although those negotiations 
were soon entered into, Peru insisted that they were unconnected to the IAPC recommendations. 
In April 1954 - when the 10th  Inter-American Conference was held in Caracas - Peru and Colombia 
announced an agreement that allowed Haya de la Torre to leave Peru and travel to Mexico 
[SCHINDLER 1998:64-65; GEROLD 1971:52]. 
 
Notwithstanding its limited acceptability as the appropriate interlocutor, the IAPC opted neverthe-
less to outline a possible route for settling the dispute. Instead of declaring itself incapable of pro-
viding its services given Peru’s refusal, the IAPC unostentatiously offered ‘recommendations’ how 
the issue could be resolved and thus seems to have indirectly contributed to reaching an agree-
ment. 
2.10.6 Guatemala vs. Honduras, Nicaragua, and the US 1954 
IAPC, Council of the OAS; making biased political and ideological declarations. 
The left-of-centre government of Guatemala blamed Honduras and Nicaragua in June 1954 of giv-
ing asylum and aid to rebels planning an overthrow. Guatemala sought to bring the case before the 
SCUN instead of the OAS. Guatemala at that time had neither deposited its ratification of the 
COAS165 nor was it party to the Rio Treaty. Another reason to engage the world body instead of the 
OAS can be found in the general position of the hemispheric body and foremost of the US against 
any regime that was collaborating with the USSR and was presumed to follow a communist policy. 
During the Tenth Inter-American Conference in March of the same year the US had sponsored and 
succeeded with a resolution under the title ‘Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the 
Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism’. 
This resolution was directed against Guatemala, although the US preferred not to state so ex-
pressis verbis. Resolution XCIII states that ‘the domination or control of the political institutions of 
any American state by the international communist movement … would constitute a threat to the 
sovereignty and political independence of the American states, endangering the peace of Amer-
ica…'. Consequently, it was decided to convoke a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in order to 
consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties [AJIL 1954:124]. 
With a vote of 17 to 1166 the resolution was adopted167. Guatemala opposed the resolution and 
Mexico as well as Argentina abstained [GRUSON 14.03.1954]. Mexico argued that the terms of the 
resolution would permit the collective intervention of the American states in the purely domestic 
affairs of a state on the alleged ground that it was letting itself be dominated by a foreign state  
[FENWICK 1956b:638]. The USSR as veto power of the SCUN supported Guatemala in its case. 
Although Guatemala was supported by the USSR, a veto wielding power of the SCUN, its bid was to 
remain unsuccessful. On 19th June 1954 Guatemala called on the IAPC to hold an urgent meeting 
so as to proceed with the adoption of the necessary measures against the violations of the principle 
of non-intervention. During the following days the attitude of Guatemala toward the IAPC turned 
out to be ambivalent. The US and with it nine other American states168 took the matter before the 
Council of the OAS. It requested the Chairman of the Council to call a special meeting of the Coun-
cil for the purpose of convoking a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in accordance with article 
6 of the Rio Treaty. At that Meeting “the danger to the peace and security of the Continent due to 
the intervention of the international Communist movement” was to be considered [FENWICK 
1954d]. However, events overtook potential multilateral deliberations. An armed intervention of 
Honduras and Nicaragua, supported by the US169
                                                 
165 See: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-41.html retrieved on 14.03.2008. 
166 UNNA later described the position of the Latin nations toward the commitment of joint action in case of 
communist infiltration as a ‘lack of enthusiasm’ [UNNA 06.04.1960]. 
167 Costa Rica did not attend the conference in protest of the non-democratic nature of the Venezuelan host 
government [NYT 26.02.1954]. 
168 Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru WP 27.07.1954 
169 FRYE observes that “the United States organized, assisted, and gave diplomatic assistance to a revolution 
ousting a left-wing ruler. … In 1954, United States Delegate Henry Cabot Lodge simply smothered UN debate 
until after the revolt was successful. The case was referred to the Organization of American States” [FRYE 
18.04.1961]. 
 led to a coup of the Guatemalan regime [GEROLD 
1971:52-53] and a takeover through a provisional government, headed by a military junta at the 
end of June 1954 [NYT 01.07.1954]. 
Later it was learned that the US Central Intelligence Agency had helped oust the ‘leftist’ Guatema-
lan government [RIDING 09.07.1980; FARER 1990:508]. Decades later, in a review of the coun-
try’s ensuing history, the Swedish Development Agency SIDA made the following observation: 
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After a decade of government by a reformist, democratically elected president, a group of 
exile Guatemalans, with the support of the USA, carried out a coup in 1954. This was the 
beginning of more than three decades of military control. Oppression and the unequal dis-
tribution of the country’s resources created all the preconditions for the guerrilla move-
ment that began operations in the 1960s.[SIDA 2003:10] 
The witnessed conflict transformation through the OAS in this case was of an adverse nature and 
helped to justify the overthrow of a member’s government. On top of that in giving tacit approval 
of the intervention which clearly contravened primary principles of international law and conduct 
between nations, the OAS indirectly endorsed the agenda of the US and its supporters. Considering 
the long drawn-out civil war which later ravaged the country – coming to an end only in the 1990s, 
this position of the OAS partly contributed to transforming the conflict into an internal one, by not 
strongly and consequentially opposing the violent overthrow of a democratically elected govern-
ment and as such sowing the seeds for decades of internal strife. 
The multilateral body, instead of supporting one of its members from imminent threats,  condoned 
gross violations of OAS norms and principles by approving the anti-Communist resolution and fur-
ther by allowing the US to go unpunished. The practice of OAS principles simply being disregarded 
if political expediency so dictates, has resulted in heavy and lasting damage to the credibility of the 
Organization as fair arbiter. 
2.10.7 Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua 1955 
Council of the OAS, IAPC, Conciliation Commission; investigation, mediation, facilitation 
of observation, establishing border demarcation zone, border observation. 
Costa Rica appealed to the OAS in January 1955 and asked for an invocation of the Rio Treaty, 
charging Nicaragua with threatening its independence and sovereignty with an invasion [DUBOIS 
14.01.1955]. At an emergency session of the OAS Council on 11th January it was decided that an 
investigating committee will be sent to Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Representatives of the following 
countries comprised that committee: Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and the United States. 
Furthermore, the Council called for a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs [SCHMIDT 
12.01.1955]. 
It appears as if this investigating body was the IAPC with partly diversified membership, since Luis 
Quintanilla, the chairman of the IAPC, was also chairing this group [DUBOIS 14.01.1955]. While 
the IAPC was visiting the region, Nicaragua announced the closure of its border with Costa Rica. 
After San José, the Costa Rican capital as well as other cities had been bombed by insurgents, the 
Council met again and 
…took a step which, although ostensibly no more than a measure to make the work of the 
Investigating Committee more effective, actually had the character of an exercise of police 
power. The Council requested the governments, who were in a position to do so, to place 
at the disposal of the Investigating Committee aircraft which, in the name of the Commit-
tee and under its supervision, might make pacific observation flights over the regions af-
fected, after receiving the consent of the governments whose territories were traversed. 
The fact that the flights were described as “pacific” could not prevent them from becoming 
in fact a deterrent to the invading forces … [FENWICK 1955:237, original emphasis] 
The committee was subsequently supported by reconnaissance planes from the US [CSM 
13.01.1955]. 
In its preliminary report the IAPC came to the conclusion that foreign planes had attacked Costa 
Rica and that rebel elements had received arms from abroad. The IAPC urged that the border be 
patrolled by airplanes of American states [NYT 14.01.1955]. When the OAS Council came together 
on 14th January 1955 it passed a resolution based upon the report of the IAPC. Nicaragua was con-
demned and asked to take stronger measures to stop the flow of war equipment to Costa Rica. The 
Council ordered the IAPC to send observers to all airports in the region, Nicaragua included. Ob-
servers should monitor “any place which might be utilized for transport of troops or military equip-
ment toward Costa Rica” [cit in: CDT 15.01.1955]. The Council asked the OAS members to set a 
date and place for a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs [CDT 15.01.1955]. The IAPC report also 
recommended that the OAS Council “contemplate at once the measures which, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, should be applied if the circumstances thus demand” 
[qtd. in: NYT 15.01.1955]. 
George Hazera, the representative of Costa Rica at the Council Meeting made clear that his gov-
ernment was grateful for the Council having gone so far but added: 
Costa Rica wishes to remind the Council that its Government has asked military aid to re-
pel the invasion of which it is now the victim. 
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I make an earnest appeal to give us the arms with which to defend ourselves170
• the strengthening and perfecting of the Amity Pact between the two countries, signed in 
1949; 
. [qtd. in: 
NYT 15.01.1955] 
Nicaragua underlined that its government was in no way involved in the transfer of military equip-
ment; the Nicaraguan government had also announced measures to avoid any intervention in the 
internal affairs of Costa Rica [NYT 15.01.1955]. However, CALVERT concludes: 
Though the Government of General Anasastio [sic] Somoza García [of Nicaragua, my re-
mark] asserted its innocence, it had in fact been forced to withdraw, although it was not 
subsequently censured. [CALVERT 1994:162] 
Reacting to the Costa Rican plea the Council met again on 16th January to approve the sale of four 
P-51 Mustang fighter planes to Costa Rica for – as was rumoured – ‘four for a dollar’. The Council 
passed furthermore a resolution requesting the IAPC to reach an agreement with the two conflict 
parties to set up a border watch [WP 17.01.1955]. The IAPC reached such an agreement also fore-
seeing a buffer zone three miles on each side of the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border [GRUSON 
22.01.1955]. Although attacks continued during the following days, hostilities came finally to an 
end. The IAPC published its final recommendations on 17th February. Those recommendations in-
cluded: 
 
• the improvement of the systems for controlling the traffic in arms and ammunition; 
• the effective application of Resolution XI of the Inter-American Conference for the Mainte-
nance of Peace and Security that ‘excessive armaments’ beyond the requirements for 
common defence in the interest for peace and security should be avoided; and 
• termination of the action of the OAS Council as provisional Organ of Consultation and can-
cellation of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs as regular Organ of Consultation. 
 
Moreover the IAPC urged the parties to appoint a bilateral Commission of Investigation and Con-
ciliation under the terms of the Pact of Bogotá to serve as a permanent guarantor for peaceful set-
tlements of future disputes [FENWICK 1955:238]. 
The Ecuadorian IAPC representative made reservations to this report. First, the representative criti-
cized that the report remained incomplete and did not mirror the full picture available to the IAPC. 
Second, it was insisted that a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall take place to consider the 
possibility of establishing an inter-American police force on a permanent legal basis. Third, it was 
urged that the arms race in the hemisphere be effectively contained [NYT 18.02.1955]. 
However, OAS Council met again on 24th February 1955 and adopted the main conclusions of the 
IAPC report. It proclaimed the termination of the activities of the IAPC but at the same time cre-
ated a Special Commission of the Council to co-operate with representatives of Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua to set up a Commission of Investigation and Conciliation [FENWICK 1955:238]. 
In March Costa Rica and Nicaragua announced the creation of a new commission designed to help 
both countries to settle their differences peacefully. The US representative on the OAS Council, 
John C. Dreier, was chosen as head of the commission [CSM 09.03.1955]. Finally, in January 1956 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua signed two agreements. One of them implements the Amity Pact of 1949 
and endeavours to prevent subversive cross border activities. The other agreement proposes the 
permanent establishment of an inter-American committee of investigation and conciliation (same 
composition as the IAPC) to watch over the peace between both countries. Free access to both 
countries for the committee was ensured [HALLETT 10.01.1956; WP 10.01.1956]. 
 
In this case the OAS was confronted with the dilemma of how best to support a member that was 
militarily attacked but lacked any effective defence. However, since the perpetrators of the attacks 
could not be located beyond doubt, no measures against them could be decided and taken. Conse-
quently, the OAS focused its efforts at ascertaining their origin, or – at the minimum – to ensure 
that similar attacks would not recur. Still, the steps it initiated – investigation, patrolling, and moni-
toring – ultimately effected the end of the hostilities, and as such transformed the violent conflict, 
at least for the time being. 
Part of the reconciliation of both countries was also brought about by rejuvenating the commit-
ments agreed to in the Amity Pact of 1949 – an achievement partly made possible by the tasked 
OAS conciliation committee at that time. In this case the OAS’s contribution can well be described 
                                                 
170 Costa Rica has and had no formal army organization. At that time it only had a 2.000 strong police-civil 
guard [HALLETT 25.01.1955]. 
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as of pacifying quality, even though the mandating of enforcement action is controversial from a 
legal perspective. Especially so given the fact that only the US was providing the required equip-
ment for the task. Similarly questionable is the facilitation of the fighter planes sale to Costa Rica, 
a measure which could eventually prompt or at least energize a regional arms race. 
2.10.8 Honduras vs. Nicaragua 1957 
Council of the OAS (POC), Investigating Committee, IAPC, Ad Hoc Committee, Two mem-
ber group, Mixed Commission; mediation, reporting, making recommendations, tempo-
rarily taking control over disputed territory. 
At the end of April 1957 Honduras turned to the OAS requesting to take up its charges that Nicara-
guan troops had invaded its territory [NYT 30.04.1957]. A long standing border dispute about the 
concerned territory had existed beforehand. In 1906 the King of Spain had awarded the territory to 
Honduras under an arbitration which Nicaragua had refused to accept [CALVERT 1994:162]. But 
while Honduras submitted its appeal to the OAS - apparently seeking peaceful means of settlement 
– Honduran planes were attacking and killing Nicaraguans in the disputed area [NYT 03.05.1957]. 
The OAS Council met on 1st and 2nd May 1957 and decided unanimously, with the conflict parties 
abstaining, to invoke the Rio Treaty and constituted itself as provisional Organ of Consultation; 
additionally it established an Investigating Committee. The Committee comprised the US, Argen-
tina, Mexico, Bolivia, and Panama as chair [WP 04.05.1957]. Again it is unclear if this body is to be 
viewed as the IAPC with changed composition. According to GEROLD [1971:53] no case was 
brought before the IAPC in the period between 1956 and 1959. However, the committee on 5th May 
1957 succeeded in reaching a four-day ceasefire, within which to settle the dispute [DUBOIS 
06.05.1957]. On 8th May the Investigating Committee presented a troop withdrawal plan to the 
dispute parties [NYT 09.05.1957; WP 09.05.1957]. Both governments signed the agreement. 
Thereupon the Investigation Committee submitted its report to the OAS Council. The report set 
forth in detail the steps in securing the agreements by Honduras and Nicaragua. The Council 
adopted the report and appointed the same members to constitute an Ad Hoc Committee. This 
committee was to work out a procedure to settle the conflict, acceptable for both parties, within 30 
days. In a number of sessions the Ad Hoc Committee did not succeed to bring about a solution with 
the means of direct negotiation. Consequently, the Council of the OAS appointed two of the mem-
bers to put before the conflict parties alternative proposals of settlement. The two members finally 
suggested: an arbitral tribunal, a single arbiter and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Hondu-
ras and Nicaragua agreed on 28th June 1957 to submit the case to the ICJ [FENWICK 1957:763]. 
In November 1960 the ICJ’ verdict held that the original award had been valid and that Nicaragua 
was obliged to give effect to it [CALVERT 1994:162-163]. Both countries accepted the ICJ opinion 
[WP 24.11.1960]. In March 1961 Nicaragua and Honduras with the support of the IAPC worked out 
a formula under which they were required to remove their authorities from the disputed area and 
allow a mixed commission, headed by the President of the IAPC, to take control. The commission 
was to stay until the territory would be under control of the Honduran authorities [NYT 
14.03.1961]. 
 
The OAS reacted along traditional lines when the Council constituted itself as provisional Organ of 
Consultation and established an Investigating Committee and/or the IAPC. However, in contrast to 
other cases of conflict the intervening body made substantial content-related proposal, including 
very concrete recommendations. Flexibility was on display when the Committee was transformed 
into an Ad Hoc Committee and after it remaining unsuccessful, tasking a group of two members to 
continue the negotiations with the conflict parties. These endeavours, including the (somewhat 
compulsory) presentation of alternative routes of resolution, finally proved successful. 
In the end-phase of the confrontation the OAS chartered new waters when it agreed to temporarily 
take control of disputed territory while the handover to the rightful holder was taking place. 
However, given the fact that the OAS – having always eagerly maintained to have the means to 
settle regional conflicts on its own – had by itself to suggest the recourse to an international judi-
cial body, revealed the imperfection of the so-called inter-American peace machinery. Its claim to 
autonomy was thus starting to be considerably undermined.  
2.10.9 Panama 1959 
Council of the OAS (POC), Investigating Committee; investigating, indirect implementa-
tion/enforcement via member states. 
In April 1959 Panama complained that its territory had been invaded by rebels, originating from 
Cuba. While Cuba itself condemned the rebellion and promised its cooperation, the OAS Council on 
28th April voted unanimously for the following: 
 
• to call a MCMFA to discuss the Panamanian rebellion; 
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• to send an investigating body to Panama; and 
• to ask all member states to prevent rebel activities on their own territory. 
 
The acting president of the OAS Council selected the following countries to make up the fact finding 
mission: Brazil (chair), the US, Paraguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica [JORDEN 29.04.1959]. 
It was the first time that the Rio Treaty was invoked without a complaint against a particular gov-
ernment. Although the invaders came from Cuba, Panama avoided blaming Havana – rather it pre-
ferred to ask for help against ‘pirates’ and ‘adventurers’. On 1st May the NYT reported that the in-
vaders – numbering about 80 persons – had surrendered after they had negotiated with the inves-
tigating committee of the OAS [NYT 02.05.1959]. 
As a further step the OAS Council approved the detention of suspicious ships entering Panamanian 
waters by inter-American patrol vessels. Those patrol ships were contributed by the US, Panama, 
and Colombia and were authorized to check on ships suspected of harbouring invading forces [NYT 
03.05.1959]. The patrolling had been requested by Panama [WP 03.05.1959]. The chairman of the 
Committee, Fernando Lobo, visited the detained invaders in order to control the conditions of their 
imprisonment [NYT 04.05.1959]. Soon after the patrol vessels were called off, the Committee left 
Panama, concluding that the threat was over [NYT 05.05.1959]. 
 
The OAS, by acting on Panama’s request, for the first time had to deal with non-state-actors and 
as such inherently with actors being no party to any inter-American legal document regulating 
resolutions of occurring conflicts. However, in contrast to the 1955 case reported by Costa Rica the 
presumed originating country was pledging its cooperation, giving no (potential) cover to subver-
sive endeavours and as such avoiding steering clear of becoming a party to the conflict.  
Another parallel with the said controversy between Costa Rica and Nicaragua can be seen in the 
OAS’ use of means by its members – be it aircraft or patrol ships – for enforcement purposes; a 
measure whose legal soundness may rightfully be doubted. However, the consent of all concerned 
governments certainly contributes to the amelioration of any potential contravention of interna-
tional law. 
2.10.10 Nicaragua 1959 
Council of the OAS (POC), Investigating Committee; investigating. 
Nicaragua complained in June 1959 to the OAS that it was invaded by rebels. Several hundred of 
armed men had landed in Nicaragua, coming from Costa Rica. Nicaragua’s President claimed that 
International Communism and the former Costa Rican President, Jose Figueres, were involved; it 
was moreover alleged that nationals from Venezuela and Cuba were among the invaders, as well 
as nationals from the Dominican Republic [AdG 03.06.1959; LAT 04.06.1959; LAT 05.06.1959]. 
The Council of the OAS met on 4th June 1959 but reacted in a rather lukewarm fashion to Nicara-
gua’s charges. In a vote 17-2 with Venezuela and Cuba maintaining that the uprising was an inter-
nal affair and Bolivia not taking part, it was decided to establish a fact finding commission to inves-
tigate the situation. The Council president appointed representatives of Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, 
and the United States to act as investigating committee. The Council constituted itself as provi-
sional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. William JORDEN, reporting for the NYT com-
mented: 
Tonight’s decision by the Council reflected the attitude of many members that available in-
formation was not sufficient to judge whether any intervention by other states was called 
for. … 
It was apparent the Council wanted to move slowly in the Nicaraguan affair. [JORDEN 
05.06.1959] 
Although Nicaragua insisted that its situation resembled the one Panama encountered view weeks 
earlier, the hesitant attitude of the OAS was explained with the high popularity of Panama among 
its neighbours in contrast with Nicaragua’s standing [JORDEN 04.06.1959]. 
The four-man investigating committee left 10 days after it was first established, an unusually long 
period compared with previous swift reactions [NYT 15.06.1959]. When the body visited Honduras 
on 16th June, it was assailed by demonstrators with eatables [NYT 17.06.1959]. Meanwhile the 
Nicaraguan armed forces battled the rebels successfully [LAT 05.06.1959]. 
A report was submitted to the OAS Council on 27th July 1959. That report contained evidence that 
a close associate of the Cuban president lent aid to the rebellion in Nicaragua. At the same time 
documents were presented which underlined the opposition of the Cuban president to any such 
ventures. The findings remained altogether ambivalent; the same goes for the conclusion of the 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES | CASES 
70 
investigating team. No recommendations were made. The report was also silent on the question if 
the invasion was the product of internal developments or outside aggression [NYT 28.07.1959]. 
Subsequently, the Council of the OAS decided in a vote 17-1171
2.10.11 Dominican Republic vs. Cuba, Venezuela 1959 
 to end the investigation. Cuba and 
Venezuela abstained, claiming that the invasion was an internal affair and did not justify the inves-
tigation in the first place. The OAS called on its members to maintain peace in the hemisphere and 
to observe the principle of non-intervention [WP 29.07.1959]. 
 
There is no denying that the OAS’s reaction compared unfavourably to the one provided in the case 
of Panama’s complaint. There, members were made to carry out inspections of vessels entering 
Panamanian waters. Especially in the face of the findings of the investigating team, the OAS’ reac-
tion was questionable at best. Instead of ascertaining the facts which would build the fundament 
for decisions by the regional organization, the investigating committee appeared unwilling to draw 
any substantial conclusions, probably out of political inopportunity. The matter was certainly com-
plicated by the fact that the rebels came not from a single country only, but from various. More-
over, the accused countries did not show willingness to cooperate on the issue which additionally 
impeded the resolution of the dispute. In fact the contrary occurred: the Venezuelan Chamber of 
Deputies voted in favour of a resolution to back ‘the people of Nicaragua in their fight for freedom’; 
and in Cuba Nicaraguan exiles were free to sell rebel bonds to finance the insurgents [LAT 
05.06.1959]. 
In evaluating OAS’ actions in this case one will have to conclude that the support it extended to 
Nicaragua was only half-hearted. Without seriously reprimanding other countries which seemed to 
have been involved in one way or the other, it was due only to Nicaragua’s deployment of military 
force that the armed rebellion was finally stopped. The Organization thus did not act according to 
its traditional principles of solidarity or the territorial non-violability. 
MCMFA, IAPC; investigating. 
On 2nd July 1959 the Dominican Republic appealed to the OAS to invoke the Rio Treaty. It claimed 
that in June two loads of armed men were brought inside its territory. The Dominican Republic 
charged that those men were organized, trained, and equipped in Cuba and had departed from 
there. Venezuela was said to have played a role in preparing the invasion. Among the groups there 
were nationals from Cuba, Venezuela, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rica, and Spain 
[WP 03.07.1959]. 
However, Cuba cut diplomatic ties with the Dominican Republic in a reaction to the latter’s refusal 
to hand over former Cuban President, Fulgencio Batista and for allowing him to run an organiza-
tion, allegedly acting against Cuba [AdG 04.07.1959]. 
Even before the OAS decided on the matter, Cuba and Venezuela voiced their opposition to an in-
volvement of the OAS [McCARTHY 04.07.1959; NYT 06.07.1959], arguing that the Dominican dic-
tator Trujillo should not be protected from overthrow. The OAS Council faced with a possible Cuban 
walk-out of the OAS, delayed its meeting two times [NYT 07.07.1959]. Meanwhile, the NYT [NYT 
08.07.1959] reported, that nine Latin countries backed the position of Venezuela (those encom-
passed: Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Honduras, Bolivia, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina). Both, 
Venezuela and Cuba, made clear that they would not permit any investigating team into their terri-
tory. Consequently, the Dominican Republic withdrew its request to the OAS [CDT 11.07.1959; LAT 
05.07.1959], notwithstanding the US’ approval of involving the Organization [SCHMIDT 
11.07.1959]. Later the Dominican Republic clarified that it merely had withdrawn the request to 
convoke the Organ of Consultation to investigate the matter but that its charges against Cuba and 
Venezuela remained valid [NYT 12.07.1959]. 
Nevertheless, OAS Council decided to call a MCMFA in order to generally consider unrest in the 
Caribbean area; but instead of referring to the Rio Treaty, Arts. 39 and 40 of the COAS were cited 
in order to overcome the opposition to deliberate explicitly on the Dominican charges [NYT 
13.07.1959; SCHMIDT 14.07.1959]. 
Faced with the strict opposition of Cuba and Venezuela, the OAS held the Fifth MCMFA172
                                                 
171 Honduras voted against the resolution ending the inquiry since it alleged that the resolution did not recog-
nize sufficiently the neutrality Honduras had shown in the affair [WP 29.07.1959]. 
172 For some details on the MCMFA see the report by the LAT on 16.08.1959. 
 in August 
1959 to deal with ‘political tensions in the Caribbean’ (see above). Agreement was reached that 
those tensions should be investigated by an strengthened IAPC. The MCMFA, however, also voiced 
its support for representative democracy and stated that anti-democratic regimes are to be consid-
ered ‘a danger to united and peaceful relationships in the hemisphere’ [MACDONALD 1964:368], 
alluding to the dictatorial regime of the Dominican Republic. 
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The IAPC was instructed to examine “the relationship between violations of human rights or lack of 
exercise of representative democracy on the one hand, and political tensions affecting continental 
peace on the other” [qtd. in: DD 24.08.1959]. 
However, before the IAPC was able to submit its report, scheduled for an OAS conference in Febru-
ary 1960, counter-charges by Venezuela that the Dominican Republic planned to overthrow its 
government, placed the latter in the dock instead (see below). 
 
The OAS’ obvious unwillingness to decisively act on the invasion charges of Nicaragua and now the 
Dominican Republic was mirroring the majority’s position in both cases. Still, it also demonstrated 
that the Organization was more inclined to act according to political interests than on the strict 
observance of its own principles or the rule of international law. However, faced with as many as 
three consecutive cases (Panama, Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic) in a matter of months, the 
OAS saw itself forced to call a MCMFA. And while it is true that one of the most important functions 
of IOs is to be seen in reconciling opposing standpoints and in this process to seek compromises, 
the emphasis of non-intervention and the parallel strengthening of its commitment to democracy 
was a hardly veiled effort to avoid condemning the alleged supporters of the invasion. Instead of 
being an impartial third party – a claim probably absurd to address to a body made up of actors 
with distinct political interests – the OAS in this case was able only to make a mainly face-saving 
decision, instructing a long dormant IAPC to make a report on such an ill-defined subject. It has to 
be assumed then, that this measure was not seriously meant to contribute to an equitable resolu-
tion of the conflict in the first place. 
2.10.12 Venezuela vs. Dominican Republic 1960 
Council of the OAS (POC), General Committee of the Council of the OAS, Working Group 
of the General Committee, IAPC, Investigating Committee, MCMFA, Sanctions’ Commit-
tee, Expert Team, IACHR; investigating, reporting, sanctioning, ascertaining democratic 
governance, ascertaining respect of human rights, electoral advising. 
After mass arrests in the Dominican Republic had resulted in more than 800 imprisonments, Vene-
zuela requested an emergency session of the OAS Council. Venezuela regarded the mass arrests a 
violation of the COAS [NYT 06.02.1960] and of the numerous OAS resolutions calling for respect 
for human rights [NYT 08.02.1960]. In Venezuela’s note to the Council of the OAS it was requested 
that the IAPC investigate ‘the flagrant violations of human rights by the Government of the Domini-
can Republic, which are aggravating tensions in the Caribbean’ [cit in: NYT 09.06.1960]. The NYT 
commented on that move the following: 
Nonintervention in domestic affairs has always been a cardinal principle of the twenty-
one-nation O.A.S. The fact that the council has been asked to consider the internal con-
duct of the Dominican Government is taken here as indicating a revolutionary change in 
attitude toward dictatorships over the last few years [NYT 08.02.1960]. 
On 8th February the OAS Council meeting took place. To support its argument the Venezuelan rep-
resentative cited the COAS, the Bogotá declaration on human rights and the Santiago Declaration 
of 1959 and requested the investigation of the situation. The Dominican Republic insisted that the 
matter was a purely internal affair. Although the delegates of the other members maintained that 
the principle of non-intervention had been a founding principle they conceded that basic human 
rights and liberties had become a pre-eminent concern [KENWORTHY 09.02.1960]. 
The Council voted 20–0, with the Dominican Republic abstaining, to delegate the issue to the 
eleven-nation General Committee of the OAS Council. The General Committee appointed a working 
group to find out whether and how the OAS can conduct an investigation in the matter. The work-
ing group comprised representatives of Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Peru, and the US [KENWOR-
THY 10.02.1960; RAYMONT 10.02.1960]. The working group concluded that the IAPC is the proper 
organ to conduct the investigation [KENWORTHY 11.02.1960]. The recommendation was referred 
to the General Committee of the OAS Council. In a vote 10 to 0, with the abstention of the Domini-
can Republic, the recommendation was endorsed [NYT 12.02.1960]. The question again was re-
ferred to the full Council of the OAS. There it was voted 18 to 1173
                                                 
173 Two countries abstained: Bolivia argued that the requested investigation could only have been carried out if 
the Dominican Republic would have asked for it. And Cuba stated that it considered the resolution assigning the 
matter to the IAPC as not strong enough [SCHMIDT 16.02.1960]. 
 on 15th February that the IAPC 
should carry out the investigation under the mandate of the Fifth MCMFA at Santiago in 1959 (see 
above) [SCHMIDT 16.02.1960]. For this particular investigation Colombia was designated as sub-
stitute for Venezuela [KENWORTHY 09.06.1960]. 
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The Dominican Republic refused to let the IAPC enter its territory to carry out its investigation [NYT 
19.03.1960]. This refusal was in conformity with the resolution of the Fifth MCMFA, empowering 
the IAPC, stating that the Committee’s action is subject “to the express consent of the states to 
investigations that are to be made in their respective territories” [WP 19.03.1960]. The IAPC had 
to rely on interviews with nationals and recent visitors of the Dominican Republic, on press mate-
rial, and on information provided by other governments of the hemisphere. On 8th June 1960 the 
IAPC published its report and stated that it 
has reached the conclusion that international tensions in the Caribbean region have been 
aggravated by flagrant and widespread violations of human rights which have been com-
mitted and continue to be committed in the Dominican Republic. Among these violations, 
mention must be made of the denial of free assembly and of free speech, arbitrary ar-
rests, cruel and inhuman treatment of political prisoners, and the use of intimidation and 
terror as political weapon. … These acts constitute the denial of fundamental rights set 
forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, as well as of principles 
of the Charter of the Organization of American States. [NYT 09.06.1960] 
The IAPC further stated that those tensions will continue to increase so long as the violations of 
human rights in the Dominican Republic persist [NYT 09.06.1960]. In a response to the report the 
Dominican government denied that human rights were violated [NYT 10.06.1960]. KENWORTHY, 
analyzing the impact of the IAPC report, wrote in the NYT: 
The committee’s uncompromising indictment of the Dominican Republic was immediately 
recognized here as marking a milestone in the inter-American system. … 
The history of Latin America has been studded with dictatorships that flagrantly interfered 
with human rights and liberties. Yet never before has the Organization of American States, 
or any of its bodies, publicly excoriated a country for such indignities. … 
What the Peace Committee [IAPC, my remark] has done, diplomats here said, is to estab-
lish a principle that violations of human rights are properly the concern of the Organization 
of American States when those violations result in international tensions. [NYT 
09.06.1960] 
Venezuela raised additional accusations only weeks after the report had been made public. The 
charges concerned the involvement of the Dominican government in an assassination attempt on 
Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt on 24th June 1960 [NYT 02.07.1960]. Venezuela asked 
the OAS Council to call a MCMFA and labelled the Dominican Republic an ‘aggressor’ under the 
provisions of the Rio Treaty [CDT 03.07.1960]. On 8th July the OAS Council decided in a vote 19 to 
0 to call a MCMFA [NYT 09.07.1960]; it however decided to act as provisional Organ of Consulta-
tion until the MCMFA takes place. Unanimous approval was also given to a full-scale investigation 
of the charge [WP 09.07.1960]. The investigating body consisted of one representative of Panama, 
Mexico, Argentina and of two representatives of the US. Another article of the NYT, however, also 
listed Uruguay as member of the mission. It started its work on 17th July 1960 [NYT 18.07.1960; 
ONIS 21.07.1960]. At a meeting of the OAS Council Venezuela demanded that the Dominican Re-
public be ousted from the OAS [WP 19.07.1960]. In contrast to the previous investigation the Do-
minican Republic invited the current fact-finding mission to investigate on its territory [NYT 
30.07.1960]. 
The confidential report of the investigating body leaked to the press on 10th August 1960 and sub-
stantiated the Venezuelan charges. Following are the main findings of the report: 
 
• the assassination attempt on Venezuelan President was part of a plan to displace Vene-
zuela’s democratically elected government; 
• the accused perpetrators received moral support and material help of high Dominican offi-
cials; 
• the electronic detonator and the explosives used in the assassination attempt were pro-
vided by the Dominican government [RAYMONT 10.08.1960; NYT 12.08.1960]. 
 
No wonder the dispute between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic was the major item on the 
agenda of the Sixth MCMFA taking place in August 1960. During the discussion about the actions to 
be taken both countries stayed away, since they were interested parties [SZULC 20.08.1960]. 
The Foreign Ministers voted to condemn the Dominican government, to recall the ambassadors and 
to apply limited economic sanction. This constituted the first time that the Rio Treaty was effec-
tively applied. The US had proposed a plan for sending a special OAS committee to supervise free 
elections in the Dominican Republic; but this suggestion was passed over [DUBOIS 21.08.1960]. 
The Final Act of the Sixth MCMFA “condemns emphatically the participation of the Government of 
the Dominican Republic in the acts of aggression and intervention against the State of Venezuela” 
[qtd. in: OAS 1960:5]. In accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty (see above) it agrees 
to the following measures: 
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Breaking of diplomatic relations of all the member states with the Dominican Republic; 
Partial interruption of economic relations of all the member states with the Dominican Re-
public, beginning with the immediate suspension of trade in arms and implements of war 
of every kind. 
Furthermore, the 
... Council of the Organization of American States, in accordance with the circumstances 
and with due consideration for the constitutional and legal limitations of each and every 
one of the member states, shall study the feasibility and desirability of extending the sus-
pension of trade with the Dominican Republic to other articles. [OAS 1960a:5-6] 
The OAS Council was explicitly authorized to discontinue the adopted measures with a two-thirds 
majority “at such time as the Government of the Dominican Republic should cease to constitute a 
danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere”174
The investigating team reported on 15th June that the Dominican Republic was calm [WP 
16.06.1961]. The Dominican President consequently called for the lifting of the imposed sanctions 
[NYT 12.07.1961]. However, in its report to the OAS Council the team recommended that the im-
. The vote was taken unanimously 19:0 with 
Venezuela and the Dominican Republic as parties to the dispute not taking part [WP 23.08.1960]. 
The press hailed the move as a fulfilment of the hopes and promises of the creators of the OAS. 
The OAS with this step has come of age, as the NYT commented [NYT 22.08.1960]. The Christian 
Science Monitor called the move ‘a historic step forward’ and recognized the transformation of the 
principle of non-intervention. The OAS, according to this opinion, apparently ‘decided to be nonin-
terventionist only toward those members who practice nonintervention’ [CSM 23.08.1960]. 
As a consequence of the agreed sanctions 87,5% of the oil imports were cut off as of September 
1960 [WOLFE 20.09.1960], dealing the island’s economy a heavy blow. 
On 3rd October 1960 the OAS set up a seven member committee to consider the economic sanc-
tions on the Dominican Republic intended to force it to introduce democratic reforms. The commit-
tee consisted of delegates from Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and the United 
States; it was an outgrowth of the August meeting of Foreign Ministers [NYT 04.10.1960]. 
In late November 1960 Venezuela presented another accusation against the Dominican Republic. 
The latter was claimed to having been preparing an armed attack against the Venezuelan govern-
ment, putting airplanes and war material at the disposal of former Venezuelan dictator Marcos 
Pérez Jiménez. Venezuela requested that the IAPC should carry out an investigation on the matter. 
Unless the IAPC took action Venezuela ‘would have to act unilaterally in legitimate self defense’ 
[qtd. in: KENWORTHY 01.12.1960]. 
In January 1961 the OAS Council voted 14:1 – the Dominican Republic dissented - to impose eco-
nomic sanctions on the Dominican Republic, following the recommendations compiled by the seven 
member Committee. The resolution recommended that the OAS members cut off exports of oil, oil 
products, trucks and spare parts to the Dominican Republic. Abstaining were Argentina, Brazil, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, and Uruguay. They argued that since August no acts had been com-
mitted that justified those sanctions. It was assumed that the abstaining countries would not par-
ticipate in the export embargo [SCHMIDT 05.01.1961]. 
On 30th May 1961 the president of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, was killed by 
assassins [CDT 01.06.1961]. The ensuing violence and the naming of Trujillo’s son as chief of all 
armed forces made the US and Venezuela request the OAS to send another investigating team to 
the Dominican Republic and to convene an urgent meeting of the OAS [KILPATRICK 03.06.1961]. 
The new Dominican President, Joaquin Balaguer, suggested that a formula for certifying electoral 
practices throughout the Western hemisphere would be a basis for bringing the Dominican Republic 
back into the inter-American family. Such a formula could be applied by OAS observer missions 
[KIHSS 05.06.1961]. The OAS decided irrespective of this invitation [CSM 07.06.1961] to send a 
special fact-finding mission to the Dominican Republic. It was tasked with investigating charges of 
police terror and brutality taking place after the assassination of Trujillo. Furthermore it was as-
signed the task to check on the treatment of political prisoners, on the Dominican plan to institut-
ing a more democratic form of leadership, and on the extent to which Dominican citizens enjoy 
basic democratic rights. The investigating team was composed of representatives of the US, Mex-
ico, Argentina, Uruguay, and Panama [JORDEN 06.06.1961]. The composition was later changed. 
On 7th June the investigating team arrived in the Dominican Republic and at that time comprised 
delegates from the US, Uruguay, Panama, and Colombia [BREWER 08.06.1961; WP 16.06.1961]. 
The Committee was asked to determine whether the developments in the Dominican Republic re-
quire the expansion or the removal of sanctions [RAYMONT 06.06.1961]. 
                                                 
174 DIAZ observes that the sanctions taken in 1960 against the Dominican Republic were opening the way for 
the later (1965) US invasion [DIAZ 1994:134]. 
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posed sanctions remain in place and that the OAS should adopt a wait-and-see attitude [NYT 
18.07.1961]. In the meantime the OAS sent three experts175
This return of the investigating body
 to the Dominican Republic to assist 
the government in studying conditions for holding general elections [NYT 09.08.1961]. In Novem-
ber the expert group recommended an overhaul of the election laws and the withdrawal of official 
government support for the ruling party. Amongst others the group insisted that the secrecy of the 
ballot should be assured [WP 11.11.1961]. 
The nine-nation Committee on Sanctions of the OAS Council recommended in August 1961 that the 
situation in the Dominican Republic shall be observed and that the investigating team shall be held 
ready for an eventual return [NYT 12.08.1961; WP 12.08.1961]. 
176 was ordered in September; it was assigned the task of 
studying the Dominican developments and its progress toward democratization [NYT 08.09.1961]. 
In October the OAS sent its relatively young human rights body, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, to the country in order to study the situation there [NYT 23.10.1961]. A third 
trip to the Dominican Republic by an investigating team177
Unchartered waters were explored when the OAS continued to press the Dominican Republic after 
its ruler had been killed and the regime subsequently exchanged. The demands even were topped 
to also cover the rules of a democratic transition, an intricately domestic matter, traditionally left 
untouched by fellow members frequently governed by autocratic regimes themselves. Hypocritical 
as such behaviour may well be classified, the non-intervention principle in this case was clearly 
watered-down and at the same time the axiom of democratic governance was underlined. To that 
end the OAS went so far as to force the political establishment to welcome an ‘expert group’ and 
accept it’s ‘advise’. This step seems to make a mockery of the usually upheld principle of sover-
eignty. It is moreover remarkable that the observance of human rights stood at the beginning of 
the OAS’ actions. By later sending the IACHR to the country the human rights cause was further 
bolstered. Sending in the IACHR became a common step in comparable circumstances; in most 
cases this measure made for additional incrimination of the accused conflict party. Generally, the 
route by which the violation of human rights was turned into a justification for action can be seen 
as an early harbinger of humanitarian interventions. Still, there is a difference to the more recent 
strain of interventions. Whereas those are usually buttressed by a found ‘need to protect’ due to 
 was ordered by the OAS Council’s 
Committee on Sanctions after the political situation there seemed to deteriorate. The team was 
instructed to ascertain whether the Dominican government has ceased to constitute a danger to 
the peace and security of the hemisphere [SZULC 21.11.1961]. Although the team stayed only a 
couple of days in the Dominican Republic it was not until January the next year that the OAS Coun-
cil voted on the matter. In the meantime the political developments were closely watched. Only 
after a broad based ‘Council of State’ had been established did the OAS unanimously decide to lift 
the sanctions. Cuba which was at that time involved in heated disputes with the US abstained, 
arguing that this precedent would be used to seat Cuba on ‘the bench of the accused’ if the US 
should so desire [SZULC 05.01.1962]. 
 
The Dominican Republic had helped put the spotlight on its domestic affairs when it had accused 
Cuba and Venezuela of supporting opposition elements on its territory in 1959. However, it also 
chose this very delicate time to flagrantly assist subversive activities in Venezuela in turn. Both 
sides definitely acted illegally under international law – still, the Dominican Republic underesti-
mated how strongly the lack of democratic credentials influenced the evaluation by its counterparts 
at the OAS. Furthermore, the acts were of such grave nature as to warrant the unleashing of the 
whole plethora of available means. The IAPC, originally tasked to scrutinize claims of the Domini-
can Republic regarding subversive activities by other states, was swiftly ordered to investigate 
similar charges brought against the Dominican Republic. It is irony that it was even the Fifth 
MCMFA, desired by the Dominican Republic in 1959, that had mandated the IAPC to investigate the 
political developments in the Caribbean area. IAPC’s findings and the assassination attempt on the 
Venezuelan President later led to the very first time that sanctions were levelled against a member 
state of the OAS. Making use of the means as made available by the Rio Treaty, diplomatic rela-
tions were cut and arms shipments stopped. When the longed for effects did not immediately ma-
terialize, the OAS further fine-tuned its pressure and extended the import ban to oil and other vital 
products. It will be fair to say that such harsh measures could only be adopted in view of the Do-
minican Republic’s powerlessness and of the broad consensus dominating in the region on the mat-
ter. 
                                                 
175 Those experts were: Henry Wells, Victor F. Goytia and Juan P. Zeballos [WP 11.11.1961]. 
176 The composition of this investigation team changed somewhat in comparison with the previous one. The 
team was made up of representatives from the US, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama [KILPATRICK 28.09.1961]. 
177 And again the composition of the team was slightly altered; it now comprised delegates from the US, Pa-
nama, Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador [SZULC 21.11.1961]. 
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widespread human rights violations, the OAS in 1960 argued along more traditional lines with the 
‘tensions’ those violations exacerbated. 
The OAS in this case was ready to employ its entire means to pressure a small and friendless coun-
try. While the activities are impressive for demonstrating the possibilities available, the aftertaste 
must be unpleasant. While regularly demanding respect for and adherence to international law, this 
example once again showed that it was advocated only as long as it conformed to the interests of 
more powerful players in the region. Especially, if the OAS line of action vis-à-vis the Dominican 
Republic is contrasted with the one taken toward interventionist and subversive activities initiated 
by the US - for instance in the case of Guatemala - the unevenness is quite stark. 
2.10.13  Cuba vs. the US 1960 
IAPC, MCMFA, Good Offices Committee; investigating, expelling a member’s government. 
The US on 27th June submitted a memorandum to the IAPC, detailing charges against Cuba. The 
memorandum claimed that provocative activities of Cuba are responsible for the rising of tensions 
in the Caribbean area. It specifically emphasizes the slander and hostile propaganda Cuba launched 
against the US178
In July 1960 Cuba, aware that the OAS was dominated by the US and stating that it considered the 
US action to endanger world and not merely hemispheric peace, submitted charges against the US 
to the UNSC. Those charges concerned the harbouring of notorious Cuban war criminals, responsi-
bility for the violation of the Cuban airspace, and the threat of economic strangulation [HAMILTON 
16.07.1960], referring to the US embargo on imports of Cuban sugar, the mainstay of the island’s 
economy. Soon thereafter the Soviet Union declared its intention to defend Cuba with rockets shall 
the US interfere on the island [NYT 28.08.1960]. However, the UNSC decided to send Cuba’s com-
plaints to the OAS [FULTON 20.07.1960; HAMILTON 20.07.1960]. The OAS Council voted with the 
approval of Cuba
. 
At the end of June Cuba started to nationalize US business assets, beginning with the oil refinery of 
Texaco. The value of overall US assets on Cuba was at that time estimated to account for $ 
950.000.000 [AdG 05.07.1960]. 
179
At the Seventh MCMFA, taking place between 22nd and 29th August 1960, most Foreign Ministers of 
the region ‘showed a clear reluctance to criticise Castro’s regime in Cuba’, as CALVERT points out 
[CALVERT 1994:160]. Supporting the US position FENWICK laments that the Meeting ‘could get no 
further than a reprimand of Cuba for misbehavior, even the name of the culprit being suppressed’ 
[FENWICK 1962:469]. However, the Declaration of San José
 on 18th July to hold a Meeting of Foreign Ministers on the differences between 
Cuba and the US [SCHMIDT 19.07.1960]. Before the Meeting of Foreign Ministers took place, Cuba 
submitted a memorandum to the IAPC answering the charges spelled out in the US’ memorandum. 
In it Cuba accused the US of attempts to overthrow its government. Additionally, it repeats the 
accusations made to the UNSC [NYT 03.08.1960]. Only days later another reply in the form of a 
memorandum was submitted to the IAPC from the US criticizing inter alia the support it received 
and the cooperation Cuba offered to the USSR and China [SCHMIDT 08.08.1960]. 
The position of the other Latin American countries remained ambivalent. Although (possible Soviet) 
intervention was unanimously rejected, the harsh US stance was equally deemed excessive [KEN-
NEDY 14.08.1960; SZULC, 14.08.1960]. 
180
During the Seventh MCMFA the US had proposed the setting up of a fact-finding committee to in-
vestigate the charges and counter-charges between it and Cuba [WOLFE 27.08.1960]. The Final 
Act of the Seventh MCMFA creates a Good Offices Committee (GOC) and although its tasks are 
formulated as supporting the settlement of controversies between American governments, no men-
tion of the dispute between the US and Cuba is made. But in a note from the US to the Secretary 
General of the OAS reference is made to the GOC and its purpose is described as ‘clarifying the 
facts relating to matters which are in controversy between the Cuban and United States Govern-
 rejects any attempts of the Sino-
Soviet powers to ‘destroy hemispheric unity and endangering the peace and security of the hemi-
sphere’ [OAS 1960b:4]. The Cuban delegation walked out of the final plenary session in protest to 
this resolution [DUBOIS 29.08.1960] and consequently did also not sign the Final Act. 
                                                 
178 For the full text of the memorandum see NYT 30.06.1960. 
179 The approval of Cuba, however, arose only from the lack of alternatives after the UNSC had referred the 
matter to the OAS. Only days before the Meeting of Foreign Ministers the Cuban President declared: ‘[t]he com-
ing meeting of the OAS is nothing more than a Yankee maneuver against Cuba’ [qtd. in: WP 08.08.1960]. 
180 Diverging opinions made it necessary to appoint a 10 nation committee for drafting a compromise resolution 
and to prevent the collapse of the Meeting. Named to the committee were ministers of Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Panama, Honduras, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, El Salvador, Argentina, and Venezuela. They had to consider a 
resolution (US) for condemning Sino-Soviet efforts to spread their influence in the hemisphere and for calling 
on Cuba to reject such attempts. The other resolution (Mexico) supported the Cuban revolution, the right of 
self-determination, and non-intervention [DUBOIS 27.08.1960]. 
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ments’ [qtd. in: NYT 20.10.1960]. But the GOC was never operating properly, due to Cuba’s boy-
cott to the body [LAT 23.02.1961]. 
In the meantime, the US had started to embargo all exports to Cuba, except medical supplies, 
medicines, and some categories of food. The US hoped to deal the Cuban economy a severe blow 
with banning exports of spare parts for American made machines that equipped most sugar mills, 
farms, and factories on the island. The export ban was portrayed as reaction to the Cuba’s ‘anti-
American’ policies [WSJ 20.10.1960]. This unilateral step was rooted in the belief that the invoca-
tion of the Rio Treaty would have not been supported by a number of Latin American countries 
[KENWORTHY 04.12.1960]. 
In October the US asked the Secretary General for an activation of GOC. Cuba was accused of re-
ceiving ‘substantive quantities of arms and numbers of military technicians’ from the Soviet bloc 
and the danger of exporting the Cuban revolution to other countries of the Americas was voiced 
[NYT 20.10.1960]. However, no actions were taken by the OAS and in January 1961 the US de-
cided to break diplomatic relations with Cuba [KENWORTHY 05.01.1961]. 
On 17th April 1961 an invasion force, numbering 1.400 to 1.500 men, landed on Cuba’s Bay of Pigs 
(Playa Girón) to instigate the overthrow of the Castro regime. The force was made up mainly of 
Cuban exiles but also some US citizens took part [WRIGHT 1963:546]. The force had been spon-
sored by the US; its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had organized and funded the operation. 
The CIA had hired civilian pilots for the planned air operations. Yet the invasion ended in disaster 
since the troops were easily defeated and imprisoned. Moreover, the popularity amongst the Cuban 
population of the Castro government had been underestimated by the Kennedy administration. The 
US first officially supported the invasion and only later distanced itself from it181
This operation was a clear violation of the inter-American principles of non-intervention
 [AH BPI; FYRE 
18.04.1961; LANGFORD 11.04.1986]. Other documents made public by the CIA in 2007 evidenced 
that the US had undertaken various attempts to kill Castro during the 1960s [NZZ 28.06.2007]. 
182, inviola-
bility of territory, and sovereignty. However, the OAS failed to take any actions against the US. In 
turning the cherished principle of non-intervention up-side-down, the OAS passed a resolution in 
March 1962, expressing the firm hope that the caught rebels would have every legal guarantee 
when being tried183
                                                 
181 Originally the planners had intended to conceal the US sponsorship of the operation [GEDDA 11.04.1986]. 
182 The President of Costa Rica, a US ally, aired his opinion on the matter on 1st May 1961. He suggested replac-
ing the principle of non-intervention with collective and disinterested action by the OAS [NYT 02.05.1961]. 
183 Later the release of the imprisoned invaders was effected with medical supplies and food, worth $ 53 million 
‘paid for by private inscription, encouraged by the United States Governments’ [WRIGHT 1963:564]. 
. Only Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador abstained [NYT 30.03.1962]. 
In November 1961 the US sent a note to the SGOAS, accusing Cuba of trying to subvert and over-
throw constitutional governments in the hemisphere [NYT 02.11.1961]. The opinion of the Latin 
American nations on Cuba at that time was split; that is why a proposal of Peru and later of Co-
lombia to hold a MCMFA on Cuba were deferred [WP 26.10.1961; SZULC 15.11.1961; FENWICK 
1962:470]. Yet the activation of the IAPC was approved in a vote (19 to 1, Cuba abstained and 
Guatemala voted against on technical grounds) of the OAS Council. The IAPC was tasked with car-
rying out an investigation of Cuba’s subversive activities. The Peace Committee included at that 
time representatives from the US, El Salvador, Uruguay, Colombia, and Venezuela [WP 
23.11.1961]. The Peruvian accusation that Cuba violated human rights was included in the investi-
gation [WP 28.11.1961]. Two commissions were created to tour the region and find out where and 
how Cuba’s subversive activities are carried out [NYT 09.01.1062]. Cuba did not assist in the in-
vestigation and denied the IAPC the permission to visit the island [FRANKEL 19.01.1962]. Given 
that the investigating team had among it a representative from the US as strongly interested party, 
this opposition came hardly unexpectedly. 
Finally, in late 1961 the OAS Council voted for the convocation of a MCMFA for January 1962 to 
consider threats to the peace and political independence of the American republics that could arise 
from the intervention of extra-continental powers. Cuba was not explicitly mentioned. In the vote 
14 to 2 five countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador) abstained, Cuba and Mexico 
voted against it [JOHANSSON 05.12.1961; SZULC 05.12.1961]. FENWICK [1962:471] calls the 
report a ‘head-on attack’ for the Cuban government. 
Before the MCMFA took place the IAPC published its report. Cuba was rebuked for its communist 
ties and subversive acts it committed in Latin America. The report asserted that the communist ties 
will prevent Cuba from fulfilling the obligations stipulated in the COAS. It claimed that subversive 
activities, classified as ‘aggression of a nonmilitary character’ had taken place in the following 
countries: Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, El Salvador, Bolivia, Panama, Uruguay, and 
Honduras [OTERO 19.01.1962]. 
Consequently, at the Eighth MCMFA it was resolved (Resolution VI): 
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1. That adherence by any member of the Organization of American States to Marxism-
Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and the alignment of such a gov-
ernment with the communist bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the hemisphere. 
2. That the present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a Marxist-
Leninist government, is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-
American system. 
3. That this incompatibility excludes the present Government of Cuba from participation in 
the inter-American system. 
4. That the Council of the Organization of American States and the other organs and or-
ganizations of the inter-American system adopt without delay the measures necessary to 
comply with this resolution [OAS 1962:14]. 
The vote on the Cuban expulsion was split. 14 countries approved it, Cuba voted against. Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Chile, and Bolivia abstained. Those 14 votes constituted the absolute 
minimum of the two-thirds required [DUBOIS 31.01.1962]. The US actually had originally intended 
merely to effect the breaking of relations with the Cuban Government [FENWICK 1962:472]. The 
Chicago Daily Tribune harshly criticized the vote taken: 
The O.A.S has done only the allowable minimum… the President [of the US, my remark] 
does nothing. He is as derelict as his laggard partners in the O.A.S. [CDT 01.02.1962] 
Resolution VIII resolves the immediate suspension of trade of arms and implements of war of 
every kind with Cuba [OAS 1962:15]. The vote was 16 to 1 with Cuba against it and Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador and Bolivia abstaining [DUBOIS 31.01.1962]. Finally Resolution VII excludes the present 
government of Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board [OAS 1962:15]. 
 
The legal basis of the exclusion of the Cuban government was hotly debated since the COAS con-
tains no provisions for such exclusion. FENWICK points out that the resolution was directed against 
the ‘present government of Cuba’, 
... so that the action taken would appear to be more or less in the nature of the suspen-
sion of participation of Cuba in the organs of the Organization, leaving Cuba still a mem-
ber of the Organization, to be readmitted to active participation when the reasons for its 
exclusion might no longer exist [FENWICK 1962:474]. 
On 14th February 1962 the Council of the OAS met. The representative of Cuba, Carlos M. Lechuga, 
was not invited yet took initially part in the meeting. However, before the vote on the exclusion of 
the Cuban government was taken, the Cuban delegate walked out [YOUNG 15.02.1962], after he 
had protested the illegality of the expulsion which violated the COAS [CSM 14.02.1962]. Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador which originally had abstained during the Eighth MCMFA this time voted for 
the exclusion. Only Brazil, Mexico, and Chile abstained [AdG 14.02.1962]. 
Only on 3rd June 2009 the OAS General Assembly resolved that the resolution excluding the Cuban 
government ‘hereby ceases to have effect’ and further held that: 
…the participation of the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of dia-
logue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the 
practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS. [OAS 09.06.2009] 
Due to Cuba’s opposition to involving the OAS in the first place – suspecting a pro-US bias – the 
conditions for a successful intervening strategy were hampered from the very beginning. It fol-
lowed that the enthusiasm for creative procedures in searching for de-escalating the conflict were 
modest. Part of the explanation might be found in the anti-Communism dominating the region at 
the time and setting the stage for the US as the cause’s prime champion. However, as detailed 
above, a considerable number of members spoke out against flatly ostracizing Cuba. 
As we have seen earlier Cuba was far from being alone as sponsor of subversive activities in that 
period. Still, the US Bay of Pigs invasion was of such ostentatious and outrageous quality as to 
make a gross mockery of the non-intervention principle. However, this act was still surpassed by 
OAS’ reaction. Instead of finding itself legitimately at the pillory itself, it was supported by most 
members, eagerly demonstrating their anti-Communist zeal. This drive finally culminated in the 
unheard of move of suspending the ‘government’ of a member state, a step not foreseen in any 
inter-American document and as such lacking proper and sufficient legal basis and justification. 
In retrospect, the OAS in effect clearly ‘transformed’ the conflict in question by labelling Cuba the 
culprit. By suspending the Cuban government the OAS deprived one conflict party of any useful 
means of multilaterally fighting its cause. This disenfranchisement can hardly be classified as con-
tributing to a sustainable and mutually satisfying resolution of the dispute. However, the fact (as 
will be shown below) that the further route taken by the Caribbean island nation – offering itself as 
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base to the USSR – only led to the hardening of the hemisphere’s opposition, does nothing for ex-
cusing the biased use of such disparate standards for evaluating the behaviours of a Gulliver and a 
dwarf’s respectively. 
2.10.14 Bolivia vs. Chile 1962 
General Assembly of the OAS, PCOAS, Special Summit of the Americas; making of state-
ments. 
After Chile began diverting part of the waters of the river Lauca which flows from Chile to Bolivia, 
Bolivia invoked the Rio Treaty on 20th April 1962 and charged the action to be an ‘act of aggres-
sion’ [CDT 21.04.1962]. Bolivia subsequently severed its diplomatic relations with Chile. At a spe-
cial session of the OAS Council mediation by a five-nation mediation board was recommended. 
However, Chile rejected this mediation effort. Consequently, Bolivia renewed its call on the OAS for 
an extraordinary urgent meeting in July 1962 [NYT 04.07.1962]. Again in August Bolivia appealed 
to the OAS to mediate in the dispute [LUKAS 04.09.1962]. 
However, the inaction of the OAS in the matter made Bolivia to withdraw temporarily from partici-
pating in the OAS system. Bolivia, as the relevant note to the OAS Council president at the begin-
ning of September 1962 read, hoped “that her empty seat will remind sister nations of the conti-
nent that she continues to await a just solution of the matter of the Lauca river” [qtd. in: CSM 
04.09.1962]. It was indicated that Bolivia would resume its participation if the OAS took firm steps 
to bring about a ‘just solution’ [LUKAS 04.09.1962]. However, Bolivia later started to decide on a 
case-by-case basis about its participation [e.g. NYT 23.04.1963; DODD 04.12.1963]. 
After the overthrow of Bolivia’s civilian government by a military junta under General Barrientos, it 
was declared in December 1964 that Bolivia will resume its full membership in the OAS. This an-
nouncement was coupled with the demand of a ‘fair and unprejudiced’ hearing of the dispute with 
Chile [RAYMONT 13.12.1964]. Bolivia consequently returned formally to the OAS on 29th December 
1964 [NYT 30.12.1964]. 
Nevertheless the matter remained high on Bolivia’s agenda, closely associated with its grievance 
about its landlocked status. Bolivia had been landlocked since it had lost 400 km of coastline to 
Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883)184
In June 1987 Bolivia, still trying hard to reach an agreement with Chile, was once again supported 
by the PCOAS. It had formulated a maritime proposal
. In 1976 Chile and Bolivia were only a stone’s throw 
away of reaching an agreement, encompassing a corridor to the pacific for Bolivia through Chilean 
territory. However, in the end Bolivia rejected the arrangement and both countries severed diplo-
matic ties. When the General Assembly opened in La Paz, Bolivia started the session with a plea for 
an outlet to the Pacific Ocean [ONIS 23.10.1979]. This initiative eventually was successful in so far 
as the OAS voted 25 to 0 for a resolution backing ‘a sovereign and useful access to the Pacific 
Ocean’ [qtd. in: WP 27.10.1979]; however it remained silent on the matter in the following years 
[EFE 24.03.2006].  
185
In April 2004 Bolivia announced to lodge a complaint with the OAS if an ongoing strike at the port 
of Arica in Chile would not be ended immediately. Bolivia enjoyed free storage and transit rights at 
 which the PCOAS endorsed. However, 
Chile continued to oppose the mediation by the OAS. The Chilean ambassador to the OAS made 
clear the following: 
Bolivia will not achieve anything by reiterating a historical demand because Chile owes 
nothing to that country and does not recognise any pending conflict or problem that may 
give it the right to resort to an international organisation. [qtd. in: BBC MS 19.06.1987] 
Soon afterwards the Chilean regime termed the proposal ‘unacceptable’ [LAAGR 25.06.1987]. 
But Bolivia never stopped to seek support for its demand and was variously supported by individual 
countries, among them Argentina and Venezuela [JOYNES 13.01.2004]. At a Special Summit of the 
Americas Bolivia once more called on the Hemisphere to support its cause. Chile responded by 
suggesting to first re-establish diplomatic ties in order to facilitate a solution [XINHUA 
14.01.2004]; however, Bolivia's demand to find a 'definitive' solution was soundly rejected by Chile 
[JOYNES 14.01.2004]. 
                                                 
184 See an article by Simon Romero, writing for the NYT, and reporting about the Bolivian Navy, created in ‚a fit 
of nationalism‘ by President Victor Paz Estenssoro in 1963, and designed to underline Bolivia’s unbending de-
mand to a sea access [ROMERO 24.09.2006]. 
185 The proposal foresaw that Chile either cede a 2,800-km- long corridor to the Pacific, or a 1,200-km territo-
rial enclave along the Pacific coast, in return for cash, natural gas, electricity, and irrigation projects [LAAGR 
25.06.1987]. 
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this port as well as at the Antofagasta port based on a treaty concluded in 1904 [BBC MS 
19.04.2004].  
In a renewed effort to bring the matter onto the OAS agenda, Chile balked, insisting this remains a 
bilateral matter [XINHUA 06.05.2004]. The same action pattern was repeated in 2006, initiated by 
the new Bolivian President Evo Morales [AFP 23.03.2006; EFE 24.03.2006]. However, when Bolivia 
forewent its multilateral approach and agreed to face the conflict bilaterally, Chile announced its 
willingness to hold corresponding talks [EFE 13.04.2006]. As symbols of reconciliation the 
neighbour’s political leaders attended the counterpart’s assumption to power in January and March 
2006 [KERR 19.07.2006]. In bilateral talks, meanwhile, Chile signalled its willingness to make 
available an access to the Pacific Ocean for Bolivia albeit without granting the country sovereignty 
over Chilean territory [NF 21.07.2006]. In talks in mid-2006 both governments agreed on a 13-
point agenda as means of building confidence [XINHUA 05.12.2007]. As an outgrowth of the plan – 
designed to have an “agenda without exclusions” - various commissions were created, discussing 
not only the sea access, but also issues like integrated border control and drug-trafficking [BBC MS 
25.03.2008]. 
Bolivia’s rejection to sell its gas (and letting it be resold) to Chile or let it be transported through 
Chilean territory complicated the issue. This refusal in 2003 had already prompted Bolivia losing a 
huge US investment, aimed at exporting gas to the US. Chile appealed to Bolivia not to seek a ‘gas 
for sea’ agreement [XINHUA 26.05.2007; EIU 14.03.2008]. Rapprochement nevertheless continued 
and remains ongoing; it is still based the 13-point agenda, leading inter alia to an agreement on 
military exchanges between both countries in late December 2007 [XINHUA 05.12.2007]. 
At the OAS General Assembly in June 2009 Bolivia’s Foreign Minister, David Choquehuanca, stated 
that “Bolivia feels that the stage of building mutual trust has evolved satisfactorily. Now we are 
approaching the moment of truth." Although accepting that the problem is a bilateral one, Choque-
huanca urged the OAS to watch over the process [BBC MS 06.06.2009]. 
 
The OAS’ capability to transform the conflict between Bolivia and Chile was and remained always 
limited to airing its position which principally was in support of the Bolivian cause. The rejection by 
the Chilean side of any involvement of the OAS hamstrung any efforts at multilaterally reaching a 
settlement of the conflict. An additional reason impeding such endeavours can be seen in the his-
toricity of the factors leading to the landlocked status of Bolivia – having its origin more than 60 
years prior to the OAS’ creation. 
Despite the current rapprochement between the two nations, the OAS proved even incapable to 
facilitate the restoration of diplomatic ties. No imaginative energy was developed by the Organiza-
tion to bring about a constructive solution. Although today the conflict seems to have boiled down 
to a technical stage, this is solely attributable to the efforts by the countries themselves. However, 
stronger involvement by the OAS might have increased existing tensions if one considers the 
strong anti-multilateral stance insisted upon by Chile. 
2.10.15 Cuba 1962 
Council of the OAS (POC); approving US quarantine, mandating armed force as defensive 
measure. 
The isolation of Cuba and its close collaboration with the Soviet Union186 led to the transport of 
Soviet nuclear missiles to Cuba in October 1962 at the height of the Cold War. Especially since the 
unsuccessful US sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the USSR had started to build up its 
forces on Cuba [BYRD 2003]. The Soviet Union with this move hoped to expand its influence to the 
Western Hemisphere. The American President, Kennedy, had already learned of missile shipments 
in July 1962 [B CMC] and received aerial photos of the missiles on 17th October 1962 [AH CMC]. 
Five days later Kennedy signed a proclamation on a quarantine against delivery of offensive weap-
ons to Cuba. Any vessel or craft was to be searched for prohibited material; the quarantine was to 
be enforced by sea, air, and land forces [BURD 24.10.1962]. Only hours before had the OAS voted 
19 to 0 approving187
… President Kennedy did inform the OAS on this occasion of his intention to impose a 
‘quarantine’ around Cuba, but only after the decision had been fully worked out, the forces 
 the quarantine. CALVERT points out the rubber-stamping the US hoped to and 
succeeded in getting from the multilateral body: 
                                                 
186 The Soviet Union had promised in 1960 to defend Cuba militarily in case of attack [B CMC]. 
187 The Uruguayan representative did not cast a vote due to lacking information from his home government 
[YOUNG 24.10.1962]. Later Uruguay removed its abstention [OLIVER 1963:376], and cast an affirmative vote 
the following day [WRIGHT 1963:558]. GEROLD points out that the US had the right to take part in the vote, 
since the conflict was not limited to the two countries, but had an international character. Hence Art. 18 Rio 
Treaty was not contravened [GEROLD 1971:139]. 
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had been deployed and he had announced on television when the blockade was going to 
begin. [CALVERT 1994:161] 
The US had asked for an emergency session of the OAS Council. At the session two US sponsored 
resolutions were introduced. The first asked for a MCMFA; the OAS Council voted in favour and 
convened as provisional Organ of Consultation to vote on the second resolution. The critical part of 
the second resolution read: 
1. To call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and 
other weapons with any offensive capability; 
2. To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the In-
ter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), take all measures, individu-
ally and collectively, including the use of armed force188
Following the Presidential Proclamation of the US, vessels of third-party states were trailed, in-
spected by approach, and boarded
, which they may deem necessary 
to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet 
powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security 
of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever 
becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent … [text in: WRIGHT 
1963:558] 
However, the resolution had no mandatory capacity but it rather authorized states of the inter-
American system that wished to engage in collective or individual measures of defence [SZULC 
24.10.1962; YOUNG 24.10.1962]. 
189
                                                 
188 In a section-by-section vote Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia abstained on the sentence authorizing the use of 
force [SCZULC 24.10.1962]. 
189 For a critical analysis of the U.S. action see WRIGHT 1963. Answering WRIGHT, MCDOUGAL supports the US 
position and measures in their entirety; the same holds for CHRISTOL and the highly apologetic article by FEN-
WICK [WRIGHT 1963; MCDOUGAL 1963; CHRISTOL 1963; FENWICK 1963]. 
 [CHRISTOL 1963:530]. Argentina and the Dominican Repub-
lic joined the US in the activities of the so-called ‘Combined Quarantine Force’ [GEROLD 
1971:140]; also Venezuela cooperated with US forces in operational activities [CHRISTOL 
1963:529]. 
At the same time the US carried out aerial surveillance of the Cuban island with military planes in 
breach of the principle that a foreign public aircraft cannot enter without the express consent of the 
country concerned [WRIGHT 1963:547]. 
The Christian Science Monitor hailed the unity of the hemisphere and most tellingly remarked: 
Another effect which the OAS vote accomplishes is that it diminishes the stigma of “inter-
vention” so often attached to United States diplomatic actions in Latin America. [JOHANS-
SON 24.10.1962] 
The crisis was eventually defused by an agreement between the US and the USSR. The nuclear 
arms were withdrawn on the condition that the US will not attack Cuba and that it withdraws its 
nuclear arsenal at that time stationed in Turkey (potentially reaching Soviet cities) in turn [AH 
CMC]. Cuba’s leader, Fidel Castro, was infuriated by the Soviet retreat [B CMC]. The quarantine 
came to an end on 20th November 1963 [CHRISTOL 1963:530]. But due to the Cuban regime’s 
rejection that its territory be subjected to international controls, the US continued its aerial surveil-
lance and declined to sign a formal guarantee that it will not invade Cuba [GEROLD 1971:141]. 
Until 2009 the Cuban government remains suspended from participation in the OAS, notwithstand-
ing various governmental statements, voicing the anachronistic nature of this state of affairs [for 
example: AP 26.10.2004]. Amongst others the IACHR in 2005 established that the economic em-
bargo of the US 'has a serious impact on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights' by 
the Cuban people [qtd. in: EFE 11.03.2005]. 
In February 2007 SGOAS Insulza, while discounting to urge Cuba to return to the fold of the Or-
ganization, advocated that a 'significant dialogue' be immediately initiated with the country [AP 
13.02.2007]. The Economist Intelligence Unit wrote on this development that its proponents  
... argue that as most Latin American countries already recognise and trade with Cuba, 
and welcome its attendance at regional meetings, the ban on its membership has become 
irrelevant and should be revoked. [EIU 03.03.2007]. 
But only 2009 the OAS decided to cease the exclusion of the Cuban government and to envisioned 
a process for its renewed participation in the inter-American system [OAS 09.06.2009]. 
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It was not the first time and it did not remain the last, that the OAS sanctioned unilateral US 
measures. As much as the stationing of missiles in the country of the hemisphere by the global 
adversary may legitimately have been perceived as a vital threat to the security and peace of the 
region, it seems incompatible with upholding the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, to 
pass judgment and exercise force on the decisions of a member state – whose government, nota-
bene, had been suspended earlier – regarding its military build-up. This conclusion is not watered 
down by the specification of ‘offensive capability’ as the text of the resolution did – as has been 
demonstrated by discussing the ‘security dilemma’ above, identifying security to be a relative and 
not absolute value. The huge nuclear arsenal of the US has been never branded as ‘offensive’ by 
the OAS – no matter the various escapades of that country in the domestic affairs of others during 
OAS’ history. 
It is remarkable that the US refused explicitly to guarantee not to invade Cuba, a commitment long 
enshrined in a plethora of international treaties. For a relatively small country like Cuba the very 
real and overpowering US invasion threat was tantamount to a threat to its existence and as such 
automatically  justifying the steps aimed at the protection of its codified right to self-defence. This 
claim, moreover, had been amply substantiated by the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion instigated 
by the US. 
Although being in accordance with the interests and positions of the majority of member states, 
the sanctioning of the quarantine and the mandating of the use of force as a measure of self-
defence, did once again underline the political status of the OAS, disqualifying it as a beacon of the 
rule of international law. The transformational output must be categorized as having been of an 
escalating nature, since encompassing again a complete siding with one conflict party and without 
respecting, much less upholding, principles of international law, traditionally considered to guide 
the behaviour of states among themselves. This case thus once more underlines the factual power 
of the will of the majority of OAS member states.  
2.10.16 Venezuela vs. Cuba 1962 
Council of the OAS (POC), Investigating Committee, MCMFA; investigating, sanctioning, 
mandating armed force as defensive measure. 
Venezuela claimed that Cuba was involved in sabotage on its Maracaibo oil fields where US-owned 
oil installations were dynamited [PHILLIPS 10.11.1962]. On 8th November 1962 Venezuela asked 
for an immediate session of the OAS Council to act on the matter [NYT 09.11.1962]. On the next 
day Venezuela presented documentary evidence before the OAS Council, acting as provisional Or-
gan of Consultation [PHILLIPS 10.11.1962]. However, the OAS remained inactive on the charges 
over the following months [CSM 09.02.1962]. 
In November 1963 Venezuela anew requested the OAS to act on the illegal shipment of arms to 
Venezuela from Cuba. Venezuela invoked on this occasion the Rio Treaty [DODD 30.11.1963]. 
Consequently, the OAS Council constituted itself as provisional Organ of Consultation and voted in 
early December to send a five-member team to Venezuela to look into the charges. Sixteen nations 
voted in favour; Venezuela was not taking part since being an interested party. Mexico abstained, 
Haiti was not represented, and Bolivia had at that time suspended its participation in OAS organs 
(see case Bolivia vs. Chile). The investigation team was composed of delegates from Argentina, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and the US [DODD 04.12.1963]. Subsequently the team visited 
Venezuela [NYT 09.12.1963].  
In January 1964 Venezuela bolstered its cause by claiming that Cuba had planned for an insurrec-
tion. Documents purporting those accusations were presented to the investigating team [RAYMONT 
04.01.1964]. While asking the Cuban government to answer the Venezuelan charges the investi-
gating team in its preliminary report had already reached the following conclusions, encompassing 
Cuba’s illicit acts: 
 
• a systematic campaign of subversive propaganda; 
• recruitment and training for guerrilla and other war operations; 
• financing of the insurrectionist movement; and 
• the presence of arms and subversive plans [RAYMONT 29.01.1964]. 
 
Cuba turned the request for answering the accusations down as being cynical; it further disputed 
that the investigation could have been carried out impartially since most of its members had cut 
relations with Cuba [CT 05.02.1964a]. 
The report of the investigation was presented to the OAS Council on 24th February 1964 and ac-
cused Cuba of ‘political aggression’ against Venezuela, the victim of its ‘expansion and ideological 
penetration in the hemisphere’ [qtd. in CT 25.02.1964]. The report claimed that Cuba had shipped 
a large cache of arms to Venezuela to be used in overthrowing the Venezuelan government. Based 
on those findings Venezuela called for the convocation of a MCMFA [CT 25.02.1964; SZULC 
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25.01.1964]. The OAS Council approved the request and decided to call the MCMFA in July 1964190
2.10.17 Dominican Republic vs. Haiti 1963 
 
in order to decide on the appropriate measures to be taken against Cuba [NYT 16.07.1964]. 
When the Foreign Ministers met in July they ordered sanctions against Cuba in a vote 15 to 4 (Bo-
livia, Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay; Venezuela as interested party was not taking part). The member 
states were ordered to severe their diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba. Additionally, all 
trade, except in food and medicine, was to be suspended. Suspension was to be also extended to 
maritime transportation. Finally, the member states were authorized to engage in collective or in-
dividual self defence, including the use of armed force, in the event of a new Cuban aggression 
through subversion [SZULC 26.07.1964]. 
Only eleven years later the embargo against Cuba was lifted and each country declared to be ‘free 
to normalize or conduct in accordance with national policy and interests … relations with the Re-
public of Cuba at the level and the form that each state deems advisable.” [qtd. in: CT 30.07.1975] 
The vote was 16 to 3 (Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile; Brazil and Nicaragua abstained) [CT 
30.07.1975]. 
The possibilities to reach a mutually agreeable solution to the conflict in this case were severely 
hampered by a number of inter-twined circumstances. Cuba was already on the defensive for a 
couple years, being the main adversary of the hemisphere’s anti-communism drive. As a result its 
government had been suspended and subject to a US-led quarantine. Any attempt to ascertain the 
truth of the Venezuelan charges was doomed to failure as Cuba was not treated on a par with the 
accuser. Confronted with a hostile environment Cuba could not have been expected to cooperate, 
while being at the same time subjected to a legally questionable sea and air quarantine. As has 
been shown in the case between Bolivia and Chile, the latter’s refusal to accept an OAS involve-
ment considerably reduced the chances of success. Moreover, any endeavours undertaken carried 
the stigma of being far from fair and impartial. This allegation was sustained by approving an in-
vestigating team that was having among its members a representative from the US which consid-
ered at that time the Castro regime as its main political foe in its vicinity for being a USSR proxy. 
This handicap of the OAS resulted in the mandating of armed force – the ultima ratio – in respond-
ing to the conflict. This constituted an absolutely disproportionate measure and reflected the weak 
standing of Cuba at the OAS at that time. Once again, the transformative power of the OAS – as 
far as it was to be distinguishable from merely rubber-stamping the US foreign policy – was con-
tributing to an escalation rather than to a resolution of the conflict in question. 
 
Council of the OAS (POC), Investigating Committee, Negotiating team; investigating, 
mediating, negotiating. 
In April 1963 the Dominican Republic charged that Haiti committed aggressive acts by seizing the 
Dominican embassy in the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince and by plotting to assassinate the Domini-
can president. The OAS invoked special powers in an emergency meeting on the matter and set up 
a five-nation investigating committee in a vote 16 to 0. The committee comprised the US, Colom-
bia, Chile, Ecuador, and El Salvador. The US later refrained from participating in the investigation 
and was supplanted with Bolivia. Yet Bolivia again had to be replaced with Uruguay191
However, after the tensions again rose to new heights and the Dominican Republic threatened mili-
tary action, the OAS called on both countries to settle their dispute peacefully [KENWORTHY 
07.05.1963]. The OAS further decided to send the already returned investigating team back to the 
region for further on-the-spot inquiry. For that purpose the instructions were broadened, empower-
ing it to perform ‘whatever service is necessary’ to settle the dispute [NYT 09.05.1963]. In July the 
investigating team presented its report to the OAS Council. In it Haiti was urged to observe the 
‘principle of respect for human rights’. An ‘undeniable relationship’ between violations of human 
rights and tensions in the hemisphere was diagnosed. The OAS Council decided to continue to sit 
, since it had 
withdrawn in protest of the handling of its own dispute with Chile (see above) [RAYMONT 
07.08.1963]. At the OAS meeting Haiti denied all charges against it and claimed they only served 
as a pretext for Dominican military action [CT 29.04.1963; YOUNG 30.04.1963]. The Dominican 
Republic set an ultimatum for Haiti to return the embassy. This ultimatum was extended upon ap-
peal of the OAS. Haiti later agreed to restore the diplomatic guarantees to the Dominican embassy 
[WP 30.04.1963]. The investigating team arrived on 30th April and on the same day Haiti agreed to 
allow 22 political refugees in asylum in the Dominican embassy to leave the country [NYT 
01.05.1963]. 
                                                 
190 The convocation of the MCMFA was delayed since a majority for the votes taken had to be assured before-
hand [TAYLOR 03.08.1964]. 
191 It is not clear if Uruguay eventually participated in the investigation. RAYMONT from the New York Times 
reported in mid-September that the investigating team consisted of four countries only [16.09.1963]. 
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as provisional Organ of Consultation; even so, the main concern had at that time seemingly 
shifted: 
Actually, the Organization’s fears of late April and early May of a military clash between 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been supplanted as the prime issue. The main pre-
occupation now is with the chaotic political and economic condition within Haiti. [RAY-
MONT 17.07.1963] 
This assessment corresponded strongly with the findings of the International Commission of Jurists, 
which reported on the interior situation in Haiti; it established that economic performance and the 
living standards of the population declined steadily; the per capita income was the lowest in the 
word and stood at $ 75 [AdG 18.08.1963]. 
Nevertheless in August the Haitian government asked for an emergency session of the OAS Coun-
cil, because of fears that an invasion force of Haitian exiles was moving toward Haiti’s second larg-
est city, Cap Haitien [RAYMONT 06.08.1963]. The invasion group, which in fact landed on Haitian 
territory, did not come from the Dominican Republic but from Venezuela, as the New York Times 
reported [NYT 06.08.1963]. Still, the Haitian ambassador in Washington claimed that the rebels 
came [JOHANSSON 07.08.1963] and were supplied with arms and ammunition from the Dominican 
Republic. At the emergency session of the OAS Council Haiti charged the complicity of the Domini-
can authorities in the invasion [RAYMONT 07.08.1963]. The OAS Council decided that the investi-
gating body already formed should also look in those accusations [KURZMAN 07.08.1963]. After 
the invasion was partly dispersed by the Haitian armed forces, some of the rebels fled to the Do-
minican Republic. Haiti consequently asked the Council of the OAS to seek the removal of the re-
bels from there, since they pose ‘a threat to Haiti’s peace and security’ [NYT 09.08.1963]. Some 
rebels still remained in Haiti, and it was reported that they frequently crossed into the Dominican 
Republic. Haiti called at another emergency session of the OAS Council on the organization to ap-
point a military committee to supervise the border area in order to prevent new crossings and ac-
cused the Dominican Republic of ‘direct and indirect aggression’ [RAYMONT 20.08.1963]. While the 
investigating team was on a visit to Haiti, it was requested to assure the safe-conduct for refugees 
seeking asylum and staying in embassies of OAS members [NYT 27.08.1963]. Through an appeal 
to the Haitian government the safe-conduct of 20 asylum seekers was effected [RAYMONT 
16.09.1963]. 
The OAS activities to reach the settlement of the dispute met with dissatisfaction of the Haitian 
authorities192
rapproche-
ment
 [RAYMONT 20.09.1963]. The OAS showed itself in fact unable to bring the two con-
flict parties to an agreement. The charges and counter-charges continued well into the following 
year. In July 1964 Haiti again accused the Dominican Republic that it was used as an invasion 
base; Dominican official denied the claim [WP 05.07.1964]. Haiti, however, abruptly changed its 
mind – presumably because of behind-the-scenes pressure from the US – and sought 
 with the Dominicans [TELTSCH 29.07.1964]. In September 1964 the OAS sent anew an in-
vestigating team to both states [NYT 16.09.1964]. Obviously changing tactics the OAS employed 
‘negotiators’ later in the year, which held talks with high officials of both conflict parties [CSM 
14.12.1964]. Subsequently, Haiti and the Dominican Republic announced that they had set a date 
for talks on the renewal of diplomatic relations under the auspices of the OAS [NYT 16.12.1964]. 
 
The employment of an investigating committee on various points of the conflict between the two 
neighbours combined with diplomatic manoeuvring by the OAS obviously helped to diffuse the ten-
sions. Still, the organization’s willingness to act according to Haiti’s reasonable wish to send a mili-
tary team for monitoring the border remained unheeded. This might have been due to lacking re-
sources or political opposition from various quarters. Investigation alone – however – turned out to 
be insufficient and mediation services had to be rendered in order to settle the dispute.  
The finding of the investigation team about the interconnectivity of abusing human rights and tur-
moil in the area is interesting. This statement seems another door-opener for meddling in tradi-
tional domestic affairs., Similar to the line the OAS had taken toward the Dominican Republic sev-
eral years earlier. 
The transformational performance of the OAS in this case undeniably was contributing to diffusing 
the tensions and bringing about the rapprochement of the two adversaries. Nevertheless, a firmer 
commitment and involvement might have considerably shortened the critical situation. 
                                                 
192 Haiti’s representative at the United Nations stated: “The regional system having failed, it is now appropriate 
for Haiti to bring her case to the United Nations” [RAYMONT 20.09.1963]. 
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2.10.18 Panama vs. US 1964 
Council of the OAS (POC), IAPC, Investigating Committee, Enlarged Investigation and 
Mediation Committee, Peace-keeping Authority, OAS Council Chairman; investigating, 
mediating, negotiating. 
After US forces stationed in the Panamanian Canal Zone193
                                                 
193 The US’ presence in the Canal Zone goes back to its support for Panama’s independence from Colombia. In 
exchange the US was granted exclusive planning rights. Construction began in 1904 and was completed ten 
years later [ABC-CLIO AH CPC]. 
 had fired on rioting civilians in January 
1964, Panama accused the US of ‘an unprovoked armed attack’. Panama requested an emergency 
meeting of the OAS Council as Organ of Consultation under Articles 6 and 9 of the Rio Treaty. 
As was pointed out in an article of the NYT this was the first time that the US has been explicitly 
accused as an aggressor under the Rio Treaty. [RAYMONT 11.01.1963]. Probably that is why dip-
lomatic efforts were undertaken to shift the forum from the OAS Council to the IAPC. Panama 
agreed on 10th January to accept the good offices of the IAPC but reserved its right to reemploy the 
OAS Council in the matter [RAYMONT 11.01.1963]. At that time the IAPC was made up of repre-
sentatives of Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile which had substi-
tuted the US as an interested party [MARDER 11.01.1964]. Amidst recurring violence both coun-
tries agreed to take steps to ease the tensions. The US decided to remove troops that have been 
stationed along the border since the outbreak of the violence. Panama undertook to clear its side of 
the border of snipers and those suspected of planning to provoke incidents. Both conflict parties 
named a permanent delegate to sit with the IAPC [RAYMONT 12.01.1964]. In addition Panama and 
the US agreed to the suggestion of the IAPC to create a joint peacekeeping authority for the Canal 
Zone. The Chilean representative of the IAPC was appointed head of the five-man authority. Pa-
nama and the US sent one civilian and one military delegate each [WP 14.01.1964]. During the 
endeavours undertaken by the IAPC the two countries were asked to suspend direct contacts dur-
ing the negotiations and to refrain from making public statements that could impair the conciliation 
effort. 
On 15th January both parties agreed to a communiqué, worked out by the IAPC, announcing the 
resumption of diplomatic relations and the start of negotiations to settle all remaining differences 
between them [RAYMONT 15.01.1964]. This was understood by Panama to include the negotiation 
about the existing treaty, on which the presence of US forces in the Canal Zone was based. How-
ever, the US disagreed with that position. This led to the renewed escalation between the two na-
tions and Panama decided to formalize her break in diplomatic relations with the US. Consequently, 
the IAPC felt compelled to resume its mediation effort [SZULC 18.01.1964]. During the renewed 
escalation the US suspended its economic aid to Panama, arguing that purely practical considera-
tions led to the decision and not political ones [SZULC 21.01.1964]. Yet Panama charged that 
measure to constitute ‘economic aggression’. It was agreed that if the new endeavour by the IAPC 
remained unsuccessful, the matter would come before the Council of the OAS [DODD 23.01.1964]. 
After intensive discussions the US eventually agreed to hold talks on the future status of the Pa-
nama Canal [SZULC 26.01.1964]. Insisting on a concrete assurance from the US that a new treaty 
would be negotiated, Panama ended its cooperation in the IAPC and requested that the Council of 
the OAS takes up the matter; however, as Tad SZULC, reporting for the NYT, pointed out: 
It appeared completely unlikely that Panama would garner the necessary two-thirds of the 
votes in the O.A.S. Council to obtain the invocation of the 1947 treaty – known as the Rio 
de Janeiro pact – against the United States. Diplomats said that Panama was obviously 
aware of that too. 
However, it appeared that the Panamanian strategy was to increase the sense of crisis in 
the hope of forcing the United States to meet her demands. [SZULC 29.01.1964] 
When the OAS Council met to hear the charges, Panama accused the US of deliberate armed ag-
gression in the Canal Zone on 9th and 10th January 1964; such acts – it was argued – could occur 
again. Panama’s chief delegate, Miguel J. Moreno, voiced this position: ‘[w]e shall live under the 
constant threat of an armed North American attack’ [qtd. in: SZULC 01.02.1964]. Panama asked 
the Council to constitute itself as Organ of Consultation and to initiate an investigation. The US 
finally agreed to both steps [SZULC 01.02.1964]. Panama was accused of ‘inciting the people to 
attack and violence’; furthermore, the involvement of communist extremist was charged [qtd. in: 
CSM 03.02.1964]. 
Latin American nations offered various forms of mediation to Panama to prevent procedures under 
the Rio Treaty against the US; Panama rejected those efforts. RAYMONT pointed out: 
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Many Latin-American governments view the use of the treaty [Rio Treaty, my remark] as 
a step likely to cause great damage to hemispheric relations and to Washington’s role as 
the leading partner in the Alliance for Progress, the 10-year program of aid and economic 
and social reform194
When the Council met again officially, the creation of the 17-member committee was decided in a 
vote 15 to 0 (Chile and Colombia abstained) [NYT 08.02.1964] and the following powers – encom-
passing the investigation of the incident and the contribution to a solution
 [RAYMONT 03.02.1964]. 
Based on a Mexican compromise formula the OAS Council voted 16 to 1 (Chile voted against; the 
US and Panama did not vote as interested party) to invoke the Rio Treaty and to investigate the 
charges [RAYMONT 04.02.1964; CT 05.02.1964b]. Contrary to the usual 5-member teams investi-
gating disputes, a 17-member committee was created for investigating and mediating in the mat-
ter. At an informal session of the OAS Council (minus Panama and the US) a draft resolution in-
voked Article 4 of the COAS, sounding the purpose of the OAS as to ‘prevent possible causes of 
difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member 
States’ [RAYMONT 07.02.1964; COAS]. 
195
• investigate the rioting and report to the OAS on the disorders and on the subsequent ef-
forts of the United States and Panama to solve their dispute; 
 - were assigned to it: 
  
• propose procedures ‘to insure that the peace will not be violated while an effort is being 
made to find a solution to the dispute’; and 
• assist the US and Panama in their search for a fair solution to the dispute and report back 
to the OAS. 
 
A five-member Committee was to handle the mediatory and investigatory missions, comprising of 
representatives of Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Costa Rica [CT 08.02.1964]. This body 
was to work on behalf of the broader committee [NYT 09.02.1964]. As of the intentions of that 
Committee the Chicago Tribune underlined: 
Observers believe the OAS body is more inclined to finding a solution to the rift between 
the two countries than to determine the validity of Panama’s charge. [CT 13.02.1964] 
After days of questioning the Committee announced that it had failed to bring the two conflict par-
ties together [NYT 18.02.1964]. However, the Committee continued to search for a settlement 
formula, based on remarks of the US and of the Panamanian presidents [NYT 04.03.1964]. Despite 
its strenuous efforts the Committee had to acknowledge its failure once again some weeks later 
[RAYMONT 18.03.1964]. After the Committee had reported back to the 17-nation body, it asked 
the US to clarify its position, since it had obviously withdrawn its support for an earlier conciliation 
formula [RAYMONT 20.03.1964]. 
After a series of secret meetings held with the assistance of the OAS Council chairman, Juan 
Bautista Lavalle, both countries signed a joint declaration196
The OAS, confronted with a conflict involving the most powerful of all members, had to act rela-
tively cautiously. Thus, it was willing to engage the IAPC, instead of the Council, deciding for the 
lower instead of the higher political level and hence ensuring the US’ willingness to an OAS in-
volvement. Special treatment of the superpower was also evidenced by appointing a bloated 17-
member body, guaranteeing a very broad based representation. In this case however, the end 
justified the means. The most remarkable achievement of the OAS’ unrelenting efforts can be seen 
 at the OAS headquarters providing for 
the immediate resumption of diplomatic relations and for the adoption of procedures for ‘the 
prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between the two countries’ [cit in: SZULC 04.04.1964]. 
At the General Assembly in June 1976 both countries were urged to settle their differences at the 
end of the year [WP 18.06.1976]. Panama and the US concluded as late as 1977 the Panama Canal 
Treaties. Under these legal documents the US relinquished four fifths of the former Canal Zone. A 
timetable by which the Canal itself was to be progressively brought under Panamanian control and 
sovereignty was included [CALVERT 1994:166].  Between 1978 and 1999 a US-Panama joint 
agency, the Panama Canal Commission, administered the zone. Since 1st January 2000 Panama 
has the exclusive control of the Canal Zone [ABC-CLIO AH CPC]. 
 
                                                 
194 Delegates to the OAS were said to fear that this case could constitute a precedent for the settlement of 
diverse international disputes and that the effectiveness of the Rio Treaty – dealing explicitly with aggression – 
might in the long run become diluted [KURZMAN 05.02.1964]. 
195 That the body carries out both, investigation and settlement, goes back to a Venezuelan proposal [CSM 
10.02.1964]. 
196 For the text of the declaration see NYT 04.04.1964. 
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in being able to include the question of the final status of the Canal Zone in the talks and as such 
incorporating this ‘non-negotiable’ issue against the will of the US. This success is one of the very 
rare cases in which the OAS was demonstrating its solid willingness to also address the deeper-
rooted causes of a conflict instead of only dealing and focusing on the symptoms and results of 
entrenched grievances.  
2.10.19 Dominican Republic 1965 
Council of the OAS, SGOAS, MCMFA, Special Committee, Inter-American (Peace) Force, 
Ad-Hoc Committee, Special Election Observer Mission; investigating, mediating, good 
offices, overseeing evacuations, arranging emergency supplies, governmental functions 
(paying civil servants), election monitoring, military policing. 
On 24th April 1965 a rebellion against the ruling junta under Reid Cabral broke out. The rebellion 
was carried out by the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano) in favour of exiled former civilian 
President Juan Bosch. Cabral asked the US for help in suppressing the rebellion but was unsuccess-
ful and subsequently resigned [GEROLD 1971:160] or rather was forced to resign [AdG 
28.05.1965]. The PRD was eager to take over the government but met some resistance in the na-
tion’s armed forces. That is why the PRD itself renewed the request to the US for help. The US 
rejected the plea and on 25th April 1965 armed hostilities between the supporters of the rebellion 
(they called themselves constitutionalists) and the armed forces broke out. On 27th April the US 
ambassador was asked for his mediation; however, also this request was rejected, officially be-
cause the US declined any intervention in the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic, unoffi-
cially the US hoped for the defeat of the constitutionalists, since they were thought of being infil-
trated with communists [GEROLD 1971:161]. 
The battling armed forces, in a worsening military position, also asked for the intervention of the 
US which again was turned down, however, with the hint that intervention would only be feasible in 
case that US citizens would be in danger. Upon this the military junta shortly afterward explained 
to the US ambassador that it could no longer guarantee for the life of foreigners [GEROLD 
1971:161]. Thus, the US announced that it would evacuate its nationals and for that purpose it 
would send 400 soldiers. What definitely was more significant was the US’ determination to prevent 
a ‘second Cuba’ in the event the constitutionalists would keep the upper hand [compare e.g. DIAZ 
1994:111f.]; the evacuations then posed only as pretext. US President Johnson himself made that 
plain in declaring: 
What began as a popular democratic revolution that was committed to democracy and so-
cial justice moved into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators. [qtd. in: FENWICK 
1966:65] 
In the following days the US increased its military personnel to 30.209 and occupied strategic 
places in the Dominican Republic [AdG 28.05.1965; figure confirmed by FRANKEL 25.06.1966]. 
DIAZ highlights that those forces “quickly took an active role in fighting the pro-Bosch forces and 
by the afternoon of April 30, had dislodged the constitutionalists” from several crucial positions 
[DIAZ 1994:113]. 
The unilateral actions taken by the US were criticized by Chile as soon as 29th April 1965. Chile 
called for the ‘immediate and collective action of the O.A.S.’ [NYT 30.04.1965]. At the OAS Council 
meeting also other Latin American delegates voiced their doubts about the legality of the US ma-
noeuvres197
• support the mediation effort under way by the Papal Nunzio Emmanuel Claricio; 
; referring to Art. 17 COAS: 
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of mili-
tary occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indi-
rectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained 
either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized. 
Meanwhile Chile opted to sponsor a resolution calling for the convocation of a MCMFA to consider 
the situation in the Dominican Republic [FINNEY 30.04.1965]. For a start, the OAS asked for the 
immediate cessation of hostilities and for the establishment of a security zone. The SGOAS was 
assigned to travel to the Dominican Republic in order to: 
 
                                                 
197 There was no vote taken on the resolution presented by Chile and Mexico requesting the withdrawal of the 
US forces [GEROLD 1971:161]. When the Mexican proposal was later (10th May) voted on, it was defeated with 
15 to 5 [FINNEY 11.05.1965]. 
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• to document the presence of the OAS; 
• to inform the MCMFA; and 
• to make preparations for a committee to be sent there [GEROLD 1971:48; WP 
30.04.1965]. 
 
The Tenth MCMFA held its first session on 1st May 1965. It voted 19:0 for the establishment of a 
Special Committee, composed of representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and 
Panama. It was instructed to ‘do everything possible to obtain the re-establishment of peace and 
normal conditions’. The committee was to give priority to: 
 
• offering its good offices to the Dominican armed groups and political groups in order to ob-
tain a cease-fire and the orderly evacuation of foreigners; 
• to investigate all aspects of the Dominican situation that led to the convocation of the 
MCMFA [OAS 1970:9]. 
 
After the Committee had arrived in the capital Santo Domingo it reported back about the appalling 
conditions in the city; the MCMFA subsequently made an urgent appeal to the member states to 
forward medical personnel, food, medicines, and medical supplies [OAS 1970:10]. 
On 5th May the dispute parties signed a cease-fire agreement, the Act of Santo Domingo, co-signed 
by the OAS Committee. If foresaw a cease-fire, the establishment of a security zone in Santo Do-
mingo, the assurance to support the OAS’ effort, the evacuation of asylum seeker in diplomatic 
missions, as well as the recognition of the OAS Commission [NYT 06.05.1965]. 
At the next MCMFA session any trait of even-handedness was abandoned when the Foreign Minis-
ters voted with the thinnest required majority, 14 to 5 (Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru; 
Venezuela abstained [CT 06.05.1965]), for a US sponsored resolution. With this resolution the so-
called ‘Inter-American Force’ was created, multilaterally legitimizing the US troops on the ground. 
That fact that the US representative as well as a ‘phantom delegate’ of the Dominican Republic 
[NYT 07.05.1965] were allowed to vote, seems problematic198 from a legal point of view199
• to request governments of member states that are willing and capable of doing so to make 
contingents of their land, naval, air or police forces available to the OAS to form an inter-
American force that will operate under the authority of the Tenth MCMFA; 
; an 
opinion also shared by the resolution’s opponents. GOSHKO, reporting for the Washington Post, 
stressed: 
All based their opposition on the contention that the OAS charter forbids intervention in 
another country’s internal affairs for any reason, that the U.S. action had violated that 
prohibition and that the act could not be legalized after the fact by the OAS. [GOSHKO 
07.05.1965] 
The controversial resolution stated that the “formation of an inter-American force will signify ipso 
facto the transformation of the forces presently in Dominican territory into another force that would 
not be that of one state or of a group of states but that of the Organization of American States” 
[OAS 1970:11, original emphasis]. It was further resolved: 
 
• that the inter-American force will have the sole purpose of cooperating in the restoration of 
normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of the Dominican 
inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmos-
phere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of the democratic institu-
tions; 
• to request the commanders of the military contingents that make up the inter-American 
force to work out the measures necessary to establish a Unified Command of the OAS for 
the operation of the Inter-American Force. In the composition of this Force, an effort will be 
made to see that the national contingents shall be progressively equalized200
                                                 
198 Compare also with SLATER [1969:63-64]. 
199 Paradoxically it had been the US that had insisted during the previous days that the government that had 
appointed the Dominican ambassador to the OAS no longer existed and that the Dominican Republic had no 
government. This notwithstanding, the US accepted the affirmative vote from that very ambassador [GOSHKO 
07.05.1965]. The rebel government, headed by Col. Francisco Caamano Deno, protested the continued recogni-
tion of the ambassador; however, the MCMFA Foreign Ministers refused to unseat the ambassador, who had 
been appointed by the overthrown government on the ground that his credentials had been approved when the 
MCMFA was called on 1st May 1965 [FINNEY 11.05.1965]. 
; 
200 The President of the US promised to withdraw the US forces (numbering at that time about 14.000) once the 
OAS has determined that the joint force it adequate to police the Dominican Republic [CT 06.05.1965]. How-
ever, this statement somehow contradicts the phrase of the resolution that speaks of transforming the present 
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• that the eventual withdrawal of the Inter-American Force will be determined by the Tenth 
MCMFA [OAS 1970:12]. 
 
On 9th May the Special Committee reported to the OAS about strong communist infiltration201 of 
the rebel movement202
In its next report the Special Committee stated that it considered its objectives accomplished (ne-
gotiation of a cease-fire, overseeing evacuation of civilians, arranging for emergency food and 
medical supplies). The Committee on this occasion criticised the role of the UN in the Dominican 
Republic, asking it to first let the OAS exhaust the procedures available to it. It further proposed 
that a single person should take over the mediation effort of the OAS
 and about the chaotic situation in the Dominican Republic [CT 10.05.1965]. 
In this regard it is worth noting that on this Special Committee only supporters of the Inter-
American Force were present.  After receiving the assessment of the Committee the MCMFA de-
cided with a narrow 14 to 3 vote (Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico; Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru ab-
stained) to broaden its responsibilities to serve as the political counterpart of the Inter-American 
Force [FINNEY 11.05.1965]. In the following days the Committee negotiated with the warring fac-
tions and endeavoured to bring them to the discussion table [SZULC 13.05.1965]. The Special 
Committee was described by DIAZ as showing ‘its willingness to serve as a pliant instrument of US 
foreign policy’ [DIAZ 1994:117]. 
Meanwhile, the first Latin contingent of the Inter-American Force, numbering 250 Hondurans and 
20 Costa Ricans were expected on the island [CT 14.05.1965]. Later Nicaragua sent 158 soldiers 
and Brazil pledged 1.250 [DODD 22.05.1965]. Also El Salvador contributed a tiny contingent [ONIS 
27.05.1965; DIAZ 1994:122]. 
The tensions rose and armed hostilities increased, endangering the ceasefire. Therefore Venezuela 
asked for another session of the MCMFA [FINNEY 18.05.1965]. When the meeting took place the 
Foreign Ministers appealed to the conflict parties to uphold the cease-fire [OAS 1970:13]. 
203. The report additionally 
rejects US efforts to set up a government, arguing that this should be sorted out be the Domini-
cans themselves and citing the non-intervention principle204
After having received the report the MCMFA announced on 20th May 1965 that it considered the 
mandate of the Special Committee completed and that it entrusts the SGOAS
 [GOSHKO 20.05.1965]. 
Busy as it was to assert itself the Special Committee was nevertheless labelled as inefficient, too 
slow, and as lacking real power by OAS diplomats [BRUNN 22.05.1965]. And according to observ-
ers and US as well as Dominican officials the activities of the Committee were biased against the 
constitutionalists, hardly astonishing given the circumstances of its establishment in the first place. 
And SLATER judges: 
Whatever the Special Committee’s inadequacies, though, it is unlikely that any OAS body 
could have done substantially better. The real power to arrange a settlement continued to 
remain in the hands of the United States … Yet a series of high-level United States repre-
sentatives were, at least at first, able to do little better than the Special Committee … 
[SLATER 1969:59] 
205
• to negotiate a strict cease-fire in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo; 
 with the following 
tasks: 
 
• to offer his good offices to the parties in conflict, with a view to the establishment of a cli-
mate of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of the democratic institu-
tions; and 
• to coordinate actions, leading to those objectives with those of the representative of the UN 
Secretary General [OAS 1970:14]. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
forces into the Inter-American force. The following day President Johnson spoke of withdrawing those forces 
‘not needed’ [FINNEY 07.05.1965]. 
201 That is to say the Special Committee substantiated the US view in this regard. SLATER points out that the 
Committee had argued in its first report that if the US would not have intervened, the Dominican revolution 
‘could rapidly have been converted into a Communist insurrection’ [qtd. in SLATER 1969:54] 
202 SHAW, however, maintains that the Special Committee did not reach consensus on the question [SHAW 
2000:144]. 
203 SLATER [1969:58] argues that the Special Committee ‘resigned in a huff’, faced with a UN but also with a US 
alternate initiative to mediate in the conflict. 
204 On those two conclusions the Panamanian representative disagreed with the other members of the Special 
Committee [GOSHKO 20.05.1965]. 
205 The SGOAS, Jose A. Mora, had been in the Dominican Republic since 30th April 1965 as an official of the OAS. 
As of the resolution taken on 20th May 1965 the SGOAS was acting as a representative of the MCMFA [FINNEY 
21.05.1965]. 
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The last point concedes the world body’s role, which had been attacked by the Special Committee 
earlier. 
Equipping the SGOAS was a ground-breaking step. Never before had the SGOAS been explicitly 
given political functions [compare also GEROLD 1971:47-48]. 
When the MCMFA met again on 22nd May the SGOAS was additionally assigned the complete func-
tions formerly carried out by the Special Committee. With 14 to 4 (Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, and 
Peru; Argentina and Venezuela abstained) [CT 23.05.1965] it was agreed to appoint a Brazilian 
Commander and a Deputy Commander from the US206
• to continue the task begun by the Special Committee and later carried out by the SGOAS of 
providing good offices to all parties, for the purpose of achieving the establishment of a 
climate of peace and reconciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institu-
tions and the economic and social recovery; 
. A Committee was ‘to study the functioning 
and maintenance of the Inter-American Force’. This new Committee was composed of delegates 
from Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the US [OAS 1970:15]. 
Indeed and as the Chicago Tribune highlighted, the OAS had encountered considerable difficulties 
in organizing the Inter-American Force due to a lack of experience and because of the need of prior 
legislative approval in most countries [CT 23.05.1965]. 
The role performed by the SGOAS was subject of differing evaluations. While he was on the one 
hand hailed for succeeding in reaching a cease-fire [GOSHKO 24.05.1965], SLATER, on the other 
hand, states that the SGOAS ‘was no more successful than the Special Committee had been’ [SLA-
TER 1969:59].  
In the meantime 600 troops from Latin American countries substituted 600 US marines on 26th May 
1965 [ONIS 27.05.1965]. 
One day later, the OAS assumed an additional task after the SGOAS had announced that it will 
start to disburse the salaries of all civil servants (including soldiers of both sides), in order to pro-
tect the cash reserves in Dominican banks. It was not clear where the funds for the salaries came 
from. Whereas ARNOLD states that the US provided the money, SLATER maintains that they were 
drawn from OAS funds [ARNOLD 27.05.1965; SLATER 1969:65]. 
The role of the OAS in general, and that of the SGOAS specifically, were criticized by the Dominican 
conflict parties [UCHITELLE 30.05.1965]. Thus, Brazil proposed that the SGOAS should be sup-
ported by a 3-man committee [NYT 29.05.1965]. The MCMFA followed that proposal and voted 15 
to 2 (Uruguay and Mexico; Chile, Venezuela, and Argentina abstained) [CT 02.06.1965] on 2nd 
June 1965 to set up such an Ad Hoc Committee to be made up of representatives from the US, El 
Salvador, as well as Brazil, and to be assigned the following: 
 
• to provide to the Inter-American Force the directives necessary for the effective accom-
plishment of its purposes [OAS 1970:16]. 
 
On the same occasion the Inter-American Force was renamed Inter-American Peace Force [OAS 
1970:17]. 
The Ad Hoc Committee devised a plan how to reach an accord; this proposal was well-received by 
the warring parties [WP 20.06.1965]. However, it took innumerable negotiations207
The final step for the withdrawal was the decision of the Tenth MCMFA, taken on 24th June 1966, 
which provided for the complete withdrawal of the force within ninety days after elections had been 
held [OAS 1970:19]. The withdrawal vote was 18 to 0 with Mexico abstaining. Chile, Peru, Ecua-
dor, Uruguay, and Venezuela recalled that they challenged the legality of the intervention and 
wished not that their withdrawal support should be interpreted as retroactive endorsement. Nota-
bly, the Dominican Republic did not take part in the voting, in contrast to the actions taken one 
 and political 
pressure until the Dominican factions finally signed an agreement on 31st August 1965, which was 
to govern not only the take-over by a provisional government headed by García Godoy and the 
holding of ensuing elections but also the successive withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force 
[NYT 01.09.1965].  
During the election, taking place on 1st June 1966, the OAS sent a 42-strong team, composed of 
‘distinguished figures from each hemisphere member’, to observe the vote. This goes back to a 
request by the provisional President of the Dominican Republic. The team was instructed to report 
any action of election fraud or misconduct [GOODSELL 02.06.1966]. 
                                                 
206 The Commander of the US troops, Lieutenant Bruce Palmer, acting officially under the overall authority of the 
Brazilian Commander, was said to have made clear that in case of conflict between the OAS and the US, he 
would take his orders from his home government [SLATER 1969:57]. Palmer also stated the following, underlin-
ing the US dominance: ‘as the international deputy and US commander, I had sufficient leverage to get IAPF 
decisions that where compatible with US desires’ [qtd. in: SHAW 2000:146]. 
207 For a brief discussion of how strongly the US representative dominated the activities of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee see SLATER 1969:60-61. 
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year earlier [FRANKEL 25.06.1966]. Finally, on 20th September 1966 the last forces of the Inter-
American Peace Force left the Dominican Republic208
SLATER details the early OAS activities that gave evidence of their bias against the constitutional-
ists but at the same times upholds that the OAS, in its totality, played rather a balanced role [SLA-
TER 1969:63-65]
 [NYT 21.09.1966]. CALVERT arrives at a dev-
astating judgement about the Inter-American Peace Force: 
… the soldiers of five dictatorships (Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua and El Salva-
dor) and twenty-one Costa Rican policemen joined the US marines in restoring ‘democ-
racy’ to the Dominican Republic by systematically massacring the remaining constitution-
alists holding out in the slums of the barrios altos. When the last of them had been 
slaughtered, the OAS force remained to supervise the election of a provisional government 
chosen by the United States, which was eventually accepted by most of the major political 
factions for fear that civil war might be resumed. [CALVERT 1994:165] 
Legal scholars differ in the analysis of the events. While FENWICK argues that the US acted in le-
gitimate self-defence when it sent troops to the rescue of its citizens, BOHAN hints that the right to 
self-defence is applied only in cases of danger to the state and not to its citizens overseas. In 
BOHAN’s critical assessment about the role of the OAS he concludes that the creation of the Inter-
American Force was ‘merely the granting of a new name and additional troops to a force already in 
existence and already engaged in the Dominican Republic’. He further judges: 
What the O.A.S. had done is to grant later approval to unilateral intervention by the 
United States, a return to unilateralism in the Hemisphere. It has, by its action, largely 
abandoned its rôle as a juridical organization and a force for harmony and law in the 
Hemisphere. [BOHAN 1966:812] 
In the same vein CLARK argues the following: 
The reputation of the OAS was tarnished by its supporting role in the Dominican Republic 
intervention in 1965, where it functioned as an arm of US policy [CLARK 1997:20]. 
And although CLARK maintains that the evacuation of US citizens and other foreigners appears 
justified, he concludes that the subsequent ‘intervention to thwart communism’ was contravening 
clearly the COAS [CLARK 1997:22]. 
209
Attempts of the US government to deny that it intervened in the Dominican Republic were objected 
even by the Washington Post
. 
DIAZ stresses the illegality involved: 
Perhaps most important, however, is the fact that the establishment of the IAPF was bla-
tantly illegal on two counts. In the first place, the IAPF never received an official approval 
from the Security Council as required by | Article 53 of the UN Charter. Moreover, the es-
tablishment of the IAPF was also illegal according to strict interpretation of the relevant 
OAS articles because Chile had called the Meeting of Consultation under the OAS Charter, 
not the Rio Treaty.” [1994:132-133, original emphasis] 
210
The OAS was from the beginning deeply split in how to deal with the situation. However, in the end 
a majority of states decided to condone the US action – being as it was in blatant contravention of 
the non-intervention principle. But it did much more than condoning – it legitimized the US policy 
and made itself an active party, siding with US political interests and priorities. The assistance it 
rendered contributed to the preferred conflict party’s victory and subsequently to the installation of 
, although the paper was generally favourable to the US action [WP 
14.10.1965] 
One has to contend that faced with the Latin troop contribution of 1.763 (Brazil, Costa Rica, El Sal-
vador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay) compared with 11.935 US soldiers as of June 1965 
[BROWNE 1984:48-49], that the vowed progressive equalization of national contingents (MCMFA 
May 6 1965) obviously never seriously took place. 
                                                 
208 For a review of the reaction of the UN toward the invasion see DIAZ 2000:124ff. 
209 The same author analyzes the consequences the OAS might incur upon its involvement in the Dominican 
Republic [SLATER 1969:67-70]. 
210 The NYT argued similarly, stating that the US violated the COAS obligation of non-intervention in the Do-
minican Republic (as well as in Cuba) [NYT 27.11.1965]. 
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a regime that was favoured by the US211
2.10.20 Venezuela, Bolivia vs. Cuba 1967 
. Having the wording and vows of so many multilateral 
documents in mind which commit the signatories to always respect each other’s sovereignty, the 
OAS decisions were a slap in the face of the rule of law. This development was finally crowned by 
failing to consult the United Nations. 
The internal disarray was demonstrated by the frequent shifting of responsibilities: Special Com-
mittee, replaced by SGOAS, again replaced by Ad Hoc Commission; it was further evidenced by the 
most narrow majorities garnered for the requisite votes. Contrary to claims made by the US that its 
troop deployments were legitimized by the request made by the Dominican Republic, at that time 
no universally recognized Dominican government was in place that might have had the right to 
make such a request. Further prove of the weak arguments offered by the pro-US camp is the fact 
that the initially claimed purpose of the force would be to evacuate foreign nationals very soon 
turned out to be a mere pretext. 
This case is one more in which the OAS – far from failing to make an impact though – displayed its 
powers by not holding the US to abide by the rule of international law, but instead to act as its 
accomplice and as such positively influencing the fortunes of particular Dominican conflict parties. 
Council of the OAS, Investigating Committee; investigating 
In June 1967 Venezuela at the OAS Council charged Cuba with landing an invasion force on its 
territory on 8th May 1967. The request for an investigation into the matter was unanimously sup-
ported, even from Mexico, the only OAS country left to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with 
Cuba [WP 20.06.1967]. The investigation team was made up of representatives of Colombia, Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and the US and travelled to Venezuela for an on the spot fact 
finding mission. GOODSELL of the Christian Science Monitor hinted that the composition of the 
team was controversial, since three of its members (Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Peru) have 
been openly targeted as sites for revolutionary activities by Cuba; moreover, the US as fourth 
member was one of the fiercest critics of the Castro regime. All in all the team lacked objectivity 
[GOODSELL 05.07.1967]. In the investigating body’s report Cuba was blamed for supporting ter-
rorist and guerrilla activities in Venezuela. Cuba was charged with sending guerrillas to Venezuela 
with the objective of infiltrating groups that planned the overthrow of the Venezuelan president 
[NYT 26.07.1967]. 
In September 1967 a session of the Twelfth MCMFA took place. Bolivia presented photos, depicting 
Che Guevara, former ‘right hand’ of Cuba’s Castro, as leading guerrillas in its territory [SMITH 
23.09.1967]. The OAS accordingly condemned Cuba ‘emphatically’ for acts of aggression and inter-
vention in Venezuela and its intervention in the domestic affairs of Bolivia. All friendly nations were 
asked to halt trade with Cuba until the Castro regime abandoned its policy of aggression. It was 
further recommended that sanctions be imposed against ships engaging in trade with Cuba. The 
vote was 20212
                                                 
211 Walter LIPPMANN writing for the Washington Post and being broadly in favour of US action since it could ‘not 
take the risk that the rebellion might be captured by Communist agents’ nevertheless warningly recalls world 
opinion holding that “we [the US, my remark] have been using the Marines and the paratroopers to defeat the 
popular party and to restore the power of a reactionary military dictatorship” [LIPPMANN 20.05.1965]. 
212 Including the new member Trinidad and Tobago. 
 to 0 with Mexico abstaining. However, since the convocation of the MCMFA was 
made in accordance with the COAS (part of Art. 39 and 40) [OAS 1967] and was not based on the 
Rio Treaty the decisions had merely the nature of non-binding recommendations. Accordingly, Ben-
jamin WELLES reported for the NYT: 
Diplomats here are privately expressing doubt that the recent meeting of the Organization 
of American States can or will produce any real tightening of security measures against 
Cuban Communist agents. [WELLES 29.09.1967] 
The means of the OAS in this case to transform the conflict in question were limited not only be-
cause of Cuba’s lacking will of cooperation. The measures applied – peaking with the suspension of 
the Cuban government – had already been implemented earlier. As GOODSELL underlined: 
...the OAS has taken virtually every action against Cuba permitted under the 1947 Rio 
treaty of reciprocal assistance – except that of outright invasion of the island ... [GOOD-
SELL 05.07.1967] 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES | CASES 
92 
Without the capacity to essentially influence the conflict matter itself, the OAS merely further ce-
mented the prior position of Cuba as the region’s outcast in being able to gradually win over Cuba’s 
only left ally - Mexico. 
2.10.21 Honduras vs. El Salvador 1969 
Council of the OAS (POC), 2-men Team, Peace Team, Military Observers, MCMFA, IACHR; 
ascertaining, negotiating, monitoring combat activities, monitoring cease-fire, monitor-
ing troop withdrawal. 
In July 1969 Honduras appealed to the OAS Council213, accusing El Salvador of aggression. It 
claimed that El Salvador had invaded Honduran territory and had fired on a local airline. El Salva-
dor was also charged with moving boundary markers to gain more territory. The complaints were 
met with counter-accusations by El Salvador, also claiming aggression. Both countries had broken 
diplomatic relations in a first reaction [BISHOP 05.07.1969]. Honduras requested the convocation 
of a MCMFA, but the Council of the OAS agreed to postpone any action, thus facilitating an initia-
tive of Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua to mediate214
When the OAS Council met the next day the conflict parties were urged to suspend hostilities and 
restore matters to the status quo ante bellum, according to Art. 7 Rio Treaty
 in the dispute [WP 05.07.1969]. Also 
the language the OAS resorted to shows the prevailing reluctance and caution: 
To recommend very respectfully to the distinguished governments of El Salvador and of 
Honduras that … they kindly take the measures that they deem appropriate to avoid any 
act that might aggravate the present situation [OAS 1984]. 
On the request of the three mediating nations the OAS sent a two-men team to assist the settle-
ment effort. They were also assigned to coordinate the activities with the OAS and to determine 
which support the OAS might contribute in resolving the dispute [WP 13.07.1969]. After Honduras 
charged El Salvador anew with aggression, the Council of the OAS met as provisional Organ of 
Consultation and decided to send a 7-nation peace team to both conflict parties. The team was 
formed by the three already mediating central American nations Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
(chairman) plus the US, Argentina, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic [NYT 15.07.1969]. The 
peace team was to study the situation, report on air and ground combat activities, and try to avert 
further hostilities [GROSE 16.07.1969]. 
215
On 16th July 1969 both countries agreed to a cease-fire, yet El Salvador only on the condition that 
rights and property of the approximately 300.000 Salvadorans living in Honduras are guaranteed 
[DIUGUID 17.07.1969]. However, the cease-fire was ultimately broken, but another one worked 
out by the OAS and was accepted some days later. A peace-plan – approved in a vote 19 to 0 – 
[NYT 19.07.1969] also included a call to order the troops out of the border area. The same meeting 
created an observer team
. 
216
As the deadline for the troop withdrawal approached, El Salvador refused to call back its soldiers, 
until the OAS would guarantee the lives and properties of Salvadorians living in Honduras. Hondu-
ras, acting on that reluctance, bolstered its own its forces in the border region [CT 23.07.1969]. El 
Salvador also informed the OAS of its refusal to withdraw its troops. Subsequently, the OAS Council 
 to monitor the cease-fire and troop withdrawal. Honduras and El Sal-
vador are also urged to hand over the occupied cities and towns to the observers. The Air Forces of 
both countries were ordered to ground. Both sides are urged to guarantee the personal safety and 
the property of the other nationals [CT 19.07.1969; OAS 1984]. At that time the number of dead 
on both sides was estimated by OAS officials to stand at 2.000 [NYT 19.07.1969]. Only days later 
the number was corrected to 3.000 (60% Hondurans, 40% Salvadorians) [WP 22.07.1969]. 
                                                 
213 Honduras requested the convocation of a MCMFA in accordance with Arts. 39, 40, and 43 as well as with Art. 
9 of the Rio Treaty [OAS 1984]. 
214 The mediation effort was said to be made under the sponsorship of the OAS [GOODSELL 08.07.1969]. How-
ever, it was the Organización de Estados Central Americanos (ODECA) that provided the structure through 
which the mediation effort was carried out [GOODSELL 15.07.1969]. 
215 Art. 7 of the Rio Treaty reads: „In the case of conflict between two or more American States, without preju-
dice to the right of self-defense in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the High 
Contracting Parties, meeting in consultation shall call upon the contending States to suspend hostilities and 
restore matters to the status quo ante bellum, and shall take in addition all other necessary measures to rees-
tablish or maintain inter-American peace and security and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means. 
The rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the aggressor and in the applica-
tion of the measures which the consultative meeting may agree upon.” 
216 The observers were drawn (at least partly) from the military of member states [CT 19.07.1969]; only later 
when the assignments had evolved to police a militarized zone, the group was renamed Military Observers [NYT 
27.06.1970; OAS 1984]. 
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set the time and place for a MCMFA. The first session of the Thirteenth MCMFA finally took place 
from 26th to 30th July 1969 in Washington D.C. An immediate troop withdrawal was ordered and 
the peace team was asked to monitor it. In Resolution II the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights is requested to support the peace committee. Furthermore, both countries will be sub-
jected to the procedures of arbitration of the Pact of Bogotá if they do not abide by their agreement 
to submit their demands and differences to any procedure of the said Pact. The parties are urged to 
bring to trial those responsible for crimes and violations of human rights. The MCMFA recommends 
also that each country takes a census the other country’s nationals residing on its territory. Finally 
a declaration of commitment to Arts. 5e, 17, and 18 COAS and Art. 1 Rio Treaty is added in which 
i.a. underline the respect for human rights [OAS 1984]. 
The subsequent withdrawal of El Salvador’s troops was hailed as a success for the OAS217
2.10.22 Ecuador vs. US 1971 
 [NYT 
30.07.1969; HORNE 30.07.1969; GOODSELL 07.08.1969]. The threat of economic sanctions had 
played their part in bringing a change of mind about among El Salvador’s political elite [HORNE 
31.07.1969; GOODSELL 07.08.1969]. 
The Thirteenth MCMFA met again on 27th October 1969 to urge the parties to re-establish diplo-
matic and trade ties. Both countries are invited to settle their boundary dispute within the legal 
inter-American framework. On top of that the utmost respect for human rights is urged in applying 
their domestic law to aliens of the adversary state [OAS 1984]. 
It took the two countries and the OAS a further 10 years that a General Peace Treaty could be 
signed (30th October 1980) and the OAS Peace Committee as well as the observer mission could be 
withdrawn [OAS 1984]. Two decades later both countries signed a demarcation agreement, a step 
hailed by the OAS [USFN 19.04.2006]. 
 
The activities of the OAS and its making available of resources were at least partly responsible for 
bringing this violent militarized conflict to a peaceful settlement. However, the initiative taken by 
three OAS members seems to have been essential as well and it is questionable if the resolution 
would have been successful without their impetus.  
The decisions to undertake comprehensive monitoring tasks in the contended territory helped to 
quell the fighting, since respective perpetrators would thus have been easily identified. When El 
Salvador retreated from its former troop withdrawal commitment the OAS clearly signalled its po-
litical will to back its resolutions by convening its regular Organ of Consultation, employing its 
strongest diplomatic device. 
The OAS furthermore stuck to its commitment for ten years, a remarkable achievement for an Or-
ganization that was until than primarily focused on fire-fighter actions, frequently neglecting post-
conflict challenges. 
Most remarkably the accusations regarding the violation of human rights by its national by the 
party brought about a change of the over-all conflict perception. This framing – although hardly 
intended to have such an effect at the outset – had the outcome of making it for the contending 
parties no longer opportune to insist on the pursuance of narrower political interests, given the 
higher moral aims to be attained. 
The OAS, by providing its human rights machinery in place at that time, proved instrumental. The 
Organization’s inclination to resort to the IACHR in this way continued to grow more pronounced, 
as later conflict instances were to attest. Thus, many later conflicts were increasingly viewed – at 
least additionally – through the human rights lens, entrenching good governance (and human se-
curity) as yardsticks and standards no longer to be ignored in cases of conflict in the Hemisphere.  
PCOAS, MCMFA. 
In early 1971 the Ecuadorian Navy had seized US fishing boats since it considered them to fish in 
Ecuador’s territorial waters (extending to 200 miles off the coast; this claim was supported by 
some other Latin countries218
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political 
character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advan-
tages of any kind. 
). The US, on the other hand, insisted on a 12 mile limit and sus-
pended military aid to Ecuador as a reprisal measure. Ecuador, in its appeal to the OAS referred to 
Art. 19 [formerly 16] COAS: 
                                                 
217 GOODSELL stresses the vital role played in the resolution effort by SGOAS, Galo Plaza [GOODSELL 
07.08.1969]. 
218 WELLES in this regard stated that the issue ‚has ranged the hemisphere’s nations virtually solidly behind 
Ecuador‘ [WELLES 31.01.1971]. 
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The US was charged with aggression by Ecuador [SZULC 27.01.1971]. However, the US main-
tained that any type of assistance it decided to render can never be considered obligatory [USDSB 
1971:249] and suggested that the matter be brought before the ICJ [WELLES 31.01.1971]. While 
the US also began to suspend military sales to Ecuador for a period of twelve months [CT 
28.01.1971], the Permanent Council of the OAS (PCOAS) voted overwhelmingly – with a vote of 22 
to 0 - to call a MCMFA as requested by Ecuador. This vote was widely portrayed as a rebuff of the 
US; the NYT for one stated that the US ‘has never before suffered such a decisive setback in an 
O.A.S. vote’ [NYT 30.01.1971]. 
Given the deadlock on the question which multilateral forum ought to support the resolution of the 
dispute, Guatemala, Mexico, and Argentina undertook a mediation initiative and worked out a com-
promise which was accepted by both parties; this proposal foresaw four-power fishing talks be-
tween the US, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile [WELLES 31.01.1971]. Subsequently, the OAS endorsed a 
resolution, urging Ecuador and the US to resume negotiations and appealing to OAS member states 
to observe the COAS [BERGER 31.01.1971]. Ecuador, however, later backpedalled an insisted that 
negotiations will only be forthcoming if the US lifts the measures it took [CT 05.02.1971]. Moreover 
the US military mission in Ecuador was ordered out of the country [GOODSELL 06.02.1971]. Since 
Peru and Chile – the other parties to the envisioned four-party talks - supported the Ecuadorian 
stance and boycotted the talks, the issue remained deadlocked [WELLES 07.01.1972]. 
Notwithstanding that Ecuador’s position was widely supported, the OAS had not the possibility to 
bring the dispute to a successful resolution. This primarily commercial conflict touched on legal 
questions not governed by the OAS in the first place, which is why its efforts at transforming the 
dispute failed in the face of the US’s outright rejection. Still, the resolutions approved at least ex-
pressed the prevailing position in a multilateral framework, clearing out any doubts how precarious 
the US stance was perceived to be by the majority of OAS’ members. 
 
2.10.23 Nicaragua vs. Venezuela, Costa Rica, US 1978 
PCOAS (POC), Ad-Hoc Committee of Observers, IACHR, Observer Team, MCMFA; ascer-
taining, monitoring border activities, funding emergency supplies, calling for regime 
change. 
When internal developments between the Somoza regime and the leftist rebels (Sandinista Front 
for National Liberation, FSNL) heightened in Nicaragua, Venezuela asked the OAS to intervene, so 
that further bloodshed can be prevented and democratization furthered [WP 25.08.1978; SHAW 
06.09.1978]. Although the PCOAS was had first addressed the crisis in Nicaragua in 1977, at-
tempts to create a powerful investigative committee where derailed by a conflict between Vene-
zuela and Uruguay [DIAZ 1994:161 FN 233]. However, in 1978 Venezuela offered air force fighter 
bombers and troop transport to Costa Rica, after the Nicaraguan National Guard crossed the border 
in pursuit of guerrilla raiders. Nicaragua insisted that the guerrillas had launched attacks into Nica-
ragua from Costa Rican soil. Meanwhile, the OAS peace machinery remained deadlocked [DEY-
OUNG 15.09.1978]. 
Nicaragua later charged that warplanes of Venezuelan origin did support the guerrillas [DEYOUNG 
18.09.1978]. 
The PCOAS on 15th September established an Ad Hoc Committee of Observers to ascertain the 
facts [OAS 17. MCMFA]. Three days later the OAS agreed to convoke a MCMFA, finding that the 
developments in the Central America affects the peace of the region and creates a situation of an 
urgent nature to the OAS member states [OAS 17. MCMFA]. Only Paraguay voted against and 
Trinidad abstained. When the meeting took place the US proposed a resolution calling for mediation 
between the internal opponents inside Nicaragua. Only a watered down version was adopted and 
note is taken of Nicaragua’s acceptance of the ‘friendly cooperation’ of OAS members to end the 
conflict [GOSHKO 24.09.1978]. The IACHR was invited by the Nicaraguan government to visit the 
country. On 17th November 1978 the IACHR published its report on the investigation it had carried 
out. The document accused the Nicaraguan government of flagrant, persistent abuses of human 
rights. It was charged of torture, summary executions, arbitrary detention, indiscriminate bombing 
of civilians and of obstructing the humanitarian efforts of the Red Cross [HOVEY 18.11.1978]. One 
day after the publication of the IACHR report the PCOAS approved the establishment of a observer 
team to document the situation; however, due to widespread violence in the country the team 
never became operative [DIAZ 1994:168-169]. As the clashes along the border continued, Costa 
Rica severed diplomatic relations [WP 22.11.1978]. 
Meanwhile, a mediation team led by the US suggested that the opposition be represented in the 
government according to the support it would garner in a corresponding plebiscite; the proposal 
was rejected by Nicaragua’s leadership [DEYOUNG 14.11.1978]. 
In December Nicaragua’s President, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, threatened to invade Costa Rican 
territory in order to destroy the rebel (Sandinista) guerrilla camps there [NYT 29.12.1978]. Costa 
Rica turned to the OAS to call an urgent Meeting of Consultation as a reaction to this threat. When 
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the Permanent Council met as provisional Organ of Consultation on 30th December 1978 it resolved 
i.a. to: 
 
• reaffirm the principle proscribing the threat and use of force, established in Art. 1 Rio 
Treaty, art. 21 COAS; 
• request the Republic of Nicaragua to refrain from any threat, act of aggression, or use of 
armed force against the Republic of Costa Rica and to take steps in order to normalize the 
commercial border traffic and passage of persons with Costa Rica [OAS 1978b]. 
 
In February 1979 an Observation Team of the OAS arrived in the troubled region. It consisted of 
five OAS officials and a handful of advisers and was supposed to monitor the crossings along the 
border area. The presence of the team was reported to have contributed to reducing the number of 
incidence, while being unable to stop the fighting altogether [GOODSELL 07.02.1979]. 
In mid-May the Observer Team, headed by Fabian Redhead, reported that calm had largely re-
turned in the preceding two months. This assessment was somewhat contradicted when two ob-
servers were caught in crossfire between the rebels and the Nicaraguan Guard some days before 
the report was presented.  
Meanwhile, Nicaragua asked for the invocation of the Rio Treaty referring to numerous invasions 
from rebels coming from Costa Rica. These charges were denied by the OAS Observer Team 
[DIUGUID 31.05.1979]. The escalation heightened when Somoza threatened to declare war on 
Costa Rica if the OAS failed to stop the rebel incursions [CT 03.06.1979]. 
The US had an interest of stopping the leftist rebels to gain power in Nicaragua but at the same 
time did not support the Nicaraguan President; that is why it urged the OAS to mediate between 
the Nicaraguan government and the Sandinistas at a time when the rebels seemed to succeed [WP 
14.06.1979]. When the fighting worsened the US representative called for the ouster of the pre-
sent Nicaraguan government and establishment of an Inter-American peace force [HOVEY 
22.06.1979]. In a session on 23rd June 1979 of the Seventeenth MCMFA 17 OAS members voted 
for a resolution (Paraguay and Nicaragua voted against; Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Uru-
guay, and Chile abstained; another three did not take part in the vote) [CT 24.06.1979], urging 
that the solution of the Nicaraguan crisis should be arrived at on the basis of the following: 
 
• immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime; 
• establishment, within Nicaraguan territory, of a democratic government, the composition of 
which should include the principal groups representative of the Somoza regime’s opposition 
and should reflect the free will of the people of Nicaragua; 
• guarantee of the respect for human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception; and 
• holding of free elections as soon as possible, that will lead to the establishment of a truly 
democratic government that guarantees peace, freedom, and justice [OAS 17. MCMFA]. 
 
Nicaragua’s President denounced the urge for the change of government and said the resolution 
was a violation of Nicaragua’s sovereignty [RIDING 25.06.1979]. However, under heavy US and 
Latin pressure, Somoza finally agreed to resign [DEYOUNG 07.07.1979], what he eventually did on 
17th July 1979. The president of the lower house of Congress assumed the presidency [DEYOUNG 
17.07.1979]. The OAS responded subsequently to an urgent Nicaraguan request for help by au-
thorizing $ 500.000 in food and medical aid [DIUGUID 03.08.1979]. 
The OAS engagement was later judged in retrospect by the NYT to have been forthcoming only 
after the rebel Sandinistas’ final offensive had already been under way [RIDING 27.01.1980]. 
However, the region was not pacified conclusively through the takeover of the Sandinistas. From 
the outset the regime was suspiciously eyed by the US. Because of their left leaning ideology and 
amicable relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union as well as the support for the leftist rebels in El 
Salvador, the US decided to cut off aid to Nicaragua. Anti-Sandinista forces – known as Contras – 
were henceforth supported by the US [WH N] and fuelled the civil war. The activities along the 
common border once again upset Costa Rica; it asked for an OAS police force to patrol the area, 
since rebel forces – this time from the other side of the political spectrum – were said to maintain 
base camps in Costa Rican territory [WEINRAUB 07.05.1983]. The Nicaraguan side rejected that 
request [NYT 09.05.1983]. Although tensions abated, skirmishes on its territory continued to be 
reported by Costa Rica as late as 1985 [LANTIGUA 03.06.1985]. 
 
The performance of the OAS in this case was biased from the beginning. Obviously reflecting the 
predominating position in the hemisphere, accusations focused on Nicaragua, neglecting the hostile 
and illegal actions and omissions by Costa Rica (and Venezuela). In a profound miscalculation, 
Nicaragua invited the IACHR which duly reported on the sorry state of human rights in the country, 
further undermining the country’s already questionable standing. The Nicaraguan regime delivered 
a sound reason for decisive steps by the OAS, when it threatened to use force against Costa Rica, 
itself having no armed forces. 
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The script of events was determined when the spotlight was ultimately concentrated on domestic 
political developments in Nicaragua. When the proposal was put forward that a plebiscite should be 
held on a new composition of government, the resistance of the Nicaraguan establishment was 
guaranteed. To ask an acting government to agree to its self-elimination can hardly be expected to 
be perceived as constructive proposal. The further stiffening of the OAS’ position led to remarkable 
demands; the resolution of June 23rd 1979 was not only calling for replacement of the acting gov-
ernment – what was more: the OAS demanded the formation of a ‘democratic’ government that is 
to “include the principal groups representative of the Somoza regime’s opposition”. Thus the or-
ganization openly signalled its willingness to decide about the composition of the new government 
– clearly infringing ‘free and democratic’ decision making. 
The disrespect for sovereignty and political independence was later displayed by the continued US 
meddling in Nicaraguan affairs against the ‘democratically’ elected government. By not targeting 
this type of activity, the OAS flagrantly failed to honour its own commitments.  
The conflict was tremendously transformed by the regional body – albeit in such a manner as to 
escalate it and keep it alive for many years to come. Its record, then, must be likened to the one it 
mustered in the case of Guatemala in 1954. 
2.10.24 Ecuador vs. Peru 1981 
PCOAS, MCMFA. 
Ecuador called for an urgent meeting of the OAS after a border clash with Peru. Ecuador claimed 
that Peruvian aircraft had attacked one of its frontier outposts. At the same time Peru explained 
that it was conducting a military operation in order to root out Ecuadorian troops from Peruvian 
territory [CT 29.01.1981] 
The border region had been disputed for centuries between both countries. In 1942 a treaty had 
ended a brief war between both countries; as a result Ecuador had had to cede 70.000 square 
miles to Peru. However, Ecuador had declared that treaty void and asked for a renegotiation [WP 
29.01.1981]. 
Peru did not recognize the authority of the OAS in the dispute and maintained that only the guar-
antor nations of the 1942 treaty (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the US) were in a position to rule on 
it [WP 03.02.1981]. 
When the Nineteenth MCMFA took place between 2nd and 4th February 1981 a cease-fire between 
both countries had already been established. Ecuador and Peru were urged to demobilize and dis-
perse their forces and dismantle the military operations. However, the MCMFA had to cede the 
main responsibility – just as Peru had insisted – to the guarantor countries. A Committee com-
posed of representatives of the said nations sent a cease-fire monitoring team to the region [OAS 
1981]. 
 
Similar to the conflict between Chile and Bolivia about the sea access of the latter, the OAS was 
unable to contribute significantly to the regulation of the dispute due to Peru’s rejection of such 
involvement. The multilateral body was only in the position to reaffirm what the guarantor nations 
virtually mediated and achieved, thus at least sustaining hemispheric acceptability of these efforts. 
2.10.25 Argentina vs. United Kingdom 1982 
PCOAS (POC), MCMFA, GA. 
At the beginning of April 1982 more than 4.000 Argentine armed forces took control of the Falk-
land/Malvinas Islands219, a British colony for the past 149 years220. Argentina had laid claim on the 
islands just as long. In 1816 the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata (later Argentina) had declared 
independence. However, in 1833 British forces occupied the islands and removed the Argentine 
garrison there [LAUCIRICA 2000:81]. Argentina – although it had turned to the United Nations in 
1965 but failed to reach an agreement with Britain - had in advance launched a diplomatic offen-
sive in Latin America for the purpose of winning back the islands. Following this logic it also called 
for an urgent OAS meeting after it had overrun the colony [SCHUMACHER 04.04.1982; ELLIS 
21.04.1982]. The PCOAS decided on the Argentine request to constitute itself as provisional Organ 
of Consultation and to hold a meeting on 26th April 1982 [OAS 20. MCMFA]. This step was taken 
against explicit US wishes, suggesting instead that the US Secretary of State should proceed in his 
ongoing mediation efforts [ELLIS 21.04.1982]. Britain reacted221
                                                 
219 For the historical background see LAUCIRICA 2000:80-81. 
220 For an informative and relatively recent overview of the conflict see TARKER 19.06.2005. 
221 For some details on the motivations behind the Argentine action and the British reaction see GORDON 
1987:59. 
 with the sending of naval forces 
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and an ensuing blockade of the islands with the aim of hindering any Argentine warship to reach 
the archipelago [APPLE 12.04.1982]. 
A resolution approved by the Twentieth MCMFA was voted 17 to 0 (the US, Colombia, Chile, and 
Trinidad and Tobago abstained). The resolution called on both countries to refrain from further 
activities that could potentially aggravate the situation. Most noteworthy resolution in point 3 
states to: 
… urge those governments immediately to call a truce that will make it possible to resume 
and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, 
taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvi-
nas Islands and the interests of the islanders222
This paragraph recognizes the Argentine claim to the islands
. [OAS 20. MCMFA] 
223
The support by the US
. To support this position the same 
document refers to the Declaration of the Inter-American Juridical Committee dated 16th  January 
1976, which reads: “[t]hat the Republic of Argentina has an undeniable right of sovereignty over 
the Malvinas Islands” [OAS 20. MCMFA]. Seymour J. RUBIN criticized the Foreign Ministers’ deci-
sion to cite this document, since in his opinion the Inter-American Juridical Committee has had ‘no 
authority to make any such declaration in regard to a territorial dispute’. RUBIN himself had been a 
member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, but was not present at the Falklands discussion 
[RUBIN 1982]. 
224
• suspension of all military exports and security assistance to Argentina; 
 for the British position was criticized by several members of the OAS and 
Costa Rica’s President voiced the suggestion the OAS headquarters in Washington should be trans-
ferred [GUILLERMOPRIETO 09.05.1982]. But US support did not backtrack but instead climaxed 
when it was providing Britain with air-to air missiles, submarine-hunting sonar buoys, and ammu-
nition for the stand-off with Argentina [CT 28.05.1982]. The US voted also for the British position 
in the UN Security Council [GORDON 1987:56] and furthermore enacted the following sanctions 
against Argentina [GOSHKO & DENTON 29.05.1982]: 
 
• withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales; 
• suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees; and 
• suspension of Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees [ACEVEDO 1984:326]. 
 
When the forces of both countries clashed in the disputed area, Argentina asked for another ses-
sion of the MCMFA on 24th May [NYT 25.05.1982]. The resolution taken on 29th May 1982 by the 
Twentieth MCMFA included the following: 
 
• to condemn most vigorously the unjustified and disproportionate armed attack perpetrated 
by the United Kingdom, and its decision of arbitrarily declaring an extensive area of up to 
12 miles from the American coasts as a zone of hostilities, without exhausting entirely 
peaceful remedies; 
• to reiterate its firm demand against the U.K. that it cease immediately its acts of war 
against the Argentine Republic and order the immediate return to their usual stations of its 
task force and all its armed forces detailed there; 
• to urge the US government to order the immediate lifting of the coercive measures applied 
against the Argentine Republic225
• to request the states parties of the Rio Treaty to give the Argentine Republic the support 
that each judges appropriate to assist it in this serious situation, and to refrain from any 
act which might jeopardize this objective [NYT 30.05.1982]. 
 and to refrain from providing matériel assistance to the 
United Kingdom, in observance of the principle of hemispheric solidarity recognized in the 
Rio Treaty; 
 
Again the vote ended with 17 to 0 (the same abstentions namely from the US, Chile, Colombia, 
and Trinidad and Tobago) [REINHOLD 30.05.1982]. 
LAUCIRICO comments on the above resolution: 
It was too little, too late. The organization (the OAS, my remark) proved powerless with-
out the commitment of the United States to back its decisions. [LAUCIRICO 2000:88] 
                                                 
222 The inhabitants numbered about 1.800 according to GORDON 1987:52. 
223 The CT judged that as ‘a victory for Argentina’ [CT 28.04.1982]. 
224 For the ‘distorting role’ the US played during the conflict see LAUCIRICA 2000:87-89. 
225 ACEVEDO (1984) analyzed extensively the economic sanctions and their justification taken by the US against 
Argentina. 
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Regardless of OAS resolutions, the U.K. defeated Argentina in a 10-week war [WH FIW]. 
Opinions on the developments are rather controversial. MOORE for one criticizes the resolution 
endorsed on 29th May. He argues that the Argentine invasion of the islands in question violated the 
principle not to resort to the threat or use of force enshrined in the Rio Treaty and the UN Charter. 
MOORE concludes: 
This OAS resolution of May 29 is not important for its legal effect. It is clear under Article 
103 of the United Nations Charter and Article 10 of the Rio Treaty that regional actions 
that are inconsistent either with the obligations of the Charter or with binding action taken 
by the Security Council in dealing with a dispute are ultra vires and without legal effect. 
[MOORE 1982:831] 
TACSAN highlights another outcome of the conflict, judging that the marginal role the OAS played 
in the conflict and its disability to perform its main purpose – maintenance of peace and security in 
the region – dealt a decisive blow to the organization’s overall credibility [TACSAN 1997:490]. 
 
Only in 1990 did the two countries reinstate diplomatic relations [DJIN 04.06.1997]. However, Ar-
gentina never gave up its claim on the islands. The 26th General Assembly of the OAS approved a 
proposal to resume negotiations on the issue [BBC MS 07.06.1996]. Again, the following year the 
General Assembly maintained that the sovereignty question remained ‘of permanent interest to the 
hemisphere’ [qtd. in: DJIN 04.06.1997]. These statements, meanwhile, seem to have gained a 
rather ritual quality226
2.10.26 Grenada vs. US 1983 
, without being backed by political will and power. 
The same lack of substance seemed to be behind plans submitted by Chile in 2003 for UN and OAS 
conferences on the matter. During the war Chile under Pinochet had tacitly provided support to the 
British in exchange for weapons at nominal prices. Only after Pinochet's rule had come to an end, 
Chile started to back Argentina's claim [XINHUA 19.08.2004]. Thus the initiative was more of a 
token redress, rather than a meaningful effort as dealing Argentina’s grievances.  
 
The confrontation between Argentina and Great Britain was a very rare case involving an extra-
hemispheric country. Although the geographic proximity may give credence to Argentina’s claim, 
the OAS clearly overestimated its competencies when it sided with its member country. However, 
what was more striking was its complete powerlessness in making the US to comply with the reso-
lutions taken. Instead, the US defied the OAS and the provisions of the Rio Treaty and followed its 
own foreign policy and explicitly supported Argentina’s adversary, even with weapons. However, 
although calling on the US to refrain from such assistance, the OAS did not approve sanctions 
against this recalcitrance. As the OAS’ historical record shows, such options were frequently agreed 
on when other states had been concerned. 
Again, the transformative impact was limited, although the symbolic gesture of supporting the Ar-
gentine claim could have prolonged the confrontation, since Argentina might have based its hopes 
for success i.a. on this type of declaratory assistance. 
PCOAS, SGOAS. 
As one among several, the Grenadian government under Maurice Bishop was critically eyed by the 
US for its left leaning political ideology and its formidable relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union. 
However, during 1983 Bishop tried to improve relations with the US. This in turn caused the ex-
treme left-leaning members of the government to overthrow the regime in mid-October. Subse-
quently, the Revolutionary Military Council under Gen. Austin was installed. Upon these develop-
ments the US sent 1.900 troops and invaded Grenada [WH G] along with 300 soldiers from Carib-
bean nations227
                                                 
226 By June 2007 the OAS had all in all issued 10 resolutions and 14 declarations in which it had urged Great 
Britain to resume negotiations with Argentina on the issue [XINHUA 06.06.2007]. 
227 Whereas the OCT article of 25th October 1983 states that six OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States) countries supported the force. The same figure is given by NOKES [NOKES 25.10.1983]. MOORE – with 
some more distance to the developments – says that the US was supported merely by Jamaica and Barbados 
[MOORE 1984:150]; this assertion is supported by an article by KOZA for United Press International [KOZA 
25.10.1983]. 
 [OCT 25.10.1983]. At its height the US force numbered 6.000 [PIENCIAK 
13.11.1983]. 
It is noteworthy that Grenadian Foreign Minister, Unison Whiteman, had already several months 
earlier, in April 1983, voiced concern of such a threat at the OAS forum: 
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Grenada is convinced that a United States-backed mercenary invasion is imminent and 
can come any day now. (…) 
We call on the peace-loving brother states of the OAS system to use their diplomatic and 
moral influence to ensure that the military aggression that the United States is now plan-
ning against Grenada does not materialize. [qtd. in: GEDDA 06.04.1983] 
The US had – according to a report by BYRD [20.10.1984] - in fact undertaken military exercises in 
previous years, simulating the invasion of a Caribbean island. 
Officially the US Secretary of State based the operation on the request of the Organization of East-
ern Caribbean States to intervene. This was said to be the legal justification228 of the invasion, 
notwithstanding the many avowals of non-intervention229
Most member states of the OAS condemned the US action
, long cherished and often repeated by 
the inter-American system. 
The members of the OECS, namely St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua & 
Barbuda, St. Kitts & Nevis and Montserrat, together with Barbados and Jamaica had met on 21st 
October and agreed to ask the US for military assistance in removing what they felt to be a secu-
rity threat to their region. Furthermore, the Grenadian Governor-General had on 24th October 
asked in writing for a peace-keeping force to be sent to Grenada [MOORE 1984 passim]. 
Still, the Chairman of the PCOAS at the time, Bolivia’s ambassador to the OAS – Fernando Salazar 
Peredes – commented on the US involvement the following: 
This is Grenada today, it could be any country tomorrow. It reminds us a little bit of the 
Dominican Republic [i.e. the military intervention of the US in the Dominican Republic in 
1965, my remark]. [KURTZ 26.10.1983] 
Although the new regime had assured the US that its citizens would be given safe passage, US 
President Ronald Reagan later declared that his paramount concern had been the safety of the US 
citizens in Grenada, estimated to number 1.000. However, Democrat Senator Thomas Eagleton, 
challenged that argument, saying “the notion that American nationals were endangered is flimsy, 
illusory and hypothetical” [qtd. in: ROWLEY & ATLAS 27.10.1983]. 
230
                                                 
228 MOORE emphatically argues in detail for the legality of the invasion [MOORE 1984]. 
229 The said OECS treaty on collective security (dating back to 1981), however, was said to deal with ‘external 
aggression’ and not with internal political developments. Furthermore the provisions would have to be taken 
unanimously, which was not the case since Grenada opposed the move. It was also hinted on the fact that the 
US hardly could argue to act in the name of the OECS, since itself did not belong to the organization 
[SOUTHERLAND 27.10.1983; ZUNES 2003:4]. 
230 The invasion was equally deplored by the majority of the UN member states: eleven members of the UNSC 
and 108 members of the UN General Assembly upheld that the invasion was violating international law [BOYLE 
1984:174]. 
 as a violation of international law and 
the principle of non-intervention [SHABECOFF, 27.10.1983]. Seventeen of the 29 member states 
questioned the legality of the invasion [PARRY 27.10.1983]. Yet, when the OAS met for a second 
time on the matter they failed to come up with a resolution to vote on. DIUGUID, reporting for the 
WP, observed on that occasion the following: 
The OAS has come under increasing criticism for repeated failures to take substantive ac-
tion in regional crisis. [DIUGUID 30.10.1983] 
Contrary to expectations that the issue will be tabled at the General Assembly in November 1983, 
nothing of that sort happened. Instead the SGOAS, Alejandro Orfila, resigned 18 month before his 
term ended, arguing that the OAS was all too often bypassed, as had been clearly shown during 
the Grenada invasion [AdG 18.11.1983]. The only move the General Assembly took distantly dis-
cernable as making reference to the invasion was observed by OMANG: 
In what was likely to be the closest thing to an OAS position statement on the U.S. inva-
sion of Grenada last month, the resolution included a section reaffirming the obligation of 
all nations in the hemisphere "not to interfere either directly or indirectly or for whatever 
reason in the internal or external affairs of any other state”. [OMANG 18.11.1983] 
The main bulk of the US military force was withdrawn by 15th December 1983, after an interim 
government under Governor-General Scoon, had been established [MOORE 1984:152]. However, 
as late as October 1984 about 300 US soldiers were still stationed on the island [IPS 24.10.1984]. 
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The invasion of Grenada is another example of blatant disregard of OAS’ and the rest of world opin-
ion by the US. Legal provisions and norms were contravened without hesitation and the OAS was – 
once more –unable to translate the opinion of the majority into any action on the part of Grenada. 
The reputation of the regional body suffered tremendously as could not be expected otherwise after 
such dysfunctional performance. The only one political symbol worth mentioning was the SGOAS’ 
resignation – a laudable personal move - although politically accomplishing nothing. 
2.10.27 Panama vs. US 1989 
PCOAS, MCMFA, Mediation Mission, IACHR; mediating, ascertaining, calling for regime 
change. 
The US was considerably critical of Panama’s military strongman Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega231
Bush's steps seemed more of a measured response designed to encourage Panamanians 
to force Noriega
 
and the policies he pursued. In the framework of the treaty governing the Panama canal, the US 
had stationed 10.000 troops in the Panama Canal Zone at the time. However, President Bush Sen. 
decided to reinforce this contingent with another 2.000 combat troops, in order to exert pressure 
on Noriega. The step was taken in the wake of bloody clashes of Noriega supporters with the oppo-
sition’s presidential candidate and his running mate, who the US regarded as the winner of the 
election of 7th May. Noriega later nullified the election, seemingly since his preferred candidate had 
failed to win [GOSHKO 22.08.1989]. HUNT commented on the US reinforcement the following: 
232
• to entrust to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, Guatemala and Trinidad and To-
bago the urgent mission of promoting, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of the 
Organization of American States, conciliation formulas for arriving at a national accord that 
can bring about, through democratic mechanisms, a transfer of power in the shortest pos-
sible time, and with full respect for the sovereign will of the Panamanian people. The Mis-
sion was to prepare a report and to fulfil its mandate until 6th June 1989; 
 from power. [HUNT 11.05.1989] 
Other steps demonstrating US military might followed [FT 23.05.1989]. Meanwhile, Venezuela 
asked for a special session of the PCOAS to propose a MCMFA on the Panamanian crisis [HUNT 
11.05.1989]. This request was approved unanimously. But while the US planned that the Panama-
nian regime should be condemned and ideally subsequently removed, Panama wanted that the 
MCMFA also addressed the systematic pattern of American inference in its internal affairs [GEDDA 
12.05.1989]. When the Foreign Ministers met in mid-May 1989 they were said to be devising an 
acceptable formula to make Noriega relinquish power [REICHERTZ 16.05.1989]. At the first official 
session of the Twenty-first MCMFA on 17th May the Foreign Ministers approved Resolution I under 
the heading: The Serious Crisis in Panama and its International Context. Noriega is herein accused 
of abuses during the electoral process. Recognising that the crisis has the capacity to seriously 
endanger international peace and security, it was resolved: 
 
• to urge the Panamanian actors and all other states to cooperate in the implementation of 
the resolution; 
• to exhort all states to refrain from any action that may infringe the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of states [OAS 21. MCMFA]. 
 
The resolution was approved unanimously, also by the Panamanian representative [GEDDA 
17.05.1989; SHANNON & MCMANUS 18.05.1989]. Panama’s government was already in consider-
able disarray. Thus, Panama’s Foreign Ministers, Jorge Ritter233
                                                 
231 Noriega had been indicted on drug-running charges in Florida in February 1988; since then the US tried to 
force him from power [HUNT 11.05.1989]. For a chronology of the numerous US efforts to unseat Noriega see 
LAMNR 08.06.1989. 
232 Noriega claimed that the US intended to replace him with a government that would agree to a continuation 
of a US military presence beyond December 1999, the date foreseen in the respective treaty for the complete 
handover of the canal zone to Panama’s authority [AGUILAR 15.07.1989]. 
233 According to the weekly ECONOMIST, Ritter along with acting president Manuel Solis Palma were at that time 
already upset with Noriega [ECONOMIST 20.05.1989]. 
, claimed that the resolution was a 
‘disappointment’ for those who sought a total isolation of Panama. He vowed the full cooperation of 
the government with the OAS Mission [BBC MS 20.05.1989]. Conversely, Panama’s government 
issued a statement, making clear that parts of the resolution violated the COAS [AGUILAR  
23.05.1989].The ECONOMIST judged gloomily about the effect of the resolution: 
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In Washington on May 17th the OAS wrung its hands over General Noriega's misdeeds, 
and promised to send a delegation. That will not shift him. [ECONOMIST 20.05.1989] 
The four-men Mission arrived on 23rd May for a 10-day stay in Panama and held talks with cabinet 
members [AGUILAR 23.05.1989], with opposition politicians and with Noriega himself [King 
25.05.1989]. Yet after only four days the Mission returned prematurely, indicating that another 
Mission should restart talks between the Panamanian conflict parties [AGUILAR 27.05.1989]. Their 
report included the following findings: 
 
• agreement among all sectors that a solution must be found to the situation of "political 
vacuum" that could emerge in 1st September, the scheduled date for the inauguration of a 
new government;  
• agreement among all parties that conciliation could be achieved through mutual conces-
sions; 
• a "shared concern" that reactivation of Panama's economy and normalisation of its interna-
tional relations should begin immediately. [LAWR 22.06.1989] 
 
When the Mission reported back to the Foreign Ministers of the Hemisphere it was decided that 
their term shall be promulgated a further six weeks. Panama’s Foreign Minister did not object to 
that proposal [GEDDA 06.06.1989]. 
Again the Mission returned after only three days in Panama, urging that the Defence Forces shall 
be included in the negotiations, and making their further efforts dependent on progress in this re-
gard. Yet such a request had already been repeatedly been turned down by Noriega [KING 
15.06.1989]. Only after the military had agreed to send a representative to the talks, did the OAS 
mission return [AGUILAR 15.07.1989]. In the end three high-ranking officers took part in the first 
round of talks, taking place at the offices of the OAS [AGUILAR 16.07.1989]. 
Upon those signs that a resolution of the conflict was forthcoming the OAS Foreign Ministers agreed 
on an extension of the mediation effort. When they met on 19th and 20th July the new deadline was 
set at 23rd August. Additionally, the MCMFA approved a declaration which called for the transfer of 
power on 1st September carried out through “democratic means and in conformity with existing 
internal Panamanian procedures” [GEDDA 20.07.1989]. With its renewed mandate the Mission 
returned to Panama on 31st July 1989 [REUTERS 01.08.1989]. After staying several days the Mis-
sion left, arguing that dialogue had begun and a self-convening mechanism existed among the 
Panamanian conflict parties [BBC MS 09.08.1989]. However, the Mission had to continue its efforts 
over the following days and weeks. But although the report the Mission submitted to the MCMFA on 
23rd August stated its optimism about a prospective solution, envisioning the installation of a tran-
sitional government, the OAS effort was judged by the WP as having been a failure, reflecting the 
US position [GOSHKO 22.08.1989]. 
The report had also concluded that the mediation might have succeeded if the process had been 
given more time. The report did moreover also call attention to the negative impact manoeuvres 
carried out by the armed forces of the United States in Panama had on the talks [GEDDA 
23.08.1989]. 
Tellingly, the results – being far short of what the US had aimed for – have been predicted to 
prompt the following: 
...causing the United States to resume  unilateral pressures against Panama and then by 
intensifying U.S. unwillingness to ease the current OAS financial crisis. [GOSHKO 
22.08.1989] 
However, as far as the OAS was concerned the foreign ministers unanimously approved at the 
fourth session of the 21. MCMFA on 24th August [TT 24.08.1989] the following resolution: 
1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago, as 
well as the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, are hereby thanked 
for the painstaking and efficient work they accomplished in compliance with the mandate 
entrusted to them by the 21st meeting of consultation.  
2. Grave concern is expressed over the fact that the participants in the political dialogue in 
Panama have not yet arrived at a solution to the crisis in their country, which solution is 
the exclusive province of the Panamanians, and they are strongly urged to make new and 
pressing efforts to achieve, in accordance with Resolution I of May 17 and the declaration 
by the president of July 20, a national accord prior to September 1, for which purpose 
they may rely on the mission's assistance, should all the parties so request.  
3. It is reaffirmed that, in the solution of the Panamanian crisis, the observance of democ-
ratic principles must be ensured in the free exercise of the sovereignty and self-
determination of the Panamanian people.  
4. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is requested to conduct, with the 
consent of the Government of Panama, another visit to Panama at the earliest possible 
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date for the purpose of completing and updating the information on the situation of hu-
man rights in that country.  
5. To keep this meeting of consultation open. [qtd. in USDSD 01.11.1989] 
While on 1st September a new interim Panamanian President was sworn in, the US – in protest to 
that move – broke diplomatic relations with Panama, claiming that the government remained sub-
servient to Noriega. During an emergency session of the OAS on 31st August the US had presented 
evidence of Noriega’s links with Colombia’s cocaine cartels [LICHFIELD 02.09.1989]. However, the 
OAS remained broadly inactive for the following period of time. Only the IACHR paid the proposed 
visit to Panama and issued a report in November 1989, stating that the government routinely vio-
lates numerous human rights of its citizens. The report additionally called on the government to 
take "immediate steps to control the excessive violence that the Defense Force police and paramili-
tary groups employ against the civilian population” criticising the rule of Noriega [qtd. in: GEDDA 
13.11.1989]. The report also addresses the power amassed by Noriega and judges: “the Constitu-
tion of Panama formally establishes a classic order for the distribution of powers; however, in prac-
tice, the outstanding role given to the Defence Forces determines that they are not duly subject to 
civilian rule" [qtd. in: PRNW 13.11.1989]. And although the annually held General Assembly was 
predominantly concerned with finding a solution to the Panamanian crisis it was able only to agree 
on a resolution that contained the reaffirmation of the urgent need for the Panamanian people to 
express their will, within the shortest possible time, through an authentic democratic process lead-
ing to the establishment of a freely elected government, without external interferences, and having 
all the guarantees necessary for the full exercise of universal suffrage [LAWR 30.11.1989]. 
In October 1989 a military coup failed to unseat Noriega. On 20th December the US invaded Pa-
nama with 25.000 of its soldiers and installed the presumed winner of the 7th May 1989 election, 
Guillermo Endara, as president [WH P]. At their peak, the invading troops numbered 12.000 sol-
diers (additionally to those already stationed in the Canal Zone). The invasion resulted in over 700 
Panamanian and 26 US deaths [NANDA 1990:497]. 
The US argued that it acted legally in self-defence and in conformity with the UN and OAS Char-
ters234 [ROWLEY 20.12.1989]. However, numerous Latin nations expressed concern about the 
move and Venezuela called for an immediate OAS meeting to reinstall Panamanian sovereignty 
[CST 20.12.1989]. At the subsequent meeting a resolution was approved that deeply regrets the 
military intervention in Panama and calls for the withdrawal of troops used in the US invasion235
The conclusion is disconcerting to an international lawyer -- that the U.S. action was in 
disregard of the pertinent norms and principles of international law on the use of force. 
The intervention was evidently dictated by political considerations, in disregard of faithful 
adherence to the existing norms on the use of force. The international community's con-
demnation of the invasion at the United Nations and the OAS appropriately reflects this 
concern [NANDA 1990:502]
. 
The OAS further rebuffed an attempt by the US and its installed Panamanian President to seat his 
appointed representative on the forum, instead holding on to the former ambassador [BRENNAN 
22.12.1989]. While at first refusing to recognize the newly installed government, the PCOAS later 
backtracked after the US occupation was secured and Endara had begun to function as President 
[BRANIGIN 29.01.1990; FARER 1990:510]. 
NANDA analyses the justification given by the US for invading Panama (saving US citizens; restor-
ing democracy; upholding the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties; apprehending Noriega) and 
arrives at the following: 
236
                                                 
234 The action was justified with explicit reference to Art. 51 UN Charter, which reads: "Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security."; reference was also made to Art. 21 COAS, which states: "The American States bind 
themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-
defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof." Quoted in NANDA 1990:495. 
235 At the Security Council of the United Nations the invasion was equally overwhelmingly criticized [LEOPOLD 
22.12.1989]. 
236 Similarly, FARER argues against the legitimacy of the US invasion. Instead, D’AMATO insists that the invasion 
was freeing the Panamanian people of Noriega’s tyranny, and was thus justified [FARER 1990; D’AMATO 1990]. 
. 
However, the OAS on the whole proved ineffective. In the aftermath the OAS merely made plain 
(the vote was 19 to 0) on the request of Nicaragua that the US was acting against international law 
in searching the Nicaraguan embassy in Panama with armed troops [GEDDA 08.01.1990]. Vene-
zuela’s President, Carlos Andres Perez, voiced in May 1990 criticism that was prevalent in a lot of 
other Latin countries at that time, pointing to the “inefficiency and ineffectiveness” of the OAS and 
stating: 
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The principles consecrated in the OAS charter did not prevent any unilateral action by the 
US, while dictatorships such as those of Somoza, Stroessner, Duvalier and Trujillo, were 
protected. [qtd. in: LAWR 10.05.1990] 
As laudable as the attention the OAS paid to the democratic development in one of its member 
countries might have been, the conclusion put forward by COOPER and LEGLER, pointing to the 
‘disconnect’ between goals and means in the OAS system for the support of democracy at that 
time, is not without merit: 
The OAS’s inability to move decisively from declaratory to operational practices contrib-
uted to the U.S. decision to invade Panama (…). [COOPER & LEGLER 2001:43] 
This assessment, however, in no way can be utilized to legitimize the US invasion. Once again the 
most basic principles of international law were trampled on in order to further the agenda of the 
United States. Compared with earlier cases, attempts by the OAS at resolving the internal conflict 
were at least undertaken at all. Still, the Organization lacked the resources and the political will 
required to meaningfully press the democratic cause. The fact that the OAS approved a resolution 
which called for the withdrawal of US troops, is a mild albeit scant indication of the body’s auton-
omy. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the OAS was completely powerless to avert or stop the 
invasion, being degraded to a mere onlooker. 
Despite the willingness of some parts of the Panamanian leadership to cooperate on bringing about 
a peaceful solution, the formula accomplished could not succeed given the considerable military US 
presence poised to invade in case events did not develop as the US intended.  Would any other 
country of the hemisphere have dared to militarily overrun one of its fellows it would have had to 
certainly fear strong retribution, and not a simple resolution, easily to be disregarded. 
2.10.28 Haiti 1991 
PCOAS, AHMFM, SGOAS, Mediation Mission, Observer Mission, IACHR, Evaluation Team, 
Special Envoy, Special (Embargo) Committee, MICIVIH (with UN), High-level Interna-
tional Mission, Special Joint Envoy (OAS-UN), International Observer Mission in Haiti, 
High-level Mission headed by SGOAS, Mission headed by Deputy SGOAS, Exploration Mis-
sion, GAOAS, Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy, Inquiry Commission, Special En-
voy, OAS Electoral Observer Mission, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy; mediating, 
decreeing trade embargo, freezing of assets, facilitating, reporting, negotiating, monitor-
ing sanctions, banning travel, decreeing embargo on commercial air traffic, verification 
of Governors Island Agreement; decreeing embargo on international financial transac-
tions, consulting, supporting democratization, supporting disarmament, co-brokering 
election calculation deal. 
When the Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide was deposed by the military on 29th September 
1991 the PCOAS met the following day to declare unanimously that the plotters would be held ac-
countable. Pursuant to Resolution 1080 (see chapter “Democracy”) the PCOAS convoked a meeting 
of the OAS foreign ministers [MOLEON 30.09.1991]. At that time one of the options evaluated by 
the OAS was the sending of a multinational force to restore Aristide [AFP 02.10.1991]. On 2nd Oc-
tober237 an Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers (AHMFM)238
• to reiterate the vigorous condemnation voiced by the Permanent Council of the grave 
events taking place in Haiti, which deny the right of its people to self-determination, and to 
demand full restoration of the rule of law and of constitutional order and the immediate re-
instatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the exercise of his legitimate authority; 
 took place. They agreed on the follow-
ing: 
 
• to request that the Secretary General of the Organization, together with a group of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs of member states239
                                                 
237 While the Annual Report of the IACHR [IACHR AR 1991] gives the 2nd of October 1991 as date of the meet-
ing, resolution 3/92 approved by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 17th May 1992, as printed in AJIL 1992 
gives the 3rd of October 1991 as that date. 
238 The Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was established with Resolution 1080, approved in June 
1991 (see chapter on democracy). 
239 The group finally comprised representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States, 
Jamaica, Trinidad, and Venezuela alongside the SGOAS, Joao Baena Soares, a Brazilian [HC 03.10.1991]. 
, go to Haiti immediately to inform those who 
hold power illegally that the American states reject the disruption of constitutional order 
and to advise them of the decisions adopted by this meeting; 
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• to recognize the representatives designated by the constitutional Government of President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the only legitimate representatives of the Government of Haiti to 
the organs, agencies, and entities of the inter-American system; 
• to urge the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in response to President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide's request, to take immediately all measures within its competence to pro-
tect and defend human rights in Haiti and to report thereon to the Permanent Council of 
the Organization; 
• to recommend, with due respect for the policy of each member state on the recognition of 
states and governments, action to bring about the diplomatic isolation of those who hold 
power illegally in Haiti; 
• to recommend to all states that they suspend their economic, financial and commercial ties 
with Haiti and any aid and technical cooperation except that provided for strictly humani-
tarian purposes;  
• to request the Secretary General of the Organization to pursue efforts to increase the In-
ter-American Fund for Priority Assistance to Haiti, but to refrain from using it so long as the 
present situation prevails; 
• to recommend to the General Secretariat of the Organization the suspension of all assis-
tance to those who hold power illegally in Haiti and to request the regional organs and in-
stitutions, such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture 
and the Latin American Economic System (SELA), to adopt the same measure and 
• to urge all states to provide no military, police, or security assistance of any kind and to 
prevent the delivery of arms, munitions, or equipment to that country in any manner, pub-
lic or private [IACHR AR 1991]. 
 
The Houston Chronicle commented on the OAS’ assertiveness the following: 
In moving decisively against the subversion of the democratic process, the OAS departed 
from its customary caution when dealing with the internal affairs of a member country.  
Diplomats said the OAS action reflected concern among some hemispheric governments 
that if the coup in Haiti is allowed to stand, military officers in other countries might be 
tempted to take similar action. [HC 03.10.1991] 
However, the Organization’s drive was frustrated. The OAS Mission returned from Haiti after dis-
cussions with the military leader Raoul Cedras and representatives of the civil society without hav-
ing succeeded in negotiating Aristide’s return. The Mission, however, was also confronted during 
the trip with critical assessments of the allegedly controversial methods of Arisitide’s rule240
The SGOAS asked Haiti’s leaders to give explicit approval for the Mission. That approval was forth-
coming, albeit with conditions on the size of the mission [TARR 27.10.1991]. On 9th November a 
14-member team arrived in Haiti - greeted by crowd of hundreds of angry Haitians, protesting 
against the embargo - and began talks on the return of Aristide [AFP 12.11.1991]. After four days 
the team left Haiti after it had concluded an agreement with leaders of the National Assembly to 
continue negotiations. The team had also agreed to send a humanitarian mission in order to evalu-
ate the effects of the embargo in order to reduce the suffering of the poor. Additionally, it was 
agreed that a human rights fact finding mission was to visit the country [NORTON 13.11.1991]. 
The consequences of the embargo obviously influenced parliamentarians who agreed to meet with 
Aristide in Cartagena, Colombia, with the OAS as facilitator, in order to find a solution to the crisis 
 [AFP 
06.10.1991]. When Cedras was to name an interim president, a move rejected by the OAS, the 
Mission returned to Haiti [AFP 07.10.1991a]. There a meeting with Cedras and Haitian parliamen-
tarians took place [AFP 07.10.1991b]. But instead of achieving their aim, the Mission eventually 
had to flee when turmoil in Haiti flared up and the legislators were forced to name a Supreme 
Court justice as replacement for Aristide [AFP 08.10.1991]. At the next Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers, taking place on 8th October 1991, the OAS approved a resolution imposing a trade em-
bargo against Haiti, as long as Aristide was not reinstated. Furthermore, the assets of Haiti’s gov-
ernment were frozen. The resolution also reemphasizes that the OAS was not willing to accept any 
other government [AFP 09.10.1991]. The OAS Foreign Ministers agreed also on sending an ob-
server mission to Haiti to help restore democracy and prevent factional violence. However, the 
resolution did not include specifics about the size, the date of departure, or how it would be pro-
tected in case of attack. Yet rumours at that time had it that the Observer Mission would number 
500 to 600 [CT 09.10.1991]. Later, Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, formerly Colombia’s Foreign Minis-
ter, was named to head the mission [BRISCOE 17.10.1991]. 
                                                 
240 On those methods see some details in: BROGAN 06.10.1991. 
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[GUTKIN 22.11.1991]. However, the talks ended after three days unsuccessfully [GUTKIN 
25.11.1991]. 
THOMPSON observes the overall double dilemma the OAS was faced with: 
In sum, the OAS simply did not know how to appear strong and merciful at the same 
time, 
and consequently it failed at each task. The reason for the failure was that none of its 
members 
were willing to support the sanctions with any meaningful force, either economic or mili-
tary. [THOMPSON 1999:82] 
Meanwhile the IACHR issued its report on the human rights situation in Haiti, observing that 1.500 
people have been killed since Aristide was overthrown. The IACHR further judged that human 
rights were violated systematically and called for the restitution of the democratic institutions [AFP 
26.11.1991]. By 1st December the 12-member team to evaluate the humanitarian situation caused 
by the embargo241
Yet it took further shuttle diplomacy of the OAS envoy and negotiations between the conflict parties 
until agreement was finally reached on Rene Theodore as new Prime Minister [NORTON 
22.12.1991]. Theodore, however, requested that the embargo be lifted before he would take on 
the post. Additionally, the worsening humanitarian situation of the poor masses and the fleeing 
Haitians that made their way to the US coast made the OAS to soften its tone. The SGOAS hinted 
consequently that the OAS was ready to drop its demand that Aristide be returned to power as a 
precondition to lifting the embargo. At the same time the OAS announced that it will send tons of 
medicines and food to Haiti
 had arrived in Haiti [GLASS 01.12.1991]. Four days later, the Special Envoy 
Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, visited the country. Ocampo was said to have brought with him a list of 
names proposed by Aristide for the post of prime minister for presentation to Haitian parliamen-
tarians, in a bit to resolve the crisis [TARR 06.12.1991]. Two days later he left without having 
reached agreement on any of the proposed names, but in the company of a senior aide of Aristide 
[Reuters 08.12.1991]. Overall the visit obviously was not entirely unsuccessful, since shortly after-
wards Haiti’s Senate President said that lawmakers would accept the return of Aristide in case he 
would accept to name a new prime ministers, indicating that Marc Bazin would be their favoured 
choice [AFP 10.12.1991]. 
242 [Reuters 15.01.1992]. When the OAS invited both, Aristide and 
Haiti’s lawmakers, for talks on the resolution of the conflict the latter did simply not appear 
[KRAMER 18.01.1992]. Also on another front the route chosen by the OAS was stymied. SGOAS 
Joao Baena Soares had to report at a special session of the PCOAS that the embargo did not ap-
pear to be working properly after several shipments of oil had disembarked at Haiti’s shores243 
[Reuters 22.01.1992]. The diplomatic effort soon showed another essential and huge crack, when 
the US announced that it plans to ease the trade embargo against Haiti; a move apparently influ-
enced by the 15.000 Haitian boat people intercepted by the US Coast Guard244
But in the following weeks the effort ran into considerable difficulties when the resistance in the 
armed forces and the economic elite prevented the ratification of the agreement by the National 
Assembly. Upon this the PCOAS approved by consensus a declaration that urged the member 
states to impose restrictions on air traffic and deny port facilities to any ship that did not observe 
the embargo. Furthermore, the economic embargo already in place was to be tightened and broad-
ened [GEDDA 01.04.1992]. The hardened stance of the region toward Haiti became obvious when 
the US seized a tanker that allegedly had delivered diesel fuel to Haiti. The tanker was registered in 
Belize, but supposedly was US owned. It had taken on the diesel fuel in New York and gave as its 
destination as the Dominican Republic, but in the end unloaded its cargo in Haiti. It was the first 
 since late October 
1991 [KAMEN & GOSHKO 05.02.1992]. 
Nevertheless, behind-the-scenes manoeuvres seemed to result in a change of mind on both sides. 
In late February, Aristide and Haiti’s political leader signed an agreement that also foresaw his re-
turn to power. In a tit-for-tat Aristide dropped his demand that the junta leader, General Raoul 
Cedras, be dismissed as armed forces commander. It was also agreed that Theodore was to form a 
provisional government and as soon as it would be installed, the embargo should be lifted [PUER-
TAS 24.02.1992]. 
                                                 
241 Laurent-Paul Tardif, director of the OAS office in Haiti and head of the humanitarian mission, made clear the 
task of the Mission, when he declared: "It is not to undermine the embargo … It is to give some relief to people 
who have been suffering." [qtd. in: GLASS 01.12.1991]. 
242 The shipment finally arrived at the end of January 1992 in Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital [AP 
28.01.1992]. 
243 For a short sketch about the economically negative effects but also about the widespread smuggling taking 
place during the time of the embargo in Haiti see CARRIBEAN UPDATE 01.04.1992. 
244 The US repatriated those refugees forcibly, arguing that they were to be considered economic migrants and 
not political refugees [THOMPSON 1999:76]. 
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time that the US had taken coercive action to enforce the OAS embargo against Haiti [GOSHKO 
03.04.1992] and was in contrast to its earlier announcement to ease the embargo. 
When the AHMFM held its next session on 17th May 1992 the resolutions already agreed on as well 
as the accord signed by the conflict parties but yet not ratified by the Haitian legislators were reaf-
firmed. The foreign ministers further reiterated the decision taken by the PCOAS somewhat earlier 
and resolved i.a.: 
 
• to expand and intensify the monitoring of the trade embargo through the Special Commit-
tee of the PCOAS by measures such as a periodical publication on violations of the embargo 
as they occur; 
• to instruct the Special Committee of the PCOAS to meet with representatives of the mem-
ber states involved in any way in actions contravening the embargo, with a view to promot-
ing unity of purpose and action in strengthening its implementation; 
• to urge the member states to deny access to port facilities to any vessel that does not 
abide by the embargo and to ensure that air transport is not used to carry goods in viola-
tion thereof; 
• to urge the member states to refrain from granting or to cancel, as appropriate, entry visas 
issued to the perpetrators and supporters of the coup d’état, and to freeze their assets; 
• to urge the member states to increase humanitarian aid to the poorest sectors of the Hai-
tian people; 
• to instruct the SGOAS to maintain coordination with the member states, the observer coun-
tries and the inter-American and international organizations for the design and develop-
ment of a comprehensive program for the economic recovery of Haiti, with a view to its 
implementation in consultation with Haiti’s constitutional authorities as soon as the coun-
try’s democratic institutions have been reinstated; 
• to reiterate its serious concern over the continual violations of human rights and to again 
request the IACHR to continue its ongoing close monitoring of the situation in Haiti [AJIL 
1992]. 
 
This lays bare that the OAS was having to tackle widespread non-compliance of its taken decisions 
by numerous of its member states. Thus, instead of being in a position to deal with the ongoing 
Haitian crisis, OAS (diplomatic) resources were partly diverted to ensure the observance of collec-
tively agreed decisions by member countries.  
DAMROSCH has pointed out the dilemma the imposition of the sanctions’ regime created: 
The Haitian case is one of several to pose the question of the feasibility of targeting sanc-
tions against actual wrongdoers, while attempting to alleviate adverse effects on the civil-
ian population. Differentiation along these lines is becoming increasingly accepted in prin-
ciple but remains elusive in practice. [DAMROSCH 1994] 
The resolution did nothing to bring about a more conciliatory attitude among the Haitian regime 
member. Thus, Marc Bazin was sworn in as new Prime Minister in Haiti in June 1992 in defiance to 
the agreement reached earlier with Aristide and the OAS [STPT 20.06.1992]. In order to break the 
deadlock the SGOAS sent a four-member delegation to Haiti to restart the dialogue. The team 
stayed four days and gave green light for a visit by the SGOAS himself [REUTERS 27.07.1992]. To 
strengthen the impact of this new initiative SGOAS Joao Baena Soares had asked for the support of 
the broader international community. The United Nations agreed to send Francesco Vendrell to 
form part of the diplomatic effort [AFP 14.08.1992]. Also the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM) as well as the European Community sent delegates. Together with representa-
tives of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the US, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, and Ja-
maica as well with the head of the IACHR, the SGOAS went to Haiti bent on achieving a final reso-
lution of the conflict [IPS 17.08.1992]. 
After four days of talks the mission returned without being able to report a break-through. How-
ever, several diplomats hinted that the embargo could be softened [FREED 22.08.1992]. This posi-
tion was confirmed by SGOAS Joao Baena Soares, who conceded: “We have seen a very leaky em-
bargo… The results are not those that were intended” [qtd. in: REUTERS 27.08.1992]. In a next 
step the SGOAS invited Aristide and Bazin to the OAS headquarters for direct talks [REUTERS 
27.08.1992]. The talks led to Bazin agreeing to let a 18-member mission visit Haiti to monitor the 
human rights violations [REUTERS 11.09.1992]. That mission was, however, confined to the capital 
and consequently proved rather ineffective [SCHNABLY 1994:426]. 
 
OAS seeks international support 
Nevertheless, the PCOAS insisted again on trying to break the overall stalemate with a call on the 
UN to support the embargo. The resolution authorized the SGOAS to “explore the possibility and 
advisability of submitting the Haitian situation to the attention of the U.N. Security Council ... to 
achieve a universal application of the embargo” [qtd. in: KRAMER 13.12.1992]; a remarkable and 
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unheard of step for the OAS, ever so careful to guard its autonomy. Reacting to this request, the 
UN sent Dante Caputo. Caputo was appointed by the UN and the OAS as Special Joint Envoy and 
started negotiations with the military junta. 
In January 1993 Caputo told the PCOAS that he had reached agreement with the Haitian side on 
the deployment of some 400 strong civilian observer mission, first mentioned in the OAS resolution 
taken in October 1991 (see above) [IPS 21.01.1993]. In mid-February the first contingent of the 
so-called International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH Mission CIVile Internationale en Haiti) 
arrived in Haiti [REUTER 15.02.1993]. The MICIVIH245 was a fully integrated project between OAS 
and UN246
Still, MICIVIH’s head was jointly appointed by the UN and the OAS. At that time the ratio of staff 
was 133 to 200 provided by the OAS and the UN respectively. The observers’ main assignment was 
to verify the respect for human rights
. However, 
DIAZ argues otherwise and judges that the OAS had lost its primacy: 
[T]he UN displaced the OAS in | handling the Haitian situation. The OAS has touted the 
fact that the embargo and the negotiations to achieve the return of Aristide were a joint 
OAS-UN operation. This was merely a face-saving technicality. [DIAZ 1994:189-190] 
SCHNABLY arrives at a similar conclusion and calls the OAS step to involve the UN ‘a decision that 
over time led to the near eclipse of the OAS on the public stage’ [SCHNABLY 1994:426]. 
247
• the start of a dialogue among the political parties, under the auspices of the UN and the 
OAS, to put the country on the path to normality; 
. 
For the purpose of reaching results on the political questions still open, Caputo started his shuttle 
diplomacy between Haiti and Washington [REUTERS 01.04.1993]. But Caputo failed in winning the 
approval to send an international police force to Haiti to be stationed there during the transition to 
democratic rule; this although the observer mission reported the continued violation of basic hu-
man rights in the country [REUTERS 08.06.1993]. This made the OAS during its General Assembly 
session in early June 1993 to once again strengthen the controversial embargo to include commer-
cial air traffic [AFP 07.06.1993]. Alongside, the UN imposed a worldwide embargo on oil and arms 
shipments to Haiti [SCHNABLY 1994:421]. 
Surprisingly the Haitian parliament voted by a slim margin (37 out of 62) in mid-June for a decree 
restoring Aristide as president of Haiti but demanded that he publishes ‘an official act in which he 
declares that he rejects and condemns all forms of physical and moral violence whatever its source’ 
[cit in: BBC MS 16.06.1993]. The long hoped for break-through came three weeks later, when on 
3rd July 1993 Aristide and Cedras signed – under the auspices of Caputo - an agreement (Gover-
nors Island Agreement) that foresaw the return of Aristide to the post of Haiti’ president. The 
agreement included the following: 
 
• the appointment of a prime minister by the president; 
• the confirmation of the prime minister by the Haitian National Assembly; 
• the suspension of the sanctions the UN imposed on Haiti on June 23 and of the other 
measures taken by the OAS; 
• the start of international cooperation, consisting of technical aid and assistance, to make 
administrative and judicial reforms and modernise the armed forces; 
• the granting of an amnesty by the president; 
• the approval of a law creating a new police force and, along those lines, the appointment of 
a new chief of police by the president; 
• the resignation of Cedras and appointment by the president of a new C-in-C of the armed 
forces who will name his own staff; 
• the return to Haiti of President Jean Bertrand Aristide by 30th October 1993; and 
• verification of full compliance of these agreements by the UN and the OAS [BBC MS 
05.07.1993]. 
 
However, the record of the hemispheric body in bringing about the agreement is questioned by 
LEVITT, claiming: 
                                                 
245 MICIVIH was active between February 1993 and March 2000. The OAS in June 1999 withdrew all but one of 
its staff to the mission [PAPWORTH 2001:142]. See also 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihfacts.html retrieved on 17.10.2005. 
246 For details on the MICIVIH see its homepage http://www.un.org/rights/micivih/first.htm. 
247 Information from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one retrieved on 
23.04.2008. 
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The sanctions and diplomatic pressure of the OAS did little to bring about the end of the 
coup regime. Ultimately it was the threat of a U.S. invasion under the banner of the UN 
that unseated Cédras. [LEVITT 2006:103] 
Aristide named Robert Malval to be prime minister; and after the government was confirmed on 
25th August 1993 the UN and the OAS suspended their sanctions [SCHNABLY 1994:435]. In Sep-
tember the SCUN established the United Nations Mission In Haiti (UNMIH) to support the imple-
mentation of the Governors Island Agreement.  But during October the security situation in the 
country deteriorated due to the military’s ‘campaign and intimidation’ [SCHNABLY 1994:435-436] 
and the OAS and UN had to evacuate their human rights monitors [AFP 15.10.1993]. UNMIH’s de-
ployment was also postponed. Finally, both international organizations were compelled to reinstate 
their embargo against Haiti [BBC MS 22.10.1993]. Expectedly, Aristide could not return on 30th 
October. Malval announced his resignation as prime minister on 15th December 1993 [SCHNABLY 
1994:447]. 
In December 1993 delegates from the so-called ‘Four-Friends’ (Canada, France, the US, and Vene-
zuela) visited Haiti to threaten that they would ask the UNSC to “consider additional measures, 
including making the embargo already applied by the OAS (Organization of American States) uni-
versal and mandatory” [qtd. in: AFP 23.12.1993], in case of further non-compliance by the military 
with the provisions agreed to in the framework of the Governors Island Agreement. Although the 
attempt to put further pressure on the junta did not bear fruit, at least the human rights monitors 
were able to return as of late January 1994 [DOWNIE 14.04.1994]. 
Political developments and the rising violence perpetrated against the population made the UN 
toughen the existing embargo with Resolution 917 of 6th May 1994. SCHNABLY described this step 
as ‘essentially converting the OAS embargo into a worldwide one’ [SCHNABLY 1994:451]. How-
ever, the junta did not give in but rather defiantly declared the post of president vacant and named 
Emile Jonaissant interim president. The overall internal situation in Haiti further worsened in that 
period so that the IACHR arrived at the judgment that the human rights violations revealed ‘a po-
litical plan of intimidation and terror’, including politically motivated cases of rape [qtd. in: NORTON 
20.05.1994]. 
When the OAS member states met at the annual General Assembly in June 1994 the embargo was 
once more tightened, now including i.a. international financial transactions. Meanwhile the US – 
faced with new record numbers of Haitian refugees on its soil – made clear that it was ready to 
invade Haiti, even without  corresponding UN approval [MCMANUS 09.06.1994]. The nervousness 
of the junta increased accordingly and the regime consequently ordered the UN/OAS Mission to 
leave the country on 11th July 1994 [AFP 11.07.1994]. The Mission was withdrawn yet the SCUN 
decisively condemned the expulsion and declared that the Haitian government’s provocative behav-
iour threatened regional peace and security [LITTLEJOHNS & KAHN 13.07.1994]. 
 
OAS diplomacy replaced by international enforcement action 
Two weeks after the OAS/UN Mission had to leave the country the SCUN decided under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, that it: 
...authorises Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and 
control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from 
Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the 
prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate 
authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable 
environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the 
understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the 
participating Member States. [qtd. in: REUTERS 31.07.1994] 
Besides creating this Multinational Force (MNF), the same resolution increased the UNMIH staff to 
6.000 and extended its mandate to make it able to assist the democratic Haitian government in 
fulfilling its responsibilities via: 
 
• sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase 
and protecting international personnel and key installations; and  
• professionalizing of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force 
[REUTERS 31.07.1994]. 
 
The Multinational Force – led by the US - landed on 19th September 1994 in Haiti where it met no 
opposition. The military junta had come under such pressure that it had agreed one day earlier to 
step down within four weeks, on 15th October 1994 [SMITH 19.09.1994]. Under the so-called ‘Port-
au-Prince Treaty’ the junta leaders would take early retirement and receive full military honours, 
backed by a general amnesty to be voted on by the Haitian parliament, while the multinational 
force would support the transition to a democratic government [IPS 19.09.1994]. The leading ne-
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gotiator was no OAS envoy248
The presidential election brought victory for Aristide’s preferred candidate, Rene Preval, albeit 
without the backing of one of the major parties and by a meagre voter turnout [OXRESEARCH 
19.01.1999]. Amid worsening civil disorder Preval was sworn in February 1996. The UN was sched-
uling its exit for the end of the month although Preval preferred a prolongation of the peacekeep-
ers’ stay [OXRESEARCH 07.02.1996]. In mid-February Haiti’s president submitted a formal request 
for UNMIH to continue its presence in the country. Finally, UNMIH’s mandate was extended for a 
further six months
 but former US president Jimmy Carter. The first contingent of US 
soldiers arrived on 20th September 1994 and was welcomed by a group of Haitians [REUTERS 
20.09.1994]. 
Three days before Aristide was to retake the presidency, the OAS lifted two of its sanctions: the 
suspension of commercial flights and its freeze on international financial transactions [IPS 
12.10.1994]. Aristide was finally reinstated on 15th October 1994 [BBC MS 17.10.1994], after hav-
ing spent 3 years in exile. 
The US-led Multinational Force, having numbered 20.000 at its heights, was reduced to 7.000 
troops in February 1995. The next month saw the replacement of the MNF by 6.000 UN peace-
keepers [OXRESEARCH 26.09.1995]. 
Meanwhile preparations for elections (2/3s of the Senate and numerous local and district councils) 
scheduled to be held on 25th June were going on. A landslide victory for Aristide’s Lavalas Party 
sparked accusations by the opposition of election rigging and threats of boycotting the second 
round of election. Although approximately 500 OAS observers, dwarfed by 2.400 US monitors, 
conceded that the election was ‘flawed’, they found no ‘organized fraud’ and maintained that they 
are nevertheless to be regarded a ‘contribution to democracy’ [OXRESEARCH 17.07.1995]. 
While the human rights and security situation witnessed remarkable improvements, the second 
round of legislative elections eventually took place on 17th September 1995 and was boycotted by 
most of the major opposition parties as announced earlier. The ballot was reported to have been 
conducted orderly, and the results further strengthened Lavalas’ lead position [OXRESEARCH 
26.09.1995]. 
When the presidential election, scheduled for 17th December, approached, the security situation 
had already started to deteriorate. The newly established police force had considerable problems to 
tackle crime and activities of paramilitary forces. On top of increasing violence, economic condi-
tions once again worsened, leading to various wave’s of ‘boat people’ heading to US shores [OXRE-
SEARCH 07.12.1995]. 
 
Election of new President prompts premature retreat of international actors 
249
Not only the UN’s willingness for a continued presence, but also OAS’s steam in the meantime had 
clearly lost its impetus; as a consequence the resources made available to oversee the democrati-
zation process turned out to be meagre. To oversee the next election round, an OAS Electoral Ob-
server Mission, numbering a mere 38 heads, was sent to the country. Although it found the elec-
tions to have been calm, it also reported various deficiencies, like the lack of security and checking 
procedures [IPS 12.07.1997]. As it turned out a political crisis ensued resulting in the cancellation 
. 
In mid-1996 the US called on the OAS to pass a resolution that would extend financial and military 
aid; it was argued that even if that resolution might not be of a binding nature, it would help con-
vince the UN to further extend its mission there [EMR 03.06.1996]. Also Colin Granderson, Execu-
tive Director of OAS-UNMIH called for a continued presence of peacekeepers in face of several kill-
ings of police officers [EMR 05.06.1996]. Even so, it was decided that UNMIH be ultimately re-
placed by the scaled down UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) [KUMAR 1999:387]. However, 
the OAS and other actors were soon afterwards once more closely involved in resolving the persis-
tent crisis in Haiti. 
Mainly due to aggravated economic hardships unrest in the form of strikes and protest surged; 
additionally the activities of vigilante groups could not meaningfully contained by the police force, 
being increasingly seen as incompetent. The embattled president thus had to appeal once more to 
the already strongly reduced UN peacekeepers to extend their stay once more [OXRESEARCH 
24.01.1997]. In face of the fragile security situation in the country, the UN approved a 2-month 
extension for its peacekeepers. In April nine senatorial seats were for grabs, and were mainly won 
by the new party established by former president Aristide, while other major parties once more 
took to boycotting the ballot. The second round had to be postponed upon pressure of the US and 
the UN. The latter had claimed that the first election round had seen a falsified counting by the 
electoral council [OXRESEARCH 02.06.1997]. 
                                                 
248 Dante Caputo withdrew from his post when the agreement was reached. Rumours made the rounds that he 
had been against the deployment of US soldiers in Haiti [REUTERS 20.09.1994]. 
249 For additional details on UNMIH see its official homepage at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm retrieved on 11.08.2009. 
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of the election results, exacerbating the month-long struggle to find a prime minister. Since the 
1987 constitution foresaw that the prime minister wields more executive powers than the presi-
dent, the political deadlock particularly hampered Preval’s possibility to govern [OXRESEARCH 
04.12.1997]. 
Additionally, in November 1997 the withdrawal of the OAS-UN Mission was imminent after China – 
in support of the re-emerging political strongman Aristide and in opposition of the current govern-
ment’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan – resisted the mission’s further extension. Only a 279-strong UN 
Police Mission was to stay in the country [NOTICEN 02.09.1999], additional to 450 US troops and 
in face of the plain ineptitude of the Haitian police force [OXRESEARCH 04.12.1997]. 
 
Preval’s constitutional coup d’état 
The constitutional deadlock over picking a candidate for prime minister acceptable to the legislature 
continued and the political polarisation between the majority Organisation for People in Struggle – 
formerly Lavalas Political Organisation – and Aristide’s political outfit, Fanmi Lavalas, deepened and 
made the outlook for resolving the impasse increasingly improbable. Since foreign funding was 
made contingent on the appointment of a prime minister, governing the country became ever more 
elusive for Preval [OXRESEARCH 24.04.1998]. Legislative and local elections due for November 
1998 could not be held whereupon the Senate voted to extend the term of 17 of its members to 
October 1999. Preval, having by then seen 3 of his prime minister candidates rejected by parlia-
ment, set a deadline to accept his latest choice by 11th January 1999. Since the date passed with-
out a corresponding legislative act, Preval declared that the legislative mandate had expired. The 
president hereby effectively suspended the National Assembly and took to rule by decree [OXRE-
SEARCH 19.01.1999]. Most notably this step precipitated no response on defending democracy 
from the OAS – in contrast to its earlier endeavours to reinstate ousted president Aristide. 
By March 1999 Preval had appointed a government and a new Provisional Electoral Council; upon 
announcing the holding of presidential and legislative elections for late the same year, the interna-
tional community promised financial and logistical aid for the ballot [OXRESEARCH 04.05.1999]. 
Raising political tensions, resulting inter alia in various political murder attempts or assassination 
were the backdrop the Electoral Council’s postponement of the elections, citing difficulties with the 
attendant preparations [OXRESEARCH 29.10.1999]. 
Preval opted for another delay due to considerable difficulties in preparing for the elections – this 
although international aid, usually covering 60% of the government’s expenditure, were still put on 
hold. Meanwhile the UN police mission was replaced by International Civilian Support Mission in 
Haiti (MICAH). MICAH’s role was no longer one of policing the country but to support institution-
building [OXRESEARCH 14.03.2000]. 
 
Elections fail to clear the air 
On May 21 local and legislative elections took place, monitored by nine different organisations, 
among them the OAS Electoral Observation Mission headed by Orlando Marville. 
The more credible OAS Electoral Observer Mission this time amounted to 2000 but this notwith-
standing the European Union and CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market250
However, international judgment of the counting was far less enthusiastic. After the Provisional 
Electoral Council (PEC) had declared the Lavalas senatorial candidates outright winners, interna-
tional observers and the political opposition demanded that those candidates ought to contest a 
second round of voting. Additionally, other serious concerns emerged about the calculation process 
which seemed designed to favour Aristide’s Lavalas party, as the OAS Mission reported
) pro-
vided additional monitors. The ballot brought Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party on top; despite numer-
ous deficiencies, the monitors largely expressed satisfaction with the conduct of the election 
[OXRESEARCH 01.06.2000; AFP 25.05.2000; OXRESEARCH 19.09.2000]. 
251
Macajou Medard of Haiti's Electoral Council rejected that criticism and said the OAS Mission had no 
right to 'order' any changes, while Elizabeth Spehar, Executive Coordinator of the OAS Unit for the 
Promotion of Democracy, underlined that “[t]he mission has never tried to usurp the place of the 
. But cor-
responding accusations were rejected by the electoral commission whereupon the OAS decided to 
boycott the second voting round on 9th July 2000 and donors refused to release funding [NORTON 
02.06.2000; OXRESEARCH 19.09.2000]. 
                                                 
250 At that time CARICOM had the following members Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Domin-
ica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grena-
dines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Haiti itself had provisional membership status that was transformed 
to full membership in July 2002 [WIKIPEDIA entry, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CARICOM#Membership re-
trieved on 02.08.2007]. 
251 Instead of taking into account the votes for all running candidates, only those accrued by the four most 
strongest were considered and taken as counting 100% [ECONOMIST 24.06.2000]. 
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local authorities. ... I think there are certain things being misinterpreted or misread” [qtd. in: NOR-
TON 05.06.2007]. 
The developments, however, resulted in Cesar Gaviria, the then SGOAS, to term the elections 
fraudulent [AFP 21.06.2000]. Reports that the US – and to some extend also Canada – were taking 
steps that aimed at the suspension of Haiti from the OAS on the grounds of the flawed election 
process, met the opposition of various other members. Especially outspoken among them were 
those nations combined in CARICOM. CARICOM itself for some time has supported the democrati-
zation process and announced to send another fact-finding mission to the country to disperse the 
controversy [BBC MS 21.06.2000], while calling on the government to re-examine its counting 
method [BOADLE 08.07.2000]. 
Two members of Haiti's Electoral Council resigned and its President fled to the US, saying that if 
correctly counted the Lavalas party would have won only 7 senate seats, instead of the 15 it 
claimed. In the lower House Lavalas won 26 seats of 83 outright [ECONOMIST 24.06.2000]. 
Since the authorities showed no sign of redressing the found deficiencies, the OAS Mission justified 
its refusal to observe the second round by stating that the first round count "violates both the con-
stitution of Haiti and its electoral law” [qtd. in: AFP 07.07.2000]. As a result the Mission pulled out 
of the country [BOADLE 08.07.2000]. 
After terming the second round of voting to have been 'fundamentally flawed' the PCOAS decided 
upon the invitation by the Haitian government to send a mission, headed by SGOAS Gaviria [AP 
05.08.2000]. OAS Permanent Council Resolution CP/RES. 772 (1247/00) of 4th August assigned 
that Mission to: 
...identify, together with the government of Haiti and other sectors of the political com-
munity and civil society, options and recommendations for resolving, as expeditiously as 
possible, difficulties such as those that have arisen from differing interpretations of the 
Electoral Law, and for further strengthening democracy in that country. [qtd. in: BBC MS 
28.11.2000] 
Meanwhile, the final election results had been published, apportioning 18 of 19 Senate seats, 72 of 
83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as 106 of the country's 133 communes the Lavalas 
party [DANIEL 17.08.2000; OXRESEARCH 19.09.2000]. The killing of 15 people in the run-up to 
the elections as well as the arrest of around 40 opposition politicians, among other facts, contrib-
uted to the assessment of the OAS Human Rights Commission, that the climate of intimidation in 
the country had intensified [NORTON 26.08.2000]. 
But neither the mission led by Gaviria, nor one headed by OAS Deputy Secretary General Luigi 
Einaudi that travelled to the country in September, were able to resolve the dispute252
                                                 
252 Enaudi commented on his visit the following: '"I admit I did not facilitate the face-to-face dialogue I hoped 
between the ruling party and the opposition, but my mission facilitated some exchange between the political 
actors. ...We can't talk about blockage because in this complex situation we have made some steps” [qtd. in: 
REUTERS 29.09.2000]. 
 [REUTERS 
29.09.2000]. The OAS grew apprehensive that the outstanding presidential elections, scheduled for 
26th November 2000, might further endanger Haiti’s democratic system [OXRESEARCH 
19.09.2000]. In October another mission was sent to the country while the probability of a victory 
by the Lavalas candidate for the presidency had mounted [EFE 09.10.2000]. However, also this 
delegation had to depart without having been successful [EFE 21.10.2000]. 
Since criticism of the May elections were not redressed, the international community with the ex-
ception of CARICOM, refused to send observers. Deputy Secretary-General Enaudi gave warning 
ahead of the elections that if its results are not such to merit endorsement by the OAS, any further 
attempts at restoring Haiti’s democracy might be abandoned The OAS referred to articles 2 (a and 
b) of the OAS Charter, finding that the elections have been conducted without redressing the 'criti-
cal deficiencies' as found in the previous election rounds. Aristide appeared as clear winner of the 
ballot, given the boycott of the other main parties. [OXRESEARCH  29.11.2000; BBC MS 
28.11.2000] 
In March of the following year the Haitian government reached out to the international community 
and asked that the OAS set up a semi-permanent mission. Haiti's Foreign Minister, Joseph Philippe 
Antonio, announced that various partial re-elections would be held to end the crisis [AFP 
14.03.2001]. This move was partly motivated by the fact that since the election more than $ 500 
million had been held back by international donors, a particularly severe step for the poorest coun-
try among the Americas [JAMES 29.05.2001]. The PCOAS thereupon passed a resolution which 
tasked the SGOAS to undertake consultation with Haiti’s government and other sectors of the 
country on a possible mission [BBC MS 15.03.2001]. 
However, an ensuing wave of violence in Haiti in March 2001 was prompted by the SGOAS to ap-
peal for restraint and the search for a peaceful end of the crisis [BBC MS 23.03.2001]. 
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In May 2001 it was announced that the OAS will join forces with CARICOM in setting up a mission 
to Haiti. It was to be headed by SGOAS Cesar Gaviria and the Dominican Prime Minister Dame 
Eugenia Charles. A joint exploratory mission was to make the necessary preparations; it was ac-
companied by advisers from the Carter Centre [BBC MS 10.05.2001]. But although meeting with 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and other politicians, no concrete results could be reported after 
four days of talks [NORTON 13.05.2001]. 
The OAS Mission itself was also no more successful, although the SGOAS announced that he in-
tended to continue with his mediation efforts [NORTON 31.05.2001]. However, President Aristide 
addressed a letter to the OAS General Assembly, indicating his readiness to hold new legislative 
elections in return for a resumption of foreign aid [AGUILAR 04.06.2001]. This pledge subsequently 
was endorsed by the OAS and the political opposition was called on to cooperate; however, opposi-
tion politicians responded by arguing Aristide achieved what he wanted: the unblocking of the 
funds in exchange for a lengthy process to hold new elections, the last stage not to take place be-
fore to November 2004 [FAUL 06.06.2001]. 
A surprise visit of the OAS leadership was arranged in late June. SGOAS Gaviria arrived together 
with OAS Undersecretary Luigi Einaudi and the new OAS representative in Haiti, Sergio Romero; 
Gaviria had announced his intention to support the creation of the Provisional Electoral Council and 
mediate in negotiations between the government and the opposition [EFE 25.06.2001]. 
After days of intense discussion and under the aegis of the OAS an agreement on the composition 
and mandate of the new electoral council was reached [BBC MS 04.07.2001]. Although political 
violence erupted, resulting in the killing of ten police officers and the rumour of a planned coup, 
after mediation by the OAS Aristide and the political opposition still showed their willingness to 
further cooperate despite an erstwhile postponing of further talks [NORTON 30.07.2001]. 
Fulfilling a mandate given by the GAOAS in June, Gaviria announced in early October the estab-
lishment of a the Friends of Haiti, which grouped the following countries: Argentina, the Bahamas, 
Belize, Canada, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, the United States, and Vene-
zuela; France, Germany, Norway, and Spain participated as permanent observers. The formation 
was welcomed by Haiti's political opposition Upon pressure applied by the OAS, the opposition 
agreed to resume the talks [NORTON 13.10.2001]. However, success remained elusive and no 
immediate agreement could be reached [XINHUA 16.10.2001]. 
 
Political violence climax on 17th December 2001 
By December the political atmosphere had again turned violent. Suspicions of a planned coup after 
the National Palace had been attacked were used by the government as a justification to act ruth-
lessly against the opposition. Party offices were attacked and several opposition supporters were 
killed; also media representatives were threatened [CHANEL 21.12.2001]; the brutalities report-
edly climaxed on 17th December when armed men attacked the presidential palace. Whereas the 
government claimed that members of the disbanded army were responsible, others suggested that 
the government itself were behind the attack, which was eventually fought back successfully. Still, 
the events prompted thousands of people – with the governmental encouragement – to rage 
against pro-opposition media staff and outfits as well as opposition politicians. At the end of the 
day around a dozen people had fallen victim to the unrest. Additionally widespread corruption, eco-
nomic decline (foreign funds still remained frozen), and popular discontent had added to the fragil-
ity of the situation [OXRESEARCH 24.12.2001]. 
Due to those political events as well as to the breakdown of the national dialogue process the 
PCOAS met on 16th January 2002 and passed Resolution 806. Herein the SGOAS was instructed to 
– in consultation with CARICOM and the Friends of Haiti to contribute in resolving the current crisis 
by: 
a. monitoring events in Haiti, including respect for the essential elements of representa-
tive democracy, and compliance with any accords that may result from OAS-sponsored 
negotiations;  
and 
b. helping the Government of Haiti in the strengthening of its democratic processes and 
institutions. [OAS PC Res. 806] 
The Resolution also made reference to the COAS and the IADC. Emphasis was placed on the events 
of 17th December the previous year, and on their investigation. The willingness of the Haitian gov-
ernment to cooperate was acknowledged and the SGOAS was requested to support the normaliza-
tion of relations to the international community, especially the international financial institutions. 
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Note was also taken of the planned CARICOM high-level mission253
In consultation and on advice of the CARICOM mission, it was decided to set up an independent 
three person
 to evaluate the situation on the 
ground [OAS PC Res. 806]. 
In late February OAS Assistant Secretary-General Luigi Einaudi made a preparatory visit [NORTON 
27.02.2002], securing an agreement with the Haitian government, that prompted him saying: 
“[f]or the first time, this gives us a chance to begin to create the conditions for the resumption of 
talks and an end of the crisis” [qtd. in: NORTON 01.03.2002]. 
254
• report on the actions taken with respect to the persons found to be implicated in the 17th 
December violence; 
 strong panel to investigate the events of December 2001, which would arrive in 
Haiti together with the planned OAS mission [WILKINSON 25.03.2002]. That Commission of In-
quiry was to formulate recommendations helping to find a political solution to the ongoing crisis. 
The OAS Mission, termed: 'Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy' was to be headed by the 
Canadian diplomat David Lee and to establish ties with Haitian institutions in order to address is-
sues related to security, justice, human rights, and good governance [SDPRD 04.04.2002]. The 
Mission, which was conceived to stay on a permanent basis, was to consist of 15 technical experts; 
however, the Lavalas People's Organizations charged that the mission would take on a military 
character and would be controlled by US President Bush [BBC MS 19.04.2002]. 
Later it was announced that the Inquiry Commission that had eventually taken up its work on 8th 
April 2002 would be in operation for three months, while the permanent mission was to stay for 
one year. In May OAS' Assistant Secretary-General Enaudi and St. Lucia's Foreign Minister Julian 
Hunte - who chaired CARICOM's Council on Foreign and Community Relations, arrived in Haiti to 
jump-start discussions between the government and the political opposition [NORTON 
12.05.2002]. In June the diplomatic mission reported that progress on a national dialogue has 
been achieved [BBC MS 21.06.2002]. 
In early July the results of the Inquiry Commission were published. The report detailed that no 
coup had been plotted but the attack prompted the distribution of weapons by government and 
ruling party officials. While calling for bringing the culprits to justice and urging the payment of 
reparations, the commission also suggested that international donations should be unblocked 
[CHANEL 05.07.2002]. 
After his 24th visit to Haiti Assistant Secretary-General Enaudi had once again to report about a 
failure, indicating that the demands of the opposition led to the breakdown of negotiations [NOR-
TON 10.07.2002]. But in a move forward President Aristide announced Haiti's approval of the Initial 
Draft Accord as proposed by the OAS. This document outlined that parliamentary elections would 
be brought forward to the second quarter of 2003; the Accord moreover contained the pledge to 
act against impunity especially in connection with the 17th December 2001 events [PRNW 
19.07.2002]. 
 
OAS launches another democracy protection initiative 
But while the political situation remained in flux amidst demonstrations demanding the freeing of 
imprisoned community leader Amiot Metayer, 150 inmates, among them those charged for the 17th 
December 2001 violence, were freed by a heavily armed group of men. Overwhelmed, the police 
had to retreat while protestors burned the courthouse and town hall [OXRESEARCH 13.08.2002]. 
The SGOAS urged the authorities to restore public order [BBC MS 07.08.2002]. Due to the coop-
erative attitude shown by the Haitian government and the increasing intransigence of the opposi-
tion the Permanent Council approved Resolution 822, wherein it called on the government i.a. to: 
 
• strengthen its disarmament policies; 
• implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry regarding human rights and 
the press; 
• restore a climate of security; 
• prosecute the perpetrators of 17th December; 
• thoroughly investigate all politically motivated crimes; 
• promptly arrange the payment of reparations for damages suffered of the violence of 17th 
December; and 
• establish an autonomous, independent, credible, and neutral Provisional Electoral Council 
(CEP). 
 
                                                 
253 The mission was to be headed by Kenny Anthony, Prime Minister of St. Lucia, and was scheduled to visit the 
country at the end of January. The mission was to report back to the PCOAS [PRNW 16.01.2002]. 
254 It consisted of the following jurists: Nicholas Liverpool of Dominica, Roberto Flores Bermudez of Honduras, 
and Alonso Gomez Robledo of Mexico [SDPRD 04.04.2003]. 
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The OAS Special Mission on Strengthening Democracy in Haiti was to support the strengthening of 
democratic institutions, the formation of the Provisional Electoral Council, the establishment by the 
CEP of an Electoral Guarantees Commission, the development and implementation of a disarma-
ment program, the promotion of a national dialogue, and the development of an independent police 
institution. It was furthermore to support, monitor, and report on the technical electoral assistance 
provided by the international community and to observe the electoral process [OAS PC Res. 822]. 
When a government-sponsored cooperative banking scheme collapsed, leaving estimated at $ 
200m deposits unpaid, demonstrations were staged and President Aristide's public support started 
to seriously erode [PRSCR 24.09.2002]. The meagre results in implementing OAS Resolution 822 – 
the deadline for the formation of the CEP was not met and by early November only 100 weapons 
had been collected – gave further cause to doubt Aristide's political will. US Ambassador at the 
OAS, Roger Noriega noted: “I have very serious doubts that Mr. Aristide would do anything the 
international community has asked him to do” [qtd. in: NORTON 04.11.2002]. When the CD re-
fused to continue its cooperation, the Political Risk Services predicted: 
Fulfillment of the demands put forward by the OAS to win the release of some $500 mil-
lion in international financial assistance will require the cooperation of the CD, which has 
displayed no willingness to compromise. In the absence of the foreign funds, economic 
woes will mount and social unrest will continue to spread, increasing the danger that Aris-
tide will drop all pretense of democratic governance and attempt to rule by decree. 
[PRSCR 19.12.2002] 
The political atmosphere did not improve and thus another OAS Mission255
Although local politicians as well as the US insisted that conditions were not fit to allow free and 
fair elections given lacking progress on appointing an independent electoral council and continuing 
outbreaks of violence, Haiti's government announced to go ahead with the planned elections never-
, again headed by Enaudi 
(OAS) and Hunte (CARICOM) travelled to Haiti in February 2003 [BBC MS 15.02.2003]. Meanwhile, 
the demands for Aristide's stepping down rang out more loudly [BBC MS 01.03.2003]. The Mission 
demanded that Haiti's government has to establish a peaceful environment and that finally an elec-
toral council has to be formed in the following ten days, to be completed by 30th March [NORTON 
21.03.2003]. However, this announcement was followed by sceptical comments on OAS's inability 
to meaningfully sanction in case of non-compliance [LAN 01.04.2003]. 
However, things worsened when the united opposition refused to participate in the formation of the 
electoral council and the economic hardship motivated previously politically inactive groups to 
propagate Aristide's resignation [PRSCR 21.03.2003]. In a move meant to alleviate the heated 
political situation Aristide appointed a new Chief of Police to replace Jean-Nesny Lucien, long 
claimed to have been carrying out human rights abuses [MACKENZIE 26.03.2003]. However, his 
successor was said to be a close associate of Aristide. Thus the wave of criticism continued un-
abated and another successor, Jean-Robert Faveur – considered to be professional and relatively 
independent - was nominated. But again this candidate resigned after having received death 
threats [EIU 09.07.2003]. 
Amid the prospect that the Organisation’s fervour was gradually wearing thinner, the OAS took a 
new initiative when it named a retired US ambassador, Terence Todman, as Special Envoy to Haiti. 
He was tasked with promoting dialogue to break the political deadlock [AP 19.08.2003; OXRE-
SEARCH 03.09.2003]. The Latin American Newsletters gloomily opined on that occasion: 
The OAS does not have a great track record in Haiti. It has sent myriad missions there 
since the disputed legislative elections of 2000, with little to show for its efforts. It is now 
over four months since it sent a team of high-level diplomats to the country to deliver an 
ultimatum to Aristide [LAN 26.08.2003]. 
In early September the step was supplemented by an OAS resolution outlining the measures to be 
taken by the government to make for a political climate conducive for conducting fair elections, by 
inter alia nominating an electoral council with civil society and political representatives; the resolu-
tion also contained an indication that even more than the held up $ 500m of aid funds should even-
tually be released. This outlook spurred the government’s willingness to lend a hand to a political 
solution amid continued recalcitrance of the opposition movement Convergence Democratique 
[OXRESEARCH 21.11.2002]. 
                                                 
255 The team also included Bahamas' minister of foreign affairs, Frederick Mitchell; Canada's secretary of state 
for Latin America, Africa and Francophonie, Denis Paradis; the United States' presidential envoy for Western 
Hemisphere initiatives, Ambassador Otto J. Reich; and the Chairman of the OAS Permanent Council, Ambassa-
dor Arturo Duarte of Guatemala; representatives from Mexico, France, the EU, and from International Financial 
Institutions were also to take part as observers [BBC MS 15.02.2003]. 
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theless [TEMPLE 23.08.2003; TEMPLE 28.08.2003]. When violence broke out during a protest by 
Haiti's opposition, Canada’s OAS ambassador and current head of the Haiti OAS Mission, David Lee, 
said that the Lavalas party had made a concerted effort to thwart the exercise of the freedom of 
expression, which runs counter to democracy. Early accounts said that at the demonstration 30 
people were injured [AFP 16.09.2003a; TEMPLE 17.09.2003]. These figures later were revised to 
38 wounded and 13 people killed. With further protests, tensions escalated in Haiti, prompting the 
OAS once more to voice its concerns [NORTON 31.10.2003]. 
The prevention and disruption of anti-government demonstrations continued also over the following 
weeks [BBC MS 27.11.2003], resulting in the occupation of OAS offices by members of the opposi-
tion outfit Group-184; the group demanded that the OAS, deemed to be an accomplice of the gov-
ernment, shall help to bring about the release of two of their activists, arrested during a 14th No-
vember demonstration [BBC MS 27.11.2003b]. On 1st December both were released. After the sit-
in the OAS decided to create a working group to examine the future of the OAS's Haiti Mission 
[TEMPLE 04.12.2003]. The PCOAS eventually decided in mid-December that the OAS Mission will 
remain in the country and called on the Haitian government to show concrete demonstration of the 
necessary political will [BBC MS 18.12.2003]. 
Such was, however, not forthcoming; instead, during a demonstration in January 2004 some police 
officers collaborated with groups that attacked the demonstrators. The continued instability re-
sulted in publicly voiced concerns by the US, the OAS, and the UN Special Rapporteur about the 
situation in the country GREEN 22.01.2004]. In the meantime CARICOM’s efforts to resolve the 
crisis received official backing by the OAS [BBC MS 04.02.2004]. In mid-February the government 
announced its readiness to welcome an international police force in accordance with the terms of 
reference signed with the OAS within the framework of resolution 822. The force was deemed to 
assist the National Police to establish conditions conducive for the holding of free and fair elections 
[BBC MS 13.02.2004]. 
In mid-February a meeting brought together the US, Canada, the Bahamas (as close neighbour of 
Haiti), Jamaica as leader of CARICOM, Julian Hunte from Saint Lucia as President of the UN General 
Assembly as well as SGOAS Cesar Gaviria. Agreement was reached to continue to support the ef-
forts at resolving the situation in the country following the plan as designed by CARICOM; stress 
was laid on the fact that only a constitutional change of government would be acceptable [USDS 
13.02.2004]. Shortly thereafter the OAS passed a corresponding resolution (861), calling on Aris-
tide to adhere to the CARICOM plan [AFP 20.02.2004]. This plan, inter alia, foresaw that a neutral 
Prime Minister 'who enjoys the public trust' should appoint a new government [SDPRD 
20.02.2004]. Resolution 861 was followed only days later by Resolution 862 which called on the 
UNSC to “take the necessary and urgent measures ... to address the crisis in Haiti” [qtd. in: SDPRD 
26.02.2004]. 
 
Final Exit Aristide 
After years of unending political tensions and violence, climaxing in a armed uprising since early 
February 2004, President Aristide stepped down after rebels had approached the capital and fled to 
the Central African Republic on 29th February 2004, Venezuela supported his charges that foreign 
forces were behind the 'coup'256
In the meantime Aristide accused US forces of having ousted him which prompted CARICOM to as 
the OAS to start an investigation into the matter
 [BBC MS 09.05.2004; AP 03.03.2004]. A claim fuelled by the fact 
that when Aristide boarded the airplane for his departure he was escorted by US soldiers [BERRY 
2005:252; OXRESEARCH 02.03.2004]. 
The OAS announced the establishment of a tri-partite council that was to choose the members of 
the Council of Sages, which again would choose a Prime Minister [DJIN 04.03.2004]. Gerard Lator-
tue was chosen as interim Prime Minister; he vowed to hold free and fair elections and asked the 
OAS and the broader international community to support his efforts [BBC MS 07.05.2004]. How-
ever, that Aristide's resignation actually constituted an unconstitutional removal from office of an 
elected leader, deliberately was not made much subject of discussions [SHAMSIE 2004:1112]. This 
seems to reflect the international community’s weariness with the long-drawn-out political impasse 
and implicit hopes of movements after the exit of the most important national political actor.  
257
                                                 
256 While final judgment is hard to come by on the question if it was a 'resignation' or rather a 'coup', SHAMSIE 
for one noted: “Although armed gangs were able to control a number of Haitian cities before the president's 
departure ... the term 'coup' seems less fitting. Nevertheless, he did not resign entirely of his own volition. 
Rather it was a mixture of political protests by a determined and intransigent opposition, violent intimidation by 
gangs of ex-military officers from the country's disbanded army, and unambiguous, and some would say 'stra-
tegic', abandonment by the international community that caused the president to abandon his office” [SHAMSIE 
2004:1097]. 
257 Initially, CARICOM had intended to ask the UN for such an investigation. The resistance of the US as perma-
nent SCUN member, made such an endeavour seem not very promising, however [AP 06.05.2004]. 
 [AP 06.05.2004]. 
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In May 2004 the OAS Special Representative in Haiti and chief of the OAS Special Mission for 
Strengthening Democracy in Haiti, David Lee, resigned. He gave as a reason the expected changes 
of the international activities and presence, after the political stalemate has been removed. With 
this Lee referred to the UNSC Resolution 1542 approved in late April. This resolution established 
the UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) – with a foreseen seize of between 8.000 
and 9.000258
When the OAS came together for its annual General Assembly the interim government of Haiti was 
recognized; however, it was also established that "there was an alteration of the constitutional 
regime which began prior to 29th February, 2004" [qtd. in: AFP 09.06.2004]. The General Assembly 
instructed – with reference to the IADC in general, and its Art. 20 in particular - the Permanent 
Council to use all necessary diplomatic initiatives to ensure Haiti's return to democracy. The Special 
Mission was to assist in preparing and conducting the elections and coordinate with the UN Stabili-
zation Force in Haiti
; Lee, after deploring the resources provided to the conceived mission, added: 
The experience of the past two years demonstrates conclusively that for successful OAS 
involvement a clear and specific mandate and adequate and explicit resources are essen-
tial requirements for the whole period in question [qtd. in: BBC MS 14.05.2004]. 
259 (MINUSTAH) [BBC MS 09.06.2004; RUDY 2005:246]. The same meeting – 
despite resistance from the US and Haiti – opened the way to an investigation, as requested by 
CARICOM260. The Caribbean body withheld the recognition of the interim government until such 
assessment would be concluded. Article 20 of the IADC261
While the political climate remained upbeat, SGOAS visited the country in October 2004 and called 
for a quick reinforcement of the UN Mission
 was invoked for that purpose [DJIN 
09.06.2004]. However, it has been variously criticized that this invocation came quite belatedly, 
several months after Aristide's departure [for example: BERRY 2005:255] 
262
When a jailed former Prime Minister - Yvon Neptune – went on hunger strike and his health dete-
riorated, the OAS proposed that an international commission be created to look into the accusa-
tions brought against him. At that time he was already in detention without charge for 10 months 
[IKEDA 05.05.2005]. The proposition was intended to relax the political atmosphere charged with 
the polarization between Aristide supporters and the former political opposition. Still, the everyday 
violence continued, frequently civilians fell victim to shootings between gang members and police 
officers, and abductions of children and other kidnappings brought daily life almost to a standstill 
as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported in June 2005 [SDPRD 24.06.2005]. 
This, however, contrasted with a statement delivered by SGOAS only two week later during a visit 
 in the country [XINHUA 08.10.2004]. OAS' human 
rights body equally condemned the political violence in the country in its report published later in 
the same month [SDPRD 28.10.2004]. 
OAS and the UN signed a Memorandum of Understanding in early November, agreeing that the first 
will play a major role in assisting Haiti and in cooperation with MINUSTAH. It was planned to create 
an Electoral Cooperation Committee which was set to also include a CARICOM representative 
[SDPRD 08.11.2004]. Still it was clear that the OAS had once again given up any form of leading 
role in resolving the conflict; this verdict also reverberated in the statement of the then acting 
SGOAS, Luigi Enaudi – having himself been highly engaged on the matter as Assistant Secretary 
General – when he said: 
We failed Haiti. ... We were unable to prevent issues from being resolved with violence. 
[qtd. in: BBC MS 19.02.2005] 
While in March 2005 the OAS showed itself optimistic with regard to the election preparations, the 
then Special Representative of the SGOAS in Haiti said the security situation continues to be 
marred by violence [SDPRD 31.03.2005]. This assessment was confirmed by a report the IACHR 
published in April [SNS 24.04.2005]. 
                                                 
258 On MINUSTAH see MINUSTAH homepage at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/ and UNSC 
Resolution 1542 at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/332/98/PDF/N0433298.pdf?OpenElement 
both retrieved on 22.08.2007. 
259 Among MINUSTAH's formidable tasks was the disarmament of up to 2.000 ex-military and around 6.000 
gang members that made security in the country that elusive [NPR 05.06.2005]. 
260 For steps taken by CARICOM as a consequence of Aristide's removal see BERRY 2005:257-261. 
261 This is contrary to the AP article by Michael HAYES [HAYES 09.06.2004] that reported Art. 20 of the COAS 
was invoked, although thereafter citing article 20 of the IADC. Most news media referred to the AP report, and 
seem not to have verified that information. 
262 JOYNES reported after MINUSTAH's first year of existence: “UN peacekeepers have been accused of being 
incapable to fulfil their role to maintain calm in Haiti” [JOYNES 08.06.2005]. 
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to Haiti; he reassured the public that the election will be held as originally scheduled263 [BBC MS 
07.07.2005]. By releasing considerable funds for the upcoming elections, the EU also signalled its 
trust in the approaching ballot [TEMPLE 13.05.2005; BARBEL 18.10.2005]. A positive assessment 
was also posted by the OAS in October – but only to be falsified soon thereafter, when the dates 
had to be postponed264
The OAS’ decisive resolution taken after the overthrow of the Haitian government through the mili-
tary was the first and early test case for Resolution 1080 only approved some months before. 
Resolution 1080 held that in the event of an “irregular interruption of the democratic political insti-
 [BBC MS 25.11.2005]. 
The kidnapping of OAS staff members in late December 2005 highlighted that though the election 
preparations were progressing, insecurity was still reigning – notwithstanding the fact that the OAS 
officials were released two days later [AFP 30.12.2005; EFE 01.01.2006]. 
When another delay of the ballot was made public, MINUSTAH and the OAS were blamed for it. The 
latter had failed to distribute the voter cards, as charged by Rosemond Pradel, Secretary-General 
of the Provisional Electoral Council; an assertion the OAS denied [DELVA 04.01.2006]. What was 
more, the PCOAS issued a statement that voiced the OAS's grave concern about the new post-
ponement and argued that there existed no valid technical reasons for this delay and that opera-
tional and security issues would not justify it either. Consequently the Haitian authorities were 
called on to immediately decide on a definitive date [USFN 06.01.2006]. Both, OAS and UN de-
manded that the elections be held not later than 7th February 2006 since the constitution provides 
for newly elected officials to be sworn in by that date [BARBEL 09.01.2006], this notwithstanding a 
certain level of continued violence in the country [BARBEL 17.01.2006]. 
 
Elections ushering in Preval once more 
On election day – having been finally set on 7th February as demanded earlier -  SGOAS José Mi-
guel Insulza visited the country accompanied by UN Representative Juan Gabriel Valdés and OAS 
Assistant Secretary General Albert R. Ramdin. They visited several voting centres and witnessed 
overall calm [USFN 07.02.2006]. Insulza opined that glitches caused by a huge voter turnout did 
not seriously hamper the exercise [AP 11.02.2006]. He, moreover, called on the UN to extend MI-
NUSTAH's mandate to help maintain stability in Haiti [XINHUA 13.02.2006] which was granted by 
the UNSC. In the meantime the political heat swelled once more when difficulties arose regarding 
the counting of the votes for the presidential front-runner Rene Preval, revolving around the ques-
tion if a run-off is required or not. Upon that the SGOAS travelled to the country for an inspection 
visit and to hold talks with the relevant stakeholders [SDPRD 15.02.2006]. 
Soon thereafter the Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council decided to declare Preval the winner in a 7 
to 2 vote; the decision was subsequently hailed by SGOAS Insulza as a significant step towards 
democracy [USFN 16.02.2006]. This despite of the controversial nature of the decision: Preval’s 
majority was only possible after the blank votes had been proportionally allocated to all candidates, 
contrary to the usual method of treating them as a separate item [LAWR 21.02.2006]. 
Via a pragmatic solution of the impending controversy the UN, OAS, and a couple of individual 
countries negotiated a solution whereby part of the bland votes were allocated to all candidates, 
still providing an outcome that gave Preval little more than the absolute majority of votes required 
[OXRESEARCH 22.02.2006]. This scheme was described as the international community’s search 
for 
a plausible voting mechanism that would launch him into the presidential seat, with the 
aim of containing brewing social turmoil. [BARBEL 17.02.2006] 
After further rounds of voting (municipal etc.) and rather calm conditions started to take root, the 
OAS looked into its and the further international community's tasks in diverse nation building ac-
tivities. Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States Albert R. Ramdin listed 
among them income generation and job creation. The OAS would continue its assistance in the 
areas of governance, for example with the establishment of the civil registry project and the trans-
formation of the Provisional Electoral Council [BBC MS 11.01.2007]. With appointing a new Country 
Representative – Arthur Gray – in March 2007, the OAS signalled its intention to remain set on the 
country's developments [USFN 30.03.2007]. 
 
                                                 
263 The election timetable foresaw presidential and parliamentary elections for 20th November 2005, with possi-
ble run-offs held on 3rd January 2006; local elections were scheduled for 11th December 2005 [BBC MS 
05.10.2005]. 
264 The new election dates were set for: 8th January 2006, for the first round of presidential and legislative elec-
tions, 15th February for the second round thereof and 5th March 2006 for municipal and local elections [SDPRD 
28.11.2005]. 
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tutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government” 
the PCOAS should be immediately convoked to look into the matter and decide on an AHMFM. 
The OAS strategy was two-pronged: while decreeing an embargo it also sent diplomatic missions 
for resolving the crisis. The OAS proved responsive in the process: when the approved embargo 
seemed to be ineffective it sent a team for its evaluation; when discontent increased among the 
Haitian population about the consequences of the embargo, it appealed to the member states for 
humanitarian aid. 
Depending on the point of view taken, the OAS’ outreach for support to the broader international 
community, especially the UN, can either be judged a Waterloo, or as wise exercise of self-
restraint, rooted in the acknowledgement that after almost a year of continuous engagements the 
organization was testing the limits of its capabilities. The OAS nevertheless remained committed by 
participating in the MICIVIH, applying flexible pressure, and by supporting political negotiations. 
In an interview MINUSTAH Chief Juan Gabriel Valdés responded optimistically to the question on 
what the election meant to the UN and OAS strategy: 
The Haitian experience is a great example of cooperation between the United Nations and 
the OAS. [qtd. in: ESQUENAZI 01.06.2006] 
However, after Aristide had been reinstated and when it came to oversee the elections of 1997 the 
OAS clearly underestimated the necessity of keeping a close watch in this critical period for the 
country. Remaining totally inactive in the face of the new president’s coup in early 1999, was a 
stark disappointment given the Organisation’s earlier voiced commitment to guard democracy in 
the Hemisphere. The Organization’s performance was also suboptimal in regard to the 2000 elec-
tions although it finally decided to boycott the second round of voting, faced with the counting ir-
regularities. Still it merits reward that the OAS, or in particular SGOAS Gaviria, kept on offering 
mediation services aiming at a peaceful resolution of the crisis. 
Belatedly and by sending the Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy the OAS underlined its 
adopted democracy paradigm in 2002. Addressing political violence mainly perpetrated by govern-
ment forces showed that the Organization sought this time around to attain a more sustainable 
resolution of grievances, and not only a quick-fix. 
However, the OAS’ reaction to Aristide’s (forced) leaving of office in 2004 again placed a question 
mark above its democratic credentials. This impression was reinforced by the Organisation’s re-
sponse to the voting procedures applied for the elections in 2006, which turned out to be highly 
unconventional and the deal reached to make sure Preval would be declared first-round winner has 
rightly be termed ‘internationally endorsed manipulation’ [BARBEL 17.02.2006]. As a résumé it has 
to be found that OAS’s activities during this long-drawn-out crisis were of mixed quality. On the 
one hand the Organization suffered under a permanent lack of resources, and on the other it did 
not put those available to their best use, displaying inadequate political foresight and judgment. 
Today it is impossible to evaluate what overall impact the Organization had in transforming the 
conflict in question, given its uncountable missions and diplomatic initiatives as intertwined with 
those of many other actors and a multiplicity of domestic variables. 
2.10.29 Peru 1992 
PCOAS, AHMFM, High-level Mission headed by SGOAS, Electoral Observer Mission; medi-
ating, negotiating, election monitoring. 
After Peruvian president, Alberto Fujimori, had dissolved Congress and suspended constitutional 
rights on 5th April 1992 the PCOAS in an emergency meeting requested by the SGOAS adopted a 
resolution that deplored the events and expressed its ‘deepest concern about their effects 
on...representative democracy in the region’ and urged Peru’s authorities to ‘immediately reinstate 
democratic institutions and full respect for human rights under the rule of law’ [qtd. in: AFP 
07.04.1992]. The also PCOAS called for an AHMFM. Meanwhile, Fujimori had justified his steps with 
his campaign against drug trafficking, terrorism, and corruption [AFP 07.04.1992]; the president 
moreover removed various justices and magistrates from their post at Peru’s Supreme Court of 
Justice [VEJARANO vs. PERU 2000]. 
The AHMFM eventually took place on April 13. On that occasion the foreign ministers deplored the 
suspension of the constitution, expressed their profound concern about the interruption of the de-
mocratic processes and urged the re-establishment of institutional democratic order. Additionally, 
they resolved to send a high-level delegation to Peru to promote dialogue between the political 
forces there. The delegation was to be headed by the SGOAS and Uruguayan Foreign Minister Hec-
tor Gros Espiell, who was authorized to invite other foreign ministers as well [GEDDA 13.04.1992]. 
SCHNABLY argues that the US – although having taken various measures (foremost cutting of aid) 
– was against the imposition of sanctions since that would seriously inhibit Peru’s fight against 
drug-traffickers and the guerrilla Sendero Luminoso [SCHNABLY 1994:461-462]. Generally the 
OAS member states seemed to be divided on the question of sanctions [PUERTAS 13.04.1992]. 
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In the meantime Fujimori announced that a plebiscite to elect a new Congress would be held within 
six months [REUTERS 13.04.1992], and declared that he would welcome the OAS mission [AFP 
15.04.1992]. 
In a comparison Reuters’ David HASKELL commented on the developments, that the 
Organisation of American States gave President Alberto Fujimori a far easier time for his 
suspension of democracy in Peru than it did when confronting Haiti's military coup last 
year. [HASKELL 15.04.1992] 
The OAS mission (Soares and Gros) arrived on 20th April 1992 in Lima and planned to hold talks 
with members of the disbanded Congress and other political leaders265
When Fujimori announced that he planned to hold a plebiscite on his power grab on 5th July 1992, 
the OAS mission under Gros and the SGOAS rejected that idea and emphasized that it was not part 
of the compromise reached at the last meeting of foreign ministers [AFP 30.05.1992]. Subse-
quently Fujimori backed down on the plebiscite question [BBC MS 01.06.1992] and declared 18th 
October 1992 as election-day for the Democratic Constituent Congress (DCC). With this date he 
 [AFP 20.04.1992]. During 
the Mission’s stay a parallel government was established by legislators of the dissolved parliament, 
headed by Maximo San Roman, which deepened existing cleavages [IPS 21.04.1992]. 
The team ended its visit after three days neither having achieved re-institution of the constitution 
nor the reopening of Congress [AFP 23.04.1992]. However, on 4th May the OAS sent the mission 
once more, albeit this time boosted with the foreign ministers of Paraguay, Honduras, and the dep-
uty foreign ministers of Argentina and Canada [IPS 04.05.1992]. Gros said during the visit that 
they had found agreement on the following two points: that Peruvians should be able to vote on 
the final proposal and that some basic constitutional reforms were needed [CALMET 05.05.1992]; 
yet no progress on how the crisis was to be resolved was made [AFP 06.05.1992]. In the meantime 
the IACHR was designated by the OAS to verify the human rights situation in Peru and started its 
work on investigating a prison riot, that had ended with 38 inmates and 2 police officers dead [IPS 
12.05.1992]. The IACHR was taken by surprise when it was not allowed to enter the prison. Fuji-
mori also turned down a request by the IACHR for a meeting. The IACHR chief, Marco Tulio Bruni-
Celli commented about Fujimori’s refusal the following:  
In more than three decades of the commission's existence in which it had made on site 
visits, it has always been received by the head of state. [qtd. in: POWER 13.05.1992] 
Nevertheless, the OAS member states found themselves in a dilemma at the next AHMFM. Analyst 
Francisco Urrunaga rounded it up, saying: 
Fujimori's domestic popularity, according to independent surveys, is growing, the armed 
forces have reiterated support for him, and foreign governments and international organi-
zations are convinced that his administration effectively controls the country. [qtd. in: IPS 
15.05.1992] 
The OAS thus changed its approach and invited Fujimori’s and the parallel governments to the 
AHMFM for the purpose of resolving the crisis [IPS 15.05.1992], while on the eve of the AHMFM 
Gros of the OAS mission paid a surprise visit to Peru [REUTERS 16.05.1992]. At the meeting of the 
foreign ministers itself Fujimori presented his case and made some concessions: the time-table for 
the return to democratic rule was speeded up and he also vowed to include his political opponents 
in the process. Fujimori promised to allow the creation of an elected ‘democratic constituent con-
gress’ that would rewrite the constitution, pass new laws, exercise oversight on the executive and 
restore respect for human rights. Fujimori also pledged to allow a free press [HOCKSTADER 
19.05.1992]. An OAS diplomat remarked on that move: “Peru recognized that if we had seen no 
movement, the foreign ministers would have had no choice but to condemn and further isolate 
Peru,” [qtd. in: HOCKSTADER 18.05.1992]. However, the Financial Times thought the economic 
consequences of the aid suspension as a reason for Fujimori’s change of mind [FT 03.06.1992]. 
Fujimori succeeded with his promises and the OAS approved a mildly worded resolution on Peru. 
Enrique GUZMAN, reporting for AFP commented “[t]he resolution effectively lent the cooperation of 
the Washington-based OAS to Peru's president, despite the disapproval the regional body has 
voiced since Fujimori's coup de force” [GUZMAN 19.05.1992].  
                                                 
265 During their visit they ultimately held talks with Fujimori, the Peruvian Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Minister 
Augusto Blacker Miller, opposition leaders and First Vice President Maximo San Roman [AFP 23.04.1992] as well 
as with the US ambassador in Lima, professional associations, the Catholic Church, business and trade union 
representatives, and national media directors [IPS 23.04.1992]. 
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was choosing the last possible one, after he had promised on 18th May to the OAS to hold such a 
vote within five months. Yet later the date was reset to November 22266
Two major Peruvian parties - APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) and AP (Acción 
Popular) - decided to boycott the election. They maintained that the election would legitimize Fuji-
mori’s de facto regime and doubted that the election would be free and fair [IPS 28.09.1992]. They 
were joined by various other opposition parties
. Peru’s opposition was 
enraged when it was learned that anyone elected to the constituent body will be disbarred from 
standing for parliament for 10 years. [FT 03.06.1992; REUTERS 03.06.1992; REUTERS 
18.06.1992]. 
267 [NOTISUR 24.11.1992]. On Fujimori’s request 
the OAS sent a 250-member election observer team268
Also COOPER judged OAS Resolution 1080 to have been a 'failure' [COOPRE 2004:98] with regard 
to the 1992 crisis. The same note is struck by LEVITT who argues that Fujimori was successful in 
 to the country [IPS 20.11.1992]. A figure 
not designed to assure a comprehensive across-the-country monitoring. 
With 40% of the vote the pro-government coalition Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria received 44 of the 
80 seats available [NOTISUR 24.11.1992]. The SGOAS, Joao Baena Soares, said after the vote  
We haven't registered any serious anomaly. We know no election is chemically perfect, 
chemically pure, but some anomalies can be considered serious and others within the 
sphere of acceptability. 
And Soares added: 
My impression is that we've seen wide popular participation. [both qtd. in: REUTERS 
25.11.1992] 
Consequently, when the OAS foreign ministers met in mid-December 1992 to evaluate the situation 
in Peru they declared that their efforts in the matter would end as soon as the DCC took up its 
functions. They further noted that the latest events were important steps toward the reestablish-
ment of democracy in Peru [BBC MS 17.12.1992]. 
Yet according to the research outfit Freedom House, Peru was in 1992 positioned at the borderline 
between ‘not free’ and ‘partly free’, receiving the second lowest score possible in terms of political 
rights [BONIFACE 2005:14]. And also the Peruvian opposition called the OAS’ step ‘premature’ 
[NOTISUR 12.01.1993].  
Nevertheless on 30th December 1992 the DCC was installed [CT 31.12.1992]. BONIFACE, analyzing 
the OAS activities in Peru, concludes: 
OAS action appears to have curbed the worst excesses of Fujimori but had no subsequent 
impact on the quality of democracy in Peru (…). [BONIFACE 2005:23] 
And also SANCHEZ finds: “[a]fter Alberto Fujimori’s autogolpe [self-coup, my remark] in April 
1992, Peru became a textbook case of an illiberal democracy” [SANCHEZ 2003:55], in stark con-
trast with the proclaimed aims of the COAS.  Also COOPER and LEGLER [COOPER & LEGLER 
2001:124] describe the OAS response to Fujimori’s autogolpe as ‘ineffective’ and claim that it 
rather amounted to ‘acquiescence as Fujimori ultimately rewrote the Constitution in order to ex-
tend presidential powers’. And DIAZ concludes: 
The OAS also demonstrated its ineffectiveness in its reaction to the self-coup by President 
Alberto Fujimori of Peru. While the OAS forcefully ‘deplored’ Fujimori’s action, its attempts 
to convince Fujimori to return to the status quo ante were a failure. … By observing the 
elections, the OAS indirectly granted legitimacy to Fujimori’s coup and subsequent actions. 
[DIAZ 1994:188] 
                                                 
266 If not against the spirit this postponement can easily be taken to be at least against the letter of the OAS 
resolution that mentioned ‘immediate elections’ [text of the resolution contained in: USDSD 29.06.1992]. 
267 The Liberty Movement (Movimiento Libertad) and three parties affiliated with the Leftist Union (Izquierda 
Unida) coalition: the Peruvian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Peruano, PCP), the Revolutionary Leftist 
Union (Union de Izquierda Revolucionaria, UNIR), and the Mariateguista Unified Party (Partido Unificado Mari-
ateguista, PUM) [NOTISUR 24.11.1992]. 
268 Political tensions inside Peru were considerable in the pre-election period, with a failed coup attempt on 13th 
November 1992 and a bloody election boycott campaign of two guerrilla groups; this atmosphere made it a 
difficult challenge for the election observers to verify the quality of the vote [IPS 20.11.1992]. 
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dictating the solution to his autogolpe, underlining the fact that the OAS failed to impose sanctions 
[LEVITT 2006:104]. 
 
Indeed, the OAS did not meet the expectation itself had created with emphasizing democracy as 
one of its main purposes. Still, one has to admit that the Organization faced a quandary: while 
being explicitly committed to the exercise of representative democracy, the Peruvian population 
was broadly in support of the illegal activities of its president. After having applied Resolution 1080 
to Haiti one year earlier, without scoring anything resembling success, the OAS took a more cau-
tious line in handling Fujimori’s escapades. 
Fujimori’s strategy was shrewd: with popular backing he made such concessions which made him 
appear compromising and constructive, but still reduced the political opposition to helpless by-
standers and detracted from his considerable recalcitrance as exemplified by non-cooperation with 
the IACHR. The concessions fell far short of a credible redress of his extra-legal manoeuvres. In 
this case the OAS’ deeds did by far not match its aspirations of becoming the guardian of democ-
racy in the hemisphere. On the contrary, the implicit recognition Fujimori received through the 
ensuing election monitoring and white-washing statements did nothing to undermine the example 
set by him of how acting politicians of the Hemisphere may illegally usurp power. 
2.10.30 Guatemala 1993 
PCOAS, AHMFM, High-level Mission headed by SGOAS; ascertaining, mediating. 
After Guatemala’s president, Jorge Serrano, had dissolved parliament and suspended the constitu-
tion and the Supreme Court on 25th May 1993, claiming to rescue the country from corruption and 
the drug mafia, the OAS decided to send a top-level mission to Guatemala, headed by the SGOAS. 
Furthermore, a meeting of OAS foreign ministers was agreed on [IPS 26.05.1993]. 
David HASKEL, reporting for Reuters commented on the developments: 
Diplomatic sources said the OAS foreign ministers would be under pressure to show they 
can produce more than rhetoric to defend democracy in the hemisphere, especially in light 
of events in Peru last year, when President Alberto Fujimori269
But before this meeting could be convened, Serrano was forced to resign under pressure from the 
military
 disbanded parliament and 
the courts. [HASKEL 26.05.1993] 
A diplomat opined on Serrano’s announcement that elections for a new assembly would be held 
within 60 days that ‘Serrano has perfected the system’, insofar as he had closely observed what 
the OAS had asked from Peru’s Fujimori and delivered it even before being asked to do so [HASKEL 
26.05.1993]. 
On 29th May the OAS team, headed by Joao Baena Soares, eventually arrived in Guatemala City 
[AFP 29.05.1993]. The visit was to last three days and meetings with Serrano and representatives 
of the society were planned. Soares was to write a report on the situation for presentation to the 
OAS meeting of foreign ministers [MURRAY 29.05.1993]. In the meantime the US, the EC, and 
Japan had threatened to or had already suspended aid to Guatemala [SCHNABLY 1994:472]. 
270
At an AHMFM on 7th June the OAS decided that Guatemala’s crisis had ended with a constitutional 
solution and that there was no need to observe the issue further. The new president De Leon Car-
 and society on 1st June 1993 [ROBBERSON 02.06.1993]. 
Leaving a power vacuum behind, Serrano fled the country. The OAS foreign ministers decided to 
send its mission once again to ascertain the facts and help with the restoration of democracy [AFP 
04.06.1993]. While Vice President Gustavo Espina Salguero announced that he will rightfully be 
Guatemala’s president, the country’s Constitutional Court ruled that he was ineligible for the presi-
dency, since he had supported Serrano’s moves. Consequently, Espina abandoned his bid to re-
place Serrano [SCHNABLY 1994:474-475]. 
On 5th June 1993 Guatemala’s Congress elected Ramiro de Leon Carpio, the governments human 
rights ombudsman as the country’s new president, although he was not endorsed by the armed 
forces [ROBBERSON 06.06.1993]. 
                                                 
269 To nobody’s surprise Peru’s Fujimori commented on the steps taken by Serrano, that although his ‘Fujigolpe’ 
is not to be exported, if Serrano acted to halt corruption in his country, he has his understanding [NZZ 
27.05.1993]. 
270 The military’s involvement was described by the Tod ROBBERSON, reporting for the WP with comments on 
Guatemala’s defense minister and ‘de facto leader’: “While trying to maintain a low profile, Garcia Samayoa has 
presided over a bizarre series of events in the past two weeks, including Serrano's May 25 suspension of the 
constitution and dissolution of Congress, his military-backed ouster a week later, an attempt by vice president 
Gustavo Espina Salguero to assume the presidency, and a Constitutional Court ruling Friday that Espina must 
step down while Congress elects a new president” [ROBBERSON 06.06.1993]. 
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2.10.31 Paraguay 1996 
 declared subsequently: “[t]he events in my country during these days must serve as a wit-
ness to the strength of instruments of hemispheric cooperation” [qtd. in: AFP 08.06.1993]. 
In application of its democracy paradigm the OAS signalled its unwillingness to accept the route 
chosen by Guatemala’s president. It held an AHMFM and duly sent a mission headed by its highest 
official. However, the domestic developments led to the solution of the crisis. That is why it is diffi-
cult to ascertain if the Organization had at that time already learnt its lesson from its questionable 
handling of the Peruvian situation one year earlier. But as the long-drawn-out example Haiti sug-
gests, OAS’s commitment declined if the strain on its overall available resources was becoming too 
severe. And this without convincingly accommodating the true requirements as dictated by the 
situation on the ground. 
PCOAS, AHMFA, SGOAS; declaratory support for democratic institutions. 
In April 1996 a political crisis developed between the democratically elected Paraguayan president 
Juan Carlos Wasmosy and army commander Lino Oviedo272
2.10.32 Nicaragua vs. Honduras 1999 
. Oviedo had defied orders from Was-
mosy. This triggered a decree from Wasmosy calling for Oviedo’s resignation. However, instead of 
stepping down Oviedo retreated to barracks with his troops and demanded that Wasmosy resigns 
[AMARILLA 23.06.1996]. Rumours of a coup d’état made their rounds while the PCOAS met to de-
clare the member states’ ‘total support’ for Wasmosy. The events were condemned and it was de-
cided to convoke a AHMFM in accordance with Resolution 1080 [OAS 1996]; although – as LEVITT 
underlines - not all members had been convinced that Resolution 1080 applied in the first place, 
since actually no 'interruption of the constitutional order' had occurred [LEVITT 2006:106]. 
SGOAS, Cesar Gaviria did not attend the meeting but instead made a visit to Wasmosy to ensure 
him of his personal support in the matter [AFP 23.06.1996]. 
Wasmosy considered offering Oviedo for his resignation the post of defence ministers in order to 
resolve the crisis. However, this step was resisted by protestors in the street and both chambers of 
parliament. The international community made clear that in case of the coup Paraguay would be 
completely isolated. In the end Oviedo agreed to resign and announced his intention to run for the 
presidency in 1998 [NOTISUR 03.05.1996]. 
COOPER and LEGLER view the role the OAS played in this case rather critically: 
During Paraguay’s 1996 crisis, the time the OAS took to respond raised questions, as did 
its inadequate preventive and monitoring abilities [COOPER&LEGLER 2001:24]. 
The validity of this criticism notwithstanding, the OAS contributed to the resolution of the power 
struggle insofar as it formulated and expressed a unified position in favour of the acting president, 
epitomized by the SGOAS’s visit to Wasmosy. While objections that the legal grounds to apply 
Resolution 1080 had not been given might be justifiable from legal point of view, the OAS’s calling 
for an AHMFM surely played its part in preventing the escalation of the stand-off. However, similar 
to the Guatemalan crisis in 1993 domestic developments spared the OAS from underpinning its 
democratic credentials with concrete actions. 
PCOAS, Special Envoy; mediating, facilitating. 
A maritime border dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras broke out at the end of 1999.  The 
crisis had developed after the Honduran parliament had unanimously ratified a treaty with Colom-
bia, originally signed in 1986, that is setting the border in the Caribbean around the San Andres 
archipelago, which is Colombian since 1928 but is claimed by Nicaragua. Arnoldo Aleman, Nicara-
gua’s President, reacted with the threat of breaking diplomatic relations with Honduras. Addition-
ally, a 35% punitive tariff on imports from Honduras and Colombia was imposed by Nicaragua [AFP 
03.12.1999a]. At the outset the OAS had welcomed the treaty between Colombia and Honduras 
[SZ 04.12.1999]. 
Faced with the arising tensions SGOAS Gaviria appealed to the conflict parties, saying “I will allow 
myself to call on both countries to peacefully resolve their differences within the framework of in-
ternational law and the charter of our organization” [qtd. in: AFP 03.12.1999b]. 
Honduras turned to the UN and OAS Secretaries-General to send observers to the contested area 
as a preventive measure in case the situation might escalate. And Honduras’ Foreign Ministers 
                                                 
271 However, Americas Watch – a human rights advocacy - judged the OAS’ step to be premature [REUTERS 
10.06.1993]. 
272 For possible underlying causes of the standoff between Wasmosy and Oviedo see NOTISUR 03.05.1996. 
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Roberto Flores Bermundez denounced the disproportion of the Nicaraguan reaction. Both countries 
charged the other of sending troops to the region, but both also denied those charges [XINHUA 
03.12.1999]. One day later Honduras went a step further and asked the PCOAS to convene an 
extraordinary session to consider the territorial dispute [EFE 04.12.1999]. Shortly afterward Nica-
ragua joined the request, claiming that the ‘situation that has developed is a serious threat to 
peace in the region’ [qtd. in: AFP 05.12.1999]. 
When the PCOAS met it was agreed to appoint a Special Envoy to support a peaceful settlement of 
the conflict. This Special Envoy was to evaluate the situation, facilitate dialogue and formulate rec-
ommendations aimed at easing tensions. Both countries were urged to refrain from measures that 
could exacerbate the tense situation [AFP 07.12.1999]. Contrary to the request of the conflict par-
ties the PCOAS declined to send observers to the region [NZZ 09.12.1999], since – as the PCOAS’ 
President stated – a full-fledge observer mission was at that point in time deemed to be beyond 
the OAS’ capacity [OEA/Ser.G CP/ACTA 1216/99]. 
And when Nicaragua declared to bring the case to the ICJ, Honduras said it was ‘pleased’ with that 
step [AFP 09.12.1999]. 
Irrespective of this international resolution route, OAS Special Envoy, US diplomat Luigi Einaudi, 
met with Nicaraguan and Honduran representatives on 10th December 1999 [EFE 11.12.1999]. 
However, tensions did not ease as a consequence; instead, Nicaragua decided to prohibit Honduran 
boats from entering and fishing in its territorial waters as a further retaliatory measure to the bor-
der treaty ratification [MEJINA 17.12.1999]. 
Einaudi finally succeeded in arranging a direct meeting of both conflict parties [EFE 20.12.1999]. 
Yet in the meantime sabre-rattling continued and resulted inter alia in the expulsion by Nicaragua 
of two Colombian military attaches one day after the border treaty between Honduras and Colom-
bia had taken effect. Nicaragua’s President Aleman provided the following explanation: “We will not 
have in our country elements who could inspire mistrust, especially in light of an act of aggression 
against our sovereignty” [qtd. in REUTERS 22.12.1999]. 
At the end of December 1999 the Foreign Ministers of the two countries and Einaudi met in Miami. 
They agreed to freeze ground troop deployments and to withdraw their naval forces from the Car-
ibbean sea and consequently to define a zone of exclusion in the area. Additionally, the Foreign 
Ministers agreed to meet again in January 2000 in order to work out the technical aspects of the 
agreement. Einaudi vigorously hailed the progress achieved: “I am convinced we have opened the 
path to a peaceful resolution” [qtd. in: MARTIN-HIDALGO 30.12.1999]. 
The next meetings took place on 12th and 13th January 2000 in Washington D.C. All participants 
voiced optimism after the conclusion of the talks, where details of the agreement were hammered 
out. It was agreed to meet again the following month [MAJANO 13.01.2000] for the purpose of 
finalizing the establishment of the demilitarized zone. 
Nicaragua also agreed at the end of January to drop the punitive tariffs it had imposed on Hondu-
ran goods [LAN 22.02.2000]; yet it later dragged its feet on the issue273
                                                 
273 See EFE 24.03.2000 for some details on further squabble about the matter. 
. Meanwhile Einaudi pre-
sented his report to the PCOAS. The progress reported therein was welcomed by SGOAS Gaviria 
[EFE 19.01.2000]. 
When both parties met on 8th February 2000 San Salvador they signed an eight-point agreement 
in. This agreement calls for police and military units to return to those positions where they were 
stationed before the escalation of the dispute. Both countries moreover agreed to “resolve their 
disputes peacefully, and faithfully abide by a ruling of the International Court of Justice determining 
the maritime limits between Honduras and Nicaragua” [qtd. in: AFP 08.02.2000]. Joint patrols – 
possibly including observers from the OAS or another country - were to be established to monitor 
the demilitarized area. Additionally, the conflict parties decided that disagreements over execution 
of the agreement will be submitted to the OAS for mediation [MARQUEZ 08.02.2000]. Finally, both 
sides agreed to meet again in March to discuss additional Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). 
But in late February hostilities between the two nations broke out once again [LAN 22.02.2000]. 
The OAS took the initiative and proposed a summit of the Presidents of both nations to resolve the 
conflict [REUTERS 28.02.2000]. Yet this offer was not accepted and instead the scheduled meeting 
of both Foreign Ministers took place at the beginning of March 2000. The atmosphere was de-
scribed as relatively delicate, taking into consideration the hostile incidents and that Nicaragua’s 
President had in the meantime refrained from the creation of the envisaged joint patrols [BAALES 
06.03.2000]. Nevertheless, the meeting resulted in a further agreement regulating the patrolling of 
shared Caribbean waters and also reducing the two countries' military presence along their shared 
border. The agreement was to be the vehicle to maintain peace in the region until the ICJ had 
heard the case and published its judgment [EFE 08.03.2000].  
In late 2007 the ICJ issued a verdict that ruled that the treaty signed in 1928 was valid, thus leav-
ing Colombia’s sovereignty thereover untouched [LAWR 20.12.2007]. 
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Although not acting in line with both countries’ demands regarding the sending of an observer mis-
sion, the OAS took an approach well-suited to tackle the controversy. By assigning a Special Envoy 
the Organization signalled that the conflict’s resolution was of essential concern. Eventually, the 
Special Envoy was able to effect de-escalation and facilitate talks which ultimately led both conflict 
parties to take conciliatory moves and to agree to bring their cause to the ICJ. This was not the 
first and remained not the last instance that the ICJ was consulted for the purpose of finding a 
solution to a regional dispute, given the absence of any comparable hemispheric institution. In 
retrospect, the OAS was successful in promoting the conflict’s transformation away from a militari-
zation confrontation towards a law-abiding settlement with only a minimum of resources. 
2.10.33 Guatemala vs. Belize 2000 
SGOAS, Special Envoy, OAS/AZ Mission; facilitating, mediating, monitoring, reporting, 
supporting implementation of CBMs (verification, carrying out resettlement project etc.). 
The border dispute between Guatemala and Belize originated in 1859 when Guatemala signed an 
agreement with the then colonial power of British Honduras (later Belize), Great Britain. Guatemala 
herein agrees to give up territory in exchange for the building of a road by the British. In 1883 the 
treaty had been amended to also include the payment of a certain sum of money [EFE 
24.02.2000]. However, the failure of the British to build the highway led to the nullification of the 
agreement by the constitutional court of Guatemala in 1946. Although Guatemala had initiated 
various efforts to negotiate a settlement – first with the British, later with the Belizean – no agree-
ment was reached [CACA 09.03.2000]. 
Guatemala finally turned to the OAS for it to support the resolution of the dispute. In March 2000 
both countries met at the OAS headquarters in Washington D.C. with SGOAS Gaviria present [EFE 
15.03.2000]. In the following week both countries agreed on setting up a joint commission to 
study proposals for a solution. Yet differences continued: while Guatemala was insisting that the 
findings of the commission should be binding on both sides, Belize hesitated to accept this condi-
tion [LAN 28.03.2000]. Meanwhile, a series of border incidents increased incipient tensions. The 
developments resulted in Belize’s call on the OAS to help secure the release of four Belizean na-
tionals detained by Guatemala, claiming that the move contravened the COAS [CU 01.04.2000]. 
The release of the Belizeans where prompted by the scheduling of another round of talks [AP 
17.05.2000]. 
Talks on 17th and 19th July 2000 where again held under OAS auspices. Both sides were asked to 
name a facilitator. The facilitators would have the task of working out a timetable for subsequent 
meetings and putting forward `technical' proposals for carrying the process forward. These propos-
als might include negotiations, arbitration, or submission to an international judicial body [LAN 
18.07.2000]. The talks were characterized as ‘hopeful’ and Belize suggested the formation of a 
group of countries interested in the peaceful settlement of the conflict (a so-called Group of 
Friends) [EFE 19.07.2000]. At the end of the meeting both conflict parties signed an agreement 
that fixed the terms of reference for a mediating panel274
The OAS maintained its engagement and agreed to organize a meeting between the two countries 
on 3rd and 4th August 2004 in order to further the rapprochement [JOYNES 21.07.2004]. In Sep-
 and a joint commission to resolve the 
issue. A mechanism on establishing contact between the respective armies was additionally con-
cluded. 
In July 2003 the OAS established a field office in the Adjacency Zone located between the two 
countries. The OAS mission stationed there (known under the term OAS/AZ Mission) was oversee 
the implementation of CBMs which involved to verify, investigate and follow-up incidences occur-
ring in the Adjacency Zone [USFN 17.04.2008]. 
Around two years later Guatemala was close to drop its claim in exchange for a $ 320 million aid 
package; however, disagreements on details frustrated a final resolution [JOYNES 21.07.2004]. 
By 2004 the confidence-building process was still ongoing, despite both parties continued interest 
in a mutual resolution. Both had re-emphasized to do so under OAS auspices. The SGOAS was 
instructed to call a meeting of the Group of the Friends, which have had contributed to the financ-
ing of the rapprochement. The OAS voiced its hopes that the envisioned agreement might even 
include mutual legal assistance agreement, a free-trade agreement, improved transit of people and 
goods between the neighbouring countries, and development of joint initiatives to promote tourism 
[GREEN 04.05.2004]. 
Both countries agreed during a meeting with SGOAS Gaviria on a new set of CBMs, shortly before 
the previous set of CBMs would have ran out [LAWR 11.05.2004]. In the scope of those measures 
Guatemala officially offered Belize a free-trade agreement in June 2004 [LACCAR 22.06.204]. 
                                                 
274 The panel was to support the conflict parties to come up with proposals on a definitive solution and make 
specific recommendations [AFP 20.07.2000]. 
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tember 2005 both parties reached agreement to renew negotiations and to aim at further confi-
dence building measures. The agreement was signed at the OAS headquarters with the support of 
mediation by the Organization [JOYNES 09.09.2005]. 
OAS Special Envoy Raúl Lagos and both countries held talks in late 2005 and agreed to create a 
bilateral commission to be instructed with finding so-called 'areas of trust', encompassing i.a. 
trade, tourism, and mutual security projects [JOYNES 16.11.2005]. In February 2006 both coun-
tries agreed to a proposal of SGOAS Insulza to begin negotiations with maritime areas and for that 
purpose to appoint an expert on the Law of the Sea as well as to include Honduras in their talks 
[USFN 10.02.2006; LACCAR 21.02.2006]. The three countries subsequently met in March 2006 and 
agreed to form a technical Committee to define their sea frontiers; the OAS continued to act as 
intermediary in the talks [XINHUA 25.03.2006]. Tripartite discussions continued also in 2007 
[USFN 18.04.2007]; however, when by November 2007 no settlement on the territorial question 
was forthcoming, SGOAS Insulza suggested to take the matter to the ICJ [NIÑO 21.11.2007]. 
One of many activities the OAS/AZ Mission fulfilled in the agreed CBMs framework275
2.10.34 Peru 2000 
 for example 
consisted in supporting the so-called Santa Rosa Community Resettlement project, transferring 
families living in the Adjacency Zone administered by Belize to Guatemalan territory [USFN 
05.02.2008]. The project was completed in April 2008 [USFN 17.04.2008]. The territorial dispute is 
at the moment of writing still pending. 
 
The OAS offered its services to the two conflict parties to assist the resolution of their dispute. It 
did so in a fashion that did not overstretch the Organization’s means by working closely with the 
Group of Friends who supported the necessary funding. The OAS facilitated the dialogue between 
Honduras and Guatemala, contributing to a extraordinary constructive approach. The support of 
measures of confidence building helped to increase mutual trust and gave the opportunity to objec-
tify the matter in question. The conflict thus was successfully contained before moving up the esca-
lation ladder. 
Election Observer Mission, PCOAS, IACHR, High-Level Mission headed by SGOAS and 
General Assembly Chair, Permanent (Negotiation) Mission; monitoring, reporting, facili-
tating, institutionalizing dialogue. 
When incumbent President Fujimori ran for re-election for a third term - although the constitution 
foresaw only two consecutive terms - the OAS was asked by the Peruvian government to send an 
observer group to monitor the campaigning and the election itself. 
However, the IACHR’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, had reported in early March: 
… the effective exercise of free expression in Peru is seriously compromised due to the 
systematic use of intelligence services and security forces as instruments of harassment 
and persecution of investigative journalists and political opposition leaders. … Peru lacks 
the necessary conditions to guarantee the complete exercise of the right to express politi-
cal ideas that oppose or criticize the government through the mass media. [qtd. in: ZARIN 
07.04.2000] 
The election was to take place on 9th April 2000; the OAS observer group numbered  a mere 90 
[OAS GS 2000a] and hence was ill-equipped to validate the overall goings-on. Two days before the 
elections the head of the observer mission, Eduardo Stein, described the electoral process as a 
‘landscape of irregularities’ [VARELA 07.04.2000]. In the final report of the OAS observer mission, 
the pre-election process was found to have not ‘been fair or equitable’ and that it had been plagued 
by ‘insufficiencies, obstacles, irregularities and abuses’ [EFE 07.04.2000]. 
When it became clear that a second round would be necessary (final results gave Fujimori 49.89 % 
of the vote and his rival, Alejandro Toledo 40.12 % [LAMA 19.05.2000]) the OAS demanded that 
the fixed date, 28th May, should be postponed in order to correct the deficiencies observed in the 
first round [EFE 12.05.2000]. However, Fujimori did not act on that request and while Toledo 
threatened to withdraw, the OAS observer mission declared: “If the irregularities, inconsistencies 
and lack of fairness continue in this second round ... the OAS election monitors will not be able to 
endorse the electoral process” [qtd. in: REUTERS 18.05.2000]. 
On 18th Toledo finally withdrew from the election since the second round was not postponed and no 
opportunity provided to dismantle the ‘machinery of fraud’. This step prompted Fujimori’s vice 
                                                 
275 For an impression of the tasks performed by the OAS/AZ Mission see its 2008 Implementation report as 
retrieved on 18.08.2009 from: www.oas.org/sap/.../Informe_Anual_OZA_Ingles_2008.DOC. 
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presidential candidate to claim that Toledo acted in face of polls that showed he will not win [LAMA 
19.05.2000]. 
A few days later the OAS Electoral Observer Mission published a communiqué announcing the sus-
pension of its activities citing the lack of consistency and precision [EFE 22.05.2000]. On 25th May, 
the Observer Mission declared that, under international standards, the electoral process was ‘far 
from being considered free and fair’ and reduced its work to preparing a report to the SGOAS, and 
withdrew the bulk of its staff from the country [OAS GS 2000b]. Furthermore the statement of the 
Observer Mission indicated “that the characteristics and circumstances of the electoral process un-
der way, with only one contender in the person of President Alberto Fujimori, do not support a vot-
ing procedure that will represent the true popular will” [EFE 26.05.2000]. Fujimori was re-elected 
as expected on 28th May for a third consecutive term as Peru’s President [OAS GS 2000b]. 
The PCOAS held a special meeting on the matter on three days later to discuss the preliminary 
report of the Electoral Observer Mission. It was decided to put the issue on the agenda of the Gen-
eral Assembly, scheduled to take place in early June [OAS GS 2000b]. The US withdrew its motion 
for invocation of Resolution 1080 given lacking support [LLOSA 31.05.2000]. 
During the General Assembly Canada promoted a resolution calling for the sending of a high-level 
mission to Peru that would aim at discussions about the strengthening of Peruvian institutions and 
specifically, about the need for independence of the legislative, judicial, and electoral authorities. 
In the meantime the IACHR caused uproar when it called for new elections in Peru, instead of limit-
ing itself to comment on the state of human rights in the country [LEMIEUX 05.06.2000]. 
The foreign ministers finally gave unanimous approval to one version of the Canadian proposal, but 
no punitive steps were included in the resolution. Hence, it was described as a compromise be-
tween calls for tough action and Peru’s resistance to any effort challenging Fujimori’s election. The 
established OAS High-Level Mission was to be headed by SGOAS César Gaviria and Canadian For-
eign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy [COHEN 05.06.2000]. OAS Resolution 1753 specifically re-
solves: 
1. To send to Peru, immediately, a Mission comprising the Chair of the General Assembly 
and the Secretary General of the OAS with the purpose of exploring, with the Government 
of Peru and other sectors of the political community, options and recommendations aimed 
at further strengthening democracy in that country, in particular measures to reform the 
electoral process, including reform of judicial and constitutional tribunals, as well as 
strengthening freedom of the press.  
2. To agree that the Mission report to OAS foreign ministers, in a manner to be deter-
mined by the Mission, in order to allow for full consideration of its findings and recom-
mendations and to initiate follow-up as appropriate [OAS AG/Res. 1753 (XXX-O/00)]. 
OAS’ High-Level Mission visited Peru from 27th to 30th  June 2000 [OAS GS 2000b]. During their 
stay Gaviria and Axworthy met with Fujimori, Toledo, other opposition leaders, representatives of 
the media, the private sector, and NGOs [AMERICAS Sept/Oct 2000]. The High-Level Mission also 
presented proposals to Fujimori and his main opponent Toledo. Those recommendations included 
29 points and centred around five areas: 
 
• judicial reform and strengthening the rule of law; 
• warranting freedom of expression and the press; 
• electoral reform; 
• congressional oversight and combating corruption; and 
• civilian control over the intelligence service and military (pillars of Fujimori’s power) [COO-
PER&LEGLER 2001:129]. 
 
Against Toledo’s wishes the mission did not call for new elections, since such a move would not 
have been covered by its mandate [HAYES 29.06.2000]. 
The Peruvian government said it would accept discussions on the proposals with the political com-
munity and civil society; the same indication was received from Fujimori’s political opponents. 
[AMERICAS Sept/Oct 2000]. In consequence the High-Level Mission was transformed in a broader 
based permanent mission with Eduardo Latorre276
                                                 
276 The OAS described Latorre’s competence thus: “His mandate is to encourage the dialogue between different 
sectors of Peruvian society and the government, monitor the process of strengthening democratic institutions in 
Peru and the implementation of the recommendations made by the special mission [the OAS High-Level Mis-
sion, my remark] to and accepted by the government and different sectors of Peruvian Society…” [qtd. in: 
MORRISON 13.07.2000]. 
 as its permanent secretary. Within the scope of 
the so-called ‘mesa de diálogo’ sustained intra-elite discussions began including the OAS as facilita-
tor, the Peruvian government (4 representatives), the opposition (8), civil society (4) and two spe-
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cial invitees. Decision making was confined to the government and opposition delegates and con-
sensus was required [COOPER&LEGLER 2001:129-130]. The first round of debate took place on 
21st August 2000 [SCRUTTON 22.08.2000] where some ‘advances’ were made and agreement to 
the establishment of four working groups was reached [EFE 22.08.2000]. Several rounds of discus-
sion followed with further tentative progress achieved [DJIN 05.09.2000]. 
However, as COOPER & LEGLER point out, “It was only after a series of detonating events ripped 
through Peruvian politics … that the mesa began to assume an important political function” [COO-
PER&LEGLER 2001:132]. The first of these events was the broadcasting of a video on national tele-
vision showing Fujimori’s close adviser and head of the National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro 
Montesinos, bribing the opposition congressman Alberto Kouri to support the government [HAYES 
16.09.2000]. 
Opposition leaders called for the resignation of Montesinos and received support from the OAS. The 
OAS argued in view of such accusations it would be next to impossible to move ahead with the 
talks if Montesinos would not be suspended [HAYES 16.09.2000]. In a sudden about-face Fujimori 
announced only days later that new presidential elections for which he would not be running will be 
called for and that the National Intelligence Service was to be disbanded [LAWR 19.09.2000]. The 
OAS backed Fujimori’s surprise call [AFP 22.09.2000]. Nevertheless Fujimori held back with the 
firing of Montesinos and engaged in negotiations on how his right hand and confidant could safely 
be brought into exile. However, finally the Fujimori administration agreed with the political opposi-
tion and under the auspices of the OAS that: “The executive branch will undertake to publish, by 
Monday September 25 at the latest, a resolution announcing that Doctor Vladimiro Montesinos 
should no longer exercise any function, job or responsibility of any kind in the state”, as Latorre 
reported [qtd. in: UZTARROZ 24.09.2000]. 
In the search for a country that would accept Montesions, Panama was approached but rejected 
the request. However, most governments of the Hemisphere clearly still preferred this option and 
SGOAS Gaviria on 23rd September wrote a letter to Panama’s foreign minister to reconsider the 
initial refusal. This move was widely criticized. The ethical standard of the OAS and all others sup-
porting Montesinos’ escape seemed questionable and compromised since he had been accused of 
various serious offences, including torture and extortion [COOPER&LEGLER 2001; FAIOLA 
25.09.2000]. Consequently, the OAS was accused of complicity and the mesa had to be suspended 
temporarily. The discussions only were put on track again by Fujimori’s resignation, and after un-
successfully endeavouring to reach to a amnesty agreement with the opposition. After Fujimori had 
stepped down on 20th November 2000, an interim government under Valentín Paniagua was estab-
lished. SGOAS Gaviria and Latorre closed the mesa de diálogo on 16th January 2000; until then 
agreements over 16 of the 29 points had been reached [COOPER & LEGLER 2001:134]. 
LEVITT, in retrospect, finds the dialogue initiated by the OAS’ to have had only limited impact: 
While the OAS observer mission had played an ancillary role by questioning the legitimacy 
of the 2000 elections, Fujimori's fall was in no sense caused by the postelection OAS 
roundtables. [LEVITT 2006:48] 
Fujimori later travelled to Japan, a nation of which he also held citizenship. When in 2004 Peru filed 
an extradition request and informed the OAS about it, the latter announced to have no intention of 
intervening whatsoever, since regarding the matter a purely bilateral one between Peru and Japan 
[XINHUA 28.03.2004]. Fujimori planned for a political comeback when he was arrested in Chile and 
extradited to Peru. There he had to stand trial for various charges. By July 2009 he had already 
been sentenced to several prison terms on charges ranging from bribing to being responsible for 
the killings perpetrated by a military death squad [NYT 21.07.2009; AFP 22.09.2007]. 
 
The OAS’s activities in this case can be termed somewhat questionable: a decision to monitor an 
election is tacitly to lend legitimacy to it and thus to signal acceptance of Fujimori’s seeking of a 
third term as president in contravention of the country’s constitution. And that is also why Resolu-
tion 1080 – would have been applicable since these political developments could well have been 
termed “occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political 
institutional process”. At least the OAS translated the severe deficiencies it observed in the first 
round into a boycott of the ensuing ballot. 
Although the Organization’s intention in initiating the mesa de diálogo was to bring about a peace-
ful and fairly constructive resolution of the crisis, this also established a forum which was doomed 
to be misused by the incumbent for a long-drawn-out distraction, while at the same time giving 
him the opportunity to further cement his political power in the background. The OAS was set to be 
fooled once more by Fujimori, who in 1992 had been successful with his autogolpe without being 
ultimately held accountable by the regional body. In fact, not the OAS but other developments 
were finally responsible for Fujimori’s demise and the ensuing political transition in Peru. 
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2.10.35 Colombia 2004 
SGOAS, PCOAS, Mission to Support the Peace Process, IACHR, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights; monitoring, negotiating, mediating, reviewing, verifying. 
In a surprise move and not to the pleasure of all its members the SGOAS struck a deal, entitled 
'Agreement on Monitoring the Peace Process in Colombia', with Colombian President Uribe in Janu-
ary 2004, regarding verification of the demobilisation-process of Colombian paramilitary groups277. 
Among the strongest critics278
In May 2004 the Colombian government eventually reached an agreement
 were Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina; they claimed that the 
deal would give the paramilitaries some respectability without really contributing to a pacification of 
the country [LND 23.01.2004; GREEN 05.02.2004]. 
The accord, later approved by the OAS, foresaw the establishment of an OAS mission to monitor 
the cease-fire, surrender, and demobilization of the paramilitaries known by the acronym AUC 
(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) [REUTERS 25.01.2004]. The accord was devised to last three 
years, with a possible further extension of such a time span. Although the mission was granted 
independence, it was at the same time barred from making political statements on Colombia's ac-
tivities [BBC MS 26.01.2004]. 
The Mission, termed 'OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia' was ultimately estab-
lished on 6th February 2004 [SDPRD 09.12.2004]. Sergio Caramagna, Chief of the Inspector's Of-
fice of the OAS in Colombia, said that the focus of the Mission was set to be placed on negotiations 
[XINHUA 03.02.2004]. 
When the PCOAS approved the monitoring project it was re-named 'Peace Process Support Mis-
sion'; the SGOAS was to report four times a year on its progress [EFE 08.02.2004]. 
In mid-February the mission kick-started its activities with visiting former members of the Cacique 
Nutibara Bloc, that back in November 2003 had given up its arms [JOYNES 18.02.2004]. When in 
mid-March the negotiation process went into trouble because the paramilitaries refused to congre-
gate in concentration camps to facilitate the verification, the OAS was asked to support the talks, 
enlarging its former role of mere monitor [REUTERS 15.03.2004]. 
279
                                                 
277 Colombia has for more than forty years been the scene of a struggle between the rightist paramilitary forces 
vs. the leftist rebels. Atrocities by the rebels had triggered the creation of the paramilitaries; however, it is 
generally believed that the latter had even more blood on their hands [EFE 28.02.2006]. 
278 For some arguments justifying this scepticism also prevalent among many NGOs see: LAWR 10.02.2004. 
279 For details of this agreement see: BBC MS 15.05.2004. 
 with the paramilita-
ries on their moving into concentration camps and a disarmament period lasting six months [XIN-
HUA 14.05.2004]. But lacking resources for providing the needed services forced the OAS to ap-
peal to the international community for support [XINHUA 20.05.2004]. 
When Mexico offered to act as guarantor in peace talks with the left-wing National Liberation Army 
(Ejército para la Liberación National – ELN), this was warmly welcomed by Colombia as well as the 
OAS, indicating at the same time that it might also aid in the ongoing peace initiative [XINHUA 
08.06.2004]. 
In the meantime President Uribe had provided the AUC with a 368km2 zone for retreat and set 
them a six months period in which to reach a settlement. Inside the zone the paramilitaries were 
allowed to hold on to their weapons [XINHUA 02.07.2004]. 
The next task for the OAS was to contribute to the establishment of a so-called ‘Security and Co-
existence Committee’ to oversee the concentration zone in cooperation with the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, the Colombian Defence Ministry, local authorities as well as members of 
the AUC [XINHUA 09.06.2004a]. The Committee, designed as a permanent entity, was to make 
decisions on logistical aspects, assess the security in the concentration zone, and was to make 
decisions on the internal regulation for coexistence, conduct of AUC members, as well as regarding 
the arrival of visitors in the area [BBC MS 05.07.2004]. 
When it had come to light that the Colombian government was conducting talks with two paramili-
taries wanted for extradition by the US on drug smuggling charges, the OAS demanded a list of all 
AUC negotiators. The provided list unsurprisingly did not contain the two men's name [LND 
23.08.2004]. 
Nevertheless the demobilisation process progressed fairly well and in December 2004 the OAS was 
in the position to announce that 3.000 paramilitaries had already been demobilized. At the same 
time the Mission’s Head, Caramagna, stated that the OAS is also taking recognition of the many 
concerns of Colombia's indigenous communities affected by the hostilities of the country's internal 
conflict [SDPRD 09.12.2004]. In the following days and weeks hundreds of additional paramilitaries 
turned in their weapons and vowed to never take up arms again [EFE 18.12.2004]. And by January 
2005 4.500 of approximately overall 15.000 AUC paramilitaries had been demobilized [SDPRD 
21.01.2005]. 
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However, funding remained was a major problem. Till March 2005 the OAS mission had received a 
meagre $ 600.000 from the US, one million dollars from the Netherlands, and $ 1.2 was provided 
by the Colombian government. Additionally, Sweden paid the salary of one official. Caramagna 
explained: 
[T]hree times that number are needed, as well as vehicles, communication media, and re-
gional offices. The peace process is taking off, albeit imperfectly, in certain regions. And 
we don't have the capacity to oversee it, which is really regrettable. [qtd. in: VIEIRA 
01.03.2005] 
Another stumbling block emerged when the OAS accepted Colombia's Justice and Peace Law which 
partly condoned past crimes of the paramilitaries [BBC MS 15.07.2005]; Human Rights Watch's 
Americas Head, Jose Miguel Vivanco, said the law was 'rewarding silence and punishing anyone 
who talks', and called on the OAS to rather suspend its activities in the extremely flawed process 
[qtd. in: BBC MS 02.08.2005]. 
Contrary to this recommendation the OAS soon thereafter announced that it intended to extend its 
mission to more effectively monitor the verification process [BBC MS 30.08.2005]. 
Again, in late September 2005 financial woes threatened to prematurely end OAS' engagement in 
Colombia [LND 30.09.2005], leading the SGOAS to make a request for additional funds [USFN 
12.10.2005]. According to an article by Latinnews Daily, the activities of the head of the OAS mis-
sion, Sergio Caramagna, had become increasingly divisive, especially after he had announced the 
lack of funding without prior consultation with the SGOAS; this sparked rumours that Caramagna 
might be replaced [LND 08.11.2005]. But for the time being Caramagna remained in his job. 
But OAS’ mission saw further complication. After a massacre, allegedly committed by paramilita-
ries, the OAS sent investigators to the spot to help clarify the events [AP 14.12.2005]. Two weeks 
later the OAS confirmed the responsibility of right-wing forces in the killings – which constituted a 
breach of the cease-fire [EFE 27.12.2005]. 
And while the demobilisation neared its finalization, the OAS Court of Human Rights issued a ruling 
on a massacre in 1990 committed by the paramilitaries and ordered the Colombian state to ac-
knowledge its responsibility for not preventing the slaying and ordered it to hand out $ 5.3 million 
to the families of the 43 victims [EFE 27.02.2006]. 
Another blow to the peace process followed shortly thereafter when OAS delegate Caramagna an-
nounced that contrary to the planned completion of the demobilization exercise, 4.000 of the all in 
all 20.000 paramilitaries had rearmed [EFE 28.02.2006]. Caramagna later that year also contested 
the reclassification of Juan Carlos Sierra by the Colombian Government as a demobilised paramili-
tary, and insisted that the Mission was unable to verify his demobilisation [LAWR 29.08.2006]. 
Still, OAS's commitment continued and was even enhanced when SGOAS Insulza ratified the ap-
proved strengthening of the Colombia mission during an on-site visit in July 2006 [USFN 
12.07.2006]. And when the demobilisation-process ran into difficulties because the paramilitaries 
broke off relations with the government due to a controversial transfer of paramilitary prisoners to 
a conventional jail, Caramagna offered to help restart the dialogue [LAWR 12.12.2006; XINHUA 
09.12.2006]. 
In January 2007 the Colombian government and the OAS signed an agreement establishing that 
the latter will continue to monitor the demobilization process for a further three years. Latinnews 
Daily commented on the prolongation the following: 
The agreement ... is crucial for the paramilitary peace process. ... Where the OAS to walk 
away, the peace process would lose all credibility, not least because the organisation has 
not been afraid to criticise many aspects of the process, especially its lack of transpar-
ency. [LND 16.01.2007] 
Shorty thereafter the smaller of the two main leftist guerrilla groups, the Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN), appealed to the UN and the OAS to engage in peace negotiations between itself 
and the Colombian government [JOYNES 26.01.2007]. The OAS undertook efforts aimed at estab-
lishing such negotiations, while conceding that talks between the bigger leftist guerrilla group FARC 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the government had broken down [USFN 
22.02.2007]. 
The OAS proved its critical position again in February 2007 when it stated that around 3.000 para-
militaries have joined 22 new criminal organizations; most of them were alleged to have been 
among those originally demobilized [BRONSTEIN 22.02.2007; see also USFN 22.02.2007]. 
Despite such statements, principally contributing to the missions objectivity, the head of the mis-
sion, Caramagna, again came under fire in May 2007 when Colombia's lower house of parliament 
voted for his dismissal, claiming that he stood by only, while the paramilitaries held orgies in gov-
ernment-granted safe havens. Yet the parliamentary resolution was of non-binding nature since 
only President Uribe held the power to take such a measure [GOODMAN 24.05.2007]. 
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The image of the government’s even-handedness was further tarnished when it was revealed that 
the police tapped not only the Colombian government's own peace commissioner, but also OAS 
representative Caramagna's telephone [LND 31.05.2007]. 
However, by the time of writing (July 2009) the Mission continues to perform its tasks and publish 
critical statements and reports. The same is true for reports published by the IACHR on the demo-
bilization process [SNS 27.07.2009; USFN 12.07.2007; NP 12.10.2007; XINHUA 24.09.2008]. 
 
There is no denying that the OAS’s activities have helped to objectify the Colombian peace process, 
especially with its vigilant scrutiny and political courage to publish critical statements and holding 
on to the much-criticized head of its Mission. The role of the Organization with its permanent mis-
sion turned out to be of such a nature as to cast aside suspicions that it performed a silent legitimi-
zation of the government’s policies. Together with other actors it performed useful intermediary 
tasks, delivering among other things regular reviews of the developments as observable only from 
within the process. 
However, by deciding to help support the process as devised by the Colombian government, the 
Organization implicitly accepted to sideline the leftist militants; a step carrying the potential of 
barring any equitable long-time solution to the conflict. 
The dire state of the Mission’s financing, moreover, reveal that the role it played did not enjoy 
over-all support. Given this half-hearted political will of its members, the continued OAS engage-
ment is all the more noteworthy. 
2.10.36 Venezuela 2002 
PCOAS, SGOAS, Diplomatic Mission, Observer Mission; IACHR; investigating, facilitating, 
mediating, observing, monitoring, reporting, verifying, evaluating. 
The short-lived coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in April 2002280
                                                 
280 For a brief presentation of the events surrounding the coup see LEVITT 2006:110-111]. 
 prompted the 
PCOAS to act with reference to Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter [RUDY 
2005:245]; this constituting the first time the IADC – adopted in September 2001 - was applied. 
Its Art. 20 reads: 
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously 
impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary Gen-
eral may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake a col-
lective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate. 
The Permanent Council, depending on the situation, may undertake the necessary diplo-
matic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy.  
If such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or if the urgency of the situation so war-
rants, the Permanent Council shall immediately convene a special session of the General 
Assembly. The General Assembly will adopt the decisions it deems appropriate, including 
the undertaking of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with the Charter of the Organiza-
tion, international law, and the provisions of this Democratic Charter. 
The necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of 
democracy, will continue during the process. 
However, preliminary reactions were quite distinct from each other, depending on the relations of 
respective governments with the controversial Venezuelan president and on the overall uncertainty 
of the course of events [LEVITT 2006:111-112]. 
However, the severity of events convinced the nations of the Hemisphere that action was required; 
thus it was decided to send a diplomatic mission to the country for investigation purposes. Addi-
tionally it was dagreed to convoke a special session of the General Assembly. However, by the time 
the session of the General Assembly was to take place, the crisis had already been defused with 
President Chávez reinstated. Hence, the OAS organ was only left with welcoming the end of the 
constitutional crisis [BERRY 2005:253]. 
However, the Organization's monitoring of and engagement in Venezuelan affairs did not end 
there. The OAS proved instrumental in establishing a national dialogue between the government 
and the political opposition, in the shape of the Coordinadora Democrática. Together with the 
Carter Center and the UN Development Programme the roundtable 'Mesa de Negociación y Acuer-
dos' was established bringing together six representatives of the government and the opposition. 
SGOAS Gaviria acted as facilitator. The three basic rules the participants were able to agree upon 
as agenda items were: strengthening of the electoral system, establishment of a truth commission, 
and investigation of the violence surrounding the coup. 
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While the opposition had lost its steam by advocating a two-month strike between December 2002 
and January 2003 but which had remained largely unobserved, talks led to an agreement to hold a 
recall referendum281
But the referendum itself was conducted to the satisfaction of the OAS. The Organization thus 
called on the opposition – which had claimed that fraud had taken place - to accept the results 
; a corresponding accord was approved in May 2003. The agreement also pro-
vided for international follow-up, oversight, and technical assistance for the implementation of the 
recall referendum [COOPER & LEGLER 2005:passim]. 
When Venezuela's opposition announced its plans to collect signatures for a referendum on the rule 
of President Chávez, Venezuela's National Electoral Council requested in late 2003 that the OAS 
and the Carter Center act as observers to the process of verification those signatures would be 
subjected to; however, their activities were put under the condition that findings won’t be pub-
lished without prior consultation [TEMPLE 15.01.2004; XINHUA 24.03.2004]. 
Soon the OAS encountered what it considered undue limitations, and asked the electoral authori-
ties to grant it greater access, in order to fulfil its verification task [FLETCHER 26.01.2004]. While 
the process continued to engender higher political tensions the opposition called for the presence of 
SGOAS which was thought to contribute to recompose the increasingly deteriorating process [XIN-
HUA 17.02.2004]. 
Political turmoil soared resulting in protests that left seven people dead and dozens wounded in 
clashes with the security forces. The OAS’ view of itself to act as ‘facilitator’ was becoming ever 
more questionable when the electoral authorities announced that only 1,8 million of the overall 
submitted 3,4 million signatures could eventually be verified, and around a further million could 
prove to be authentic only if those citizens would come forward to explicitly confirm their signa-
tures [DJIN 05.03.2004; XINHUA 19.03.2004]. 
Still, impressions of the Organization’s objectivity varied. So, in March the President of the National 
Electoral Council, Francisco Carrasquero, accused the OAS of siding with the opposition and the 
media in the verification process [XINHUA 19.03.2004]. At the same time, however, one of the 
Electoral Council’s five Directors, Jorge Rodriguez, of the maintained that ‘at no time has the CNE 
[National Electoral Council, my remark] considered the withdrawal of the international observation’ 
[qtd. in: XINHUA 24.03.2004]. 
When the Election Council presented the outlines of a process, scheduled to take place between 
27th and 30th March for allowing the contested signatures to be individually confirmed, the OAS - in 
tandem with the Carter Center - endorsed the procedure and pledged to also observe this upcom-
ing phase of verification [EFE 29.04.2004]. 
Still, when the OAS and the Carter Centre voiced criticism on some technical aspects of the process 
this triggered a stern warning by the National Electoral Council, hinting also to the possibility of 
disqualifying the organizations as observers [EFE 13.05.2004]. This was prompted by a call of 
Venezuela's presidential party that the head of the OAS observer mission steps down, since he had 
demonstrated a bias in favour of the opposition [DJIN 26.05.2004]. Finally, also Vice President Jose 
Vicente Rangel echoed that opinion one day before the confirmation phase was to be opened say-
ing: 
Either Jaramillo [Fernando Jaramillo, head of the OAS delegation; my remark] leaves or 
we won't accept their (OAS) presence in the country. It's as simple as that. [qtd. in: DJIN 
27.05.2004] 
All that said, both organizations – whose heads have been present during the reconfirmation proc-
ess - hailed the signature confirmation process after its completion. The National Electoral Council 
later announced that the confirmation of 2,451,821 signatures surpassed the requirement of 2,43 
million, meeting the conditionality for the holding of the referendum on the tenure of the President 
[[XINHUA 02.06.2004; XINHUA 05.06.2004]. 
Subsequently to that announcement, Venezuala’s Foreign Minister, Jesus Arnaldo Perez, asked the 
OAS to act as observer during the referendum [XINHUA 09.06.2004b]. The OAS mission tasked to 
observe the referendum was headed by Valter Pecly Moreira. Not all things went smoothly and in 
the run-up to the referendum the IACHR called on the Venezuelan government to guarantee the 
safety of reporters, after those had been the target of various attacks perpetrated by government 
supporters. However, also the OAS mission came under fire when contentions arose upon revela-
tions that the latest observer mission had been financed by the US, a staunch Chávez critic. There-
upon Venezuela demanded that financing be diversified and made transparent this time around [AP 
09.07.2004; BBC MS 03.08.2004]. 
                                                 
281 A recall referendum was foreseen in the constitution and had been suggested by the Venezuelan government 
and the Carter Center [COOPER & LEGLER 2005:437]. 
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which showed a 58% share in favour of the continuation of President Chávez' term [AP 
16.08.2004; EIU 17.08.2004]. 
In order to dispel the harsh criticism and scepticism of the opposition the OAS and the Carter Cen-
ter suggested a 'second audit' of the recall referendum. Jimmy Carter of the Carter Center ex-
plained somewhat ambivalently: 
[W]e have no reason to cast doubt on the integrity of the results... 
still the audit was thought to 
... address the opposition's reasonable doubts. [qtd. in: BBC MS 18.08.2004] 
The OAS and the Carter Center subsequently started to cross-check the results; nevertheless the 
Venezuelan opposition refused its cooperation since instead of looking into the voting machines 
themselves, the audit was conducted only by comparing the machines' results with the returns 
[WEBB-VIDAL 20.08.2004]. 
After having finished the auditing procedure both organizations confirmed Chavez' victory. Still, an 
OAS official noted that observers would continue investigating fraud allegations [EFE 21.08.2004]. 
The PCOAS however, endorsed the results with Resolution 869 on 26th August 2004  and welcomed 
the President's offer to foster national dialogue [OAS PC Res. 869], an offer tentatively accepted 
some days later by opposition leader Claudio Fermín [JOYNES 31.08.2004]. 
When SGOAS Gaviria in mid-September published a report in which he called on the Venezuelan 
authorities to continue investigating fraud allegations, prompting the political opposition to endorse 
the report [AP 14.09.2004]. 
Both organizations declined to send observers for the October 2004 local elections – citing the lack 
of time for requisite preparations as well as the opposition's distrust of the evaluation results as 
provided by them [REUTERS 15.10.2004]. Legislative elections the following December were moni-
tored and declared free and fais although President Chávez' party took all available seats due to 
the opposition's boycott. Irrespective thereof, the OAS election observers recommended that the 
electoral system be overhauled in order to strengthen its credibility, and thus to increase voter 
turnout, which had been a mere 25%. Unsurprisingly Venezuela's government rejected the pro-
posal [IKEDA 02.02.2006]. 
 
Having at its disposal the new instrument of the Inter-American Democratic Charter the OAS acted 
swiftly and decisively. Although the events had soon overtaken the process initiated, the OAS de-
cided to remain set on the political situation and advocated a political dialogue. This move demon-
strated the Organization’s commitment to address, if not resolve, the underlying causes of the po-
litical turmoil. The endeavours to facilitate a broad political dialogue – although being crowned with 
limited success – was intended to find a constructive solution to existing cleavages between the 
opposition and the political establishment. The same motivation seems to have been behind the 
OAS’ extensive and lengthy effort to support the objectification of public votes, a procedure which 
gained additional credibility via the cooperation with the Carter Center. In the end the conflict, 
although unresolved, was at least managed to remain largely peaceful; a circumstance at least 
partly attributable to the services of the regional body. 
Despite the enhanced pro-democracy machinery the OAS had been equipped with, the Venezuelan 
crisis was intrinsically domestic in nature and thus more intrusive acts by outside powers would 
with some justification have been perceived as unwarranted meddling in disregard of the sover-
eignty principle. 
2.10.37 Nicaragua 2004 
PCOAS, SGOAS, Chairman of the PCOAS, Diplomatic Mission, Special Envoy, Electoral Ob-
server Mission; mediating, negotiating, monitoring. 
Domestic developments aimed at deposing the Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolaños prompted 
some Central American nations in October 2004 to turn to the OAS to intervene for the sake of 
preserving democratic institutions [EFE 16.10.2004]. Subsequently, the PCOAS met and decided to 
send OAS interim Secretary General Luigi Einaudi and the PCOAS' President Aristides Royo to the 
Nicaraguan capital to hold talks i.a.  with members of the Supreme Court, the National Assembly, 
political parties, and members of the board of the comptroller-general's office. During its stay in 
Nicaragua, the mission was handed over some information by Bolaños concerning his election cam-
paign. 
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Originally, tensions had erupted after the Nicaraguan Comptroller's Office asked parliament to im-
peach the President since he had not properly complied with disclosure rules during his presidential 
campaign in 2001, a course of action considered unconstitutional282
Although the SGOAS even prolonged his visit to bring about a solution to the political stalemate 
[AFP 18.06.2005], his efforts were to no avail after President Bolaños had rejected his proposal, 
said to suggest the President's acquiescence to a stronger parliament in exchange for political 
peace [XINHUA 19.06.2005]. Upon reporting to the OAS Insulza said the country needed a broad 
 by various Nicaraguan political 
actors [EFE 17.10.2004; EFE 18.10.2004]. Bolaños’ supporters claimed that the endeavour to top-
ple him was rooted in his fight against corruption which i.a. has led to his predecessor's – Arnoldo 
Aleman’s – arrest and sentencing to 20 years in prison. Aleman loyalists, however, dominated the 
parliament [ALEMAN 18.10.2004; CASTILLO 27.09.2005]. 
The mission scored a success during a meeting with Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista opposition, 
who agreed to postpone the creation of a commission to study the impeachment request until the 
local elections, set for 7th November 2004 had been concluded [EFE 20.10.2004]. Thus, when the 
mission left after two days it voiced confidence in Nicaragua's democracy [TEMPLE 21.10.2004]. As 
soon as the OAS team had left the country Bolaños claimed, that the OAS was deeming the im-
peachment process against him illegal [LND 25.10.2004]. 
A proposal that the OAS act as guarantor in a national dialogue was rejected by the opposition 
leader Ortega, claiming this was an issue to be sorted out by Nicaraguans themselves [XINHUA 
02.11.2004]. 
Eventually, the OAS’ sent a small mission, no more than 45 monitors, to observe the local elections 
[EFE 02.11.2004]. 
Later, the PCOAS decided to keep monitoring the political developments in the nation [AMERICAS 
01.01.2005]. 
In January 2005 President Bolaños received a welcome reprieve delivered by another regional 
body.The Central American Court of Justice (CCJ) issued a ruling that ordered Nicaragua's National 
Assembly to hold in abeyance the proceedings initiated by the request from the office of the Comp-
trollers-General; additionally, it ordered that recently approved constitutional amendments that 
limit the presidential powers shall not be ratified. The judgment was subsequently opposed by Bo-
laños' political rivals. Thereupon Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Norman Caldera stated that a failure 
to abide to the CCJ ruling would make an invocation of the IADC likely [LAWR 11.01.2005]. 
However, chiefly because of many OAS member's unwillingness to make reference to the IADC, 
Bolaños asked the PCOAS to maintain 'a state of alert for democracy'; in the meantime he had 
agreed that two guarantors, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, the Archbishop of Managua, and 
Jorge Chedieck, Resident UN Coordinator, function as 'guarantors' and that a national dialogue be 
initiated [LAWR 18.01.2005]. 
With a strike in the capital Managua in April 2005 and increasing political pressure, Bolaños once 
again turned to the OAS to support him 'to end any attempt on the democratic order' [qtd. in: LND 
28.04.2005], whereupon the Organization issued a statement that called on the political and social 
forces to resolve their differences peacefully [SDPRD 28.04.2005]. 
Meanwhile, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court had decided to declare the CCJ's decision as null and 
void, and classified the already approved reforms as valid. On the President's call the OAS sent two 
officials of the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs to hold talks. Latin American Weekly 
Report commented on those developments by criticizing OAS's execution of the IADC: 
As drafted, the Inter-American Charter can ostracise a government that arises from a 
coup, or one which violates its own constitution. Other than applying diplomatic pressure, 
the OAS has so far been unable (and in fact unwilling) to try to apply the charter to situa-
tions where rules are bent within a formally constitutional framework - as seen in the ac-
cumulation of power by the Sandinistas and Liberals in Nicaragua. [LAWR 24.05.2005] 
In June 2005 Bolaños reiterated his call on the OAS for support and urged that a mission be sent to 
his country after a previous one in May had largely failed [JOYNES 07.06.2005; JOYNES 
09.06.2005]. Agreement was finally forthcoming to send a mission, headed by the newly elected 
SGOAS José Miguel Insulza [LAWR 07.06.2005]. On the same occasion the General Assembly in-
voked Art. 18 of the IADC which provides for the SGOAS or PCOAS to arrange visits or other steps, 
with the prior consent of the concerned government in case situations arise that may affect the 
democratic exercise of power [RUDY 2005:238]. However, Nicaragua's National Assembly, domi-
nated by political opponents of Bolaños, explicitly rejected the involvement of the OAS [LND 
08.06.2005]. Before the mission arrived, the Comptroller-General issued another call on the Na-
tional Assembly to impeach the President [LND 15.06.2005]. 
                                                 
282 For the view that the effort was played by the book see: LAWR 26.10.2004. 
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dialogue; for this purpose he announced to name a high-level representative [SDPRD 22.06.2005]; 
he finally appointed former Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo to the job [EFE 28.06.2005]. 
While the opposition campaigned for the President's immunity to be lifted, Bolaños suggested a 
referendum to be facilitated and supervised by the OAS that would offer the people the opportunity 
to decide on the contested constitutional reforms [LAWR 12.07.2005; AFP 15.07.2007]. 
When the National Assembly took further steps to impeach283
Tensions subsided somewhat during the following months and the OAS in summer 2006 sent an 
Electoral Observation Mission to the country well ahead of the presidential elections scheduled for 
November 2006. The Chief of the Mission, Gustavo Fernández, prepared a pre-electoral report, 
citing various challenges
 the President Foreign Minister Cal-
dera called on the OAS to stand up against this violation of the IADC [GEDDA 02.09.2005], where-
upon the Organization issued a strongly worded statement warning that “[t]he escalation of the 
institutional and political crisis in Nicaragua threatens the country's democratic governance, the 
legitimate exercise of power, and the rule of law” [qtd. in: DANIEL 10.09.2005]. In an accompany-
ing resolution the PCOAS urged the parties involved to initiate a constructive dialogue and respect 
the authority of President Bolaños while keeping to the OAS Charter and IADC [SNS 12.09.2005; 
OAS PC Res. 892]. 
Although the National Assembly started to lift immunity from members of Bolaños' government, it 
simultaneously signalled its willingness to hold talks [LAWR 27.09.2005]. 
As a consequence of OAS mediation efforts Nicaragua's National Assembly approved in October 
2005 the Framework Law which stipulated that the controversial reforms are held in abeyance until 
after the next government was supposed to have taken office (January 2007) [LAWR 08.08.2006]. 
284
2.10.38 Ecuador 2005 
 while maintaining that the chances remained intact for free and fair 
elections. Nicaragua's Permanent Representative at the OAS on the same occasion requested that 
another pre-election report be drafted and the process be vigilantly monitored [USFN 01.08.2006]. 
Sandinista presidential candidate Daniel Ortega – having opposed the Organization’s involvement 
from the start - thereupon claimed that the OAS aimed at discrediting the election on behest of 
Bolaños, since he – Ortega -  was leading in the polls; earlier Ortega had also said that the country 
was in no need of OAS election monitoring [LND 13.09.2006]. 
Venezuela's continued support on behalf of the Sandinistas and the US's opposition against them, 
made the OAS declare its concern about interventions by foreign nations (without singling out any 
by name) in the electoral process [ALEMAN 26.09.2006]. Another reprimand was targeted at Nica-
ragua's Election Council, when the head of the OAS Mission told it in mid-October to issue another 
200.000 identity cards to voters which still had not received them for the upcoming elections [LND 
13.10.2006]. 
The voting itself, which brought Ortega to power, was classified by the OAS to have been peaceful 
and orderly with a huge voter turnout [USFN 06.11.2006]. 
 
The OAS’ record in handling the matter has to be judged as patchy. Although it initiated various 
efforts at resolving the domestic crisis, its activities sometimes lacked credibility, as showcased for 
example by the meagre size of the electoral observer mission it sent for monitoring the locals elec-
tions or the belated invocation of the IADC. At the same time it has to be admitted that with the 
expressed unwillingness of one of the main contenders to accept OAS’ services the Organization’s 
possibilities were impaired considerably from the very beginning. That is why the OAS has to be 
credited for contributing to bring about a type of political moratorium with the Framework Law 
which ensured that the battle be decided by the voters in the coming regular election. 
PCOAS, IACHR, High-level Mission headed by SGOAS and PCOAS Chairman, Monitoring 
Missions, Electoral Observer Mission; investigating, facilitating, monitoring. 
When President Lucio Guitierrez in 2004 accused judges of the Supreme Court to have favoured 
opponents during a botched attempt to impeach him for misuse of public funds, the nation's Con-
gress voted in December of the same year to replace the judges, and later also nominated their 
replacements. This move was rejected by the OAS which asked that its legality be scrutinized and 
that a respective report be prepared for the IACHR [XINHUA 02.03.2005]. The president subse-
quently sent two envoys for representing his cause versus the inter-American body [AP 
02.03.2005]. 
                                                 
283 For details on the chosen measures of the opposition see LAWR 13.09.2005. 
284 Among those challenges were: the conflict between branches of government, the partisan composition of 
electoral bodies, an imprecise electoral law, an electoral registry with deficiencies, a slow and inappropriate 
voter registration process, operational and logistical limitations, as well as a polarized and confrontational politi-
cal tradition [USFN 01.08.2006]. 
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However, in a turn of events Gutierrez himself was removed and fled to the Brazilian embassy. In a 
meeting outside of parliament congressmen decided to oust the president. Their step was based on 
Gutierrez's disbanding of the Supreme Court and his call for a state of emergency which in their 
view posed a violation of the constitution. They justified their move with a clause in the nation's 
constitution that allows Congress to remove the president for 'abandonment of the post'. The OAS 
reacted immediately and gave Ecuador 24 hours to elucidate the situation [IKEDA 21.04.2005]. 
And when Vice-President Alfredo Palacio took over the presidency the OAS refused to recognize 
him [LAND 22.04.2005]. 
When the PCOAS postponed any further decision but to continue to study the situation, this foot-
dragging caused criticism from various quarters [EFE 22.04.2005]. However, the following day the 
OAS took the decision to dispatch a special mission to Ecuador, tasked with investigating Gutierrez' 
removal [AFP 23.04.2005]. This high-level mission was headed by acting SGOAS Luigi Enaudi and 
OAS Permanent Council Chairman Alberto Borea and planned to hold talks with various actors. 
After meeting Palacio the OAS Permanent Representative to Ecuador, Jose Maria Ocampo, said: 
“[t]he president's response was suitable. He has explained what occurred” [qtd. in: LOPEZ 
27.04.2005]. By late April the OAS Mission concluded its probe and praised the democratic creden-
tials of the Ecuadorian people. And while not yet recognizing the new government, the OAS made it 
plain that it intended to cooperate with it [EFE 30.04.2005]. 
However, the report on the Ecuadorian crisis as presented by the special mission in May 2005 also 
contained i.a. recommendations to strengthen the political institutions; those suggestions were 
flatly rejected by the Ecuadorian Representative to the OAS and other lawmakers, and dubbed 
'meddling' in the internal affairs [LOPEZ 12.05.2005]. 
This notwithstanding the OAS approved a resolution on 20th May which praised the country's deci-
sion to strengthen governance and ensure respect for the rule of law; additionally, the cooperative 
behaviour of the new leadership was acknowledged. The text, however, made reference to the 
'progressive deterioration of democratic institutions' that preceded the change of leadership 
[SDPRD 23.05.2005]. With that move the OAS 'essentially recognized' the new government, as the 
Economist Intelligence Unit judged [EIU 24.05.2005]. 
Regarding the delicate restructuring of the Supreme Court the OAS sent a mission – upon Ecua-
dor’s request - comprising Costa Rican Legislator Sonia Picado and Chilean Senator Antonio Viera 
Gallo, to monitor the developments [DJIN 19.08.2005]. 
However, when President Palacio's sent his request to approve plans for a referendum deciding on 
the question if a constitutional assembly may rewrite the constitution, not to the Congress but in-
stead to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, he was rebuffed and the Congress urged hereupon the 
OAS to 'act immediately to activate the mechanism of collective action in defence of institutional 
order and democracy in Ecuador' and for this purpose to send a mission to the country [DJIN 
27.10.2005]. Upon that the OAS thus decided to send its Secretary-General to help facilitate a 
solution [BARBEL 01.11.2005]. Tensions subsided somewhat when Palacio announced to postpone 
the plebiscite, scheduled for mid-December, until January [JOYNES 08.11.2005]. Tempers cooled 
further down when a new Supreme Court was elected in late November [LND 29.11.2005]. How-
ever, when Congress voted against the referendum this caused again a tense atmosphere, result-
ing also in some cabinet resignations [LND 08.12.2005]. 
In early 2006 and with the aim of smoothing the political tensions, the OAS signed a cooperation 
agreement with Ecuador's Supreme Electoral Tribunal. This agreement contained the commitment 
to extend technical electoral assistance for the upcoming general elections, scheduled for October 
that year [USFN 10.02.2006]. However, the head of the electoral observers, Rafael Bielsa, caused 
some controversy. Civic groups alleged that Bielsa acted partially and refused to investigate reports 
of possible fraud; subsequently his resignation was demanded [EFE 14.10.2006]. After the first 
round of voting in the presidential election, Bielsa declared that no evidence of fraud was had been 
detected [LND 18.10.2006]. 
One of the presidential candidates, due to stand in a run-off, Rafael Correa, called on the OAS to 
replace Bielsa, who in his opinion was ‘guilty of unpardonable actions and omissions’ during the 
first round of voting. Correa also blamed SGOAS Insulza for ratifying Bielsa's findings [SOLANO 
30.10.2006]. 
Although not heeding that demand directly, Bielsa in the end was not participating in the further 
election process; instead, Jose Antonio Viera Gallo acted as spokesman and head of the mission on 
election day. The electoral observers judged the vote to have been conducted freely and calmly, 
recognizing Correa's victory, while at the same time drawing attention to the low voter turn-out 
[BBC MS 28.11.2006a; BBC MS 28.11.2006b; USFN 27.11.2006]. 
 
The OAS intervened when the internal developments seemed to impair the democratic order. How-
ever, it desisted from strong actions after the acting President has been removed by Congress in a 
– to say the least - controversial move. Political will for decisive action was obviously lacking. In 
retrospect the OAS was criticized for its inactivity. Michael Schifter of the think-tank Inter-American 
Dialogue believes that the OAS could have acted but, '[t]he fact is that nobody wanted to' [qtd. in: 
AFP 04.06.2005]. It was later claimed by former President Gutierrez that the OAS had refused to 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES | CASES 
136 
talk with him, indicating clearly with which party the organization had decided to side [LND 
13.06.2005]. 
However, the OAS continued to mediate between the presidency and the legislative branch in order 
to prevent further extra-legal developments in the conflict. Another measure meant to create con-
fidence between the contenders was the overseeing of the elections. The indirect and tacit with-
drawal of the OAS’ Electoral Observer Mission during the election, showed the Organization’s re-
sponsiveness; hereby tensions were eased and the credibility of the ballot was increased. 
2.10.39 Peru vs. Venezuela 2006 
PCOAS, SGOAS, GAOAS; mediating. 
When Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez threatened to withdraw his country's Ambassador in Peru 
if presidential candidate Alan Garcia (having unfavourably compared his opponent Ollanta Humala 
with Chávez during the election campaign) would win the upcoming election, Peru's President Ale-
jandro Toledo asked the OAS to condemn this interference on the basis of the IADC [LND 
30.05.2006] as meddling [LANS 05.05.2006]. 
Chávez continued calls on Peru's electorate to vote for Humala was to be addressed by the OAS’ 
36th General Assembly, scheduled for early June. Peru insisted that Venezuela violated the OAS 
Charter with disregarding the non-intervention principle285
While both countries had already withdrawn their ambassadors, SGOAS Insulza, talking to journal-
ists during the 36th OAS General Assembly
. Chávez in turn claimed that Garcia's 
statements constituted 'aggression' [EFE 03.06.2006]. 
286
2.10.40 Ecuador vs. Colombia 2006 
 voiced his opinion on the issue and discounted Peru's 
claim: 
You have to distinguish between what we would call purely verbal intervention ... and in-
terventions that mean concrete actions to alter the results of elections. [qtd. in: IRIZARRY 
04.06.2006] 
Although the head of the Electoral Observation Mission in Peru, Lloyd Axworthy, had also criticized 
Chávez’ comments, ultimately Peru was talked into backing down from its request to secure a con-
demnation of Venezuela, after realizing a lack of support among most members [VAPRD 
05.06.2006; BACHELET 06.06.2006a]. 
After candidate Garcia had been elected President he declared to be looking forward to respectful 
bilateral relations with Venezuela, striking a distinctly conciliatory note [BARBEL 07.06.2006]. 
 
Although the differences between Peru and Venezuela in this case were subsiding mainly because 
of Garcia’s decision to smooth over them after having been elected President, SGOAS Insulza’s 
position helped to calm down the existing tensions and prevent further escalation. Nevertheless his 
position is questionable from a legal point of view insofar as the OAS Charter in its article 19 
states: 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State [emphasis added]. 
PCOAS, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Commission Delegation; providing ex-
perts. 
To fight coca production Colombia had taken to large-scale spraying of glyphosate to destroy the 
crop. In December 2005 bilateral talks with its neighbour Ecuador which had complained about the 
harmful effects of the aerial fumigation on its territory had led to a bilateral agreement to suspend 
the practice and conduct respective studies to ascertain its actual effect on human health and the 
environment. In disregard of this accord Colombia continued the spraying which in turn prompted 
Ecuador in late 2006 to turn to the OAS for remedy [LUCAS 19:12.2006]. 
                                                 
285 A similar claim had been voiced by Nicaragua in May 2006; it was argued that Venezuela's shipment of sub-
sidized fertilizers was aimed at supporting Nicaragua's Sandinistas and as such would constitute outlawed for-
eign funding of a party. Venezuela's President moreover had had openly declared his support for the Sandinista 
presidential candidate Daniel Ortega [LAWR 09.05.2006]. 
286 For some details on the quid-pro-quo of both countries and attitudes of some other OAS members see 
BACHELET 06.06.2006b. 
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In January 2007, after Ecuador had recalled its ambassador in Colombia the previous month, the 
OAS agreed to look into the evidence Ecuador had earlier provided to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights [JOYNES 05.01.2007; BBC MS 27.04.2007]. 
In a meeting on the sidelines of the inauguration of Daniel Ortega as Nicaragua's President, both 
Presidents met and reached an agreement comprising the following three elements: 
 
• establishment of a commission consisting of representatives of both countries and of the 
OAS which would be informed each time Colombia intends do spray the border area in or-
der to determine if the spraying would cross into Ecuador; 
• conducting a comprehensive study of glyphosates’ effects on human health287
• gathering of testimony on both sides of the border [LND 11.01.2007]. 
; and 
 
Nevertheless Colombia soon afterwards resumed its spraying activities prompting Ecuador to send 
yet another diplomatic complaint to its neighbour [BBC MS 08.02.2007]. Only after Colombia had 
again suspended the fumigations, Ecuador sent back its ambassador [BBC MS 27.04.2007]. How-
ever, unsatisfied with Colombia’s on-and-off approach, Ecuador in the meantime had asked the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to the highest attainable Standard of physical and mental Health, 
Paul Hunt, to look into the matter. The Special Rapporteur consequently called for a halt to the 
spraying [VIEIRA 25.09.2007]. And in late March 2008 Ecuador filed suit at the ICJ since it sus-
pected that Colombia once again had restarted its aerial fumigations [EFE 31.03.2008]. 
 
OAS’ contribution to resolving the dispute between Ecuador and Colombia was minimal. In face of 
the circumscribed extend of the matter - focusing primarily on technical issues - the Organization’s 
willingness to intervene was modest only. Another element probably inhibiting the OAS’s leeway 
was the strong US support for Colombia’s stance. The US is financing the so-called ‘Plan Colombia’ 
in whose framework coca production is targeted – of which the spraying was one component. 
The ineffectiveness of the services rendered by the OAS made Ecuador to turn to other third par-
ties for help. Although the occasion was not the first time that the OAS proved incapable of sub-
stantially influence the resolution of conflicts between two of its members, this incident again laid 
bare the Organization’s inadequacies.  
2.11 Recent OAS Developments and Activities 
Generally speaking the role the OAS played in the previous past in security matters has changed 
first in terms of quality and second in terms of political importance. As demonstrated above, the 
security concept entertained by the OAS underwent considerable change. Its approach has been 
fairly broadened to include the protection and the promotion of representative democracy and hu-
man rights, rounded up in the concept of ‘human security’288
…we reaffirm that the basis and purpose of security is the protection of human beings. Se-
curity is strengthened when we deepen its human dimension. Conditions for human secu-
rity are improved through full respect for people’s dignity, human rights, and fundamental 
freedoms, as well as the promotion of social and economic development, social inclusion, 
and education and the fight against poverty, disease, and hunger. 
. In this regard the Declaration on 
Security in the Americas, approved on 28th October 2003 states the following (II,4,e) : 
289
                                                 
287 The following month the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense published findings that 
strongly indicated the toxicity of the spraying; the results were made available to the US Congress. The US was 
actively supporting the so-called Plan Colombia, which targeted the eradication of the coca cultivation and pro-
duction of which also the aerial fumigation was part of [PRN 14.02.2007]. 
288 However, an early harbinger of this path of evolution was the Inter-American Peace Committee’s re-
empowering by the Fifth MCMFA in 1959 which had tasked the Committee to examine the connection between 
human rights violations and non-exercise of democracy, as well as the interdependence of underdevelopment 
and political stability (see above). 
289 Compare also the Special Meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric Security, dealing with appropriate ap-
proaches to international security and the preparation for the Special Conference on Security and i.a. Brazil’s 
and Jamaica’s request to take into account the concept of human security [OAS PC 2000d]. 
 
However, at the same time, the traditional clout the OAS wielded in various disputes, especially 
bilateral ones, has clearly diminished. This observation is implicitly confirmed in a document of the 
PCOAS’ Committee on Hemispheric Security, dealing with finding common approaches to interna-
tional security in the hemisphere: 
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With regard to the possibilities of conflicts between states, delegates pointed out that, de-
spite the progress made by the Hemisphere in recent decades, it was important to sustain 
efforts to prevent such disputes, to make systematic use of existing mechanisms for over-
coming controversies, and to upgrade the inter-american system’s capacity in this specific 
area. [original emphasis; OAS PC 2000d] 
TACSAN argues that it was inter alia the OAS’ failure in the Malvinas/Falkland conflict between Ar-
gentina and Great that sustainably undermined hemispheric confidence in the organization. DIAZ 
however makes out another turning point, finding that the Latin nations started to turn to other 
fora a in reaction to the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; while the US followed suit 
after the Nicaraguan crisis at the end of the 1970s [DIAZ 1994:190]. The OAS’s lack of successful 
involvement was partly replaced with the contribution of other third-party actors in the region, 
notably by the UN. Especially the world body’s success in Nicaragua and El Salvador helped to raise 
its profile in a region that was formerly proud to manage its own affairs and its own conflicts by 
itself290
The role of the UN was further strengthened with the end of the Cold War and bipolarity
 [TACSAN 1997:491]. 
291
Alongside the UN sub-regional entities gained in importance in the field of conflict resolution. For 
example during the 1980s the Contadora group
. Thus, 
the main reason prevailing during the previous decades to shun the involvement of the UN in inter-
American affairs, was no longer present, and the means and resources available to the world body 
and easily outstripping those of the OAS were welcome [compare also DIAZ 1994:187]. 
292 played an instrumental role in bringing about 
peace in the Central American conflict, due to the OAS’ inability to do so293
Today, various sub-regional instruments dealing with security
 [CALVERT 1994:172].  
294
Parallel to historical developments and the Organization’s redefined role, the OAS’ main contractual 
tool in maintaining peace and security – the Rio Treaty – diminished in relevance and impor-
tance
 have developed and are recog-
nized by the OAS as effective security mechanisms [OAS PC 2003]. 
The cooperation between the OAS and CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market ) 
showcased the evolving division of labour. Formal relations started in 1992 and since then the two 
organizations met several times. Through the cooperation in regard of the Haitian conflict in the 
1990s and early 21st century the relations were further strengthened. Among a plethora of areas fit 
for cooperation the two organizations also listed ‘multidimensional security’ on the occasion of the 
first ever working meeting between OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza and CARICOM Sec-
retary-General Edwin Carrington in early March 2007 [USFN 02.03.2007]. 
295, not least because of its lack of inclusiveness296 [OAS PC 2003:5]. This opinion was also 
voiced by the OAS itself297
                                                 
290 The Mexican representative to the PCOAS’ Committee on Hemispheric Security pointed explicitly to the sub-
ordination of the OAS to the UN [OAS PC 2000d] in a rare and uncommon clarification of the international legal 
realities (compare for instance Article 53 UN Charter). 
291 For the historic antagonism between the OAS and the UN see for example: DIAZ 1994:83-90. 
292 In 1983 Contadora was created by Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. WEHR & LEDERACH describe 
its main purpose “to detach Central American conflicts from larger US-Soviet competition and to shift them 
from military to political and diplomatic levels” [WEHR & LEDERACH 1991:88]. 
293 DIAZ describes this sidelining of the OAS with the following words: “[t]he OAS was completely bypassed in 
the initial stages of the Central American peace process” [DIAZ 1994:186]. 
294 Among those are the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security (1995); the Caribbean Regional Security 
System (1996); the declaration by the MERCOSUR countries together with Bolivia and Chile of being a peace 
zone (1999), and the Andean Charter for Peace and Security (2002) [OAS PC 2003:5]. 
295 During the Special Meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric Security, held in November 2000, the dimin-
ished importance of the Rio Treaty and the Pact of Bogotá were found to be “in direct contrast to the continuing 
force and effect of the OAS Charter” [OAS PC 2000e]. 
296 The US’ evaluation of the Rio Treaty seems to contrast with this general view. In October 2003 the US Un-
dersecretary of State Marc Grossman opined that the Rio Treaty “remains an essential component of our secu-
rity architecture because it is the legally binding security instrument within our hemisphere” [qtd. in: DJIN 
29.10.2003]. 
297 For a comprehensive evaluation by the OAS member states concerning the Rio Treaty and the Pact of Bogotá 
see the analysis of the answers to the respective questionnaire distributed to the member states by the CHS, 
available at: http://www.oas.org/csh/english/documents/cp10315e08.doc. 
 [OAS PC 2000d]. The Dow Jones summed it up with the following 
words: 
Many countries consider the treaty [the Rio Treaty, my remark] an outdated, military-
based relic that was used as a way for the U.S. government to justify uprooting commu-
nist groups in Central America during the Cold War era. Its usefulness also was called into 
question when countries tried unsuccessfully to invoke it after Britain sent troops to recap-
ture the Falkland Islands from Argentina in 1982. [DJIN 29.10.2003] 
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The OAS member states in October 2003 entrusted the CHS in the ‘Declaration on Security in the 
Americas’ with the study and assessment of the Rio Treaty and the Pact of Bogotá [OAS 
DSA:IV,48]. 
Although the eventual impact the OAS today exerts is indeed limited, the region’s awareness of the 
negative consequences that violent conflict might bring about has been sharpened. The UPD, in its 
Study on the Problems and Risks, and on Conflict Prevention and Resolution has defined three main 
arguments to prevent conflict in its violent form: 
In ethical terms, there is the irreversible loss of life caused by armed conflict. Politically, 
there is the fact that armed confrontations develop in unforeseen ways. For while their 
beginnings are clearly defined, their evolution and end are far from clear, and given the 
interconnectedness of today’s world, their impact inevitably extends beyond the physical 
borders within which they occur. Economically, there is the fact that it is always less costly 
to anticipate and prevent conflict than to deal with its consequences. On those grounds, it 
may be said that conflict prevention between states encompasses all measures to prevent 
disputes between states from deteriorating into armed aggression. [OAS PC 2003:1] 
The UPD differentiates in its study conflicts between states, and conflicts arising from domestic 
factors [OAS PC 2003:2]. The following recommendations are made to prevent and resolve violent 
conflicts: 
 
• Encouraging processes of political and trade cooperation and integration (interdepend-
ence)298
• Strengthening democracy as the form of government of the OAS member states (democ-
ratic peace) and 
; 
• Reinforcing the rule of law in the hemisphere. [OAS PC 2003:11-12] 
 
In recent years the OAS came to define various so-called ‘new’ or ‘non-traditional threats’ that may 
affect the countries of the hemisphere in a manner that touches – one way or the other – on their 
security: 
 
• terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption299, asset 
laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons300
• extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population that erode social 
cohesion and affect stability and democracy as well as undermine the security of states
; 
301
                                                 
298 When lack thereof for example led to a dispute between Argentine and Uruguay about the construction of a 
paper mill or to a battle of words between Peru and Venezuela, SGOAS Insulza urged the Hemisphere in May 
2006 to consider installing a conflict resolution mechanism to deal with non-sovereignty disputes that would 
allow the OAS to offer support in the event of bilateral conflicts [USFN 04.05.2006]. 
299 In 1996 the OAS had adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. This Convention commits 
its signatories to criminalize corrupt practices, pledges cooperation on extradition, mutual legal assistance and 
forfeiture for corruption-related crimes; additionally it foresees the implementation of various transparency 
measures [BBC MS 16.01.2004]. For the text of the Convention see: 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html and for the attendant status of ratifications see 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html both retrieved on 28.08.2007. During the 2004 General 
Assembly which focused i.a. on corruption the participants underlined that corruption “jeopardizes democracy 
and democratic governance, weakens institutions, undermines economic and social development and the fight 
against poverty, erodes public trust, and disrupts political stability” [qtd. in: GREEN 12.07.2004, emphasis 
added]. 
300 OAS had in 1997 adopted the Inter-American Convention against the Fabrication and Illegal Trafficking of 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials; the first Conference of the Convention was held 
in March 2004 [XINHUA 09.03.2004]. The Convention provides for a comprehensive licensing system, for the 
criminalization of illicit manufacturing and trafficking,  for relevant information exchanges, and for international 
cooperation [USFN 09.08.2006]. The Convention is accessible via 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-63.html as retrieved on 29.08.2007. It went into force in 1998 
[SNS 14.08.2005]. In 1999 followed the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons 
Acquisitions [see: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-64.html retrieved on 29.08.2007]. This con-
vention imposes two main obligations on the state parties: first, the parties are required to provide annual 
reports to the OAS depository containing its imports and exports of weapons as covered by the Convention and 
second, the parties are to notify the depository of its arms acquisitions as covered by the convention – be it via 
imports or national production and within a 90-day period starting with the incorporation into the inventory of 
the armed forces [USDS 2002]. 
; 
301 One effort in that regard was undertaken by the OAS in early 2005 when it established an office tasked with 
the protection of the human rights of people of African descent; additionally, the 'Special Rapporteurship on the 
Rights of Persons of African Descent and on Racial Discrimination' was to raise the awareness of the problem. 
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• natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other health risks, and en-
vironmental degradation; 
• trafficking in persons; 
• attacks to cyber security; 
• the potential for danger to arise in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime 
transport of potentially hazardous materials (toxic waste, radioactive materials, petroleum 
etc.); and 
• the possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery by terrorists [OAS DSA:II,4,m]. 
 
As emphasized earlier, the most remarkable advances of the OAS in regard of re-conceptualizing  
its approaches toward maintaining peace and security in the region, have been recorded in the 
area of democracy-promotion, as elaborated below. 
2.11.1 Democracy 
Security has in recent years generally come to be defined much more broadly than in the period of 
the Cold War. The concept of Human Security – developed by the UN Development Programme in 
the 1990s -  goes well beyond traditional meanings of security and includes several spheres: econ-
omy, food, health, environment, person, society, and politics [KRAUSE 2005:2-3]. Beside this 
comprehensive general approach to security and as such to conflicts as well, proponents of the so-
called Democratic Peace are maintaining that democratically governed states do not go to war 
among themselves. Although the theory is far from being uncontested302, many scholars uphold 
that war has transformed into a very inefficient and costly way of resolving conflicts. Rationalists 
argue that democracies are constituted in such a way as to make violent disputes unlikely. Liberals 
on the other hand opine that democracies share values and ideals and perceive themselves as fel-
lows and not as foes [OWEN 2004:608-609]. Projected onto the domestic scenes, democracies 
might be poised to produce a type of governance which reflects the desires and the will of the peo-
ple much more authentically than other political systems. Inspired by such insights303
                                                                                                                                                        
The new office was to closely cooperate with the IACHR and formulate corresponding recommendations [SDPRD 
28.02.2005]. 
El Salavador's decision to bring the issue of the so-called 'maras' – the ever more increasing phenomenon of 
street gangs, contributing to lawlessness and also discernible among several other American countries – to the 
OAS, may be classified to belong to one of the newly perceived threats [EFE 30.11.2005]. This notion was con-
firmed when Major General Keith Huber, Director of the Inter-American Defense College and Assistant Secretary 
General listed juvenile crime in general and the maras in particular as one of the new security challenges the 
OAS would have to face [USFN 03.10.2006]. 
A general reaffirmation that inequality, social exclusion, and extreme poverty contributed to endanger security 
and stability were aired during a seminar by OAS entities held in March 2007 [USFN 12.03.2007]. 
302 See RAY 1998 for a relatively recent overview. 
303 Compare also LAGOS & RUDY 2004:288. 
 the OAS has 
increased its activities in respective fields since the 1980s and has in that period approved various 
documents dealing with democracy. However, democracy as such, had for decades not occupied 
the place and position it probably should have held as the hallmark of a comprehensive security 
concept - especially given the Democratic Peace paradigm mentioned above. Still, one has equally 
to take into consideration that for lengthy periods many states in the region were governed by 
military regimes – a factor making the championing of democracy quite unlikely, no matter the 
otherwise positive effects of that type of political system. The conflict cases presented have amply 
demonstrated that in the past the conflict transformation capacity was directed toward the regula-
tion of bilateral disputes and overwhelmingly toward the threat perceived to disseminate from 
communism [compare also PECK 1998:139]. 
Mention has already been made of the provisions of the COAS concerning democracy. Nevertheless 
it is helpful to look at the evolution of the concept in a coherent chronological manner. The original 
version of the COAS approved in 1948 already contained the following paragraph: “The solidarity of 
the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organiza-
tion of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy”. The effec-
tive exercise of representative democracy is claimed to be a ‘requirement’ of OAS’ aims and of 
inter-American solidarity. The numerous military regimes that took hold in the region in later years 
proved that this OAS provision lacked any legal obligation and makes abundantly clear that the 
political will to enforce it was for long periods absent. However, as will be shown below, at least the 
theoretical concept itself gained ever more prominence on the agenda of the OAS. 
However, LEVITT finds: 
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For much of the organization's history, these provisos [as enshrined in the COAS, my re-
mark] amounted to lip service at best and cynical realpolitik at worst. [LEVITT 2006:94, 
original emphasis] 
The evolution of the democratic paradigm took another step forward when the Foreign Ministers 
met in 1959 for the Fifth MCMFA to discuss the political tensions in the Caribbean. They arrived at 
the conclusion that the existence of ‘non-democratic regimes’ violated the founding principles of 
the OAS. The Declaration of Santiago further held that: 
...the exercise of power without a fixed term and with the manifest intent of perpetuation, 
is incompatible with the effective exercise of democracy. 
Later, the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) and the Additional Protocol to the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1988) further 
enhanced the concept. The Conventions do not stop at guaranteeing the right to hold and vote in 
periodic elections, but also enshrine the broader concept of democracy insofar as they provide for 
freedom of thought, opinion, expression, assembly, and participation in government amongst oth-
ers [BERRY 2005:249-250]. 
When the COAS was amended in 1985 the idea of ‘representative democracy’ was sustained when 
the following was included in the preamble: “…representative democracy is an indispensable condi-
tion for the stability, peace and development of the region”. Thus, direct connection is observed 
between ‘peace’ and representative democracy, i.e. the latter is considered an ‘indispensable’ con-
dition of the first. Since peace and security of the region was always a prominent purpose of the 
OAS (see above) it is only consistent that the Protocol of Cartagena amending the COAS included 
as a further purpose [Art. 2,b]: “To promote and consolidate representative democracy” while still 
upholding that this ought to happen “with due respect for the principle of nonintervention.” Irre-
spective thereof, PECK opines that with the 1985 Charter amendment the OAS has initiated consti-
tutional change,  
…that not only allow, but actually mandate, the organization to become involved in the in-
ternal affairs of a member state when there is a threat to a democratically elected gov-
ernment. [PECK 1998:141] 
In this sense the General Assembly approved Resolution 837 [AG/RES.837 (XVI-0/86)] in 1986 
which called on each state that had not re-established democracy, to do so through elections. 
2.11.1.1 Election Monitoring 
Another development in support of democracy was initiated well before the 1985 COAS amend-
ment. In 1962 an electoral observation mission was sent to Costa Rica, where the general election 
was monitored [UPD 2001]. KRENNERICH points out that the electoral observation missions sent 
between 1962 and 1984 were quite limited in numbers and constrained with regard to the critical 
evaluation304 of the elections they monitored [KRENNERICH 1999:155]. Still election oversight 
activities were increased over the following years305 and decades with increasing frequency306
Ironically it was the revolutionary Sandinista government in Nicaragua that was responsi-
ble in 1989 for devising a formula that would transcend the sacred principle of non-
intervention. President Daniel Ortega invited the OAS, the United Nations, and numerous 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to observe and mediate the terms of Nicaragua's 
first election. The Nicaraguan precedent proved so compelling that, with the exception of 
Cuba, during the course of the next decade, every country in the hemisphere permitted 
international election observers. [PASTOR 2004:91] 
. The 
first election observer mission that clearly marked a quality and quantity leap was sent in 
1989/1990 to Nicaragua, leading the way to what the OAS classifies as ‘second generation’ elec-
toral observation missions [OAS 2007:5]. The OAS was present six months before the election and 
some weeks afterward and sent 433 observers to the country. [SNS 05.11.2004]. Likewise, PAS-
TOR argues: 
                                                 
304 The ECONOMIST judged until 2000 that the OAS has a ‘hard-earned reputation for limp-wristedness when it 
comes to election monitoring’ [ECONOMIST 08.04.2000]. 
305 BONIFACE opines that the OAS proved unable to develop a coherent policy regarding the promotion of de-
mocracy during the Cold War [BONIFACE 2005:2]. 
306 For a comprehensive listing of the missions undertaken see the OAS’ Unit for the Promotion of Democracy’s 
homepage: http://www.ddpa.oas.org/opd/electoral/default.htm retrieved on 17.09.2005. 
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The General Assembly, thus, in 1989 recommended to the SGOAS (AG/RES.991 (XIX-O/89)) that 
when “a member state so requests in the exercise of its sovereignty, missions should be organized 
and sent to said state to monitor the development, if possible at all stages, of each of its electoral 
processes” [qtd. in UPD 2001], reaffirming the support for such missions. 
2.11.1.2 Solidifying Democracy Promotion 
As early as 1964 suggestions had emerged of establishing a Committee for the purpose of promot-
ing democracy [KURZMAN 09.10.1964]. However, only in 1990 was democracy promotion put on 
an institutional basis. General Assembly Resolution 1063 [AG/RES.1063 (XX-O/90)] asks the 
SGOAS to establish the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). The Permanent Council was to 
adopt a corresponding program for that purpose [OAS AG Res. 1063]. In 1991 this program with 
the objective of responding to “member states that request advice or assistance in preserving or 
strengthening their political institutions and democratic procedures” [OAS PC Res. 572] was ap-
proved. The main functions of the UPD are defined as: 
 
• overseeing the OAS electoral missions; 
• administer small country programs to improve democratic institutions and processes (for 
instance by facilitating the dissemination and exchange of knowledge about democratic 
values); 
• providing advice and support in modernizing or improving electoral laws, civil registries, 
administrations, and processes; 
• developing peace-building programs and supporting post-conflict societies; 
• supporting programs of humanitarian demining in Central America and the Andean region; 
and  
• providing advisory services and assistance to recently installed governments [SNS 
05.11.2004]. 
 
COOPER & LEGLER describe the creation of the UPD as signal of a more embedded institutional 
concern with the process of democratization [COOPER & LEGLER 2001:103]. 
And another author highlights different aspect: 
…[T]he establishment of the UPD by the OAS represents an important institutional step as 
it has an inter-governmental organization that assumes authority for activities such as 
electoral assistance, which was previously viewed as outside the legitimate boundaries of 
such organizations. [PASTOR 2004:94] 
Executive Co-ordinator of the UPD, Elizabeth SPEHAR, underlines the interconnectedness of the 
UPD’s services and support for the member countries with security, when she writes: 
This support reflects a long-term commitment to institutional strengthening and to the 
promotion of a democratic political culture in the Americas, which in itself can be con-
sidred [sic] a form of prevention against future conflicts or ruptures in the democratic 
process in Member States. The premise is that a country with strong democratic institu-
tions and a thriving democratic political culture is less vulnerable to both external and in-
ter- | nal conflicts or crises which could seriously debilitate it. [SPEHAR 2001:66-67] 
Since its inception the UPD has been active in a number of peace-building projects, contributing 
decisively to the way conflicts are dealt with on the ground and thus trespassing strict definitions of 
traditional democracy promotion operations. For example the PROPAZ (Culture of Dialogue: Devel-
oping Resources for Peace-Building in Guatemala) programme undertakes to create national capac-
ity of skilled people in Guatemala who will then be in a position to develop local mechanisms for 
dealing with arising conflicts. 
Another case in point is the OAS International Verification and Support Commission (CIAV) estab-
lished in the framework of the Central American peace process which has had the purpose of sup-
porting the demobilization, repatriation, and relocation of ex-combatants in Nicaragua. Later the 
CIAV also conducted trainings for local leaders on the promotion of human rights and conflict reso-
lution techniques [SPEHAR 2001:67-68]. 
 
2.11.1.3 Santiago Commitment and Resolution 1080 
A further cornerstone was set in June 1991 when the General Assembly approved the Santiago 
Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System as well as Resolution 
1080.  
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The Santiago Commitment i.a. declares that special priority is to be assigned to the strengthening 
of “representative democracy as an expression of the legitimate and free manifestation of the will 
of the people” [OAS AG/Res. (XXI-O/91] whereas Resolution 1080, termed ‘Representative Democ-
racy’ foresees: 
to instruct the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of a meeting of the 
Permanent Council in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular 
interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of 
power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organizations’ member 
states, in order, within the framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on 
and convene and [sic] ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or a special ses-
sion of the General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day period. 
to state that the purpose of the ad hoc meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or the spe-
cial session of the General Assembly shall be to look into the events collectively and adopt 
any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the COAS and international law. 
[AG/Res. 1080 (XXI-O/91)] 
The first paragraph is classified by PASTOR to have 're-defined sovereignty' [PASTOR 2004:91] as 
purely domestic matters are expressly being put on the OAS agenda. 
One of the most outstanding features of Resolution 1080 is the automatism it contains307
• an automatic procedure to follow in cases of democratic interruption; 
, making 
it – at least in theory – impossible to avoid the setting-in-motion of the respective machinery. 
Resolution 1080 has until today been invoked in the cases of Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala 
(1993), and Paraguay (1996) [BONIFACE 2005:2-3; COOPER 2004:93; SNS 08.04.2008]. 
Ironically Resolution 1080 can be seen as a late reincarnation of a Guatemalan suggestion voiced 
during the discussions establishing the Rio Treaty back in the 1940s. Guatemala had had proposed 
that a Meeting of Consultation be held if there was a threat to the ‘democratic structure of the 
American governments’ [qtd. in: DIAZ 1994:66]. However, the proposal was defeated. DIAZ 
opines that the time had not been ripe for such a revolutionary idea: 
This event demonstrated that while the American states might become comfortable with 
the idea of erecting a collective security apparatus for the defence of their sovereignty, 
they still vehemently opposed its extension to cover issues of domestic politics. [DIAZ 
1994:66] 
Referring to the Santiago General Assembly PASTOR notes that with it the OAS governments finally 
“began a journey to instill substance into the fulsome declarations of democratic solidarity” [PAS-
TOR 2004:91]. COOPER & LEGLER observed that the Santiago Commitment and Resolution 1080 
added three ‘crucial elements’ to the ‘prodemocracy doctrine’ of the OAS: 
 
• a license for the OAS to undertake a wide range of collective activity, as long as the GAOAS 
gave its approval; and 
• the establishment of a rapid response [COOPER & LEGLER 2001:43]. 
 
Another scholar, Barry S. LEVITT, opines more critically that the rules and procedure of Resolution 
1080 were vague and open-ended. And if a resolution was passed, it did not posses binding quality 
for the approving bodies to act [LEVITT 2006:95]. 
2.11.1.4 Protocol of Washington 
With the 1992 Protocol of Washington the COAS was furnished with the possibility of suspending 
member states whose democratically elected government had been overthrown by force. This pro-
vision, due to its importance, shall be quoted here in its entirety: 
A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has been 
overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate in the 
sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organi-
zation and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the commissions, working groups and 
any other bodies established.  
a) The power to suspend shall be exercised only when such diplomatic initiatives under-
taken by the Organization for the purpose of promoting the restoration of representative 
democracy in the affected Member State have been unsuccessful;  
                                                 
307 Compare SNS 03.06.2008. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES | RECENT OAS DEVELOPMENTS AND ACTIVITIES 
144 
b) The decision to suspend shall be adopted at a special session of the General Assembly 
by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Member States;  
c) The suspension shall take effect immediately following its approval by the General As-
sembly;  
d) The suspension notwithstanding, the Organization shall endeavor to undertake addi-
tional diplomatic initiatives to contribute to the re-establishment of representative democ-
racy in the affected Member State;  
e) The Member which has been subject to suspension shall continue to fulfill its obligations 
to the Organization;  
f) The General Assembly may lift the suspension by a decision adopted with the approval 
of two-thirds of the Member States;  
g) The powers referred to in this article shall be exercised in accordance with this Charter 
[OAS PW]. 
To add suspension to the potential measures to be taken in case of forceful coup d’états clearly 
strengthened the OAS’ power in matters of democracy protection. In order to soften the interven-
tionist impact of the Washington Protocol emphasis is placed on the fact that only after diplomatic 
efforts have failed to restore democracy a suspension may be exercised. Especially in view of the 
Rio Treaty amendment – though never having entered into force – which eased the criteria for the 
lifting of imposed sanctions to an absolute majority, it is remarkable, that for the imposition as well 
as for the lifting of the suspension a two thirds majority is required. 
Thirty-one OAS nations approved the Washington Protocol while Mexico opposed it and Trinidad 
abstained. It went into effect on 25th September 1997 [PASTOR 2004:92].  
2.11.1.5 Managua Declaration 
With the Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Development (1993) the 
OAS obligates itself to “prevent and anticipate the very causes of problems that work against de-
mocratic rule”, setting itself a tall order indeed. The Declaration of Managua moreover propagates 
the idea of ‘ethical and effective governance’ – a move clearly heading to incorporating the concept 
of human security - and calls on its members to: 
 
• modernize domestic administrative and political structures and systems; 
• improve public administration; 
• protect minorities and political opposition groups; 
• achieve national reconciliation and consolidate a democratic culture; 
• meet basic human needs; 
• safeguard human rights; and  
• ensure the subordination of armed forces to legitimately constituted civilian authority 
[PECK 1998:142]. 
 
This concept squarely encompasses the main sources of (internal) conflict that – if permitted to 
escalate – end up in a violent form. In so far improvements made based on that concept are a 
means to avoid such escalation and a tool – even if only indirectly – of transforming conflicts be-
fore they degenerate. 
PECK opines on the obligation to ‘prevent and anticipate the very causes of problems that work 
against democratic rule’ as enshrined in the Declaration of Managua, that: 
As such, the Organization of American States as an institution goes beyond any other re-
gional organization and beyond the United Nations in its declaration of support for and de-
fense of democracy. 
But she adds: 
Of course, these declarations do not necessarily reflect deeper behavioral realities, and a 
gulf still exists between institutional rhetoric and political action [PECK 1998:142]. 
Elizabeth SPEHAR, then Executive Co-ordinator of the UPD, has conceded that despite the Managua 
Declaration’s intentions of finding a more explicit role for the OAS in anticipating and preventing 
conflicts, those expectations remained unfulfilled [SPEHAR 2001:64]. Still, HARRIS and REILLY 
have termed the increasing institutionalization of democracy protection in the legal system of the 
OAS to be of ‘proactive’ quality [HARRIS&REILLY 1998:373]. This label fits also to the next step the 
OAS took on the furtherance of democratic governance. 
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2.11.1.6 Inter-American Democratic Charter 
In 2001 the comprehensive conceptual development was further enforced308 with the adoption of 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC)309
• respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
. The IADC contains a progressive element insofar 
as no outright coup d’état has to have taken place; instead, the notion of an ‘unconstitutional al-
teration of the constitutional regime’ encompasses the stage before an eventual overthrow and has 
as such a preventive capability [GAVIRIA 2004].  
The preventive aspiration is more starkly outlined in the provision contained in Article 17: 
When the government of a member state considers that its democratic political institu-
tional process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk, it may request assistance from 
the Secretary General or the Permanent Council for the strengthening and preservation of 
its democratic system. 
LAGOS & RUDY, however, pointed out that governments would be reluctant to utilize Article 17 
since this would entail admitting that it was unable to manage its own affairs [LAGOS & RUDY 
2004:291-292]. 
 
The main cornerstone of the IADC, the provision making the suspension of a member state possi-
ble in case its democratic outfit is disrupted, is enshrined in Article 19 which holds, 
… an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration 
of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member 
state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle to its government’s par-
ticipation in sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of 
the Organization, the specialized conferences, the commissions, working groups, and 
other bodies of the Organization. 
The IADC additionally spells out ‘essential elements of representative democracy’ in its articles 3 
and 4: 
 
• access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law; 
• the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suf-
frage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people; 
• the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations; 
• the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government; 
• transparency in government activities; 
• probity; 
• responsible public administration on the part of the governments; 
• respect for social rights and freedom of expression as well as of the press; 
• constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted civilian author-
ity; and 
• respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and sectors of society [LAGOS & 
RUDY 2004:285 FN 11; see also PASTOR 2004:93 and LEVITT 2006:95]. 
 
Such specifications are making the concept clearer and broader and hence violations more easily 
discernible and identifiable. The significance of those ‘essential elements’ was enhanced when the 
GAOAS in applying the IADC in the Venezuelan case urged society to take “into account the essen-
tial elements of representative democracy set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of the Inter-American De-
mocratic Charter” [qtd. in: LAGOS & RUDY 2004:285 FN 11]. 
In cases of situations that may affect the “democratic institutional process or the legitimate exer-
cise of power” the SGOAS may send a mission to analyze the situation and report to the PCOAS 
although this requires the 'prior consent of the government' [Art. 18]. Collective assessments via 
the PCOAS can be initiated by any government or the SGOAS and decisions as deemed appropriate 
may be taken. In line with the Washington Protocol a member may be suspended by a 2/3 vote - a 
step to be reversed only with another 2/3 majority - and only after diplomatic endeavours are con-
sidered to have failed. 
Additionally, 'any person or group of person who consider their human rights [to] have been vio-
lated' may present their case to the inter-American system [PASTOR 2004:93]. The paradigmatic 
                                                 
308 For an outline of the IADC see RUDY 2005. 
309 The IADC was initiated at the Third Summit of the Americas, taking place in April 2001 in Quebec City [LA-
GOS&RUDY 2002:173]. 
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shift toward democracy promotion had also general effects on the human rights agenda, as CERNA 
observed: 
The fact that the region now attempts to guarantee democracy has also brought about a 
change in the nature of the violations presented to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. Whereas the earlier period (1959-1989) of the Inter-American Commis-
sion's history was replete with petitions concerning forced disappearances, extrajudicial 
executions and torture, petitions presented in recent years concern problems common to 
most democratic states, such as violations of due process, delays in judicial proceedings, 
disputes over property rights, and status questions (e.g. loss of employment, decrease in 
pension, and the like). [CERNA 2004:202] 
COOPER has provided a thorough analysis of the genesis of the Charter and pointed out the essen-
tial role played by Peru’s recent political history (for details see above) for the creation of the 
IADC: 
By revealing the weakness of Resolution 1080 with its focus on the 'interruption' of de-
mocracy as opposed to other more ambiguous scenarios, the | Peruvian crisis of 2000 and 
President Alberto Fujimori's antidemocratic actions, inextricably gave the charter a "made 
in Peru" flavour. [COOPER 2004:94-95] 
Carefully reviewing the IADC LEVITT highlights the following terminological inconsistency which 
might amount to nothing more than a drafting mistake: whereas Article 21 refers to an 'unconstitu-
tional interruption of the democratic order', article 19 adds 'an unconstitutional alteration of the 
constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order' and only the latter phrase is 
found again in Art. 20 which enumerates the reasons for the PCOAS to be summoned [LEVITT 
2006:96]. 
The IADC has been applied for the first time in April 2002 on occasion of the alteration of the con-
stitutional regime in Venezuela. After the Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez had been ousted, 
consensus dominated among the countries of the hemisphere to invoke the IADC [BONILLA 
13.04.2002]. In accordance with Art. 20310
The establishment of the IADC and of Resolution 1080 has been termed the ‘legalization’ of the 
OAS’s ‘prodemocracy interventions’ [BRACHET-MÁRQUEZ 2008]. Generally, the democratic para-
digm
 of the IADC a special Meeting of the PCOAS was con-
vened and the SGOAS was instructed to head a fact-finding mission to investigate the events. The 
SGOAS was moreover urged to undertake such steps that would assist in restoring constitutional 
order. 
Although Chávez was soon returned to power a Forum for Negotiations and Agreement was set up 
and the SGOAS acted as facilitator [OAS AR SGOAS 2003] – steps being intended to address the 
most pressing political grievance between the government and the opposition. On 29th May 29 
2002 the  Venezuelan government and the political opposition signed the OAS dialogue table 
agreement, setting the framework for a recall referendum as allowed by the Venezuelan constitu-
tion, and replacing the dialogue table with a ‘permanent liaison’ mechanism [SNS 05.11.2004]. 
 
311
- In March 2005 the PCOAS expressed its 'firm support' for Bolivia's 'constitutional' President Carlos 
Mesa, who had increasingly come under pressure by acts of civil disobedience [EFE 08.03.2005]. 
 developed by the OAS in previous years had a preventive aspiration. 
 
As a result of its newly acquired toolbox the OAS took to various correlating activities, among them 
inter alia: 
 
                                                 
310 Article 20 reads: „In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously 
impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request the 
immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to 
take such decisions as it deems appropriate. The Permanent Council, depending on the situation, may under-
take the necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy. If such 
diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or if the urgency of the situation so warrants, the Permanent Council 
shall immediately convene a special session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly will adopt the 
decisions it deems appropriate, including the undertaking of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with the Char-
ter of the Organization, international law, and the provisions of this Democratic Charter. The necessary diplo-
matic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy, will continue during the proc-
ess.” 
311 LEVITT, amongst others, has argued that the inter-American system has in effect developed a 'defense of 
democracy' regime, using the international regime theory as fleshed out by KRASNER or YOUNG (see above) 
[LEVITT 2006:97-99]. 
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However, when tensions heated up further and the OAS considered discussing the Bolivian situa-
tion at the up-coming General Assembly, the country's Foreign Ministry rejected any intervention 
by the Organization [XINHUA 03.06.2005]. Only when President Mesa had resigned, Bolivian For-
eign Minister Jose Ignacio Siles asked the OAS to pass a resolution to “support the person who, in 
accordance with constitutional succession procedures, takes over the presidency” [qtd. in: AFP 
07.06.2005]. The OAS thereupon pledged to provide the necessary help, if formally requested to 
do so [PAIN 07.06.2005; EFE 07.06.2005]. 
- Another occasion occurred in April 2005 when opposition groups and labour unions called for 
fresh elections and staged protests in Belize. The OAS appealed for an early and peaceful resolution 
of the crisis and acting SGOAS Luigi Enaudi said that the citizens ought to: 
abide by the constitution of Belize, and to engage in dialogue to resolve any outstanding 
issues of national interest in accordance with the democratic tradition of the people of Be-
lize and with the principles of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. [qtd. in: BBC MS 
27.04.2005] 
And PCOAS resolution condemned acts which threatened democracy, the rule of law, and govern-
ance. Reference was made to the right to democracy as enshrined in the IADC [SDPRD 
28.04.2005]. 
- Another instance arose after the newly elected Ecuadorian President Correa made known his in-
tention to call a plebiscite to convene a constitutional assembly. The country’s Congress agreed to 
the plan, however, only under the precondition that the constitutional assembly would not have the 
power to dissolve Congress. Upon Correa's insistence to hold on to that prerogative as well, Con-
gress fired the head of the Electoral Court. In turn the head of the Electoral Court fired 57 of 100 
legislators [OPPENHEIMER 29.03.2007]. In April the OAS sent a mission to make an inspection on 
occasion of the referendum [LAND 13.04.2007]; subsequently the Organization endorsed the con-
stitutional reform process in general and the referendum in particular, in which eventually around 
80% voted in favour of the creation of a constitutional assembly [BARBEL 18.04.2007].  
 
The Democratic Charter has also its critics; among them PASTOR makes the following assessment 
of the IADC: 
All in all, the Charter fails to add very much to the democracy resolutions of the previous 
decade, and given the circumstances, represents a serious missed opportunity. [PASTOR 
2004:93] 
And looking back at the performance of the IADC, the Miami Herald opined in mid-2005: 
The charter commits nations to protecting each other's constitutional order. But since it 
was implemented in 2001, four elected governments have been toppled by popular re-
volts, underscoring the widespread impression that the OAS is little more than a talk shop. 
[MARTIN & BACHE 08.06.2005] 
With regard to the OAS’ efforts of democracy promotion one can undoubtedly classify them as hav-
ing contributed to beneficial developments in a myriad of countries in the Hemisphere. However, 
some criticism remains justified, especially when taking a closer look. A case in point was under-
lined by Yasmine SHAMSIE. She has analyzed OAS activities in Haiti for the period 1990-2000 and 
has pointed out two main deficiencies of the Organization's strategies: 
 
• through promoting neo-liberal policies in tandem with its democracy promotion, it under-
mined the people's participation in political decisions via contributing with such to a further 
impoverishment of the masses; 
• and its institution building efforts, especially its judicial reform endeavours, failed to take 
into account that the state institutions traditionally have been designed to serve the elite 
and preserve the current system. OAS' and other outside actors' activities did not re-orient 
the system, but rather were limited to more superficial reforms [SHAMSIE 2004:passim]. 
 
This type of justified criticism prompted various actors to voice the need to reform and perfect the 
OAS democracy protection machinery. For instance, in response to the long-drawn crisis in Haiti, 
the US proposed on occasion of the Annual General Assembly in 2005 that the OAS should estab-
lish a 'democracy crisis monitoring service' or an 'assistance mechanism for fragile democracies'312
                                                 
312 For details on the notion behind this proposal see LAWR 14.06.2005. 
. 
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Also the newly elected SGOAS, Jose Miguel Insulza, deplored the fact that the OAS 'has no chance, 
without invitation, of saying there is some danger in some country' [qtd. in: AFP 05.06.2005]. The 
US proposal met with resistance from various quarters, notably from US adversary Venezuela [EFE 
03.06.2005; AFP 04.06.2005]. Finally, agreement was reached on entrusting the SGOAS with pre-
paring proposals to address situations that might compromise the democratic political process or 
the rule of law313
2.11.2 Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS) 
 [LAWR 14.06.2005]; additionally, the SGOAS was to prepare ‘proposals and ini-
tiatives’ of ways to avert future democratic break-downs [MARTIN & BACHE 08.06.2005]. 
However, the IADC shortcomings could not be resolved immediately, prompting SGOAS Insulza 
during a high-level panel on the role of the IADC, to highlight that although notwithstanding the 
IADC's merits, it is fails to specify ways to 'follow-up' or 'promote' democracy; a task the OAS was 
still supposed to fulfil; he further lamented that the IADC did not detail the conditions that would 
constitute a basis for action [USFN 24.05.2007]. However, as recent political developments in the 
region have demonstrated, it is nearly impossible to foretell which exact measures might lead to 
the collapse of a democratic government. Hence, formulations will necessarily have to be formu-
lated in general terms, allowing the necessary flexibility. 
The PCOAS’ Committee on Hemispheric Security was created by the 25th GAOAS in 1995 and func-
tions as the OAS forum for security issues. Its origins reach back to the Special Committee on Se-
curity that had been established in 1992. Article 14 of the Rules of the PCOAS defines the CHS as a 
permanent committee [OAS PC RP 2003:3]. The CHS is composed of the 34 OAS member states 
and has a chairman and three vice-chairs that are elected for a twelve-month period [SNS 
05.11.2004]. 
The major responsibility of the CHS was defined as: 
… studying and formulating recommendations for the Permanent Council regarding issues 
of Hemispheric security, specifically to promote cooperation in this area, as requested by 
the Permanent Council or by the General Assembly, through its intermediary. [OAS PC 
2003:8] 
During the Second Summit of the Americas (18th-19th April 1998) the Committee on Hemispheric 
Security (CHS) was entrusted with – i.a. – the following tasks: 
 
• to analyze the concept of international security in the Hemisphere;  
• to examine ways of strengthening the inter-American system’s institutions that deal with 
the issue of hemispheric security; and 
• to hold a special regional conference on security at the beginning of the next decade314
 
. 
To that end various Special Meetings of the CHS were held315
• resolving inter-state border tensions; 
. The envisaged Conference on Secu-
rity was originally planned to take place in 2004 and deal i.a. with the topics of disarmament and 
arms control. However, with the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 the Conference 
design was adapted and brought somewhat forward to October 2003 [NOLTE & OETTLER 2003:28]. 
The approved 2003 Declaration of Security in the Americas enlarges the security plateau to hence-
forth include also cover non-traditional concerns like: extreme poverty and social exclusion; natural 
and man-made disasters; HIV/AIDS, diseases and other health risks; environmental degradation; 
human trafficking; and cyber attacks. In order to meet those challenges the document calls for 
strengthened bilateral and sub-regional security and defence arrangements and cooperation. Addi-
tionally, the Declaration contains guidelines for: 
 
• lowering pressure for arms spending; 
• promoting democratic norms; and 
                                                 
313 Michael CHRISTIE, reporting for Reuters, underlined that the final declaration contained a statement holding 
that all countries have the right to decide their own political status as well as social, economic, and cultural 
development. And CHRISTIE adds: “[t]hat wording could be regarded by Venezuela as a victory” [CHRISTIE 
08.06.2005; compare also EIU 09.06.2005]. However, the US hailed the agreement as bringing about the es-
tablishment of an early warning system for democracies in danger [VAPRD 13.06.2005]. 
314 For details on this Summit of the Americas and on all other Summits see the requisite homepage: 
http://www.summit-americas.org. 
315 The first Special Meeting took place between 20th and 21st April 1999; the second Special Meeting was held 
between 20th and 21st March 2000; and the for the third Special Meeting the representatives came together 
between 13th and 14th November 2000. 
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• fostering a climate of confidence, trust, transparency, and cooperation316
 
Generally speaking the Committee on Hemispheric Security functions as the OAS’ a permanent 
forum to discuss overall issues of security, focusing especially on arms control, defence, non-
proliferation [SNS 08.04.2008]. 
 [COLLIER 2006; 
SNS 08.04.2008]. 
2.11.3 Terrorism 
In April 1996 the OAS convened the First Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism. 
SGOAS Gaviria on that occasion voiced the opinion that cooperation on terrorism was only possible 
now that all OAS nations had democratically elected governments, since military regimes had 
shown an inclination to improperly classify legitimate opposition as terror [MONAHAN 26.04.1996]. 
The same conference approved the Declaration of Lima encompassing a 24 point plan which inter 
alia vowed the conclusion of anti-terrorism accords, exchanges of relevant information, and the 
lending of mutual legal assistance. Additionally, the document stipulates that governments ought 
not to offer concessions to hostage-taking terrorists, are to provide mutual technical assistance to 
each other, should strengthen border security, and are to curtail the flow of weapons [CRAIG 
27.04.1996]. 
The main fruit of the Second Inter-American Specialized Conference, taking place in November 
1998 was the creation of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE). CICTE was 
tasked to foster cooperation and coordination through training and information exchange among 
specialists and political decision-makers. However, in the early years of its existence, CICTE lacked 
attention from its member states [OAS PC 2000d]. The Committee held various regular and special 
sessions and was institutionally strengthened in 2002 by the establishment of a secretariat. Among 
CICTE’s current initiatives are: 
 
• various counter-terrorism legislative drafting projects with the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime and the UPD; 
• a secure network between counter-terrorism authorities for communication and online 
training; 
• an online database on counter-terrorism related best practices, guidelines, and authorities; 
• money laundering initiatives with the OAS Counter Drug Committee; 
• a border assessment/management program; 
• a port security training program; 
• a cyber-security initiative; and 
• a comprehensive airport security training program [USFN 25.01.2008]. 
 
On occasion of the 9/11 attacks on the US, the Rio Treaty was invoked [AFP 19.09.2001] and it 
was on 19th September 2001 that the OAS met and condemned the attacks. Three days later the 
23rd MCMFA took place pursuant to Arts. 61 to 65 COAS; among other things the members and the 
rest of the international community was called upon to take effective measures against the activi-
ties of terrorist groups and the PCOAS was entrusted with preparing a draft Inter-American Con-
vention Against Terrorism [OAS 23. MCMFA]. On the same day the 24th MCMFA took place317
terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks against all American 
states and that in accordance with all the relevant provisions of the Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the principle of continental solidarity, all States 
Parties to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to address such at-
tacks and the threat of any similar attacks against any American state, and to maintain 
the peace and security of the continent
, this 
time acting as Organ of Consultation in application of the Rio Treaty. The resolution entitled ‘Ter-
rorist Threat to the Americas’ states that. 
318
                                                 
316 Transparency was also enhanced with the three Declarations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 
(CSBMs) adopted in 1995 (Santiago de Chile), 1998 (San Salvador), and 2003 (Miami). In this regard CSBMs 
have been defined as: “… bilateral and multilateral actions designed to prevent situations of crisis and conflict. 
They seek to strengthen peace and international security, contribute to communication between and | among 
actors, and create a favorable atmosphere for establishing a structure of understanding that mitigates the per-
ception of immediate threat and prevents possible elements of surprise” [qtd. in: OAS PC 2003:6-7]. 
317 The meeting took place on the initiative of Brazil [SNS 05.11.2004]. 
318 This paragraph directly refers to Art. 3 Rio Treaty (see above). 
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The Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism was eventually adopted in 2002319
                                                 
319 It entered into force on 9th July 2003 [SNS 05.11.2004]. 
, and was 
based partly on recommendations of CICTE. The Convention commits the signatory states to be-
come party to ten international legal instruments related to terrorism. Additionally, the state par-
ties are obliged to take various measures in order to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to 
eliminate terrorist financing [AJIL 2006:246]. 
Although terrorism would not automatically be put on the agenda of conflict transformation in the 
sense this thesis has conceptualized it, a formal commitment to fight terrorism collectively holds 
the potential of streamlining related activities. Thus incongruence between the state parties’ dis-
tinct approaches in the event of terrorist attacks while not being avoided completely might more 
easily be made compatible. If, however, the undertaken efforts to date will provide for sufficient 
common understanding as not to allow for ruptures in case of substantial terrorist interventions, 
remains to be seen. 
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3 The Association of South-East Asian Nations 
3.1 Origin of ASEAN 
In August 1967 five states established the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The 
founding nations were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand320. The first 
enlargement took place in 1984 with the accession of Brunei. Eleven years later Vietnam joined 
ASEAN to be followed in 1997 by Laos and Myanmar (Burma). The last enlargement took place in 
1999 with Cambodia [ASEAN Homepage]. With the admission of Cambodia ASEAN viewed its 
membership as complete321 [LEWIS 1999:83]. The only exception occurred, when formerly Indo-
nesian occupied East Timor had gained independence. Indonesia immediately sponsored East 
Timor’s membership322, even before independence had been declared [AFP 16.04.1999]. But at 
that time East Timor’s independence leader, Ramos Horta, made clear that he regarded the partici-
pation in the South Pacific Forum323
Adding to disintegrating tendencies, the immediate period before ASEAN’s creation had been 
marked by sharp political rivalry between Indonesia and Malaysia, captured by the term Konfron-
tasi (confrontation). Between 1963 and 1966 Indonesia under President Achmed Sukarno had de-
clared confrontation against Malaysia, a campaign of diplomatic and military intimidation. Konfron-
tasi was rooted partly in Sukarno’s wish to distract public awareness away from the current eco-
nomic tribulations of his Guided Democracy and partly in differing international outlooks of the two 
countries and their former relationship [LEIFER 1976a:139]. When Malaysia
 more important than membership in the more culturally dis-
tant ASEAN [AFP 26.07.1999a]. 
The countries of the region had formerly been ruled by different colonial masters, leading to a ne-
glect of lines of communication among themselves. Cambodia, Laos, and the two Vietnams had 
been controlled by France; Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore by the United Kingdom; Indonesia by 
the Netherlands and finally the Philippines first by Spain and later by the US – merely Thailand was 
able to maintain a degree of independence [LEWIS 1999:49-50]. The only unifying factor prevalent 
in this regard was the intention to remove colonial regimes [SINGH 1997:216]. 
324
However, since the policy was frustrated by eclipsing its military aims on the one hand and disaf-
fecting the Indonesian army, its effect was backfiring in contributing to president Sukarno’s down-
 had gained inde-
pendence in 1963 and the union with Singapore and Sabah Sarawak was imminent, Sukarno 
claimed that this plan constituted a ‘neo-colonialist’ scheme [KHONG 2005:36]. Indonesia regarded 
the incipient Federation of Malaysia a regime installed by the West to oppose anti-colonial forces in 
the region, and was thus conceived to be anti-Indonesian as well [DWH 2000:Konfrontasi]. 
Konfrontasi included Jakarta's sponsorship of low-level military incursions into Malaysia and sup-
port for subversive groups in an effort to destabilize the newly created country [KATANYUU 
2006:826].  
                                                 
320 Sri Lanka had also been invited to be among the founding members but declined the offer [OANA 
26.11.2002]. Ten years later it applied for membership, but was turned down [ACHARYA 2005:105]. 
321 However, that was not always clear from the beginning. For instance, shortly before the third ASEAN summit 
took place Philippine newspapers quoted diplomatic sources holding that ASEAN was intending to invite Papua 
New Guinea [JEN 12.12.1987b] which had earlier voiced its wish to join the Association [JEN 14.12.1987]. It 
was only when a new government took over in Papua New Guinea in 1988 that the initiative to join ASEAN was 
finally dropped [REUTERS 11.07.1988]. By mid-1996 Papua New Guinea was seeking ‘a form of permanent 
association’ with ASEAN [JEN 20.07.1996b]. 
In 1994 Mongolia made its wish to be admitted as ASEAN member known. Mongolia’s Foreign Minister, Tseren-
pilin Gombusoren told the press “[o]ur external relations interest is to join ASEAN within three years, but it 
depends on the agreement of ASEAN members” [qtd. in: AFP 28.02.1994]. 
In early 1996 Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong was quoted as saying it was "possible that Australia 
and New Zealand may one day join Asean, I would say that both countries are small enough to be considered 
as possible members one of these days”. Upon that New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Don McKinnon said that his 
country would be keen on talking about joining ASEAN [DOMINION 17.01.1996]. However, Malaysia’s Foreign 
Minister Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Badawi later voiced his opposition to such an enlargement, when he said: “Ob-
viously, we must draw the line somewhere. I suggest we hold the line in Southeast Asia which is what Asean is 
all about, anyway. … Asean belongs to Southeast Asia. There are 10 such nations, no more, no less.” [qtd. in: 
NST 05.03.1996]. 
322 That initiative was basically welcomed by ASEAN as the then Secretary General insinuated [AP 03.08.1999]. 
323 The South Pacific Forum had been created in 1971 and held occasional meetings. In 1986 a nuclear free 
zone was declared.  At the time of East Timor’s independence it had the following members: Australia, Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Zea-
land, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Samoa. In 2000 the South 
Pacific Forum was renamed ‘Pacific Forum’ [PALMOWSKI 2008]. 
324 Singapore, a former internally autonomous state, became independent in 1965 [WH M]. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | ORIGIN OF ASEAN 
152 
fall. Thus, his successor ended the endeavour in 1966. The political turnaround was underlined 
when Malaysia and Indonesia signed a formal agreement ending Konfrontasi [DWH 
2000:Konfrontasi; LHMW 1998]. Also relations between Indonesia and the former Malaysian terri-
tory Singapore improved gradually [HAYWARD 31.05.1973]. 
The early 1960s were also marked by political and diplomatic unrest in other parts of the future 
ASEAN. Notable among it was Philippines’ territorial claim regarding the Sabah region of Malaysia. 
Although the claim was officially dropped only as late as 1989 by the Philippine government [XIN-
HUA 21.04.1989], both countries managed to entertain fairly sustainable working relations as fel-
low ASEAN members (see below). 
 
The Southeast Asian area had seen two other attempts at establishing a regional body. But both 
schemes remained largely unsuccessful: 
 
• the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)325
• MAPHILINDO, created in 1963 and composed of Indonesia, Malaysia (Malaya) and the Phil-
ippines fell prey to Sukarno’s Konfrontasi against Malaysia [NYT 09.08.1967]. 
, formed in 1961 by Thailand, Malaysia (then 
known as Malaya), and the Philippines; was broken up by the latter with its claim to the 
Malaysian territory of Sabah only two years later; and 
 
GANESAN observed: 
The collapse of ASA and the failure of Maphilindo were symptomatic of a larger problem: 
Bilateral relations between Southeast Asian countries in the 1960s were exceptionally 
strained. [GANESAN 1995:212] 
In such political turmoil the creation of ASEAN – encompassing the former adversaries – was a firm 
commitment to a change of policies. Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mahatir Mohamad commented at 
the 25th anniversary of ASEAN’s creation: 
It was out of this crucible of conflict, indifference even contempt, that there arose the 
conviction that it was time to get to know each other better...to undertake a historical act 
of regional reconciliation. [qtd. in: KN 12.10.1992] 
KHOO argues that the formation of ASEAN was also a quid pro quo for the member states with 
regard to the region’s hegemon: 
In return for playing a constructive and stabilizing role, Indonesia was recognized as pri-
mus inter pares in the non-communist half of Southeast Asia. [original emphasis, KHOO 
2004:36] 
LEWIS views the creation of ASEAN, given the earlier failure of creating a viable regional organiza-
tion, as a ‘milestone in advancement of area cooperation in Southeast Asia’ [LEWIS 1999:67]. 
BA underlines as a distinct feature of ASEAN that it was formed not for a specific reason, but to 
answer general impressions of insecurity, fragmentation, and underdevelopment. Also GANESAN 
makes out a rather diffuse motivational backdrop for ASEAN’s establishment in 1967, arguing that 
it 
... was opportune because Southeast Asia urgently needed a multilateral forum for the 
peaceful reconciliation of interstate differences. … Consequently, the management of 
strained political relationships and the search for solutions to divisive political issues be-
came overriding concerns, although the situation was often not acknowledged publicly. 
Because many such issues preceded the formation of ASEAN, they became inextricably in-
terwoven into the organization’s implicit mandate. [GANESAN 1995:212] 
NARINE highlights in more detail the interrelated security functions ASEAN was supposed to fulfil: 
 
• to alleviate intra-ASEAN tensions through political and economic connections326
                                                 
325 It has been pointed out that ASA’s principles and objectives where very much the same as of those later 
enshrined by ASEAN [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:44]. For some details on ASA see LEWIS 1999:58-61. 
 - function-
ing as a 'non-aggression pact' between its members; 
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• to reduce the influence of outside powers through the promotion of internal security; 
ASEAN could be the instrument by which its members managed their own security envi-
ronment to the exclusion of the major powers327
• to alleviate the domestic social conditions and in this way communist insurgencies
; and 
328
 
And PEOU opines, resounding the overwhelming chorus of the literature on the creation of ASEAN: 
ASEAN’s raison d’être was primarily security regime building through peaceful and pro-
gressive economic development to promote social stability within the national boundaries 
and through security from external interference in the members’ domestic affairs. [PEOU 
1998:447] 
 
through the promotion of the socio-economic development of the member states [NARINE 
1998a:33; NARINE 1998b:196; NARINE 2005:475]. 
Also other authors329
With regard to the Association’s ideological orientation and direction, BUSSE contradicts various 
scholars that argue ASEAN was primarily conceptualized as an anti-communist organization, point-
ing out that if such had been the case, the Association would have been expected to develop into a 
military alliance or an organization for joint operations against communist insurgents, which it did 
not [BUSSE 1999:46]
 argue comparably, among them BUSSE, reasoning that ASEAN’s establish-
ment was agreed upon in order to ‘stabilize the region’ [BUSSE 1999:46]. 
This view was also confirmed by ASEAN’s former Secretary General Adolfo Severino who explained 
after his tenure had ended: “…ASEAN was founded for a political purpose: to provide a framework 
to deal with potential conflicts in a peaceful way” [qtd. in: HIR 2003]. 
330
Although ASEAN was originally conceptualized – at least on a declaratory basis - primarily to coor-
dinate and channel cooperation in the economic field, it proved unable to accomplish this goal sat-
isfactorily for the most part of its existence [LEWIS 1999:80]. Only recently has ASEAN made some 
more effective and sustainable efforts in this regard. NARINE and LEWIS underline that intra-
ASEAN trade in 1967 was 20,9 percent of ASEAN total exports; by the mid-1990s this figure had 
not significantly changed [NARINE 1998b:202 FN 202; LEWIS 1999:80]. A decade later again the 
figure remained almost constant, standing at 22,50 in 2004 [OANA 29.08.2005], a trend only to be 
confirmed by figures published in 2007 that put intra-ASEAN trade at below 22% [NZZ 
15.12.2007]. Regarding economic integration, ASEAN accordingly has been judged to never have 
‘been more than a | highly embryonic economic community’
. However, BRISTOW emphasizes that ASEAN from its inception had incor-
porated an (albeit unarticulated) 'security component', being in opposing the alleged threat to the 
region emanating from Communist Vietnam [BRISTOW 2005:13]. However, this contrasts clearly 
with the swiftness and smoothness the Association later incorporated Vietnam. And supporting 
scepticism regarding ASEAN’s anti-communist credentials is an evaluation by Vietnam’s ministry of 
foreign affairs. While preparing to join the organization the ministry reached the following assess-
ment: 
ASEAN basic documents do not have any point that is openly or tacitly suggestive of the 
anti-communist, anti-socialist and anti-Vietnamese nature of the organization. ASEAN is 
not aimed at opposing any other country (...) [qtd. in NGUYEN VU TUNG 2007:493] 
331
                                                                                                                                                        
326 Compare also LEIFER who observes: „The key to understanding the nature and regional role of ASEAN and 
its relationship to peace lies first of all in appreciating that the Association was established as the institutional 
fruit of conflict resolution (...)” [LEIFER 1999:26]. 
327 Similarly argue LEWIS 1999:68 and LIM 1998:118; see also SIMON 2008:268. 
328 The ever attentive anti-communist Washington Post nevertheless observed: “It is perhaps worth noting that 
nothing in ASEAN’s Charter [The Bangkok Declaration, my remark] precludes eventual membership by a Com-
munist country” [WP 10.08.1967]. Regarding its ideological aims, Thai Foreign Minister, Khoman, in 1968 clari-
fied: “We did not set up ASEAN to be an anti-communist group, or a group hostile to any one nation” [qtd. in: 
WP 11.08.1968]. As will be shown, rather than being an anti-communist organization per se, “[f]or a good part 
of its early life, the ASEAN, wittingly or unwittingly, played into the logic of communist containment” by its 
opposition towards Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia [TENORIO 16.05.1997]. 
329 For example CABALLERO-ANTHONY 2002: 531-532. 
330 Also MORADA disagrees with the notion that ASEAN’s formation was motivated by anti-communism [MO-
RADA 2002:59] 
331 Vocal criticism in this regard came from the President of the Philippines, Corazon Aquino, during the 19. 
AMM, when she observed: “After 19 years of existence, ASEAN should already be evaluating the impact of re-
gional economic cooperation instead of endlessly discussing how to get it off the ground” [qtd. in: REED 
23.06.1986]. 
 [LEIFER 1999: 36-37]. SWAN-
STRÖM also supports the notion that “the economic integration is definitely not distinctly higher 
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than a natural evolution of economic cooperation could have accomplished” [SWANSTRÖM 
2002:136].  
EMMERSON comes to the following judgment, looking back on 20 years of ASEAN’s existence: 
Notwithstanding its founders’ rhetoric for economic and cultural cooperation, and their 
avoidance of a military pact, the Association has succeeded above all politically, diplomati-
cally, and in security terms. [EMMERSON 1987:2] 
The analysts of Oxford Analytica in a review of the failures of two decades of regional trade coop-
eration highlighted the following explaining factors: 
 
• ASEAN countries generally have similar natural resources and a range of primary products 
which are competitive rather than complementary; 
• member states have achieved varying levels of economic development. Indonesia in par-
ticular is set to resist reductions in tariffs because it fears that its emerging manufacturing 
sector would be undermined by imports from industrially-advanced Singapore; 
• long established trading patterns, institutional links, and poor intra-regional transportation 
continue to exert an external bias; 
• ASEAN countries (except Singapore) have similar industrial policies, based on import sub-
stitution which tends to reinforce the competition between them. Moreover, they export 
relatively simple manufactures in exchange for capital goods and technology. This pattern 
is more conducive to trade with advanced industrial countries than within ASEAN itself; and 
• domestic priorities and the chauvinism inherent in states which have not long been inde-
pendent inhibit the perceived erosion of national interests in the wider cause of regional 
solidarity [OXRESEARCH 11.12.1987]. 
 
Even though the economic success of ASEAN might have been negligible, the organization and its 
members from the very beginning conceptualized security to be based i.a. on the economic well-
being of the people. Thus, also the global debate about the New International Economic Order was 
connected by the Philippines’ President Marcos to be a key to ensuring global peace and security 
[XINHUA 06.07.1984b]. 
And instead of creating a viable security organization emphasis was rather laid on the benefit of a 
common ASEAN arms market332. The Thai Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonhava, amply signified 
that position, when he explained his proposal for the ASEAN arms market333
                                                 
332 For a glance on the defence market in the ASEAN area at the beginning 1990s see CHEUNG 30.08.1990. 
333 The idea was supported by Philippines’ Defence Secretary, Fidel Ramos, in order to gain self-sufficiency as 
regards military supplies [XINHUA 15.05.1989]. 
: 
The government realises that military industries can help boost the country's economy … 
Being able to produce military supplies by ourselves is a way of saving our money since 
we would not have to buy them from other countries. [qtd. in: XINHUA 21.04.1989] 
At the same occasion Chatichai added – in reference to the end of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambo-
dia: 
Under a changing situation, we are turning battlefields into market-places. [qtd. in: BP 
20.04.1989] 
AMER’s analysis of ASEAN’s approach concludes regarding ASEAN’s purpose: 
Particular emphasis has been placed on promoting and achieving regional resilience based 
on the internal resilience of each of the member states through economic development, 
which would result in greater political support for the governments and lead to enhanced 
political stability [AMER 1999:1036]. 
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3.2 ASEAN’s Make-up 
3.2.1 Bangkok Declaration334
The founding document of ASEAN is the Bangkok Declaration
 
335
• an Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting) as the highest body 
[LEWIS 1999:69]; Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required; 
. The brief document contains 
mainly the aims and purposes as well as the so-called ASEAN ‘machinery’, that is to say the institu-
tional shaping of the organization. 
As far as security matters are concerned paragraph 2 among the aims and purposes is of signifi-
cance; it reads: 
To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of 
law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of 
the United Nations Charter. [ASEAN BD] 
However, the document is bare of any mention of the peaceful settlement of disputes among the 
member states. CABALLERO-ANTHONY has underlined this fact: 
(…) the core reasons for the establishment of regional organizations are to ameliorate the 
insecurity complex of member states and to settle disputes peacefully. ASEAN was formed 
with that very reason in mind, although this was not explicitly mentioned in any of the 
documents that have been produced since it was established in 1967. [CABALLERO-
ANTHONY 1998:42] 
The founding of ASEAN took place while the bigger political landscape was in motion. The Vietnam 
War raged and the US was militarily present in Thailand and the Philippines. At the same time Brit-
ain also had stationed troops in Malaysia and Singapore [HUGHES 16.04.1968]. Accordingly, the 
Bangkok Declaration contained the following affirmation: “that all foreign bases are temporary and 
remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be 
used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the 
area…”. This paragraph was meant as official vow and assurance that the Association would not 
function as a tool of Western imperialism [NYT 09.08.1967]. NARINE points out that this commit-
ment was rooted in deference of the ASEAN countries to Indonesia which was especially independ-
ent-minded, as mentioned earlier. However, they agreed to it in the consciousness that ‘there was 
no possibility of turning the statement into reality’, since all of the other countries at that time de-
pended heavily on foreign military support [NARINE 1998b:197-198]. Similar arguments are put 
forward by LIM, who underlines that the Bangkok Declaration ‘glossed over large differences of 
strategic outlook’ between Indonesia and the rest of the ASEAN founding states [LIM 1998:119]. 
Thus ASEAN’s self-conception was defined by external as well as internal conditions and develop-
ments. Singapore’ Prime Minister, stressed in his opening address to the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting the two major objectives of the Association to be: to accelerate economic growth and to 
promote regional peace and stability [ASEAN 14.04.1972]. 
As regards ASEAN’s organizational outfit the Bangkok Declaration holds: 
 
• a Standing Committee336
• Ad-Hoc and Permanent Committees of specialists on specific subjects; and 
, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the host country plus the 
Ambassadors of the other member states; this body is to ‘carry on’ the work of the ASEAN 
in-between the Meetings of Foreign Ministers; 
• a National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of ASEAN on behalf of 
that country and to service the other bodies of the Association. 
                                                 
334 The Bangkok Declaration remained non-ratified until as late as 1976 [ASIA PULSE 09.08.2001]. 
335 The Bangkok Declaration, although founding the Association, did not have the character of a charter – de-
noting the somewhat loser quality of ASEAN, at least at the time of its birth. At the AMM in 1974 the Philippines 
made the proposal, that ASEAN should give itself a proper charter to gain institutional strength. The proposal 
was sent to the Standing Committee and the members were requested to submit their comments [ASEAN 
09.05.1974]. However, the initiative came to nothing. 
336 The Standing Committee was to be situated in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta, underlining the dominant position 
of the country inside ASEAN [WP 10.08.1967]. 
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3.2.1.1 The Secretariat of ASEAN 
At the Sixth AMM (1973) it was decided to establish a Central Secretariat to strengthen the Asso-
ciation. Recommendations were to be studied and submitted by a Special Committee [ASEAN 
18.04.1973]. At the Seventh AMM (1974) the report of the Special Committee was acknowledged 
and it was agreed to submit it to the ASEAN member states’ governments [ASEAN 09.05.1974]. By 
early 1976 the Secretariat was still not in place; however, agreement was at least reached about 
the future chief of the Secretariat: the Indonesian Lieutenant General Hartono Rekso Charsono; he 
was appointed as first Secretary General at a meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in mid-
February 1976 [ANDELMAN 11.02.1976]. Two weeks later at the first summit of the heads of gov-
ernments (Bali Summit) the agreement for the establishment of the Secretariat was signed [ASEAN 
24.02.1976a]. The Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat (being re-termed only in 1992 to 
ASEAN Secretary General [HUND 2002:113]) was not vested with a high degree of power337
The position and weigh of the ASEAN Secretariat however, remained extremely weak. MCDONALD, 
writing for the Asian Wall Street Journal described it as ‘little more than a post office’
 and 
his tenure was limited to two years only [ASEAN 24.02.1976c]. The Secretariat in 1983 was 
enlarged to include economic officers to enable ‘the Secretariat to provide greater service, assis-
tance as well as coordination of the economic cooperation of ASEAN’ [ASEAN 25.06.1983]. 
The term of the Secretary-General was increased to three years through an amendment of the 
Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat [ASEAN 09.07.1985]. Another amend-
ment followed in 1989, primarily dealing with the posts of Deputy Secretary-General and Bureau 
Directors [ASEAN 04.07.1989b]. 
Later it was decided to increase the term once again to five years. And although there were no 
provisions barring a second term, a senior ASEAN official on condition of anonymity explained: “But 
based on ASEAN's tradition and understanding among members, the post can be kept only for one 
term and should be rotated among representatives from member states according to alphabetical 
order” [qtd. in: PARAMESWARAN 05.06.2002]. 
Generally, the institutional structure of ASEAN, although it was enlarged to cover various additional 
subject areas, remained rather loose over the decades [NARINE 1998a:43]. 
At the second summit of ASEAN heads of states and governments in August 1977 the status of the 
Bangkok Declaration was reaffirmed; but at the same time it was agreed that the organizational 
structure would have to be adjusted to ASEAN’s increasing activities [ASEAN 05.08.1977]. Thus, at 
the third ASEAN summit in December 1987 the pledged nebulously under the heading: ‘Machinery 
for ASEAN Cooperation’ that: 
The ASEAN organizational structure will continually be improved with a view to enhancing 
its effectiveness. [ASEAN 15.12.1987b] 
338
The SGASEAN’s new competencies added in 1992 included a diverse and comprehensive list of 
duties
. A little 
boost was witnessed when it was decided at the 25th AMM in 1992 that the SGASEAN would be 
endowed with ministerial rank and given the authority to commission independent ASEAN studies 
and to represent the Association to other countries and international organizations [MCDONALD 
20.07.1992]. Explicitly the summit declaration stated that “[t]he Secretary-General of the ASEAN 
Secretariat shall be re-designated as the Secretary-General of ASEAN with an enlarged mandate to 
initiate, advise, coordinate and implement ASEAN activities” [ASEAN 28.01.1992]. WAH, Senior 
Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, commented on that change for the Straits 
Times: 
Until 1992 when major amendments were made to the post's status and length of tenure, 
the office-holder was secretary-general of the Asean Secretariat, not the secretary-
general of Asean. This fine distinction, not often appreciated even within the region, re-
flected the loose institutional structure of Asean at the time, when most of the essential 
work was decentralised at the national level. [WAH 27.12.2002] 
339
                                                 
337 The first SG was recalled from his position in 1978 for making critical statements about Indonesia’s President 
Suharto [UPI 08.01.1978]. 
338 For the usage of the term compare also WAH 27.12.2002. 
339 For the complete list see: the Protocol Amending The Agreement On The Establishment Of The ASEAN Secre-
tariat, Manila, Philippines, 22nd July 1992 [ASEAN 22.07.1992c]. 
. Among them the SGASEAN was to 
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(...) serve as spokesman and representative of ASEAN on all matters, in the absence of 
any decision to the contrary in respect of a specific subject by the Chairman of the Stand-
ing Committee. [ASEAN 22.07.1992c] 
In the mid-1990s the workload of the ASEAN Secretariat had reached such proportions that the 
then Secretary-General, Dato' Ajit Singh, pointed out that no new partnerships could be handled 
since ‘[i]t's very difficult to make ends meet’, and he added ‘we are too stretched now’. In 1995 
ASEAN held 244 meetings, almost all organised by the ASEAN Secretariat with an annual modest 
budget of $5.5 million. In 1997 the seven ASEAN members spent $ 750.000 each on the Associa-
tion’s Secretariat [AFP 20.07.1997]. And funding of the Secretariat remained ‘mediocre’, amount-
ing by 1998 to no more than $9 million annually [PEOU 1998:447-448]. The Secretariat at that 
time employed a mere 30 managers that were supported by 80 local workers [JP 29.05.1996]. 
However, that the Secretariat was not furbished with any executive power, was explained with the 
state-centric attitude of ASEAN’s members, which insist on highly decentralized structures for the 
organization. 
To improve the Secretariat’s resource capacity and structure ASEAN commissioned the consultancy 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers for conducting respective research. Subsequently, ASEAN Director Gener-
als met in mid-February 1999 and decided to develop the Secretariat henceforth to be a ‘pro-
active’ entity, expanding its mere functional tasks to include security and political cooperation [NA-
TION 19.02.1999]. 
Still, the Secretariat's power up until today remains weak. NARINE explained in 2005: 
A further indication of the extent to which ASEAN's members kept the organization weak 
is the ASEAN Secretariat. This body has been perennially understaffed and given respon-
sibilities that prevent it from exercising any independent influence. Every ASEAN state has 
an ASEAN ministry that helps to formulate organizational policy, keeping ASEAN tightly 
controlled by its members. [NARINE 2005:475] 
A more scathing comment was published by The Economist, which found the following words to 
characterize the Secretariat: 
This has traditionally been a feeble body of pen-pushers under a mild-mannered secre-
tary-general, usually a senior regional official rewarded with the post as the crowning 
boondoggle in a career of not rocking the boat. [ECONOMIST 24.05.2008b] 
3.2.1.2 ASEAN Summits 
Probably signalling the Association’s low political status in the years following its creation, the lead-
ers of its member states deemed it not worth get together until 1976, nine years after the founding 
act. However, such summits – bringing together the ultimate decision-makers – unsurprisingly 
turned out to be the pacemakers of ASEAN’s integration, diluting the significance of other ASEAN 
gatherings. Only meetings of the political elite  had the power to make significant decisions. For 
instance, the 1976 summit resulted in the adoption of one of the most important documents as 
regards security relations in the region, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia [see 
chapter below]. On the same occasion the heads of government agreed to introduce the Meeting of 
Economic Ministers of ASEAN, manifesting the intention to strengthen economic coordination in the 
region. 
The frequency of such gatherings increased, and at the forth ASEAN summit in January 1992 the 
heads of state and government agreed to henceforth hold such summits every three years ‘if nec-
essary’ [USDSD 03.08.1992; ASEAN 15.12.1987c], and ‘with informal meetings inbetween’ [ASEAN 
28.01.1992]. 
The summit-framework was regularly utilized for concluding and approving new treaties or 
amendments thereof. At the Fifth Summit in 1995 the attendees for instance signed the Southeast 
Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. 
At the formal ASEAN Summit of December 1995 the idea of holding informal summit meetings was 
endorsed. There it was decided to hold annual informal summits, described by Thai Foreign Minister 
Kasem S. Kasemsri as ‘private, businesslike ... get-togethers' to fill the long periods of little per-
sonal contacts between the formal summits’ [qtd. in: DJIN 14.12.1995]. 
The first of such Informal Summits eventually took place in late November 1996. Since Informal 
Summits were organized on an annual basis unless formal summits were supposed to be held 
[XINHUA 22.11.2000]. 
The periods between the formal Summits generally grew shorter; thus, in 2007 even two Summits 
took place. Until the time of this writing (July 2008) in all 13 formal Summits and four informal 
Summits have been held [compare ASEAN homepage]. 
The ASEAN nations’ general tilt toward informality led also to the establishment of other regular 
procedures and fora that were not so much in the limelight as the annual ASEAN meetings. Another 
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fruit was for instance the introduction of the ‘informal’ ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meetings. The 
ASEAN members in this regard emphasized  
… the importance of continuing this form of periodic informal consultations in order to en-
hance cooperation among the ASEAN countries and to provide a forum in which they could 
coordinate their efforts in safeguarding the interest of the region as a whole. [ASEAN 
14.07.1972] 
3.2.1.3 The ASEAN Retreats340
Originally sponsored by Singapore, the first Retreat of ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held in mid-
1999. Retreats were distinct from the annual Ministerial Meetings insofar as they were held on re-
quest of individual ASEAN members and had no fixed agenda, but merely lists of recommended 
topics. Only the Foreign Ministers plus the ASEAN Secretary General were allowed as delegates to 
the Retreats [XINHUA 04.03.2004a]. 
This innovative meeting format was inspired by the perceived need to change the modus operandi 
of the Association, improving its ability to grapple with modern day challenges it faced. In this re-
gard the aim was to reconcile the traditionally guiding norms of non-interference, unanimity and so 
forth, with the need to manage issues of governance, human rights, and democratization [HAAKE 
2003:63]. 
The Retreat, as special get-together has thus been classified as signifying a deviation of ASEAN's 
strict non-interference principle – instead giving more room to Thailand's initiative of 'enhanced 
interaction' [HAACKE 2005:190] by engaging the ASEAN partners with concerns that might well 
touch on matters that hitherto had been considered to be exclusively domestic in nature. 
On the occasion of the first Retreat the need for ASEAN to adapt to the following issues of concern 
was discussed: 
 
 
• ASEAN’s expansion; 
• human rights; 
• governance; and 
• environment [ASEAN 28.11.1999a]. 
 
In order to meet the challenges of the new millennium the need to strengthen ASEAN’s capacities 
and capabilities was acknowledged341
                                                 
340 ASEAN also established Retreats for other Ministers, e.g. Economic Ministers. In March 2007 the very first 
Retreat of the ASEAN Defence Ministers was convened [ARF 02.08.2007]. Only the previous year had the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers held their first formal meeting. However, I focus on those of the Foreign Ministers and 
the Heads of State and Government, since those two have the main relevancy for security concerns. 
341 However, the need to tackle issues on multiple fronts led the informal ASEAN Summit taking place in late 
November 1999 to also explored a new approach in their consultations. Southeast Asia’s foreign, economic, and 
financial ministers met for their first Joint Ministerial Meeting (JMM), a scope that was to grasp the challenges of 
an ever more globalised world. Philippines’ Foreign Minister, Domingo Siazon explained that “[i]n today's inter-
dependent world it is no longer workable nor productive to deal with issues as complex as environment, energy, 
technology, trade, capital movement or security from just any single perspective” [qtd. in: COLLINSON 
26.11.1999]. 
Such meetings were thought to map out ways toward sustained growth as well as toward lasting peace [COL-
LINSON 26.11.1999]. The press statement i.a. held that they would pursue “the strengthening of the rule of 
law and the improvement of governance by promoting transparency, accountability, participation and predict-
ability” in their future development efforts. Echoing some dimensions on how human security can be achieved 
in the long-run [ASEAN 26.11.1999]. 
. Furthermore, the commitment to strengthen the Associa-
tion’s role as ‘primary driving force’ of the wider ARF process was reaffirmed [ASEAN AR 2000]; 
being part of its search for a more robust international stature. 
The 1999 AMM statement gave some clarification on the Retreat’s purpose, when it explained: 
The Retreat provided an opportunity for all ten ASEAN Foreign Ministers to hold frank and 
wide-ranging discussions on the future of ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and 
ASEAN’s dialogue relationships. The Retreat is part of a continuous process of serious re-
examination of the longer-term issues facing ASEAN. [ASEAN 24.07.1999] 
Strengthening the overall diplomatic network was a decision reached during ASEAN’s Informal 
Summit in November 2000. There the heads of state and government decided that their Foreign 
Ministers will henceforth meet thrice a year, complementing the AMM (in mid-year) and the annual 
get-together during the UNGA session (in fall) with an informal meeting in spring [KN 22.11.2000]. 
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However, as regards Retreats the first in 1999 was followed by one in July 2000 and – besides 
holding talks on the issues of the previous meeting – additionally discussed ways how to implement 
the ASEAN Troika as a mechanism to mediate future conflicts (see respective chapter below) 
[HAACKE 2003:63]. 
The Foreign Ministers again came together for the next Retreat in late April 2001 in Myanmar’s 
capital342
...many of the characteristics of the retreat do not yet signal a full retreat from ASEAN’s 
diplomatic and security culture. [HAACKE 2003:64] 
, Yangon It was the first time ever that it was organized separate from the regular AMMs 
[ASEAN 24.07.2001]. On that occasion narcotics trade and the internal political situation in the 
host country were tabled [STEWART 30.04.2001], as well as the aim of bridging existing gaps be-
tween the founder members and the new members [HAACKE 2003:63]. 
The next Retreat in February 2002 discussed among it issues East Timor’s application for observer 
status. It was also expected that the issue of anti-terrorism would be a topic for the Foreign Minis-
ters [APN 11.02.2002]. On East Timor no consensus war reached; instead the Foreign Ministers 
agreed to adopt a gradual approach [KN 21.02.2002]. However, the main success of that Retreat 
meeting seemed to have been agreement between Vietnam and Malaysia to bury their differences 
regarding the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea [MARFIL 26.02.2002]. 
The outbreak of the US war against Iraq was looming when the ASEAN Foreign Ministers met for 
their Retreat in March 2003. The member states were split on the issue; while Singapore, the Phil-
ippines, and Thailand were in support, Malaysia and Indonesia opposed the war. Although the Re-
treat was finally cut short, Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar opined: 
I am not unduly despondent by the fact that ASEAN does not have a homogeneous posi-
tion on Iraq but the fact that we are here to discuss the implications is a good sign. [qtd. 
in: NG 19.03.2003] 
One year later discussions at the Retreat revolved around the traditional security concerns in the 
region, among them the latest developments between Taiwan and China and the North Korean 
nuclear crisis. Another topic was submitted by Indonesia, the proposal to create a regional peace-
keeping force. However, the initiative was not broadly welcomed, and Singapore explicitly pointed 
out that ASEAN was neither a security nor a defence organization [DJIN 05.03.2004]. 
The Retreat taking place in April 2005 had to tackle the question which countries should be partici-
pants of the first East Asia Summit, planned for the same year [AFP 10.04.2005]. The issue of how 
to act on the upcoming Burmese ASEAN chairmanship, which had caused boycott calls, remained 
controversial and remained unresolved for the meantime [DJIN 11.04.2005]. 
And while recommendations for the envisioned ASEAN Charter were worked out, the Foreign Minis-
ters' Retreat in April 2006 - taking place after a meeting of the EPG, responsible for the collecting 
and drafting of said recommendations - also pondered the issue [XINHUA 20.04.2006]. 
At the following Retreat consensus on the Charter was proclaimed and the hope was expressed 
that it could be finalized in the same year [XINHUA 02.03.2007]. Moreover, the applications of 
various countries regarding dialogue or observer status at ASEAN were discussed. The Ministers 
additionally deliberated the East Asian cooperation process, underlining the priority of the ASEAN 
Community project currently underway [TNS 06.03.2007]. 
In February 2008 the Foreign Ministers discussed the ratification process of the recently signed 
Charter [CA 19.02.2008]. Faced with the tense political developments in Myanmar the other ASEAN 
members on that occasion urged the country to allow the permanent stationing of a UN envoy in 
the country [KN 19.02.2008]. 
 
HAACKE holds that the Retreat, by making it possible for all participants to discuss any topic has 
entered unknown territory [HAACKE 2003:64]. However, one would suppose that such discussion 
always had taken place on the sidelines of the regular ASEAN meetings. Still, with establishing the 
Retreat as a meeting in its own right, more and regularized room was provided for such matters of 
delicacy. 
The Retreat, nevertheless, integrated this new intra-ASEAN openness with traditional norms and 
procedures, like informality or quiet diplomacy (for instance, transparency was limited as the rather 
paltry information given to the press demonstrates). 
Thus HAACKE claims: 
                                                 
342 Mirroring the function of the meeting as part of ASEAN’s preferred modus operandi, Myanmar’s Foreign Min-
ister Win Aung commented: “[t]his meeting was not to make any specific decisions ... no declarations, no reso-
lutions -- it is about the exchange of views and the free flow of ideas between the ministers” [qtd. in: STEWART 
30.04.2001]. 
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Demonstrating the general feeling that Retreats provided added-value was a statement delivered 
at a briefing prior to the ASEAN Summit scheduled for December 2006. The Philippines as current 
Chair of the Association took the opportunity to announce that the 'retreat format' would hence-
forth be also introduced to the Summit level, allowing participants to choose their subjects freely 
[XINHUA 06.12.2006]. Subsequently, one such Summit Retreat took place right after the 12th for-
mal Summit of January 2007 [RAVICHANDRAN 11.01.2007]. However, an earlier Summit Retreat 
was reported to have taken place already in December 2005, as the New Straits Times chronicled 
[MOSES 13.12.2005]. During Summit Retreats the most pressing of current issues came under 
discussion, be it the political situation in Myanmar or the meta-issue of climate change, as taken up 
by the Summit Retreat in November 2007 [e.g. MULCHAND & XUEYING 21.11.2007]. 
3.2.2 Hanoi Plan of Action and Concord II 
3.2.2.1 The Reform’s Prelude - The Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) 1998 
The HPA was approved at ASEAN’s Sixth Summit in December 1998 and fleshes out the so-called 
ASEAN Vision 2020343 agreed to one year earlier and defining ASEAN’s way ahead as one of an 
outward-looking Association of ‘caring societies’ that support each other’s dynamic development 
[RAVICHANDRAN 06.12.2006]. The HPA predominantly deals with economic measures designed to 
alleviate the regional economic meltdown the region witnessed at the end of the 1990s and steps 
to prevent such in the future. For that purpose it foresaw a plethora of measures344
• Encourage greater efforts towards the resolution of outstanding problems of boundaries de-
limitation between ASEAN member states; 
 for the purpose 
of boosting Association’s integration [NG 13.12.1998] However, it also contained various pledges 
concerning conflicts in the region, i.a. to: 
 
• Ensure border security and facilitate safe and convenient border crossings; 
• Encourage Member Countries to cooperate in resolving border-related problems and other 
matters with security implications between ASEAN member countries. 
• Encourage ASEAN Member Countries as parties to a dispute to engage in friendly negotia-
tion and use the bilateral and regional processes of  peaceful settlement of dispute or other 
procedures provided for in the U.N. Charter [ASEAN 15.12.1998]. 
 
Additionally, the HPA listed the SEANWFZ’ acceptance by the nuclear nations, the accession of in-
terested countries to the TAC, the peaceful resolution of conflicting claims in the South China Sea 
as steps further steps designed to strengthen regional peace and security [ASEAN 15.12.1998]. 
Significantly, it was also agreed to formulate rules of procedure for the never established High 
Council, foreseen in the TAC; a proposal that was primarily sponsored by the then Philippine Presi-
dent Jose Estrada [GARCIA 17.12.1998b]. 
Regarding the enhancement of ASEAN’s ‘role as an effective force for peace’, the HPA included the 
commitment of ASEAN to hold on to the chairmanship and to remain the ‘primary driving force’ of 
the ARF. Additionally, it was reemphasized that the ARF process was to move from its current focus 
on confidence building toward preventive diplomacy. Finally agreement was reached to develop a 
set of basic principles based on the TAC ‘as an instrument for promoting cooperative peace in the 
Asia-Pacific region’  The HAP was envisioned as a six year process (1999-2004) to be reviewed 
after three years [ASEAN 15.12.1998]. 
HAACKE i.a. assumes that the HPA’s 
reference to the TAC is in fact also one to the ‘ASEAN Way’, not least because | there is no 
mention about enhanced interaction in the text of the HPA. In consequence, the HPA can 
also be understood as an implicit reaffirmation of principles such as quiet diplomacy in the 
context of ASEAN’s ambiguous practice of non-interference. [HAACKE 1999:602-603] 
When in 2004 the HPA expired, the reform process was elevated by the vision of the ASEAN Com-
munity as embodied by the ASEAN Charter [ONN 28.06.2004]. 
3.2.2.2 New pillars of the community - ASEAN Security Community 
The next remarkable move to strengthen ASEAN’s integration came with the members’ decision 
that was taken in 2003 to establish the so-called ASEAN Community as enshrined in the Declara-
                                                 
343 For the text of ‘ASEAN Vision 2020’ see http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm retrieved on 28.10.2008. 
344 For a list of the main measures (of an overall 270 [QUANG 16.03.2001]) – giving an overview of the breath 
of suggested proposals – see REUTERS 16.12.2006. 
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tion of ASEAN Concord II. Concord II i.a. included a commitment to a comprehensive and holistic 
approach to conflict resolution. Besides underscoring the traditional mechanisms (TAC, ARF etc.) 
and underlining the long-upheld principles of non-interference, sovereignty, and the like, it also 
broadened the approach by including exploration of norm-setting, conflict prevention, conflict reso-
lution and post-conflict peace building, thus touching also upon yet unknown ground [KN 
06.10.2003b]. HAACKE observes the following: 
Although left vague, the enumeration of these points has made for an interesting contrast 
with earlier ASEAN documents. Read in conjunction, | these provisions could be inter-
preted as heralding significant movement beyond more traditional understandings of 
ASEAN's norms and practices. At the very least, the Bali Concord II suggests that member 
states broadly concur that a range of security issues might in future at different points in 
time be approached by ASEAN as relevant regional concerns requiring collective attention 
[HAACKE 2005:201-202]. 
Concord II, moreover, highlighted the resolution of transnational issues in general and of maritime 
ones in particular. The main aim of Concord II was phrased as ‘to bring ASEAN's political and secu-
rity cooperation to a higher plane’ [BBC MS 07.10.2003].  
 
Indonesia’s ASC initiative 
The ASEAN Community eventually to be established was to consist of an ASEAN Security Commu-
nity, ASEAN Economic Community, and of an ASEAN Social and Cultural Community (of which only 
the first will be discussed). Indonesia was the main sponsor of the ASEAN Security Community 
(ASC) idea, and it presented it originally to its counterparts at the 2003 AMM. The draft foresaw 
that the ASC was to offer a mechanism to consult on security matters with special attention to 
threats emanating from terrorism. But generally, it was designed as a comprehensive structure, 
covering i.a. also human rights matters. Makarim Wibisono, director-general for the Asia-Pacific 
and Africa in Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs, revealed that Indonesia’s long upheld pos-
tulation of self-reliance was also playing its part in this regard, when he commented: “[w]e need to 
create a climate that guarantees the security of the region so that no external power could inter-
fere” [qtd. in: NT 15.06.2003]. 
Although the first proposal was sketchy only, it did not fail to make clear that it envisioned the 
strengthening of police and militaries ties - focusing in the main on defence cooperation - by 2020. 
Taking into account the traditional reluctance of the member countries on collaborating in such 
issue areas, Indonesia expressly called on them to henceforth address them more frankly and to be 
ready to principally foster security cooperation as well. And it was argued by Indonesia’s Foreign 
Minister Hassan Wirayuda that these steps along with economic cooperation would constitute ‘two 
sides of the same coin’ [qtd. in: GOMEZ 16.06.2003]. 
The proposal, nevertheless, met with the fear - held by many ASEAN nations - that it eventually 
aimed at installing a military pact. However, Indonesia answered such scepticism with emphasizing 
that such was not intended. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers requested Indonesia in turn to elaborate 
in more detail on the ASC concept [LKBNA 22.07.2003]. Later, the Indonesian Foreign Minister 
even noted that he recorded ‘enthusiasm’ from other ASEAN members for the proposal on this oc-
casion [XINHUA 08.08.2003]. 
A deadly terrorist bomb attack in Jakarta that killed 10 and wounded 150 people renewed the im-
petus and Indonesia’s President Megawati demanded with new vigour: 
ASEAN needs to grow into a full-fledged security community … this does not mean a de-
fense or military alliance, but a more comprehensive political cooperation in which they 
share responsibility in responding to threats to regional harmony and security. [qtd. in: 
LEKIC 08.08.2003] 
It was foreseen that agreement should be reached on the proposal under the heading Concord II, a 
term alluding to the first Concord of 1976 that had envisioned an economic community [BBC MS 
27.08.2003]. 
Explicit and official support for the Indonesian proposal first came from Thailand [XINHUA 
31.08.2003], even though the full scope and shape of it still remained at the time to be hammered 
out. During a radio interview Indonesia’s Foreign Minister revealed more of the conceptual back-
drop of the ASC, explaining: 
If we look the actual [condition] among ASEAN countries, are we free from feeling threat-
ened by neighbour countries, which are also ASEAN countries? I don't think we are. We 
can strengthen regulations in the future, through a non-aggression treaty among ASEAN 
members. So in the future, we will not think anymore that Singapore is threatened by In-
donesia or Malaysia. In other words, strengthen the rules, laws, and norms for good con-
duct among ASEAN members. [qtd. in: BBC MS 09.09.2003] 
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After negotiations Indonesia finally was successful with its venture and in early October 2003 
ASEAN announced the overarching framework of Concord II – covering an ASEAN Economic Com-
munity345, an ASEAN Social and Cultural Community, and an ASEAN Security Community346
Opposition came also from the more progressive corner of the Association. Thailand, usually among 
the most pro-active of ASEAN member countries, voiced the opinion that there was no need for a 
regional peacekeeping force since no conflicts to be handled raged in the area. Instead, in case a 
, with 
the aim to be completed by 2020. It was explicitly stated that no defence pact, military alliance, or 
joint foreign policy was pursued. However, the intention to resolve ‘long-standing disputes through 
peaceful means’ was specified [KN 06.10.2003a]. 
 
ASC Plan of Action 
For the upcoming 10th ASEAN Summit a Plan of Action for the ASC was to be formulated. The draft 
was prepared by Indonesia and deliberated during the Retreat of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in 
early March 2004 [ASEAN AR 2004; KN 03.03.2004]. 
At the end of the Retreat some opposition was still prevalent and the opinion that the launching of 
such an ambitious project was too premature for ASEAN was voiced [XINHUA 04.03.2004b]. Thus, 
when Indonesia's spokesman Marty Natalegawa stated, that “[t]he general principle of having an 
ASEAN arrangement to deal with regional security issues is something widely recognized but how 
you develop the idea is something that needs to be discussed further” [qtd. in AFP 04.05.2004] it 
sounded somewhat like wishful thinking. Thus the FEER pointed out that no other country had so 
far publicly voiced its support for one of the most ambitious points of the ASC, the idea to create a 
regional peacekeeping capability [WAIN 06.05.2004]. 
In February 2004 Indonesia had already elaborated its ASC concept, which stroke a rather compre-
hensive note. Besides providing for an early warning mechanism to prevent conflicts, the plan con-
tained the following for the peaceful settlement of conflicts to the satisfaction of all parties: 
ASEAN shall activate and strengthen its dispute settlement mechanism in the political and 
security areas, develop a regional peacekeeping arrangement, and consider the estab-
lishment of supporting institutions to facilitate efforts to settle conflicts [KN 20.02.2004]. 
The draft held that by 2012 an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force with a standby arrangement should be 
established. The first step would be to promote technical cooperation with the UN and other or-
ganizations to benefit from their expertise, later a network of the national peacekeeping centres 
shall conduct joint planning and training; additionally, experience was to be shared leading in the 
long run to the creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre. Makarim Wibisono, Director-General for 
Asia, Pacific and Africa Affairs at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry elucidated the idea with present-
ing a remarkable example: 
This idea is just for efficiency and a standby mechanism so when a conflict happens, for 
example in Indonesia's Aceh or in the southern Philippines, we can quickly deploy neutral 
forces to the conflict areas. [qtd. in: KN 20.02.2004] 
On a later occasion Indonesia spelled out once more how the peacekeeping force would primarily 
be deployed when Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda explained: “most conflicts in the 
world today are not between states but within states, and internal strife has a way of spilling over 
from the embattled country to the rest of the region” [qtd. in: DJIN 25.02.2004]. 
As was to be expected, Indonesia's bold and far-reaching endeavour, met with considerable resis-
tance. For example, Singapore's Foreign Minister Jayakumar explained his country's reluctance with 
the following words: 
Singapore's view is that for the time being, the peacekeeping force idea is probably not 
the right time now, precisely because ASEAN is not a security or defense organization. 
[qtd. in: KN 04.03.2004] 
                                                 
345 On the need of such an endeavour to reinvigorate the Association and in order for it to retain its relevancy, 
see an article by the FEER: WAIN 04.09.2003. 
346 The document stated that those shall be the three pillars on which the ASEAN Community is established 
[ASEAN BC II]. 
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member would be in need, it should address its fellows in ASEAN who again could extend their help 
on an individual basis347
During a SOM which was discussing the ASC Plan of Action, Indonesia had eventually to give up its 
peacekeeping force idea. The phrase 'developing a regional peacekeeping arrangement' was re-
placed with 'developing an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability' – a 
much more flexible and non-committing wording
 [XINHUA 23.02.2004]. 
Other components of the ASC concept addressed human rights; among them was the drafting of an 
ASEAN rights charter and the establishment ASEAN regional human rights commission [LKBNA 
01.03.2004]. 
But also for this proposal the time was not ripe. This was also partly due the implicit calling into 
question of the norms/principles of non-interference and quiet diplomacy governing the Associa-
tion; furthermore: 
… Indonesia's ideas about ASEAN's empowerment and future role, as expressed, for ex-
ample, in the notion of establishing a regional peacekeeping force, challenged ASEAN's 
prevailing diplomatic and security culture; the proposals pointed to ASEAN not only as 
playing a much larger, perhaps key role, in addressing intra-state conflict and helping to 
settle long-standing disputes among members, but also moving beyond mere diplomacy. 
… This challenge was repulsed [HAACKE 2005:204]. 
And while Indonesia was working on redrafting its proposal, the general feeling in the region was 
described as judging the ASC idea a thinly veiled reclaim of the country’s unofficial regional leader-
ship-role; a status it had practically lost after Suharto's fall in 1998. This prevailing assessment 
also reflected the general scepticism and reluctance to the ASC approach [WAIN 10.06.2004]. 
348
• ASEAN members now share the opinion that henceforth they might refute claims to apply 
the non-interference principle and 
. Additionally, the timeline of all other political 
and security activities in connection with the ASC were dropped [KN 15.06.2004]. As was later 
confirmed, many proposals of the draft had to be dismissed altogether [UNIDJAJA 23.06.2004]. 
However, at least the ASEAN countries agreed to discuss their domestic political issues henceforth 
more frankly [ONN 23.06.2004]. 
The draft version circulating ahead of the 2004 AMM, also included the phrase, that the ASEAN 
nations: 
shall not condone unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government or the use of 
their territory for any actions undermining peace, security and stability of other member 
countries. [qtd. in: LEKIC 26.06.2004] 
HAACKE has argued that this phrase of the ASC Plan of Action meant that: 
 
• ASEAN would be eligible to discuss matters that have detrimental security implications for 
other members [HAACKE 2005:206]. 
 
The notion generally echoes the idea incorporated in the OAS' Inter-American Democratic Charter 
(2001) that bars unconstitutional interruptions of the democratic order or an unconstitutional al-
teration of the constitutional regime. This impression was further substantiated by the following 
statement made by M.C. Abad, ASEAN spokesman, in view of the draft Action Plan to be submitted 
to the AMM: 
We have to recall before this document the word 'democracy' has never been found in 
ASEAN official documents and it's there for the first time, that ASEAN will promote the 
democratic principle in governance. [qtd. in: AFP 27.06.2004] 
In the meantime, the signing of the Plan of Action was postponed to the ASEAN Summit scheduled 
for November 2004 [XINHUA 26.11.2004]. 
The final version of the Plan of Action349
                                                 
347 Ironically, in April the same year some internal developments in Thailand – termed to be an insurgency that 
led to more than 100 people killed -  made a Malaysian opposition politician to call for a meeting of the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers [TNS 06.05.2004]. 
348 A senior Southeast Asian official was quoted as saying: "Now all we've got is a collection of platitudes" [qtd. 
in: MCBETH 15.07.2004]. 
349 The following is taken from the text of the ASC Plan of Action as published in: ASEAN 2005:51-55. 
, as eventually agreed on 29th November 2004 stipulated 
that the ASC would be based on, but not limited to: 
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• political development: to achieve peace, stability, democracy, and prosperity. The mem-
ber countries are to 'consider their individual security as fundamentally linked together and 
bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives'; 
• shaping and sharing of norms: norms are to be set on the following principles: 
o non-alignment; 
o fostering of peace-oriented attitudes of ASEAN member countries; 
o conflict resolution through non-violent means; 
o renunciation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and avoid-
ance of arms race in Southeast Asia; and 
o renunciation of the threat or the use of force. 
• conflict prevention: its objectives are to strengthen confidence and trust, to mitigate 
tensions and prevent conflicts to arise, and to prevent the escalation of existing disputes. 
The members are called upon to enhance security cooperation by confidence building 
measures, by preventive diplomacy, by resolving outstanding regional issues and 
strengthen cooperation on non-traditional security issues. Among the relevant activities in 
that area, the development of an ASEAN early warning system was cited; 
• conflict resolution: by use of existing settlement mechanisms and processes and by way 
of working towards 'innovative modalities' to maintain peace and security; and 
• post-conflict peace building: encompassing i.a.: support of humanitarian relief assis-
tance, reconstruction, and rehabilitation so as to created the conditions for sustainable 
peace and prevent the resurgence of conflict. 
 
Those so-called 'strategic thrusts' [ASEAN AR 2005:14] were to be implemented via various proce-
dures and measures in order to ensure the progress of the ASC. To be sure, the final Plan of Action 
– in line with prior drafts - reemphasizes the following clarification ex negativo: that the ASC is 
neither intended to constitute a defence pact, a military alliance nor a joint foreign policy. 
In early 2007 it was announced that the community idea will be brought forward; its completion 
was newly envisioned for 2015, instead of 2020 [DY 16.01.2007]. 
 
Put into context HAACKE has come to the conclusion that the ASC is very well in line with the prior 
security culture of ASEAN and ought to be understood as outpouring of the earlier advocated ap-
proach of 'enhanced interaction' [see passim HAACKE 2005]. However, it will remain to be seen 
how the ASC in the end will materialize and how much influence or even power in political and se-
curity policy area it will accrue, given the strong reluctance and reserve among some ASEAN coun-
tries. 
3.2.2.3 Refoundation - The ASEAN Charter 
The overall reform-push also triggered a process for drafting an ‘ASEAN Charter’ [RAHIL & TORS-
RICHAROEN 26.07.2005]. The Charter – among other things – was to help promote good govern-
ance, human rights, and democracy. The drafting process officially was kicked off at the ASEAN 
Summit in December 2005 [NG 09.12.2005]. 
The Summit produced a Declaration on an ASEAN Charter350
An Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was to be created and tasked with evaluating the contents of the 
ASEAN Charter and to make relevant recommendations [OANA 12.12.2005]. The ensuing fleshing 
out of the Charter was to be done by a so-called High Level Task Force, basing its work on the 
 which clarified that it would be de-
signed to aim to 'reduce development gaps among member countries, continue to create a com-
munity toward a regional identity, promote democracy and human rights,  create clean and trans-
parent governance, and strengthen the institution of democracy' [qtd. in: OANA 12.12.2005]. First 
and foremost the Charter was to function as a 'legal and institutional framework' for ASEAN. This 
alone was a clear indication of changing times, a step away from the cherished and long cultivated 
informality cornerstone of the ‘ASEAN Way’. The signatories further pledged that the Charter was 
to: 
confer a legal personality to ASEAN and determine the functions, develop areas of compe-
tence of key ASEAN bodies and their relationship with one another in the overall ASEAN 
structure. [ASEAN 2006:8] 
                                                 
350 The following details of the Declaration, as far as not indicated otherwise, are taken from the version pub-
lished by ASEAN: ASEAN Documents Series 2005. 
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EPG's recommendations and the Declaration. The EPG351
The announcements made by the EPG, including slogans and catchwords like: 'one vision, one 
identity, one community' or even 'one union' [XINHUA 07.12.2006] seemed to be a little far-
fetched, considering the less-enthusiastic attitude of most member states. Finally, after a year in 
operation, consultation with various governmental and civil society representatives and 8 meetings 
the EPG published its report in December 2006 [XINHUA 08.12.2006]; it was handed over to the 
ASEAN Charter Task Force on the occasion of ASEANs 12th Summit in January 2007
 met subsequently and tabled highly con-
troversial issues; among them the principle of non-interference and decision-making by consensus. 
The Chairman of the EPG, former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam explained: 
Where anything that is happening within the borders of a sovereign nation is perceived to 
have any negative effect on the collective interest of the community...then it would be -- 
it seems to be the consensus now -- it would be, and should be, made a concern of this 
community. [qtd. in: TORSRICHAROEN 13.12.2005] 
Regarding the consensus principle, the EPG recommended to uphold it in sensitive areas like de-
fence, diplomacy, and matters touching on national sovereignty but allowing it to be loosened in 
other less controversial matters, like economic issues [DY 16.01.2007]. 
While talks of the EPG progressed some innovative ideas leaked out. Among the most revolutionary 
was the proposal to establish a mechanism to sanction non-compliance. Furthermore, a formal 
decision taking procedure was mulled as well as a revision of the non-interference policy. More-
over, there were deliberations about endowing the Association's Secretary-General with a legal 
personality and with additional competencies [KHALIK 05.04.2007; TJANDRANINGSIH & TORS-
RICHAROEN 18.04.2006]. The Philippine EPG representative, former President Ramos, also an-
nounced that the Charter will call for the creation of a human rights body [LUCI 11.08.2006]; the 
establishment of such a body was also publicly supported by ASEAN's 'gentle giant' Indonesia as 
attested by its ASC proposal [XINHUA 18.12.2006]. 
It was again Malaysia that stressed that in the scope of the Charter the non-interference principle 
ought to be 'refined': '[i]f there is anything that affects us, we should be able to deal with it, rather 
than ignoring it and say this is internal affairs', Malaysia's Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar clari-
fied [qtd. in: AP 08.08.2006]. 
Preparations were advancing and the Charter was expected to be submitted to the ASEAN Summit 
in December 2006 [PNA 02.11.2006]. 
352
The Task Force was scheduled to meet for the first time in January and was to bring together one 
high-level representative from each member and no more than 4 experts; ASEAN’s Secretary Gen-
 [XINHUA 
12.01.2007]. 
However, the EPG recommendations were only one of five sources providing input for the Charter. 
Beside it directives of the ASEAN leaders, existing commitments of other ASEAN documents, guid-
ance by ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and finally consultation with various other stake holders (senior 
ASEAN officials, representative of business, NGO, academia etc.) [ASEAN 04.01.2008]. Thus, the 
EPG’s most revolutionary ideas could well be mitigated. 
It later emerged that the Charter also envisioned sanctioning political developments not in line with 
the rule of law; thus unconstitutional changes would be forbidden 'because we consider that an 
important principle', as former Singaporean Foreign Minister and member of the EPG, Jayakumar, 
observed [GOMEZ 12.01.2007]. Commenting on those progressive ideas, Benito LIM, a political 
scientist at Ateneo de Manila University in the Philippines, argued: 
It is controversial because one of the principles they are committed to would be commit-
ment to democracy, human rights - and you know most of the ASEAN states are not real 
democracies so that would be a big problem. [qtd. in: BLUME 05.02.2007] 
                                                 
351 The EPG comprised alongside Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam as Chairman, Brunei's Foreign 
Affairs and Trade Minister Lim Jock Seng; Cambodia's Adviser to the Prime Minister Aun Porn Moniroth; Indone-
sia's former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas; Laos' former Deputy Minister Khamphanh Simmalavong; Myanmar's 
Chairman of the Civil Service Selection and Training Board Than Nyun; former Philippine President Fidel Ramos; 
Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Law S. Jayakumar; Thailand's former Deputy Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister Kasemsamosorn Kasemsri; and Vietnam's former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minis-
ter Nguyen Manh Cam [TORSRICHAROEN 13.12.2005]. 
352 The declaration issued by ASEAN on the taking-over of the Task Force read: “We endorse the report of the 
Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter and agree that the high level task force should commence the 
drafting of the ASEAN Charter based on our (leaders) directions given at the 11th and 12th ASEAN summits, 
the relevant ASEAN documents, together with the EPG recommendations, to be completed in time for the 13th 
ASEAN summit in Singapore in November 2007” [qtd. in: AGNOTE 13.01.2007]. 
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eral was to serve as resource person to the Task Force [AGNOTE 13.01.2007]. All in all the Task 
Force met 13 times between January and October 2007 [ASEAN 04.01.2008]. 
The English daily Jakarta Post voiced its fear that the EPG’s most progressive recommendations – 
being at the same time the most essential ones if the Association wanted to remain relevant – 
might be substantially watered down in the drafting process [JP 16.01.2007]. This allegation 
seemed to be well founded; while the incorporation of a human rights mechanism looked to be 
assured, Thai Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram dampened the expectation on increased proce-
dural flexibility, when he said: 
Consensus or unanimity remains our fundamental decision-making rule on general issues. 
We are not to abandon that principle just as we will never give up the non-interference 
policy. [qtd. in: TORSRICHAROEN 02.03.2007] 
Also the recommendations concerning the options of expulsion or suspension of erring members 
was dropped relatively early on, since they were considered too 'divisive' and 'confrontational' and 
rather designed to 'embarrass' members states [GOMEZ 24.03.2007]. Still, Indonesia strongly 
advocated that various compliance mechanisms should be introduced, and that serious breaches 
should be referred to the planned ASEAN Council [KHALIK 19.04.2007]. 
The establishment of a human rights commission, as suggested in the early draft, seemed to fall 
through because of the outright resistance of Myanmar as well as the reluctance of Vietnam, Cam-
bodia and Laos [DJIN 30.07.2007]. However, as things stood in mid-2007 a charter draft obtained 
by Associated Press revealed that it contained the following components: 
 
• it upholds the rule of law, good governance, nonaggression and democracy. Rejects uncon-
stitutional regime changes; 
• it reaffirms ASEAN's bedrock principle of non-interference in members' domestic affairs;  
• it mandates establishment of a human rights body to protect and promote rights and fun-
damental freedoms in a region with widespread violations;  
• it backs a decade-old treaty banning nuclear weapons in the region and prohibits all other 
weapons of mass destruction and interference by external powers;  
• it fosters free trade, economic integration and the narrowing of the economic divide among 
member states; 
• it empowers the region's heads of state, to be known collectively as the ASEAN Summit, as 
the bloc's highest policy-making officials. They are to meet twice instead of once a year, 
and could deal with emergencies; 
• it retains the bloc's traditional decision-making by consensus but member states are study-
ing other options, including voting on economic agreements and other crucial issues. One 
proposal is to allow a member state to be voluntarily absent during voting with the condi-
tion it would accept any decision reached; 
• it accords a legal identity to ASEAN for international negotiations and transactions and calls 
for peaceful settlement of disputes among member states;  
• it designates August 8 each year as ASEAN day [AP 30.07.2007]. 
 
The draft also pointed out that the membership application of East Timor needs further studying 
[AP 30.07.2007]. 
On the controversial topic of a human rights commission a compromise on the issue, if not on the 
very details, was concluded, allowing to speak of a 'human rights body' instead [MS 31.07.2007]. 
On 20th November 2007 the ASEAN member states finally signed the Charter353
The same body will be addressed when ‘consensus cannot be achieved’ – in that event the ASEAN 
Summit ‘may decide how a specific decision can be made’. These provisions both make sure that 
. Although cau-
tiously worded, the Charter was a sea change in so far as it formally expresses the members’ obli-
gation to compliance. Art. 5 para. 2 reads: 
Member States shall take all necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate 
domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply 
with obligations of membership. [CASEAN] 
It goes even farther to hold that in case of ‘a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance’, the 
matter shall be ‘referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision’ [Art. 20,4]. 
                                                 
353 All details, if not indicated otherwise, are taken from the Charter of the ASEAN as published on the ASEAN 
homepage: http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf retrieved on 18.07.2008. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | ASEAN’S MAKE-UP 
167 
no minority opinion is simply overruled, but also provides an avenue for settling contentious issues, 
instead of simply leaving them unresolved and allowing them to hold up cooperation. 
 
Institutional innovations 
The CASEAN comprehensively redesigns the institutional outfit of the Association. It identifies the 
ASEAN Summit to be the ‘supreme policy-making body’. Among the tasks of the Summit are: 
 
• providing policy guidance and make decisions on key issues; 
• taking action in case of emergency situations affecting ASEAN; 
• making decisions on dispute settlements; 
• authorize the establishment and dissolution of ASEAN institutions; and 
• appointing the Secretary-General of ASEAN [Art 7,2]. 
 
ASEAN Summits are going to be held twice annually and ‘whenever necessary’ [Art. 7,3 a+b]. 
 
Article 31 deals with the Chairmanship of ASEAN and establishes that this role is to rotate annu-
ally, based on the alphabetical order of the member states. It chairs the ASEAN Summits and re-
lated summits; the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Councils, where appropri-
ate the ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and senior officials as well as the Committee of the Per-
manent Representatives (for details of the new bodies see below). Among the tasks specifically 
assigned to the Chairman are: 
 
• to actively promote and enhance the interests and well-being of ASEAN; 
• to ensure the centrality of ASEAN; 
• to ensure a response to urgent issues or crisis situations affecting ASEAN, including provid-
ing its good offices; and 
• to represent ASEAN in strengthening and promoting closer relations with external partners 
[Art. 32]. 
 
The CASEAN creates the ‘ASEAN Coordinating Council’ which is comprised of the Foreign Minis-
ters. It is charged with preparing the ASEAN Summits, with coordinating implementation, approv-
ing the appointment of the Deputy Secretaries-General upon recommendation of the Secretary-
General, and with coordinating with other ASEAN Community Councils to ensure coherence and 
efficiency. The Coordinating Council is to meet at least two times a year. 
 
The level below of the Coordinating Council comprises the three ASEAN Community Councils: 
 
• the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council; 
• the ASEAN Economic Community Council; and 
• the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council [Art. 9,1]. 
 
Those Councils are to comprise national representatives of each member state [Art. 9,3]. The 
Community Councils are responsible for ensuring ASEAN Summit decisions’ implementation; coor-
dinate the work of the sectors under their purview; and to submit relevant reports and recommen-
dations to the ASEAN Summit [Art. 9,4]. Like the ASEAN Coordinating Council the Community 
Councils are to meet at least twice a year [Art. 9,5]. 
 
The ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies as outlined in Article 10 are to act in accordance with 
their respective mandate, implement decisions of the ASEAN Summit, support with their work 
ASEAN’s integration and community building, as well as submit reports to the corresponding Com-
munity Councils. 
 
The Charter addresses also the Secretariat and the office of Secretary-General (SGASEAN). It 
establishes that the term of the SGASEAN is to last five years on a non-renewable basis and ‘se-
lected from among of the ASEAN member states based on alphabetical rotation’ [Art. 11,1]. The 
SGASEAN’s duties are enumerated as to: 
 
• carry out the duties and responsibilities in line with the Charter provisions, relevant ASEAN 
instruments, protocols, and established practices; 
• facilitate and monitor progress in the implementation of ASEAN decisions and agreements; 
• submit an annual report on the work of ASEAN; 
• participate in meetings of the Community Councils, Coordinating Council, Sectoral Ministe-
rial Bodies and other ASEAN meetings; 
• represent ASEAN vis-à-vis external actors; and 
• recommend Deputy Secretaries-General candidates to the Coordinating Council [Art. 11,2]. 
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The SGASEAN has the rank of a Minister and is the ‘Chief Administrative Officer’ of the Association 
[Art. 11,3; 11,4]. As such the office-holder is not to seek nor receive instructions from govern-
ments or external parties [Art. 7], ensuring his commitment to the Association and its interests. 
 
Another new body is created by establishing the Committee of Permanent Representatives to 
ASEAN, comprised of Permanent Representatives with the rank of Ambassadors from all member 
states [Art. 12,1]. The Committee is accorded the following tasks: 
 
• support the Community Councils and Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; 
• coordinate with ASEAN National Secretariats; 
• liaise with the SGASEAN and Secretariat; and 
• facilitate cooperation with external parties [Art. 12,2]. 
 
As the lowest and most locally based level the ASEAN National Secretariats are to carry out the 
following duties: 
 
• serve as national focal points; 
• be the repository of information on all ASEAN matters at the national level; 
• coordinate the implementation of ASEAN decisions at the national level; 
• support the preparation for ASEAN meetings; 
• promote ASEAN identity and awareness at the national level; and 
• contribute to ASEAN community building [Art. 13]. 
 
As regards the long heralded human rights entity, Article 14 of the Charter stipulates ASEAN is 
going to establish a human rights body “[i]n conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental free-
doms”. However, the Charter drafters have been criticized for not using a more pronounced and 
concrete language on how the body is going to be established, made up, and what its competen-
cies would encompass. Moreover, 
[t]he Charter pays great deference to the autonomy of individual governments, despite 
having member states -- for example Burma -- with long records of human rights abuses 
and resistance to international pressure. Continuing a tradition of non-interference and 
consensus decision-making, the Charter limits ASEAN's ability to protect citizens from 
government abuses [HRB 2008:45]354
                                                 
354 Another author has underlined that „the Charter itself insures that ASEAN human rights remains [sic] subor-
dinate to the Association’s bedrock principle of non-interference“ [SIMON 2008:278]. 
. 
A statement by George Yeo, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, shortly before the signing of the Charter 
was very indicative. He explained: “I'm not sure if it will have teeth, but it will certainly have a 
tongue. ... It will certainly have moral influence, if nothing else” [qtd. in: BURTON & KAZMIN 
19.11.2007]. This remark, while displaying the Association’s cautious approach, encapsulates the 
realistic hopes to be pinned on such an innovative venture by the standards prevalent in this part 
of the world. 
 
The Charter also foresees that an ASEAN Foundation is to assist the SGASEAN in order to support 
community building by way of promoting awareness of ASEAN identity, people-to-people interac-
tion, as well as collaboration among the business sector, civil society, academia, and other stake-
holders [Art. 15]. 
 
Last but not least the Association is accorded a legal personality in Article 3. CABALLERO-
ANTHONY has called this provision to be ‘perhaps the most significant achievement of the Charter’. 
With that move ASEAN is accorded a status that confers rights and obligations on it and opens the 
possibility to enter transactions on its own. Furthermore, this measure forces the member states to 
recognize ASEAN’s new status and, 
... having a charter would be useful in providing a legal framework for incorporating 
ASEAN decisions, treaties and conventions into the national legislation of member coun-
tries. [CABALLER-ANTHONY 2008:76] 
Procedural provisions 
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The Charter underlines the traditional modus operandi of ASEAN when it declares that as a ‘basic 
principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus’ [Art. 20,1]. As 
mentioned already, only in cases where consensus cannot be attained is the ASEAN Summit to 
decide how the decision in question shall be arrived at [Art. 20,2]. 
Thus, hopes were broadly dashed as regards softening the consensus rule. Still, it remains to be 
seen how daring the ASEAN Summit will act in cases of unattainable consensus. However, the text 
itself does not formally prescribe any sort of flexible decision taking.  
After reviewing the evolution of the Charter CABALLERO-ANTHONY concludes: 
...[W]hat has come to light is the fact | that even with the ASEAN Charter, it is still pretty 
much “business as usual” in ASEAN in which the usual features – of decision-making by 
consensus, working on the lowest common denominator, strict adherence to the principle 
of non-interference and reticence towards any form of sanction for non-compliance – re-
mains unchanged. [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 2008:81-82] 
Settlement of disputes 
Chapter VIII deals with the heretofore unmentioned settlement of disputes. It is stated that the 
member states shall ‘endeavour’ to resolve disputes in a peaceful fashion through ‘dialogue, con-
sultation and negotiation’ [Art. 22,1]. Furthermore ASEAN holds out to create ‘dispute settlement 
mechanisms’ in all areas of concern to ASEAN. Article 25 states that for disputes arising from the 
interpretation of the ASEAN Charter and other ASEAN instruments ‘appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanisms’ – including arbitration – are to be created; however, it is not clear beyond doubt that 
Articles 22 and 25 are referring to the same type of disputes. 
The ASEAN Summit is also in cases of irresolvable dispute the last resort. Art. 26 establishes that 
in such events ‘this dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit, for its decision’. 
 
Article 23 details the approach member states are to choose in the event of disputes: 
1. Member States which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to resort to good 
offices, conciliation or mediation in order to resolve the dispute within the agreed time 
limit. 
2. Parties to a dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN, acting in an ex-officio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation. 
As a general rule the Charter furthermore points out that disputes – if not provided otherwise 
through the interpretation of an ASEAN instrument – ought to be resolved peacefully in accordance 
with the TAC [Art. 24,2].  
 
Compliance 
An innovation is found in Article 27, dealing with compliance, but only with regard to ASEAN dis-
pute settlement mechanism. It reads: 
1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat or any other 
designated ASEAN body, shall monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations 
or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, and submit a report 
to the ASEAN Summit. 
2. Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the findings, recommendations 
or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, may refer the mat-
ter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision. 
With this provision a watch-dog function on the implementation of and compliance with ASEAN 
dispute settlement decisions is designed. This is not only an innovation with regard to the tradi-
tionally over-cautious ASEAN approach of dealing with contentious issues; also in comparison with 
other International Organization such a designation is very rare. The aspiration as such is remark-
able; even more so if ultimately implemented. 
 
Democracy 
As regards democracy expectations remained largely unfulfilled. Although the preamble holds that 
member states adhere to the ‘principle’ of democracy, and Article 1 lists among ASEAN’s purposes 
to ‘strengthen democracy’ the general commitment was fleshed out rather feebly. This is also not 
changed by the statement that the Association and the member states will act in accordance with 
‘adherence to ... the principles of democracy and constitutional government [Art. 2,2h] nor by the 
formulation in Article 1 reading that one of ASEAN’s purposes is 
[t]o ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with the world at 
large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. 
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No provision for safeguarding this type of government is to be found in the whole document. In this 
context it is interesting to note that the Philippines let the world know in early 2008 that it intends 
to ratify the Charter only when Myanmar makes progress with its transition to democracy355
3.2.2.4 Brief critical prima facie Assessment 
 [BA-
JPAEE 09.01.2008]. However, later the Philippine president established an inter-agency task force 
designed to see to the Charter’s passage through the Senate [HAACKE 2008:360]. 
But the expectation that democracy would be more strongly endorsed was unfounded in the first 
place. As the Financial Times correctly observed a community that brings together a military dicta-
torship (Myanmar), an absolute monarchy (Brunei), two communist states (Vietnam and Laos), 
three so-called ‘managed democracies’ (Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia), and three democra-
cies with strong nationalistic undercurrents (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) is an unlikely 
role-model advocate for democracy promotion [BURTON & KAZMIN 25.11.2007]. 
 
A shimmer of prospect for advancing the safeguarding of democracy emerged in mid-2008 when 
the Jakarta Post reported that ASEAN was working on a draft aiming at establishing an ASEAN elec-
tions observation mission mechanism, as part of the ASC. I Gede Ngurah Swajaya, ASEAN's politi-
cal and security affairs director, explained that certain problems would still have to be overcome, 
but that the mechanism’s function was to ‘assert democratic values in ASEAN’ [qtd. in: HOTLAND & 
PURBA 23.07.2008]. 
While laying the ground for reshaping ASEAN into an entity more based on rules and regulations, 
and hereby partly replacing long cherished informality, the unclear and indefinite language as well 
as the lack of enforcement provisions put the effectiveness of the reforms undertaken in doubt. 
The ECONOMIST’s assessment was clear-cut, finding that “ASEAN leaders further undermine their 
credibility with a toothless new charter ... It [the Charter, my remark] commits ASEAN’s leaders to 
nothing that matters” [ECONOMIST 24.07.2007]. A similar judgement was rendered by the Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung calling the Charter a paper-tiger; however, it additionally found that the strength-
ening of the ASEAN Summit revealed a paternalistic and autocratic approach, vesting the ultimate 
decision-making power into the hands of political leaders who rather pursue interests of their own, 
and in a way that is at times to the detriment of the Association’s progress [NZZ 15.12.2007].  
Along these international voices also regional news outlets aired scepticism. The Bangkok Post, for 
instance, argued that ASEAN’s credibility will further erode ‘by promising so much but delivering so 
little’. While the Charter formulates aims like the realization of the rule of law, good governance, 
democracy, or human rights but at the same time fails to add corresponding compliance mecha-
nisms, the signatories are free to choose which of those goals they are willing to implement at a 
given time or occasion. The Bangkok Post article is outspoken with its evaluation: 
With its crucial summit now over and its scarcely relevant charter signed, Asean is now 
back to square one. Its limitations have been laid bare, its runaway ambition to become a 
legal, integrated entity anywhere near the EU having turned into folly. It has taken a baby 
step forward but pretends to the world that this is a giant leap. Instead of upgrading its 
political values by focusing on majority voting, democracy promotion, human rights pro-
tection, and compliance, Asean’s highly proclaimed charter has turned into a regional ex-
hibit for Burma’s intransigent internal repression and blatant disregard for basic civil liber-
ties. [PONGSUDHIRAK 28.11.2007] 
Due doubts have also been voiced regarding how and why the Summit should be in a position to 
resolve disputes referred to it or to handle compliance problems [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 2008:78-
79]. 
3.3 The ASEAN Way356
The term “ASEAN Way” has over the existence of the Association gained currency and captures the 
distinct quality of the organization’s cooperative approach. Various scholars and observers have 
endeavoured to pin down what exactly one is to subsume under the now popular phrase. 
For instance, NARINE has defined the ASEAN Way to consist of: 
 
                                                 
355 HAACKE has explained this position partly by the Philippines being one of the closest allies of the US. The US 
is among the most outspoken critics of the Burmese regime [HAACKE 2008:360]. 
356 The term ASEAN Way was also used in a public document of the Association: the Ha Noi Declaration of De-
cember 1998 included the phrase: “We shall endeavour to resolve outstanding problems and prevent the emer-
gence of disputes in the ASEAN way and in accordance with international law and practice” [ASEAN 
16.12.1998]. 
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(…) a distinct pattern of consultation and consensus building, supposedly based on Malay 
cultural practices, that has developed within ASEAN as the organization has matured. … 
Decisions are made within ASEAN on the basis of consensus. If a consensus cannot be 
reached on an important issue, the ASEAN states agree to disagree and go their separate 
ways, and ASEAN assumes no corporate position on the issue. ASEAN also has conditioned 
its members to work around conflict. While intra-ASEAN issues may not be resolved, they 
can be put aside so that they do not interfere with cooperation on other matters. [NARINE 
1998a:34] 
Additional features of the ASEAN Way were discerned by EVANS to be found in: 
 
• establishing a comfort level among all participants; 
• emphasizing inclusiveness and avoiding strategies of exclusion and isolation; 
• reinforcing state-enhancing principles of sovereignty and equality; 
• emphasizing encouragement rather than punishment; 
• moving at a pace acceptable to all participants; and 
• using unilateral processes to set the stage for successful bilateral negotiations and conflict 
management [EVANS 2001-104]. 
 
HELLER adds the following characteristics as part of the ASEAN Way: a sense of community spirit 
(gotong-royong) and the search for a general agreement, even in absence of a common under-
standing concerning the specifics357
It has been pointed out that in cases the parties agree to disagree, the resulting lack of consensus 
is rarely voiced officially; instead ‘quiet diplomacy’ goes on behind the scenes that involves exten-
sive, often ‘ritualistic dialogue’ [KATSUMATA 2003:107]. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Tan Sri 
Ghazali Shafie has once stated that whatever disagreements occur at ASEAN meetings they are 
played down and discussed behind closed doors: “without the blare and glare of publicity, the for-
eign ministers were able to examine difficult political issues with thoroughness and cool heads. 
Thus many sharp edges of conflicts were blunted and the first 25 years [of ASEAN’s existence, my 
remark] became a period of confidence building” [qtd. in: SHAFIE 22.10.1992; partly quoted also 
in: CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:58]. One hallmark of the ASEAN Way can consequently be seen in 
the explicit reluctance to openly blame fellow ASEAN or neighbouring nations by name
 [HELLER 2005:128]. 
The former ASEANSG, Rodolfo Severino, providing an insider-view, made out four elements consti-
tuting the ASEAN way: 
Preference for informal processes: originating in the politically delicate relations of the found-
ing nations it was tantamount that the new organisation proceeds extraordinarily carefully. Thus 
inherently contentious negotiations and enforcement of legally binding agreements were eschewed. 
Pragmatism and flexibility: are the main characteristics of ASEAN's approach to its own affairs 
and its relations with third countries, as well as in searching for responses to various issues (Viet-
nam's occupation of Cambodia etc.). 
National sovereignty and non-interference: emanating from the region's colonial past, the 
ASEAN countries carefully guard their sovereignty and independence and consequently refrain from 
creating supranational bodies. 
No overt leadership / equality: although Indonesia is often perceived to lead the Association, in 
effect equality is practised principally: chairmanships are based on alphabetical rotation and contri-
butions to ASEAN's operations are identical [SEVERINO 2004:280-183]. 
 
This type of modus operandi results in a policy of the lowest common denominator and avoids un-
realistic official political commitments. As NARINE has observed thanks to this approach ASEAN 
was able to remain unified over time [NARINE 1998b:202].  
The behavioural tendencies encapsulated in the ASEAN Way-approach entail certain consequences. 
Thus, for instance, the insistence on consensus explains ASEAN’s general disinclination to create 
rules by which all ASEAN members have to comply, or which foresee the punishment of noncompli-
ance [PEOU 1998:448]. 
358
                                                 
357 SWANSTRÖM [SWANSTRÖM 2002:149] makes out ASEAN’s ‚shared culture of conflict avoidance‘ or mus-
grawarah – although when he traces that to a preference of informal negotiations, the term does not apply 
since avoidance would also not prompt negotiations whatsoever. Anyway, avoidance itself is an impossible tenet 
much less goal to attain, given it being intrinsic to social interaction per se. 
358 Barbara CROSSETTE in a report about the Philippines for instance stated: “No ally … within the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations … will publicly criticize a fellow member of ASEAN. That is not their style” [CROSSETTE 
24.11.1985]. 
. For in-
stance, when Malaysia arrested several people under its Internal Security Act suspected of spying 
for an ASEAN nation, the Malaysian Deputy Home Minister refused to name the alleged country ‘in 
the interest of ASEAN solidarity’ [qtd. in: AZNAM 21.12.1989]. Another instance of ASEAN’s non-
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confrontational manner was on display at the occasion of the scheduled take-over of the ASEAN 
chairmanship by Burma in 2006; many countries – first and foremost western ones – had indicated 
their planned boycott of ASEAN meetings in case Burma should take its turn as would have been in 
line with the alphabetical rotation. When the Foreign Ministers met to a Retreat in April 2005, in-
stead of pressuring Myanmar head on they relied on their particular style of doing business. The 
AFP reported the following: 
Political noises ahead of the retreat died down when the ministers cloistered themselves at 
a beachfront resort, and the Myanmar foreign minister Nyan Win was instead grilled on re-
forms during a 45-minute coffee break. That way, the chairmanship issue was left out of 
the official ASEAN agenda, a strategy to show Myanmar that the other nine members were 
not closing ranks against it, said a senior ASEAN diplomat after the meeting. The ministers 
preferred to use "gentle persuasion" on Myanmar, which if pushed to the wall could take a 
more hardline stance against democracy fighters, the diplomat warned. [AFP 15.04.2005] 
Another example was ASEAN’s reaction to the EU criticism against the planned integration of 
Burma into the Association. When the EU highlighted the dismal human rights record of the Bur-
mese regime at an ASEAN-EU meeting, a senior ASEAN diplomat suspected the Europeans of an 
intention to turn ASEAN into a ‘country-bashing club’ [qtd. in: PASTOR 13.02.1997]. 
Instructively, Romualdo Ong, a Philippine diplomat explained: 
[S]outheast Asian peoples have certain ways of dealing with one another and that does 
not include pointing fingers or exposing others to public embarrassment. [qtd. in: PASTOR 
29.10.1992] 
Not to confront conflicts offensively and instead diverting it359
However, from the preceding depiction it is clear that to follow the ASEAN Way will often result in 
quite unsatisfactory results
 so that they do not hinder coopera-
tion other issues provides for tempers to cool down and bilateral relations to remain by and large 
intact [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:52]. The time span made thus available subsequently can be 
used to adjust the positions and eventually reach at an agreement [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 
1998:60-61]. 
Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi, however, strongly rejected the notion that ASEAN 
states do shun from frank discussions, explaining in some detail the Association’s behind the 
scenes style: 
We have not only commented and criticized, we have even expressed reservations when 
necessary. But we do all of this quietly, befitting a community of friends bonded in coop-
eration and ever mindful of the fact that fractious relations undermine the capacity of 
ASEAN to work together on issues critical to our collective being. We do it in this quiet way 
because criticizing loudly, posturing adversarially [sic] and grandstanding bring less re-
sults and does more harm than good. Problems existing between two countries are best 
settled at the bilateral level. There is no need to transform such problems to become an 
ASEAN issue. [qtd. in: RAMCHARAN 2000:80] 
RAMCHARAN outlines that apart from the Association’s strong non-interference position, the his-
torical record shows that in fact ASEAN members went for ‘actual interference’ making their voice 
heard and in many cases also influencing policy outcomes [RAMCHARAN 2000:60;80-81]. 
360
                                                 
359 Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Mochtar, echoed this approach when he once explained that: “In Southeast Asia 
you have to be very slow. It takes years to get somewhere” [qtd. in: SCHWEISBERG 09.07.1984]. 
360 SMITH  even went so far as to term the ASEAN Way an 'euphemism' [SMITH 2004:420]. 
. KHOO underlines the example of ASEAN’s dealing with the military 
regime of Burma: 
Often, consensus has been difficult to establish, and issues have been put on ice for reso-
lution at a later date, with adverse consequences for the organization. A prominent exam-
ple in this regard was the failed attempt by ASEAN, led by Thailand, to pursue a ‘construc-
tive engagement’ policy toward the State Peace and Development (SPDC) regime in Yan-
gon. That policy, which began around 1992, manifestly failed to alter the military regime’s 
behavior and ended with the admission of Myanmar into ASEAN in 1997. [KHOO 2004:40] 
As the remark by Prime Minister Mahatir cited above points out, the ASEAN Way generally prefers 
that disputes between the association’s members are settled bilaterally. Conflicts are not to ‘fester 
and infect the ASEAN body’ [LEWIS 1999:141]. 
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3.3.1 Resilient Relationships / frequent Contact 
The ASEAN Way puts special emphasis on the importance of resilient relationships with the capac-
ity to ‘withstand any shift to adversity in interstate ties’. Those relationships are commonly re-
markably close361
ASEAN senior officials and ministers thrash out some of the most contentious issues on 
the greens and fairways
 and frequently substitute formal legal mechanisms for settling conflicts [LEIFER 
1999:28]. As part of shared socialising activities, playing golf has been described as an essential 
ability between ASEAN leaders. Barry WAIN AWSJ-Editor-at-large explained: 
362
The first thing we tell them is that there are three qualifications for joining Asean. … You 
have to play golf, sing karaoke and eat durian
. [qtd. in: CASTRO 10.03.1995] 
Illustrative was a joke made by a senior ASEAN official on the occasion of Vietnam’s entry into the 
Association: 
363
However, with regard to inter-ASEAN relations it has been assumed that they are so close as to 
enable the respective counterparts to predict each other’s reaction when confronted with a particu-
lar issue
. [qtd. in: HIEBERT & SCHWARZ 
03.08.1995; compare also CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:59] 
Another case in point occurred when Thailand was about to confront its fellow ASEAN members 
with the highly controversial policy idea of ‘flexible engagement’ as alternative to the traditionally 
cherished principle of non-interference, facing stiff opposition from the overwhelming majority of 
his colleagues; at that point it was remarked that the Thai Foreign Minister had arrived without his 
golf clubs, interpreted to be ‘a discomforting sign of trouble ahead’ [CHANDA & ISLAM 
06.08.1998]. 
Later ASEAN also introduced its way of making business into the ASEAN Regional Forum. On occa-
sion of the 13th ARF meeting MALLET, reporting for the Financial Times, underlines: ‘the informal 
talks between karaoke songs and comic sketches are usually more fruitful than the formal negotiat-
ing sessions’ [MALLET 02.08.2006]. The flexible engagement proposal was later only accepted in a 
watered down version of ‘enhanced interaction’. Yet as one outgrowth of the cautious erosion of 
the strict non-intervention attitude of the Association the idea of establishing an ASEAN Troika was 
launched – again sponsored by Thailand (see respective chapter). During the discussions about the 
powers and procedures of that ad-hoc body, which was supposed to deal with arising security 
threats, the Foreign Ministers also vowed to ‘have more interaction, more informal gathering, more 
communication’ [qtd. in JEN 24.07.2000]. Herewith and with the re-iteration of the commitment to 
the ASEAN Way it was intended to counter the potentially loosening impact of the initiative on the 
non-invention principle.  
364
Thus, also ASEAN can be seen as an multilateral outgrowth of such relationships. CABALLERO-
ANTHONY even goes so far as to interpret the ASEAN framework providing for frequent contact 
between the member states as an institutionalized mechanism for dispute management
 [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:59]. A Malaysian Foreign Minister is quoted as having 
described ASEAN as an ‘almost telepathic community’ [qtd. in: BUSSE 1999:54]. 
During the campaign against Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, Singapore’s Foreign Minister empha-
sized the culture of very regular contact between the officials of the ASEAN member states, ex-
plaining: 
So when a problem comes up, they pick up the phone and call each other (…) They are 
not talking to abstractions but to individuals, and that helps contain conflicts. [qtd. in: 
STERBA 04.05.1979] 
365
                                                 
361 The emphasis on informality and personal relations facilitates the so-called ‘corridor diplomacy’. VATIKIOTIS 
mentions a story about Singapore’s then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Indonesia’s President Suharto, find-
ing common ground during a round of golf and a subsequent joint exercise of meditation [VATIKIOTIS 
22.10.1992]. 
362 For another glimpse on how important playing golf can be see JOHNSON 12.12.1995. 
363 Durian is an exotic fruit. 
364 A veteran former Foreign Minister of Indonesia compared ASEAN to a ‘marriage’ [VATIKIOTIS 22.10.1992]. 
365 In 2003 the then Assistant Director M.C. Abad Jr. offered a comparable terminology: ‘[b]roadly defined, 
ASEAN itself is a confidence-building mechanism’ [ABAD 1999]. 
. Con-
stant consultation “has been used increasingly to discuss regional and international issues, particu-
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larly political and security matters, leading to an ASEAN consensus and position on some of these 
issues” 366
3.3.2 Informality 
. CABALLERO-ANTHONY elaborates: 
During these meetings, contentious issues were ironed out to the extent possible and dif-
ferences harmonized, which consequently enabled ASEAN to play a more effective role in 
regional and international matters and even exert some influence in regional affairs. [CA-
BALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:47] 
ASEAN’s style of networking is given further substance by the fact that the ASEAN Foreign Minis-
ters are vested with the authority to speak on behalf of their heads of governments [CABALLERO-
ANTHONY 1998:59]. This is a distinguishing feature in comparison to the procedure predominating 
in the OAS, where frequently votes are not cast since the attending diplomats still have to obtain 
the respective positions of their governments. 
ALAGAPPA upholds that cooperation in the economic, cultural, and political fields was from the on-
set meant to build a sense of regional community. Thus, violent conflicts were thought to be mini-
mized or ideally eliminated among the ASEAN states [ALAGAPPA 1993:449] in a quasi automatic 
fashion. 
This view is supported by KAMARULZAMAN et. al. who argue that the numerous Foreign Minister 
Meetings, Summits, Meetings of Economic and Environmental Ministers and Senior Officials Meet-
ings “…give ASEAN members the opportunity to interact at various forums even when they may be 
engaged in conflict” [KAMARULZAMAN et.al. 2002:24]. 
However, another author underlined the other side of the coin. SAN argues that the significance 
personal relations between politicians have may easily also lead to negative consequences. As an 
example, SAN highlights the sorry personal atmosphere between interim President Habibie of Indo-
nesia and the Singaporean leadership as having detrimental effects on both countries relations 
[SAN 2000:286]. 
As regards ASEAN’s strongly entrenched preference of informality, CABALLERO-ANTHONY ob-
serves: 
Since the only formal and legal mechanism of dispute management that can be found in 
ASEAN [the TAC, my remark] has not only allowed for so much flexibility but has also not 
been used at all, it provides the best indication that the | preferred ASEAN way of manag-
ing disputes is clearly outside the parameters of formal structures and institutions [CA-
BALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:51-52]. 
BUSSE traces that tendency toward informality to the prevalent political culture of the Southeast 
Asian states that usually shun public debate and criticism in order not to threaten existing loyalties 
and the ‘very basis of power’ [BUSSE 1999:48]. He also reports that in its diplomatic and political 
campaign against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 80% of decisions were made during in-
formal meetings [BUSSE 1999:50], hinting at the dimension such off the record activities played in 
the association’s dealings and underlining ASEAN's inclination in favour of private talk (empat 
mata) [HELLER 2005:128]. Instructively, the Prime Minister of Singapore at the 15th  AMM ab-
stracted the ASEAN Way with the following words: 
ASEAN countries have learned to manage their differences and to contain them. ASEAN 
had made progress in an Asian manner, not through rules and regulations, but through 
musyawarah and consensus. Most important, ASEAN countries have made a habit of 
working together and of consulting each other over common problems. [qtd. in: ASEAN 
16.02.1982, original emphasis] 
In contrast to the most western countries’ view of the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement 
of disputes – incorporating contractual binding resolution, ASEAN’s approach aims at the ‘preven-
tion of escalation of conflicts by promoting mutual trust’ [KATSUMATA 2003:107]. Malaysian For-
eign Minister Datuk Abdullah Badawi hails that approach when stating: "[t]here is nothing quite as 
satisfying as the Asean deliberative process, where we dispense with prepared texts and actively 
discuss issues in a friendly atmosphere" [qtd. in:  TASKER et.al. 28.07.1994]. 
SIMON even goes as far as arguing that, 
                                                 
366 Similarly argues ALMONTE 1997/98:81. 
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ASEAN and its offspring (ARF, APT and the EAS) better serve Asian international relations 
as venues for smaller sidelines meetings that address specific national concerns than in 
the larger gatherings that create rhetorical agreements with little subsequent capability of 
intention for implementation [SIMON 2008:288]. 
And although decisions are only cumbersomely reached due to ASEAN’s proverbial tendency of 
informality, TENORIO observes: “[b]ut ASEAN is the most binding regional group in Asia whenever 
it decides” [TENORIO 16.05.1997]. Some theories of the constructivist branch moreover are sug-
gesting that informal, face-to-face interaction makes it more probable that actors will do things 
which they deem to be agreeable to liked others [JOHNSTON 2005:1032], thus strengthening the 
cohesiveness of the concerned collectivity. 
However, with its project of erecting an ASEAN Community based on the ASEAN Charter, the Asso-
ciation conceded the need to adapt and put itself on some firmer ground. The Charter created new 
organizational structures. Inter alia it provided also for the establishment of a human rights body. 
Michael MONTESANO, a south-east Asia studies professor at the National University of Singapore, 
sees the prospects of this and other ASEAN bodies, thus: 
The degree to which Asean institutions are meaningful is always related to the nature of 
the regimes that compose Asean. ... It's a club of governments whose origins lie in a dis-
trust of change beyond their members' control. [qtd. in: BURTON & KAZMIN 19.11.2007] 
3.3.3 Style of Diplomacy 
ASEAN’s modus operandi in general and of resolving disputes in particular has been called ‘diplo-
macy of accommodation’. The concept rests on the following three pillars: 
 
• restraint: this encompasses non-interference (no aid to insurgencies, no comments about 
personalities, no challenges to legitimacy, no use of force) and a general attitude of toler-
ance; 
• respect: includes the observance of customary approaches of decision-making, that is 
musyawarah367 (consultation) and muafakat (consensus)368
• responsibility: other members’ interests and sensitivities are considered when national poli-
cies are carried out
; and 
369
 
AMER underlines the significance of musyawarah and muafakat, finding that they 
…are important mechanisms in the conflict management process since they aim at pre-
serving peaceful relations between member states by such measures as avoiding, defusing 
and containing issues which could lead to open inter-state conflicts. [AMER 1999:1036] 
 [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:52-53]. 
3.3.4 Restrained primus inter pares 
Another aspect of the ASEAN Way is seen in the abdication of Indonesia – the ‘gentle giant’370 [VA-
TIKIOTIS 22.10.1992] - of its potential claim of hegemony371
Indonesia has always considered its membership in ASEAN a demonstration of self-
imposed containment … In return, recognition – if not of Indonesia’s pre-eminence, then 
 and the concurrent assurance of 
equality among the member states [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:59; compare also ANWAR 
03.12.1987] . 
VATIKIOTIS argues: 
                                                 
367 The practice of musyawarah has evolved from village practices applied in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Phil-
ippines, is informal in character, and endeavours to settle disputes by preventing them from arising in the first 
place [AMER 1999:1036]. The term musyawarah was explicitly mentioned in the Joint Communiqué of the 15. 
AMM in July 1982. 
368 KATSUMATA on the other hand rejects the notion that the regional body is inspired by local traditions since 
the national institutions of the Association’s constitutive parts by no means are constructed along these lines 
[KATSUMATA 2003:109]. 
369 The last argument is also brought forward by EMMERSON 1987:7. 
370 Indonesia was also described as ‚natural leader’ employing a ‚softly, softly’ approach [THAYER 2000:37]. 
371 SAN pointed out that such a ‚discreet rule of the game’ has evolved over time grounded in the intra-mural 
understanding and acknowledgement that Indonesia’s regional ambitions were constrained by its membership 
in ASEAN [SAN 2000:282]. 
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at least of its right to be consulted and have an important say – was more or less implicit. 
[VATIKIOTIS 16.01.1992b] 
A similar argument is brought forward by SMITH, who writes: 
The legacy of Indonesia's contrition towards the other original ASEAN members resulted in 
a deliberate strategy by Jakarta to simultaneously become the "leader" of ASEAN while 
never enforcing its will on the other members [SMITH 2004:419]. 
EMMERSON underlines what he calls the ‘balanced disparity’ with Indonesia being the member with 
the highest figures in territory and population, and Singapore as regards the per capita product. It 
is concluded that in ASEAN ‘stability without hegemony’ prevails, contrary to the frequently em-
ployed concept of ‘hegemonic stability’ by scholars of international relations [EMMERSON 1987:5-
9]. 
Although the worry that Indonesia might still one day try to force its will on the Association372
Any move that could be viewed as a digression of Indonesia’s foreign policy, or as a lessening of 
commitment was accordingly observed with the utmost attention. A case in point was the proposal 
of Indonesia’s President Wahid that East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Indonesia be members of the West Pacific Forum
 is at 
times discernible, the former ASEAN Secretary General, R.C. Severino, counters the claim that 
Indonesia would dominate in the region with the following argument: 
To be sure, Indonesia has been widely considered as the leader of ASEAN. … Indeed, In-
donesia's foreign-policy orientation had greatly influenced ASEAN positions on many inter-
national questions, and its activism on regional issues like the settlement of the Cambo-
dian problem and the workshops on the South China Sea had given Indonesia promi-
nence. But these were the functions of the quality of the leadership of Indonesia's foreign-
policy establishment and the assertive role that I played on the world stage rather than its 
overt leadership of ASEAN. [SEVERINO 2004:182] 
Michael LEIFER grasped this effect as 'institutional-locking by Indonesia'; John IKENBERRY used the 
term 'institution binding' for the same phenomenon [in: ACHARYA 2005:109-110]. 
373. That prompted speculation which in turn 
pressed the former long-time Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, to reassure the public, that Indonesia still 
regarded ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy [PTI 08.01.2001]; a position also con-
firmed by the then Foreign Minister, Alwi Shihab [KN 12.01.2001]. However, it was also argued 
that Indonesia’s dominant position had already come to an end374
As was clearly observable during the crisis about East Timor the internal instability of Indonesia
 with the demise of the long-time 
reign of President Suharto in 1998 [PURBA 12.11.2002; KHOO 2004:139] and the ensuing period 
of its political elite being largely absorbed by internal developments. 
375 
was and remained an essential concern to the region. Still, when President Wahid was about to be 
impeached, ASEAN hardly betrayed its principles of non-interference, arguing that such develop-
ments are a domestic affair. That at least was underlined by the then ASEAN Secretary General 
Severino [AFP 21.07.2001a]376. However, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai clari-
fied: „we are concerned, we hope that the situation will defuse leading to something that is within 
a democratic framework“377
                                                 
372 During the political upheavals caused by independence seeking East Timor in the 1990s Indonesia objected 
strongly to a East Timor conference organized in the Philippines. On this occasion a senior Malaysian warned: 
„There is a danger of setting a precedent here. ... Once an Asean member state has succeeded in using strong-
arm tactics, it could do so again“ [qtd. in: TASKER et al. 28.07.1994]. 
373 The forum was said to have been intended to foster solidarity in order to act against separatism, as Indone-
sia’s Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab explained [KN 12.01.2001]. 
374 For some in-depth analysis on the effects of domestic developments on Indonesia’s standing in the Associa-
tion see SMITH 1999. 
375 SOLINGEN described that period and its effects thus: „...the collapse of a relatively coherent domestic coali-
tion under Soeharto in Indonesia transformed it from a regional giant underpinning ASEAN co-operation as 
primus inter pares to the sickest man on the block...“ [SOLINGEN 1999:48, original emphasis]. 
376 Compare also Severino’s remarks in: KN 22.07.2001b. 
377 Concern was not lessened by the fact that the Indonesian Foreign Minister declined to attend the scheduled 
ASEAN Meetings due to the internal developments, and instead sent Hasan Wirayuda, the Foreign Ministry's 
director general for political affairs [DJIN 22.07.2001]. 
 [qtd. in: KN 22.07.2001a]. Similar comments were made by the For-
eign Minister of Malaysia about the situation, referring also to ASEAN’s overall stability that might 
be affected by the turmoil [ENG 23.07.2001]. Consequently, a sigh of relief was going through the 
region, when the transition that brought Megawati Sukarnoputri to the presidency was managed 
peacefully and according to the constitution [AP 23.07.2001]. The atmosphere was further im-
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proved when the new Foreign Minister, Hasan Wirayuda, reassured that ASEAN will be given prior-
ity, irrespective of the internal squabbles or any plans of a West Pacific Forum which anyway were 
primarily intended to help Indonesia’s economic activities378
3.3.5 The ASEAN Way both Extended and Adjusted 
 in the form of sectoral cooperation 
[ASIA PULSE 12.08.2001]. 
Still, KHOO comments especially outspoken about the paralysis emanating from Indonesia's failure 
to lead, holding: 
Given this institutional leadership vacuum, ASEAN qua institution has locked its members 
into a vicious pattern of negative interaction that is corroding the ASEAN institution and 
will spell its continuing irrelevance, if not eventual demise. … [T]he cost of maintaining the 
status quo under ineffective Indonesian leadership is that ASEAN's constituent states are 
locked in a decaying organisation whose raison d'être is continually challenged as it fails to 
respond effectively to regional events. [KHOON 2004:139] 
However, when Indonesia proposed a broad range of measures to implement its idea of an ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC), this venture – including an array of various steps that were in contra-
diction to traditional conservative attitudes – met with scepticism. A Southeast Asian official on 
that occasion warned: 
If you give in to Indonesia on this … it will change something fundamental that made 
Asean work -- the willingness of the largest member not to assert itself crudely or insist 
on always getting its way. [qtd. in: WAIN 10.06.2006] 
Ultimately, Indonesia’s rather ambitious ASC concept was approved in a significantly watered down 
version only, as later also enshrined in the ASEAN Charter agreed to in 2003. 
Today, Indonesia seems to have won back its political stability. As democratically brought about 
alternations of governments become the routine, the country is increasingly portrayed as a new 
role model for the region, contrasting to former vanguards Thailand and the Philippines which are 
facing mounting political instability [compare ECONOMIST 04.04.2009]. 
ASEAN itself viewed the ASEAN Way as the modus vivendi ensuring its own progress. At the ASEAN 
Summit of December 1995 the Heads of State and Government underlined their commitment to its 
traditional style of doing business despite the ongoing enlargement process and stated that: 
ASEAN shall explore ways to consolidate its tradition of consultation and consensus within 
an expanded ASEAN. [ASEAN 15.12.1995b] 
Similar self confidence was voiced at the AMM the following year, when the Foreign Ministers 
noted: 
(…) that the political and security situation In the Asia Pacific region was relatively stable 
and peaceful. They expressed their belief that the relative peace and stability in the region 
could be largely attributed to the endeavours of ASEAN to cultivate the habits of dialogue, 
consensus and cooperation among the countries in the region and to encourage the solu-
tion of disputes through negotiations and other peaceful means. [ASEAN 21.07.1996] 
The expansion of ASEAN, naturally, was set to make the search for consensus even more burden-
some, raising questions if the search for unanimity could also be pursued in future [SAWATSA-
WANG et.al. 08.08.1997]. 
However, on another front ASEAN was able to extend its style to the far bigger ARF gatherings. As 
a case in point the evolutionary quality of the ARF process was regularly pointed out [e.g. ARF 
27.07.1997]. Another instance is the emphasis on the importance of informal discussions, contrib-
uting to ‘greater interaction and networking’ among the participants [ARF 27.07.1997]. Besides 
imprinting the ASEAN Way on this large get-together, the ARF meetings very frequently acknowl-
edge that ASEAN is considered the ‘primary driving force’ of the ARF [ARF 27.07.1997]. 
                                                 
378 In mid-September 2001 ASEAN endorsed a framework with Australia and New Zealand (Closer Economic 
Relations, CER), promoting trade and investment flows; as such it bore some resemblance to the West Pacific 
Forum notion [XINHUA 16.09.2001]. 
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However, the ASEAN Way also faced challenges. So when Thailand379
• the notion that ‘flexible engagement’ would be made in public, instead of the quiet diplo-
macy usually practiced by ASEAN; 
 and the Philippines suggested 
in the late 1990s that ASEAN should adopt a policy of ‘flexible engagement’, allowing fellow mem-
bers to comment on the internal affairs of each other, the idea was repudiated by most other 
members. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Abdullah Badawi, for one, declared: 
If there are problems, we will overcome them our way in a manner which does not un-
dermine the dignity of anyone and which shows that we are sensitive over any incident 
which occurs. [qtd. in: AFP 17.07.1998b] 
Additionally, Badawi argued that the existing bilateral channels could be used to solve any prob-
lems arising [JEN 17.07.1998], reemphasizing the traditional attitude that the Association is not to 
be burdened with such matters. 
However, the pressure for changing the established style and approach to face modern-day prob-
lems and challenges arising, grew with the economic meltdown during 1997/1998. Moreover, by 
losing the traditional overarching threats (China, USSR, US) as well as by the incorporation of long-
time opponent Vietnam into the grouping, ASEAN felt pressed to find another justification for its 
existence. LARIMNER et. alia concluded: “[w]ithout a shared mission, the differences among the 
countries, the old, festering resentments and rivalries are emerging” [LARIMER et.al. 02.11.1998]. 
Thailand’s Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, explained the call to reform with the argument that 
ASEAN would otherwise ostensibly lose its influence: 
I think Asean has reached a point where it has to have a self-examination, soul-searching 
-- whether you call that an identity crisis or a maturing process. [qtd. in WAIN 
30.10.1998] 
Generally, the tenor inside ASEAN shifted remarkably to a rougher style, departing form strict cor-
diality; the ripples which the contentious sacking of Vice-Premier Anwar through Mahathir in Malay-
sia (for details see the chapter Security Community), sent through the region, being only the tip of 
the iceberg [LARIMER et.al. 02.11.1998]. 
But the necessity to reform was also acknowledged by ASEAN’s Secretary General who urged a 
change of mind concerning the style of cooperating inside ASEAN. Rodolfo Severino in that regard 
for instance stressed the need for more legally binding agreements instead of informal understand-
ings in order to manage effectively ‘problems that transcend national boundaries’ [APN 
26.07.1999c]. 
 
HAACKE has worked out three challenges that the ‘flexible engagement’ proposal seemed to pose 
to the traditional ASEAN Way: 
 
• it appeared that ‘flexible engagement’ was to support criticism under the ASEAN umbrella; 
• it seemed that what until than had been managed by way of bilateral diplomacy would 
henceforth be dealt with multilaterally; and 
• ‘flexible engagement’ also seemed to threaten a removal of ASEAN’s past practice of the 
principle of non-interference, officially deviating from the prevalent position that had taken 
the shape of ‘an ambiguity that had proved important in allowing ASEAN countries to re-
main largely tolerant of past instances of perceived interference’ [HAACKE 1999:584-585; 
HAACKE 2005:189]. 
 
The ASEAN Way was also challenged otherwise by globalization. Thailand’s Foreign Minister, being 
in the vanguard of those to support the reforming of ASEAN’s approach, explained: 
While tremendous success has been achieved during the past few decades by pursuing the 
"ASEAN Way", we clearly need a new road map and a new vision to guide us into the terra 
incognita of the future. Indeed, ASEAN will need to adapt, adopt and adjust itself, lest it 
be engulfed by the tsunami of globalization. [qtd. in: JP 10.01.2000] 
Another concrete challenge arose to ASEAN’s style with the ascent of terrorism. After the 9/11 
attacks in the US, and although having adopted a Declaration on the matter, the Associations cur-
                                                 
379 For details on the suggested approach as brought forward by the Thai Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, see 
HAACKE 1999:585-587]. 
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rent business style was judged to be insufficient. The UN Special Envoy on Myanmar, Razali Ismail, 
urging a reappraisal of the way the Southeast Asian nations do deal with each other, underlined: 
This is not to say that ASEAN's focus on economic development and nonintervention in 
each other's affairs should be dropped, but we must accept that the 'ASEAN Way' was not 
designed with this kind of threat in mind. [qtd. in: KN 07.11.2001] 
This evaluation by UN representatives was surprisingly nuanced in February 2002 when UN Assis-
tant Secretary General, Danilo Turk, revaluated the hitherto critically viewed ASEAN WAY by con-
ceding: “[w]e also recognize that traditional 'quiet diplomacy' between governments can be an 
effective route to conflict prevention“, citing specifically the conflicting claims in the South China 
Sea [BW 21.02.2002]. This went down well with the more conservative elements of ASEAN’s elites. 
Among them, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar, reiterated his stance in July of the 
same year, upholding that the strict observance of ASEAN’s principles, mechanisms and practices 
would help in sustaining peace in the region. Syed Hamid further championed the indirect effects 
thus enjoyable: “[t]hrough ASEAN, countries in Southeast Asia can focus on their desire for devel-
opment, thereby eliminating the use of arms as a means for conflict resolution” [qtd. in: VNAB 
16.07.2002]. 
However, pressures for reform were unrelenting and the Association itself acknowledged them by 
initiating the draft process of an ASEAN Charter in 2005. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali 
Alatas, member of the surprisingly innovative-minded Eminent Persons Group charged with formu-
lating recommendations on the Charter opined: 
The charter will provide ASEAN, whose activities so far have been based on a mere decla-
ration, with a legal basis after a period of over 38 years. As a result, we can no longer 
take decisions using the ASEAN way, which is very slow, consensual and flexible. Now, all 
decisions must be taken in accordance with strict rules. ... It is about time that ASEAN 
changed several of its traditional ASEAN ways because of tougher competition and inter-
dependence among nations. [qtd. in: KHALIK 05.04.2006] 
The final ASEAN Charter as a document ultimately satisfies some but certainly not all of Alatas’ 
demands. But only the future will tell if the ASEAN Way has sustainably been changed. 
 
The ASEAN Way has been the object of many scholarly works, as demonstrated above. However, 
probably almost no scholar scrutinizing the Association would go as far as NISCHALKE who states: 
Put starkly, the “ASEAN way” has proven to be a myth. [NISCHALKE 2000:107] 
And reviewing the nature of the Association HURD finds arrives at the impression of ‘an organisa-
tion trying to integrate without integrating, of nation states trying to coordinate without being co-
ordinated’; and he continues: 
In other words, ASEAN has started to build a common house, but has failed to solidify the 
foundations and devise a common roof. [HUND 2002:118] 
And Victor MALLET underlines that the political establishment’s claim of a distinct ASEAN / Asian 
approach, inherently fulfilled a consolidating function: 
The campaign for Asian values will come to be seen in the years ahead as a pragmatic in-
terlude during which Asian leaders briefly sought to justify authoritarian rule (...). [qtd. in: 
ECONOMIST 12.02.2000] 
3.4 ASEAN’s first Test 
ASEAN was only nine month old, when the controversy about the Sabah region newly erupted be-
tween the Philippines and Malaysia380
                                                 
380 Precursor of the heightened tension was the so-called Corregidor incident. Manila newspapers reported that 
a secret Filipino Muslim army was undergoing training on Corregidor island, with Sabah as their prospective 
invasion area [SAN 2000:284]. Referring to the same incident,  KHONG asserted that “the Philippine military 
was implicated in training Muslim insurgents for infiltrating the Malaysian state of Sabah” [KHONG 2005:34]. 
, two of its founding countries. Originally, the Philippine claim 
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was based on the argument that all the land on the north-eastern part of Borneo were once subject 
to the Sultanate of Sulu, which was now a part of the Philippines [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:53]. 
Interestingly, Malaysia appealed indirectly to the Association on the matter, although its founding 
documents contains no explicit commitment to resolving disputes between member states. Even 
so, Malaysia’s Premier stated: “[a]ll ASEAN members should press the Philippines not to go ahead 
with a claim like this” [qtd. in: CSM 10.06.1968]. Thailand – another ASEAN member - supported 
mediation between the conflict parties [CSM 10.06.1968]. Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippine Presi-
dent, renewed the claim on Sabah but obviously not so much because he was convinced of its le-
gitimacy. The reason rather seemed to be that the political opposition and the press set out to ex-
ploit the topic, and hence Marcos felt compelled to make a move forward, especially since he had 
to contest elections the following year [SMITH 06.10.1968; CSM 29.07.1968]. 
Talks between the Philippines and Malaysia yielded no result, but on the occasion of the first 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) August 1968, the dispute was swept under the carpet, reflecting 
the informal way of handling disputes characterizing the region’s typical style of diplomacy. No 
mention was made in the Joint Communiqué, however, one must read between the lines. One of 
the last paragraphs reads: 
The Meeting was held in an atmosphere of perfect cordiality, mutual understanding and 
goodwill. The Ministers reaffirmed their faith in the ASEAN Declaration as the expression 
of their collective will to attain stability and peace in the region as a prerequisite for the 
well-being and prosperity of the ASEAN peoples. [ASEAN 07.08.1968] 
The emphasis on ‘perfect cordiality’ and the attainment of peace echoes the current political tribu-
lation ASEAN went through. A statement of the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, also reveals 
the struggles the Association was faced with in its first year of existence: “I would like to stress 
that even though we have not been able to produce a spectacular project the fact that the five 
nations got together is already a dramatic and significant achievement” [qtd. in: WP 11.08.1968]. 
As part of the behavioural pattern provided by the so-called ‘Asian Way’ of diplomacy – later to be 
renamed ‘ASEAN Way’ the Foreign Ministers informally met on the second day of the AMM. It was 
assumed that the Ministers used the opportunity to forge a closer foreign policy consensus [WP 
11.08.1969]. 
Nevertheless, ASEAN at that time could not offer the necessary status, machinery nor resources to 
resolve the dispute itself. The Philippines even went so far as to direct its diplomats to ‘record a 
reservation concerning Malaysia’s competence to represent Sabah’ at international conferences, 
what they did at a meeting of ASEAN’ Permanent Committee on Commerce and Industry, held be-
tween 30th September and 5th October 1968. The Malaysians thereupon threatened that as long as 
such a reservation was not retracted, it would not further attend ASEAN meetings. In November 
the worsening situation culminated in the withdrawal of the diplomatic representatives from each 
other’s capitals [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:53]. Other tracks and fora had to be used. At the 
General Assembly of the UN Thailand and Indonesia together with the non-ASEAN-member Japan 
tried to find a solution to the dispute [WILLIS 11.10.1968]. At the same time the Philippine gov-
ernment proposed to Malaysia to submit the claim to the International Court of Justice [JAMESON 
29.10.1968]. 
During 1969 both countries recognized it to be in their best interest to overcome their dispute381
                                                 
381 Among the possible reasons for the rapprochement are i.a. the following arguments: Malaysia faced racial 
riots at home and was not interested to continue the stand-off; and region-wide worries about the vacuum that 
the Nixon doctrine of disengagement of its forces in Asia brought the dispute parties closer together [CABAL-
LERO-ANTHONY 1998:54]. 
 
[e.g. NYT 12.12.1969]. Although, as has been hinted at earlier, ASEAN did ostensibly play no spe-
cific role as mediator, it was at the opening of the Third AMM in December 1969 that Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister, made the announcement that the ties between the two countries will be normal-
ized. It was understood that the representatives of both countries had held discussions in the run-
up to the ASEAN meeting and worked out a formula for the reestablishment of ties [CT 
17.12.1969]. Prior to the AMM, however, the Philippines had also revoked the reservation on the 
Malaysian representation of Sabah. [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:54]. The Joint Communiqué of 
the Third AMM ‘warmly welcomed this happy development’ [ASEAN 17.12.1969].  
But in the mid-1970s the territorial dispute gained another dimension. The Sabah region, enjoying 
comprehensive autonomy, was then ruled by autocratic Tun Mustapha. Malaysia’s premier was not 
able to co-opt high-handed Mustapha who was said to give personal support to the Muslim rebel-
lion in the neighbouring 
Philippines. Mustapha moreover also allowed the channelling of Arab funds to the rebels [GREEN-
WAY 28.08.1974, compare also OXRESEARCH 28.12.1984]. 
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After surviving this complication, a decade later relations between the Philippines and Malaysia 
worsened once again because of instances of piracy. In early October 1985 the Philippines accused 
Malaysia to have conducted a raid on a small island as a piracy suppression operation, killing or 
abducting 53 people. Malaysia, on the other hand, denied that such a raid ever took place. Still, the 
Philippines’ Defence Minister spoke of a ‘possible confrontation’ between the two countries [CUM-
MING-BRUCE 02.10.1985]. 
Apart from these difficulties, there have been several attempts by the Philippines to drop its claim 
[for instance in late 1984: OXRESEARCH 28.12.1984]; however, each time internal developments 
did not allow it to carry its planned renunciation out [CABALLEOR-ANTHONY 1998:66 FN 35]. 
In January 1993 a Philippine President visited Malaysia for the first time, which was judged to be a 
historic move. Both countries agreed to open ‘extension offices’ in one another [VATIKIOTIS & TI-
GLAO 11.02.1993]. That step, however, did not mean that the issue was resolved finally. Philippine 
politicians reverted to renewing their country’s claim on Sabah, only to find Philippine government 
reacted resiliently, being no more willing to further upset its relations with Malaysia [e.g. MS 
30.08.2002]. 
The quiet was unsettled again by ICJ ruling published in December 2002. The verdict established 
Malaysia’s sovereignty over two Sabah islets – Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan, arousing Philippine 
protests [JARA-PUYOD 01.01.2003]. In a first reaction and with a view to cool the ensuing diplo-
matic crisis, Malaysia temporarily suspended its long planned deportation of hundreds of thousands 
of illegal Philippine immigrants [CALLICK 01.01.2003]. 
Also the Philippines showed restraint in the following months and it was underlined that caution is 
going to prevail in the matter [compare for instance NST 10.09.2004]. In that regard the Assistant 
to the Spokesman of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Chris Aro, explained that the government – 
as a policy – consults with the other ASEAN countries before making decisions on such critical is-
sues like the Sabah claim [AP 08.07.2004]. For the meantime the issue remains only incompletely 
resolved. 
 
Assessment of the Association’s performance in the matter is overall positive. While LEIFER classi-
fies the ad hoc initiatives of ASEAN on that matter as the only case of preventive diplomacy ever 
undertaken by the regional body [LEIFER 1999:26], LEWIS points out that the fact that the Sabah 
claim did not derail the Association can be attributed to “…the willingness of countries to place area 
cooperation ahead of national interest…” [LEWIS 1999:71]. LIM on the other hand opines that on 
the Sabah dispute ASEAN ‘responded wisely by inaction’ [LIM 1998:118]. 
3.5 The Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality 
Among the great power zones of influence the nuclear weapons of China was the most immediate 
threat potential during ASEAN’s infancy. Thus, the Philippines’ President, Ferdinand Marcos, warned 
ASEAN’s other members explicitly against China’s expansive endeavours. Marcos urged the Asso-
ciation indirectly to create ‘an effective universal system of collective security’ to counter the threat 
[qtd. in: WP 14.01.1968]. However, Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam as well as his In-
donesian counterpart, Adam Malik, insisted that ASEAN had to remain non-military, echoing Indo-
nesia’s advocated policy of non-alignment [HUGHES 16.04.1968]. 
However, the political and diplomatic dynamism of the period brought about constant change. 
When US President, Richard Nixon, announced that he will visit China – an outright ideological en-
emy until then –  President Marcos initiated an informal meeting of ASEAN’s representatives. Mar-
cos suggested that an AMM should be convened in order to organize an exclusively Asian summit. 
At the suggested AMM agreement was to be attained on the list of invitees and the summit agenda 
[ASTRACHAN 08.10.1978]. 
However, instead of convening the said summit, the five member states announced on 27th No-
vember 1971 their territory to henceforth be a ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality’ (ZOPFAN). 
The move was also motivated by China’s recent assumption of its seat in the SCUN [NARINE 
1998b:199]. 
The precursor, a so-called ‘neutralisation’ proposal had first been promoted by Malaysia in Septem-
ber 1970 [LEIFER 1976b:305]. However, Malaysia's original idea – constituting a call on the great 
powers to 'neutralize' Southeast Asia - was not acceptable to other members. Whereas Indonesia 
expressly rejected any foreign activities in the region, others – the Philippines and Thailand – did 
not want to shy away their foreign protectors. The thus re-designed concept was accomplished by 
accommodating conflicting perceptions of security by way of transforming it into a non-binding 
declaration [NARINE 2006:201]. ZOPFAN was later called by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Tun Abdul 
Razak ‘a significant initiative by the five countries to show the world they can take care of them-
selves’ [qtd. in: CT 27.11.1971], portraying the move to have been one of regional assertion. 
As regards the ZOPFAN Declaration itself, it is noteworthy that its preamble is longer than the rest 
of the  text. The signatory states underline in the preamble that they are: 
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• desirous of bringing about a relaxation of international tension and of achieving a lasting 
peace in South East Asian nations; 
• inspired by the UN aims of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, abstention from 
the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, self-determination, 
non-interference and equal rights of states; 
• dedicated to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired; and 
• believing in the need of cooperation within and outside the region to meet the current 
‘challenges’ in furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony. 
 
The ASEANS member nations in the ZOPFAN Declaration state solely the two following paragraphs: 
1. That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to 
exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East 
Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of inter-
ference by outside Powers; 
2. That South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of 
cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship 
[ASEAN 27.11.1971]. 
GANESAN underlines the inherent contradiction of existing military obligations with outside powers 
and ASEAN’s new commitment to neutrality: “[a]lthough many of the ASEAN member-states … 
were neither neutral nor in a position to enforce neutrality, ZOPFAN was broadly adopted. After all, 
being a signatory only required a declaration of intent rather than a firm commitment to a specific 
course of action” [GANESAN 2003:232]. 
Originally Thailand and Singapore, preferring the continuation of the US' military role in the region, 
had been sceptical about the ZOPFAN idea. However, the document’s vagueness of wording as well 
as its somewhat non-committal status made both countries falling into line [KHONG 2005:30]. As 
was to be one of ASEAN’s most defining procedural hallmarks also the agreement on ZOPFAN was 
enabled by ensuring the broadest possible informality. Thus, all member states could join into a 
collective policy dedication without denting their other ideological or foreign policy commitments. 
After ZOPFAN had been approved it was announced that a committee of top ASEAN diplomats (a 
Senior Officials Committee, SOC) would convene in order ‘to study neutrality and recommend steps 
to bring it about’ [CT 27.11.1971]. However, especially the positions of Malaysia and Indonesia did 
not converge easily. Malaysia endeavoured to reach a guarantee of the influential powers, whereas 
Indonesia did not want to rely on such commitments, having witnessed adverse experiences with 
the Chinese supporting the Indonesian Communist Party coup in 1965 despite of its declaratory 
vow to non-interference [HARVEY 13.08.1972; compare also KHONG 2005:29-30]. 
During extensive talks between Malaysia and China about establishing relations382, Malaysia kept 
the other ASEAN members closely informed; but if failed to receive any substantial concession from 
China383
As mentioned, and as was correctly observed by the Christian Science, the declaration was ‘more a 
statement of intent than of fact’ [compare also NARINE 1998b:197]. The Philippines
 [SHARKEY 13.12.1973]. Even so, about half a year later China at least officially endorsed 
the call for neutrality (ZOPFAN) [WP 29.05.1974] – only shortly before the restoration of full dip-
lomatic relations between Malaysia and China were announced. This step was emphatically wel-
comed by the other ASEAN members countries [MORITZ 03.06.1974]. Significantly, soon after the 
conclusion of the Malaysian-Chinese agreement, China started also negotiations with the other four 
ASEAN members on the establishment of diplomatic relations [CSM 27.06.1974]. 
However, the Malaysian concept met with dismissal when presented to two other ‘great powers’, 
namely the US and the USSR [NARINE 1998b:199]. 
384 and Thai-
land continued to maintain active defence and aid agreements with the US385
                                                 
382 Malaysia had considerable domestic reasons (ongoing riots) to reach out to China [compare NARINE 
1998b:198 FN 5]. 
383 For a brief sketch of the relations between the ASEAN states and China at that time see: SOUTHERLAND 
05.04.1974. 
384 The Philippines in 1947 had concluded the so-called Military Bases Agreement with the US, laying the 
groundwork for the significant military presence of the US there until 1991 [GANESAN 2003:230]. 
385 Officially, the US had made clear that it would henceforth avoid direct involvement in Asian conflicts, but at 
the same time implicitly promised military assistance with the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 [LELYVELD 29.06.1975] 
 and also took part in 
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SEATO386 [LEWIS 1999:56]; whereas Malaysia and Singapore were signatories to the five-power 
defence arrangement with Britain387
The operations of ideologically affiliated insurgency movements in some of the member states 
seemed to discredit the commitment to neutrality. As Singapore’s Foreign Ministers, Rajaratnam 
pointedly said, that parallel to pursuing the neutralization policy ‘... we should also make other 
arrangements, if you like, interim arrangements, to ensure some measure of security, whether 
collectively among ourselves or with people we consider our friends’ [qtd. in: CSM 01.12.1971]
, Australia, and New Zealand. 
388
This came despite the US’
. 
389
The SOC which had been tasked with drawing up a blueprint to develop a common understanding 
of the interpretation of ZOPFAN finished its work not until 1976
 and Great Britain’s announcements of their planned disengagement 
from the region. The latter had announced in 1967 that it is going to withdraw its commitments 
east of the Suez Canal with the exception of Hong Kong [LEWIS 1999:52]. The US two years later, 
in 1969, had made clear with the Nixon Doctrine that it would henceforth avoid direct involvement 
in Asian conflicts, but at the same time promised indirect military assistance [LELYVELD 
29.06.1975] LEWIS notes the consequences this had for ASEAN: 
It can be argued that as a result of this doctrine (the Nixon Doctrine, my remark) ASEAN 
became diverted from its economic mission and more concerned with security concerns. 
[LEWIS 1999:73] 
On the one hand scholars judge the ZOPFAN Declaration is to have been the first major initiative of 
ASEAN [NARINE 1998a:44; CT 27.11.1971] – NISCHALKE even called it a ‘significant milestone for 
co-operation’ - [NISCHALKE 2000:92] and on the other hand it is classified to be a mere ‘political 
compromise cobbled together to accommodate ASEAN states with strongly divergent strategic per-
spectives’ [NARINE 1998b:200]. 
It is true, ZOPFAN’s concept always remained grossly under-defined. At the opening of the Seventh 
AMM (1974) for example, Indonesia’s president still found it necessary to reiterate: 
(…) that ASEAN was a genuine grouping which did not serve the interest nor execute the 
policy of whatever outside power. The President said that ASEAN was an indigenous or-
ganisation to guard regional interests to strive for peace, stability and welfare in the re-
gion and was not directed against any power or group of powers. [ASEAN 09.05.1974] 
390
                                                 
386 The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization had been established in 1955 with the main aim of defending the 
region against communist expansion. It was originally formed by Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thai-
land, and Pakistan as well as the US and the Philippines. SEATO was disbanded in 1977 due to disagreement 
among its members on how to react to the Vietnam War [MCLEAN & MCMILLAN 2003:SEATO]. 
387 This was despite Great Britain’s announcement  in the year of ASEAN’s formation to withdraw its commit-
ments east of the Suez Canal with the exception of Hong Kong [LEWIS 1999:52]. 
388 For a short analysis which difficulties ASEAN faced with its proclamation of neutrality see: SIMONS 
11.12.1971. 
389 For a review of the US' relationship with the Southeast Asian region see: CHANDRA 2005. 
390 The approval of the blueprint was postponed in May 1975 as desired by Singapore and Indonesia. The end of 
the Vietnam war seemed to them to make rejection of the document by the Indochina states likely [LELYVELD 
14.05.1975]. 
. The eventual document speci-
fied that ZOPFAN could only be realized if the region was free of ideological, political, economic, 
armed and other forms of conflict. Furthermore basic principles were highlighted (sovereignty, non-
interference). Nevertheless, the conditions that would have to prevail so that ZOPFAN could be 
realized were largely theoretical and ideal and represented a somewhat lacking political commit-
ment to the whole concept [NARINE 1998b:200]. This fact was attributed to the general if not ex-
plicitly stated wish that the US maintains a (military) presence in the area despite the Nixon Doc-
trine, especially so to counter the Indochinese communist regimes’ power after the end of the Viet-
nam war [LELYVELD 29.06.1975]. 
As a consequence the ZOPFAN idea was only reaffirmed in a lukewarm fashion during the Tenth 
AMM in 1977. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ continued commitment to ZOPFAN sounded somewhat 
hollow when they agreed: 
(…) that ASEAN countries would continue their deliberations on the various initial steps al-
ready proposed and to consider further initiatives which would create conditions conducive 
for the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality free from any form or 
manner of interference by outside Powers. [ASEAN 08.07.1977] 
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Despite the Vietnam war the lack of outright endorsement for the ZOPFAN idea from the three ma-
jor powers (China, the US, and the USSR) seems to have been co-responsible for the inadequate 
realization of the concept [LEWIS 1999:73-74]. And the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and 
ASEAN’s position in that respect additionally to seriously undermining ZOPFAN391. As mentioned, 
ASEAN in that situation rather took to encourage the involvement of the US392
• the Five Powers Defence Pact
 and China in South-
east Asia to balance Vietnamese and Soviet activities, thus clearly contradicting the Association’s 
professed principle of neutrality [NARINE 1998b:207] and undermining the overall tenet of ZOP-
FAN. In conceding this back-pedalling, ASEAN stated in the same period that a political solution to 
the Cambodian situation would be ‘essential to the establishment’ and ‘conducive to the realization’ 
of ZOPFAN [ASEAN 16.06.1982; ASEAN 25.06.1983]. 
It was indicative of the prevailing mood in the region when during ASEAN’s third summit in Decem-
ber 1987 rumours made the rounds that a secret paper had been submitted, entitled ‘Regional 
Security Concerns’ which supported the existence of the US bases in the Philippines. However, 
since directly contradicting the ZOPFAN concept, ASEAN leaders were unwilling comment on it pub-
licly [AP 17.12.1987]. Similarly, ASEAN representatives meeting for their annual AMM at a time 
when the Philippines had to discuss the renewal of leases for its two US bases, omitted any men-
tion of the subject in their released communiqué. Singapore’s Foreign Minister even told reporters 
that he did not consider the issue to be a matter for discussion in ASEAN [REUTERS 06.07.1988]. 
In the post-cold war era the ZOPFAN concept ultimately lost its residual relevancy. NARINE judges: 
ASEAN now views ZOPFAN as impractical because international economic interdepend-
ence, and Southeast Asia’s need for access to the world economy, requires that the region 
be closely integrated with the rest of the world. It cannot maintain an insular security pol-
icy at the same time. Moreover, the ASEAN states now believe their security is best served 
by pursuing a policy of ‘equilibrium’ between the great powers and themselves. [NARINE 
1998b:210] 
The Christian Science Monitor’s scepticism aired at ZOPFAN’s birth, however, proved to be justified. 
The 1990s saw numerous steps renewing the military defence ties with extra-regional powers: 
 
393
• in 1990 the US and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding
, including Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Great Britain, 
and New Zealand has been rejuvenated since 1989; 
394; this document 
is giving the first access to shore facilities of the latter395
• Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia negotiated access agreements with the US and the con-
duct of joint operations; 
; 
• Thailand and the US hold annually their joint exercise ‘Cobra Gold’; 
• in 1995 the Philippines and Australia agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding governing 
defence cooperation; 
• also in 1995 Indonesia and Australia signed a ten-year defence agreement396
 
 [LEWIS 
1999:159; BURNS 06.07.1990]. 
The only major step that could be interpreted as an implementation of ZOPFAN was the eventual 
1992 removal of the US naval presence at Philippines Subic Bay. However, after China had secretly 
                                                 
391 ALAGAPPA concludes that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia resulted ‘in the indefinite postponement of 
the ZOPFAN’ [ALAGAPPA 1993:453]. 
392 The Philippines’ President, Ferdinand Marcos, on a state visit in September 1982 to the US urged to review 
the future of the two large US bases on its soil, and suggested that the respective base agreements might be 
terminated. However, although Marcos mentioned ASEAN’s endeavour to reach a state of neutrality, the issue 
could well have served as a bargaining chip for other negotiations, i.a. trade preferences [NYT 07.09.1982]. 
393 The Five Power Defence Arrangements consisted of a set of arrangements which obliged the parties to coun-
sel each other in case of an external aggression or threat of attack against Malaysia or Singapore in order to 
decide how to respond to the attack [BRISTOW 2005:5]. 
394 For some details on the MoU see DOLLAH 13.11.1990. 
395 Singapore offered the US the use of military facilities at a time when the Philippines negotiated with the US 
about higher rentals for the bases it used there; the contracts governing the issue were to run out in 1990. 
Thus, Singapore’s offer was termed as being against the ASEAN spirit on top of contravening the 1971 declara-
tion of ZOPFAN [ST 09.08.1989]. Malaysia proposed that in case the US should take up the offer ASEAN shall 
meet to discuss the issue. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister made clear that he objected the idea altogether [ST 
13.08.1989a]. Contrary to that Thailand maintained that such an offer was only a bilateral issue, reflecting its 
generally positive attitude to it [ST 13.08.1989b] 
396 LIM underlines that the agreement was negotiated without Indonesia consulting its ASEAN partners [LIM 
1998:125]. EMMERS opines that this step constituted the end of Indonesia’s ‘declaratory reliance on non-
alliance’. The East Timor crisis and Australia’s sending of troops to the contested region made Indonesia re-
nounce the agreement in September 1999, however [EMMERS 2001:285]. 
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occupied Mischief Reef, also claimed by the Philippines, a Visiting Forces Agreement between was 
signed in 1999, that would allow US forces to use Philippine facilities in order to train Philippine 
forces. Additionally, both countries resumed their joint military exercises the same year, and later 
strengthened their joint anti-terrorism cooperation [BUSZYNSKI 2003:352-353; EMMERS 
2001:285; compare also EIU 25.11.2008]. 
But already in 1992 – despite the imminent US troop withdrawal - Pomualdo Ong, Philippine Assis-
tant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs, openly questioned the ZOPFAN idea in early 1992 when 
he told the press: 
We have to re-assess the concept of ZOPFAN particularly the neutrality aspect because 
neutrality is based on a bi-polar Cold War which no longer exist [sic]. [qtd. in: AFP 
19.01.1992] 
However, Indonesia continued to promote the ZOPFAN idea but with a varied nuance. Instead of 
aiming to exclude the major powers, ZOPFAN was presented to actually intend to keep them ‘con-
structively engaged in the region’ as Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Alatas pointed out [qtd. in: 
STEWART 30.10.1992]. 
When ASEAN at last gave birth to the ASEAN Regional Forum a new chapter opened, as WAIN, 
reporting for the Asian Wall Street Journal observed: 
In any event, Asean realizes that for its own safety and survival it has to abandon the idea 
of excluding major powers from Southeast Asia implied in its concept of a Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality endorsed in 1971. A different strategy, initiated in 1992, is to 
promote a dialogue of outside parties to guarantee the security of the wider region. [WAIN 
25.02.1994] 
EMMER’s assessment follows the same line when he opines that the creation of the ARF “repre-
sented an informal abdication of the commitment to realize ZOPFAN” [EMMERS 2001:262]. And 
also ACHARYA agrees stating that the ARF’s establishment displaced the ZOPFAN idea with a coop-
erative security approach [ACHARYA 2004:258-259]. 
Nevertheless, ASEAN took the opportunity of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in late 1995, to hail it as a component of ZOPFAN [ASEAN 
15.12.1995a]. And NISCHALKE agrees, describing the SEANWFZ as a revitalization of the ZOPFAN 
concept [NISCHALKE 2000:97]. 
However, the US’ intention to endow the Philippines the status of a major non-NATO member in 
their fight against terrorism, although undeniably contradicting the spirit of self-reliance stipulation 
in the ZOPFAN framework, was warmly welcomed by the Philippines397 [OANA 21.05.2003]. A fur-
ther phenomenon of the increasing interdependence of the region with the wider world – also in 
regard of security relations - was the endorsement of a five-point counter-terrorism work-plan be-
tween the Association and the US providing for US training and equipping398
3.6 The Vietnam War 
 assistance to and the 
countries of the region, especially to make it fit for safeguarding the vital shipping lane, the Ma-
lacca Strait [PARAMESWARAN 16.06.2003]. 
In another step away from neutrality the Philippines' in 2005 concluded a Status of Forces Agree-
ment (SOFA) with Australia, facilitating joint anti-transnational crime and counter-terrorism train-
ings [ASIA PULSE 18.10.2005]. 
The Vietnam War pitting North vs. South Vietnam and involving various other international actors – 
chief among them the US - was of prime interest for the ASEAN member states, raging at their 
very doorstep. In order to share their views and find common ground the ASEAN representatives 
met in mid-July 1972 for an Informal Meeting. Most noteworthy of the published press statement is 
the following: 
                                                 
397 Philippine President Gloria Macagapal-Arroyo explained on that occasion: “we must find a way to support 
continued engagement of Asean with the US at a time when there are forces working against this relationship, 
and when there are those with an evil agenda to disrupt it [qtd. in: OANA 21.03.2003]. 
398 The work-plan comprised the following measures: improving intelligence and terrorist financing information 
sharing; enhancing linkages among law enforcement agencies; strengthening capacity building to respond to 
transportation border and immigration control challenges; tackling the flow of terrorist material, money, and 
people and have counter-terrorism and training through relevant US agencies; and enhancing capabilities of the 
region to tackle terrorism and sea piracy especially in communication capabilities [PARAMESWARAN 
16.06.2003]. 
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(…) the meeting reiterated its view that peace and stability in Southeast Asia is the pri-
mary responsibility of the countries of the region399
3.7 Bali 1976 – A New Chapter of Cooperation 
. [ASEAN 14.07.1972] 
The wording suggests – even if not expressis verbis – that the Association views itself as being 
responsible for safe-guarding regional peace and thus indirectly lays claim to the rights and duties 
of a proper regional organization under the UN. The other effect of such a statement lies in its em-
phasis on regional self-reliance in security matters, as epitomized in the vague ZOPFAN. The said 
Informal Meeting stressed its ‘grave concern’ about the conflict in Indochina. It was agreed that the 
resolution of the conflict was vital for the ASEAN member states and accordingly the parties were 
urged to intensify their effort at settling it.  The same paragraph concludes: 
Towards that end [settlement of the Indochina conflict, my remark], the meeting is of the 
view that ASEAN countries should explore the possibility of making concrete contribution 
towards the final settlement of the Indochina question. [ASEAN 14.07.1972] 
Consequently, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, told the press in September 1972 that 
ASEAN had prepared a peace initiative proposal for the Indochina conflict [WP 15.09.1972]. The 
proposal seemingly could not convince the relevant conflict parties. Nevertheless, ASEAN remained 
quite sensitive to the political developments in its neighbourhood. Thus, after cease-fire agreement 
between the fighting parties had been published the members’ representatives agreed to make a 
careful study of its implications [STOCKWIN 27.01.1973]. Indonesia was invited to take part in the 
Paris peace conference and promised to its fellow ASEAN members that it will inform them 
[STOCKWIN 21.02.1972]. 
In February 1973 the ASEAN Foreign Ministers again convened an Informal Meeting reviewing the 
progress on the resolution of the Vietnam war. They recognized that to discuss security matters in 
a relevant and comprehensive manner also non-ASEAN-members should be involved in the effort: 
It was therefore necessary for these countries to come together and to discuss matters of 
vital interest and mutual concern. In this connection, the meeting recognizes the desirabil-
ity of convening a conference of all South-East Asian nations to serve as an Asian forum at 
an appropriate time in the future. [ASEAN 15.02.1973] 
Next to this follows the announcement that enlargement of the Association to cover all of South 
East Asia was to be sought and hopefully would soon be realized [ASEAN 15.02.1973]. With those 
statements the Association on the one hand concedes its own inadequacy (although being por-
trayed as due only to the its limited geographical reach) to solve the conflict in question; on the 
other hand enlargement is advertised as a reward for ending the raging violent conflict, considered 
to be a carrot big enough to motivate the conflict parties on to a peaceful way of conflict resolution. 
However, even though the war ended in 1975, ASEAN’s corresponding contribution thereto was of 
negligent proportion. 
The Bali Summit 1976 – bringing together for the first time the heads of state and government of 
the ASEAN nations – resulted in the signing of three landmark documents, outlining the future of 
the regional organization. Apart from the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN Secretariat as men-
tioned above, the summiteers also signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, governing the set-
tlements of conflict and the general conduct among acceding countries. Finally, the participants 
approved the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord, containing inter alia the prospect of strengthened 
political cooperation among the member states, and specifying corresponding principles and a re-
spective programme of action. 
3.7.1 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC400
Vietnam’s reunification in 1975 motivated the ASEAN member states to develop their organization 
a step further and to add to its political weigh. The idea for an amity pact was aired by the Philip-
pines as early as May 1975, after communist regimes had taken over in Cambodia and South Viet-
) 
                                                 
399 At the next Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers in February 1973 this view was repeated [ASEAN 
15.02.1973]. 
400 The TAC was described ‘as the Southeast Asian Magna Charta for the peaceful settlements of disputes’ 
[RÜHLE 2002:88, original emphasis]. 
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nam [NYT 10.05.1975]. When the heads of state and government came together for their first time 
ever summit meeting, they signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Bali in February 1976 
[NARINE 1998a:33-34] along with  the ASEAN Concord (see below). 
The TAC was technically part of the realisation of ZOPFAN [WP 15.05.1975] as recommended by 
the Senior Officials Committee. It had two main functions: fixing a code of conduct for state inter-
action in Southeast Asia and being a non-aggression pact [NARINE 1998b:201]. When the idea of 
an amity treaty had been first circulated in 1975, ASEAN nations hoped that the resulting accord 
ultimately would also be accepted by both Vietnams, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma [WP 15.05.1975] 
as a sort of working accommodation with them [LEIFER 1999:30]. But at the same time the Asso-
ciation was careful to avoid the impression that ASEAN intended to ‘gang up’ on the communist 
governments of Indochina [WP 16.05.1975]. 
This intention was mutual, and with the establishment of diplomatic ties between the ASEAN states 
Thailand and the Philippines, Vietnam signalled that it no longer viewed ASEAN as a hostile regional 
grouping [HALLORAN 18.07.1976]. That foreign policy trend continued and by December the fol-
lowing year Vietnam had also installed diplomatic relations with other ASEAN members [NYT 
25.07.1977; SIMONS 03.12.1977]. 
The TAC document itself states in article one that the purpose of the TAC is “to promote perpetual 
peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their 
strength, solidarity and closer relationship”. The principles that are to govern the relations between 
the signatory states are enumerated as below: 
a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and na-
tional identity of all nations;  
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coersion [sic]; 
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;  
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;  
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;  
f. Effective cooperation among themselves [ASEAN 24.02.1976b]. 
Twenty years after the TAC’s signing BUSSE mutatis mutandis identifies those principles as the 
‘behavioural norms of ASEAN’ [BUSSE 1999:46]. 
The topics amity (chapter II), cooperation (chapter III), and pacific settlement of disputes (IV) are 
heading the treaty’s chapter. 
Chapter II, Art. 3 of the TAC states that the contracting parties shall strengthen their traditional, 
cultural, and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation that bind them to-
gether. Contact and intercourse between the signing nation’s peoples shall further the understand-
ing among themselves. The reference to the ‘peoples’ is in so far remarkable as ASEAN states 
largely uphold a very state- and elite-centrist worldview. 
Chapter III contains i.a. the vow to foster cooperation to strengthen peace, harmony, and stability 
in the region. In order to achieve this ‘… the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular con-
tacts and consultations with one another on international and regional matters with a view to coor-
dinating their views actions and policies [sic]’ (Art. 9). This can be understood as a type of com-
mitment to consistency (in case so attainable) of the regional foreign policies of the signatory 
states. 
Of the highest significance in this study’s context is Chapter IV which deals with the pacific settle-
ment of disputes. Article 13 prohibits the threat or use of force in the event that disputes among 
the contracting parties arise. Instead, such disputes shall be settled through ‘friendly negotiations’. 
Institutionally, a High Council, comprising a representative from each signatory state at ministerial 
level, shall be established on a permanent basis. The High Council (HC) is assigned to taking ‘cog-
nizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony’ (Art. 
14). 
In the event that negotiations between contending parties to not result in a settlement, the HC 
shall again take cognizance and recommend appropriate means (good offices, mediation, inquiry, 
or conciliation) to find a solution. The HC is free to offer its good offices. However, to constitute 
itself as a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation, the HC needs the agreement of the dis-
puting parties. If it is deemed necessary the HC ought to recommend measures for the prevention 
of the escalation of a dispute (Art. 15). 
It is also clarified that the treaty does not preclude recourse to the peaceful modes of settlement 
contained in Art. 33 (1) of the UN Charter (i.e. negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means 
of their own choice). Before resorting to other procedures of the UN Charter, the contracting par-
ties are ‘encouraged’ to solve their disputes by friendly negotiations (Art. 17). Malaysia was re-
ported to be suspicious of this chapter of the TAC since it feared that the Philippines might use 
those provisions to reopen its claim to Sabah [GREENWAY 23.02.1976; see corresponding chap-
ter]. 
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Finally, Art. 18 declares the TAC open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia. 
 
At the same summit, the Bali Summit, it was also abundantly made clear that ASEAN had no inten-
tion of turning into a military alliance, reassuring all international actors that might harbour corre-
sponding worries. Some representatives even found it necessary to point out that ‘ASEAN is not, 
nor should it be a security organization’ nor even a ‘political bloc’ [qtd. in: GREENWAY 
24.02.1976]. 
The Washington Post commented on the TAC that the machinery for the settlement of disputes it 
contained was without teeth, since it depended on the difficult-to-come-by agreement of the dis-
pute parties [GREENWAY 25.02.1976]. This judgement proved to be true. Thus, the High Council 
has never been invoked. LEWIS observes: 
Over the years member countries have proposed convening a High Council to resolve a 
dispute, but the other party has always feared that the other ASEAN members might not 
be impartial. This is because usually those who would sit in judgment would also have ter-
ritorial disputes with one or the other party. Practice has shown this mechanism for con-
flict resolution to be impractical – the equivalent of having | friends and neighbors settle a 
dispute. In addition, involving all the other members of ASEAN into each bilateral dispute 
risks fragmenting the association. [LEWIS 1999:157-158] 
Also LEIFER comes to a similar reasoning why the High Council has never been invoked: 
The strong reluctance to invoke that provision has been indicative of the recognition that 
engaging in formal intra-mural dispute settlement could well be highly contentious and di-
visive and therefore self-defeating to the limited security purpose of the Association which 
is, above all, about conflict avoidance and management. [LEIFER 1999:29] 
Similar arguments have been brought forward by CABALLERO-ANTHONY, pointing to the prefer-
ence of ASEAN for flexible, non-rigid modes of conflict management [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 
1998:50]. Later developments – the accession of numerous countries to the TAC – seem to support 
the view held by the Association and expressed by the Philippines during their ASEAN Chairman-
ship. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Alberto G. Romulo, explained: 
The TAC is our major diplomatic instrument for the promotion of regional peace and secu-
rity. Its widening acceptance clearly manifests that ASEAN is a focal point for regional sta-
bility. [qtd. in: MB 07.08.2007] 
Still, the assessment needs certain qualification, in so far as the Treaty’s impact is being limited to 
an overarching common understanding providing largely general guidelines of dos and don’ts, in-
stead of concrete material remedies.  
3.7.1.1 TAC amendment 1987 
The main purpose of the TAC’s amendment in 1987 on the occasion of the third ASEAN summit, 
was to make it possible that non-Southeast Asian nations can join the treaty [JEN 12.12.1987b]. 
Accordingly, Art. 18 was amended to henceforth include the provision: “States outside Southeast 
Asia may also accede to this Treaty…” [ASEAN 15.12.1987a]. To Art. 14, governing the constitution 
of the High Council was added a clarification, constraining disproportionate extra-regional influ-
ence: 
However, this article shall apply to any of the States outside Southeast Asia which have 
acceded to the Treaty only in cases where that state is directly involved in the dispute to 
be settled through the regional processes. [ASEAN 15.12.1987a] 
The TAC became over the years a vehicle for third parties to forge closer ties with ASEAN. The 
practice became customary that prospective members first signed the TAC (e.g. Vietnam and Laos 
did son in 1992) in order to then gain observer status, which again was bringing the applicant 
closer toward ASEAN membership. Papua New Guinea which had considered itself to be among 
potential future ASEAN members, acceded to the TAC in July 1989; however, it later emerged that 
the Association was not ready to accept the country as a member [KN 25.07.1994a].  
But also countries not eligible for membership were willing to sign the treaty, a move epitomizing a 
strong commitment to maintain healthy relations with countries of the area as combined in ASEAN 
[see for instance in the case of Russia: JEN 30.07.1995]. But ASEAN nations were reluctant to in-
vite those states to outright accession. They were careful not to let outside nations participate in 
the TAC’s conflict resolution mechanism, since that was deemed to undermine ASEAN’s preponder-
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ance. In September 1995 Senior ASEAN officials worked on a proposal that would establish the 
possibility for outside powers to ‘associate’ with the TAC [MARUKATAT 14.09.1995], also this pro-
posal was nurtured by the Association’s401
3.7.1.2 TAC amendment 1998 / Rules of Procedure for the High Council 
2001 
 refusal to accept outside powers gaining to much influ-
ence in the High Council. The Philippines’ Foreign Affairs Undersecretary, Rodolfo Severino, gave a 
glimpse on the intricate issue: 
Certainly Australia and New Zealand want to accede. But they can't because we (ASEAN) 
are still debating on the proper way to do so. We encourage all of them (regional powers 
and major players) to accede but we need to have the appropriate modality. [qtd. in: 
VILLEGAS 28.09.1995] 
And although the required provisions had y not been decided on, the ASEAN Summit of December 
1995 called 
… on all non-Southeast Asian countries to associate themselves with the TAC. ASEAN rec-
ognises that such an association will contribute positively towards the security and stabil-
ity of the region (...) [ASEAN 15.12.1995b] 
In 1998 once again Art. 18 of the TAC was modified; this time the enumeration of all ASEAN mem-
bers along with the geographical clarification that those are to be considered  the ‘states in South-
east Asia’, emphasized that the Association’s members should hold the prerogative to decide about 
which countries might accede to the TAC. The revised Art. 18, Paragraph 3 now read in full: 
States outside Southeast Asia may also accede to this Treaty with the consent of all the 
States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Re-
public of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myan-
mar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand 
and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. [ASEAN 25.07.1998] 
The ASEAN Foreign Minister described the amendment to ‘enable non-Southeast Asian states to 
accede to the TAC as an instrument of commitment to friendly and constructive relations with 
countries of Southeast Asia’ [ASEAN 25.07.1998]. After amending the TAC thus, ASEAN re-invited 
all its Dialogue Partners to accede to it [ASEAN AR 1999]. 
The non-use of the machinery provided for by the TAC, however, naturally undermined the Treaty’s 
significance. Hence the urge by the then Philippine President, Estrada, addressed to his ASEAN 
colleagues at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in December 1998, to live up to the provisions foreseen in 
the TAC, specifically as regards the never realised establishment of the High Council402
                                                 
401 Indonesia for one reportedly was against outside nations to simply accede to the TAC. However, this opinion 
was not unanimously shared by other ASEAN members [JP 13.10.1995]. 
402 The non-operationality of the High Council has inspired HAACKE’s description of this body as ‚phantasmal‘ 
[HAACKE 2003:60]. 
. Among the 
current situations endangering the peace of the region Estrada pointed to the contested Spratlys in 
the South China Sea. During the 1990s tensions had been flaring up frequently between the Philip-
pines and China concerning those Islands [BERNAMA 15.12.1998b]. So when ASEAN adopted the 
Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA), the ASEAN leaders vowed to formulate a ‘draft rule of procedure’ for 
the operation of the TAC’s High Council [GARCIA 17.12.1998b]. Upon the suggestion of Thailand 
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to conduct a feasibility study on how best to establish the body 
[PORTER 29.07.1999]. 
But the issue of the TAC’s rules of procedure was not resolved until mid-2001. A draft proposal was 
submitted, foreseeing that a ministerial representative of a concerned country would have to ad-
dress its counterparts in the High Council (HC) in writing, outlining the problem. After the HC 
members had given their confirmation, a meeting of the HC could be convened. Decisions would 
have to be taken with consensus. Only if that cannot be achieved a four-fifths majority will suffice. 
In order to receive assistance in its responsibilities the HC was granted the liberty to set up ad-hoc 
working groups [KN 17.07.2001]. 
HUND, joining other scholarly sceptics (e.g. HAACKE 2003:79], trenchantly calls the ASEAN High 
Council a ‘phantom’, and he predicts: 
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Even though ASEAN Foreign Ministers resolved on the rules of the High Council in 2001, 
there is little hope that the High Council will ever represent an effective mechanism for 
dispute settlement. [HUND 2002:111] 
In mid-1999 China had announced its plan to accede to the TAC, a step that would satisfy ASEAN’s 
aspiration of strengthening the TAC’s extra-organizational impact [JEN 27.07.1999]. However, it 
was not until mid-2000 that the latest TAC amendment went into force, eventually paving the way 
for accession by non-Southeast Asian states [ANTARA 29.11.2000; ASEAN 2003:255]. China did 
not act until 2003, and then only reiterated its wish to accede [KN 29.04.2003]. By that time also 
India, Japan, and Russia had voiced their intention to accede to the TAC [KN 29.04.2003]. 
August 2003 finally saw China submit its formal application to accede to the TAC; the ceremony 
was planned to take place the following October [KN 19.08.2003]. Just around the same time India 
also took final steps for a prompt accession to the TAC, countering China’s move of strengthening 
its influence in the region [CHANDA 12.09.2003]. Both nations finally signed the TAC in October 
2003 [BBC MS 08.10.2003b]. Those steps were followed by formerly rather reluctant Japan403
                                                 
403 Ahead of its decision Japan had argued the TAC might infringe on its ability to cooperate within the US-Japan 
Security Treaty [NR 12.12.2003]. 
 an-
nouncing its intention to sign the TAC [OANA 18.11.2003]. Japan’s admittance was expected for 
the following year, after having assured parliamentary approval [BBC NF 12.12.2003]. 
Concerning the TAC’s functionally the Indonesian Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda announced also 
in 2003 that his country is heading to boost the final establishment of the High Council, conceding 
however that: “… I know that several countries are not ready to accept. They are worried that their 
problems will be brought to this high council” [qtd. in: BBC MS 09.09.2003]. 
In mid-2004 Japan and the newest member of the ARF, Pakistan, acceded to the TAC [XINHUA 
02.07.2004]. South Korea followed them in November 2004, arguing that the TAC constituted the 
'roadmap governing relations with ASEAN' [qtd. in: KT 29.11.2004]. Also Russia acceded to the 
TAC on the same occasion [KEA 29.11.2004]. 
The Plan of Action of the ASEAN Standing Committee, also approved in November 2004, envisioned 
to strengthen the TAC regime i.a. by: 
[p]eriodic assessments of the implementation of the TAC and exploration of ways and 
means for its effective implementation. 
The ASEAN Annual Report 2005 commented on the recent accessions thus: 
These accessions are a show of political support for ASEAN's principles of peaceful coexis-
tence, friendly consultation and resolution of conflict, and goodwill in cooperation. [ASEAN 
AR 2005:17] 
The same documents spells out the TAC's High Council discretion to appoint supporting bodies. The 
HC may establish on an ad hoc basis an ‘Experts Advisory Committee’ or an ‘Eminent Persons 
Group’, which may assist the former to provide advice on the settlement of disputes upon request 
[ASEAN 2005:53-54]. 
Meanwhile, Mongolia signed the instrument of accession to the TAC in late July 2005 [Xinhua 
28.07.2005]. In December of the same year Australia signed the TAC. This step had been made a 
condition for the participation in the first East Asian Summit [DJIN 10.12.2005]. 
Given the increasing array of accessions EATON & STUBBS argue: 
With so many key Asian states agreeing to the TAC principles, ASEAN can quite | justifia-
bly feel it has set the stage for more stable relations across much of the region. … This is 
a major achievement for ASEAN and would seem to be ample demonstration of its power 
to act. [EATON & STUBBS 2006:147-148] 
However, the TAC’s attractiveness among ASEAN’s partners had not abated and while a planned 
accession of France was postponed, the EU announced its wish to sign the TAC during the mid-
2006 round of ASEAN meetings. However, this came in light of the EU’s wish to take part at the 
scheduled East Asian Summit and  the mentioned conditionality attached thereto [BBC MS 
27.07.2006]. 
And approaching the 30th anniversary of relations between the US and ASEAN, the idea that the 
first might one day accede to the TAC was circulated and seemed to be welcomed, at lease tenta-
tively so [KN 18.11.2006]. 
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Regardless of the overwhelming success as a document epitomizing cordial and constructive rela-
tions between the Association and third countries, the TAC’s original functionality for regulating the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts remains largely untested. Reviewing the practice of the recent past, 
ACHARYA and TANG conclude the following: 
However, the manner in which ASEAN member nations have hitherto managed bilateral 
disputes suggests that the main instrument for resolving intramural problems, notably the 
High Council, would probably not be employed, and that, even when it is, it may be ham-
pered by the non-interference principle (...) [ACHARYA & TAN 2006:54] 
January 2007 saw the accession of France and East Timor to the TAC [YOONG 13.01.2007]. Soon 
thereafter followed the announcement that Britain as well intends to sign the TAC [XINHUA 
09.04.2007]. Also Bangladesh said in July 2007 it was ready to join the TAC [XINHUA 25.07.2007], 
which it promptly did404
3.7.2 Declaration of the ASEAN Concord 
 along with Sri Lanka [XINHUA 01.08.2007]. One year later also North Ko-
rea signed its accession to the TAC; however, experts did not agree if this would change the coun-
try’s international behaviour [TIMBERLAKE 24.07.2008], besides being widely regarded as a princi-
pal step on the path to more openness of the reclusive state [KAZMI 24.07.2008]. The most sig-
nificant boost of TAC’s relevancy came in July 2009, when the US acceded as well [NT 
25.08.2009]. 
Apart from this wave of international recognition via accession, the TAC remains a declaration of 
intent, without ever having been activated. Hence, Don EMMERSON, expert on Southeast Asia and 
professor at Stanford University, opines: 
The fact that TAC's High Council has never been convened, despite various incidents that 
might have resulted in that body's activation, is further evidence that when signatories 
have disputes they prefer to settle them outside the Treaty's terms. [qtd. in: CHOONG 
24.07.2008] 
It remains to be seen if the phrase in the newly approved yet not generally ratified ASEAN Charter 
emphasizing that disputes are to be resolved in accordance with the TAC and its rules of procedure 
[Art. 24,2], is a recommendation strong enough to trigger its first-time-ever application. 
Apart from the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation the ASEAN Bali Summit participants signed also 
the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord. But unlike the TAC, the ASEAN Concord relates only to 
ASEAN member states. It consists of general principles regarding overall goals and specific aims of 
the Association. It contains six sections dealing with cooperation in the following areas: political, 
economic, social, cultural/information, security, and improvement of ASEAN’s machinery [ASEAN 
24.02.1976c]. 
Among the general principles and goals the following (with relevance in this study’s framework) 
can be found: 
1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution 
to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats 
posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.  
2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early estab-
lishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. 
(…) 
6. Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful proc-
esses in the settlement of intra-regional differences. 
7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to create conditions conducive 
to the promotion of peaceful cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the ba-
sis of mutual respect and mutual benefit. [ASEAN 24.02.1976c] 
The first principle enunciates the idea that domestic security is vital for peace in the overall organi-
zation, and that this in turn contributes essentially to the maintenance of peace and security 
worldwide. As an explicit threat the signatory states vow to wipe out subversive threats to their 
own security, without referring to subversive activities concerning a neighbouring government. This 
paragraph, moreover, with emphasizing domestic stability of the single member states, is disre-
                                                 
404 Interestingly, on the occasion of the signing ceremony Bangladesh’s Foreign Advisor Iftekhar Ahmed Chowd-
hury called the TAC to be ‘the centerpiece of the ARF’ [qtd. in: UNBL 02.08.2008]. 
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garding the means with which such stability is to be ensured. No mention is made of say democ-
racy as the course to attain it. Thus, repressive measures to uphold tranquillity - however superfi-
cial and fragile it may be - seem also to be implicitly legitimized. 
The ASEAN Concord, in line with the TAC, affirms that differences between ASEAN’s member states 
be resolved by peaceful means, abdicating as such any threat or use of force – a pledge not found 
in ASEAN’s founding document. 
Finally paragraph seven describes ASEAN’s overarching approach to ensuring peace in the region, 
i.e. through confidence building and trust furtherance. 
 
The Concord’s programme of action in the political field contains the concrete efforts and means 
with which to support peaceful cooperation between ASEAN’s members: 
 
• Convening a Meeting of the Heads of Government of the member states as and when nec-
essary; 
• Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; 
• Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means as soon as possible; 
• Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible; 
• Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation; 
• Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN Extradi-
tion Treaty; 
• Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating 
positions, and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions. [ASEAN 
24.02.1976c] 
 
Finally, the section termed ‘security’ simply formulates the desire to continue cooperation with par-
ties outside of the ASEAN framework in security matters, depending on their individual needs and 
interests [ASEAN 24.02.1976c]. This highlights a policy area in which ASEAN was later to focus its 
efforts in a remarkably promising and widely encompassing way (e.g. through ARF, see below). 
3.8 Vietnam’s Cambodia Invasion 
Regional developments in the near neighbourhood were intently watched by the still young Asso-
ciation. This was also true regarding the internal developments in Cambodia. After the Khmer gov-
ernment had taken over in April 1975, the Philippines’ President called for an urgent summit meet-
ing of ASEAN ‘to consider their security’ [WP 18.04.1975]. However, instead of such a meeting, 
ASEAN decided in a matter of weeks to recognize the new Cambodian regime [GODSELL 
02.05.1975]. 
ASEAN’s indifference toward the suffering of the Cambodian people under the Khmer government 
was later contrasted in a caustic manner with the activities ASEAN initiated after Vietnam’s inva-
sion by the WSJ: 
An independent Cambodia, even one run by the brutal Communist regime of Pol Pot, 
doesn’t pose great danger to Thailand and other ASEAN states, no matter how barbarous 
it may be toward its own people. But a Vietnam-imposed government there, however be-
nign toward Cambodians, is a quite different thing. [KEATLEY 23.09.1980] 
 At the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 the ASEAN members had felt the general need not to give 
the impression ‘that we are alarmed, that we are weak’ vis-à-vis the communist regimes, as Sin-
gapore’s Foreign Minister upheld [qtd. in: LEVYVELD 14.05.1975, compare also ALAGAPPA 
1993:453-454]. 
Basically ASEAN’s position toward Indochina405 was friendly (see TAC chapter), while the military 
strength of a reunified Vietnam406
                                                 
405 Indochina comprises the three states of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 
406 In this regard ALAGAPPA has pointed out that even if ASEAN would have had a collective self-defence ar-
rangement at hand “the ASEAN states did not have the collective capability to | inflict military defeat on Viet-
nam” after its invasion of Cambodia [ALAGAPPA 1993:454-455]. 
 (since July 1976) was specifically recognized. Although ASEAN’s 
overtures at first were tacitly accepted and subsequently followed by the establishment of diplo-
matic ties, relations deteriorated during 1977. When Cambodian troops attacked Thai territory, 
Thailand’s Prime Minister portrayed the threat to be one to the whole Association, implicitly calling 
on the other members’ to prove their solidarity: 
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The general hostility displayed toward ASEAN as a collective entity by a neighboring coun-
try has given rise to a new situation facing this region. It is now evident that ASEAN is be-
ing challenged. [qtd. in: SIMONS 05.08.1977] 
Although Singapore shared that view, warning that ASEAN shall not allow others to divide and rule 
them, the Philippines and Malaysia stressed their wish for friendly relations with Vietnam [SIMONS 
06.08.1977]. However, ASEAN reached a certain degree of consensus on the matter and the For-
eign Ministers at the Tenth AMM stated their desire to promote beneficial relations with all coun-
tries ‘including’ Kampuchea (Cambodia), Laos and Vietnam. Additionally, it was underlined that the 
principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference will have to be observed in the 
matter [ASEAN 08.07.1977]. The Association’s stance on this issue underlined the conservative 
‘hands-off’ approach generally characterizing its position towards interference. 
However, in a slight deviation the posture was somewhat adjusted at the Second ASEAN Summit 
the following August. The joint communiqué does not repeat the above principles; instead the 
ASEAN heads of state and governments emphasized the cooperative improvements when they 
(…) noted with satisfaction. [sic] that exchanges of diplomatic and trade visits at high 
level have enhanced the prospects improved relations between ASEAN countries and the 
countries of Indochina. They agreed that further efforts should be made to enlarge the 
area of understanding and cooperation with those countries on the basis of mutuality of 
interests. [ASEAN 05.08.1977] 
Two weeks407
Without naming Vietnam explicitly, the meeting “strongly deplored the armed intervention against 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea”, a prime example of the 
ASEAN Way that prefers a non-confrontational approach and language
 after Vietnam had invaded Cambodia, the ASEAN states met. On the occasion of that 
meeting they adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude. Kulkarni, reporting for the CSM, highlighted 
ASEAN’s cautious and languid reaction: 
ASEAN sources pointed out that the organization would not like to give an impression that 
it would be meddling in the conflict, preferring instead to remain neutral. [KULKARNI 
10.01.1979] 
408
What is observable here is the emphasis placed not so much on the suffering caused to the con-
cerned population or the breach of general rules of conduct between states, but instead on the 
 [ASEAN 12.01.1979]. 
SHARPE on the other hand has emphasized that this type of reaction was designed not to “inspire 
Beijing to grasp an excuse for a military response” [SHARPE 2003:236]. 
The reluctance of ASEAN to act on the conflict was such that Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja, opening the ASEAN meeting, suggested to call on the UN to take steps in order to 
end the fighting [KULKARNI 10.01.1979]. This proposal was taken up by the Special Meeting of the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers, taking place on 12th January 1979. On that occasion the Foreign Ministers 
again ‘deplored’ the developments and stressed the right of the Kampuchean people to determine 
their future by themselves (this call cannot be automatically interpreted as promoting a democratic 
form of government, as evidenced by the ASEAN’s own composition and some other policies it 
propagated) . Thus, the Association’s ‘neutral’ stance had been dropped with ASEAN calling for the 
immediate and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchean territory [ASEAN 12.01.1979]. 
However, the positional change of ASEAN member states was also nurtured by the growing prob-
lem of the refugees entering their territory due to the ongoing conflict. When ASEAN met the fol-
lowing day, the member states emphasized 
(...) that the continuation of the refugee problem, apart from causing difficulties to ASEAN 
countries, would seriously affect the stability of the region. Noting that the outflow of peo-
ple from Indochina has reached alarming proportions, they stressed that the Government 
of Vietnam, which has pledged to promote regional peace and stability and other countries 
of origin should take appropriate measures to tackle the problem at the source. The 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers are convinced that such measures will make an effective contri-
bution towards the solution of the refugee problem, thereby contributing to regional peace 
and harmony. [ASEAN 13.01.1979] 
                                                 
407 I do not agree with ALAGAPPA’s assessment that the time span of 2 weeks can be described as a swift re-
sponse by ASEAN [ALAGAPPA 1993:453 FN 46]. 
408 SINGH interprets ASEAN’s reluctance to mention Vietnam by name as with its awareness of the threat that 
the Cambodian Pol Pot regime had originally posed to Vietnam’s security [SINGH 1997:220]. 
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negative effects ensuing instability would have on the region. This approach is a significant hall-
mark of ASEAN’s general view of peace and security. Peace and security are not be guarded for 
being desirable in their own right. The underlying logic and argument is rather that peace brings 
about stability; stability for the region and for the individual countries and as such for the respec-
tive elites and regimes409. Peace is viewed as a requirement for power consolidation. As has been 
mentioned somewhat earlier, ASEAN also never displayed interest in the quality of peace410
• that the sovereignty of a state was inviolable and 
, or 
more correctly: stability. A feature most notably showcased by ASEAN’s later treatment of Myan-
mar (see below). As long as the Myanmar regime was (and is) in the position to guarantee stable 
conditions, ASEAN as a whole, never saw (and sees) the necessity to meaningfully address the 
oppressive policies the regime pursued as part of maintaining this tranquillity.  
As regards the occupation of Cambodia, ASEAN’s general retention can be classified as inadequate 
insofar as Vietnam’s activities clearly conflicted with some of the principles it had usually endorsed: 
that of non-inference/non-intervention, and that of the non-use of force. What was more: Thailand 
viewed the invasion with some legitimacy as a national security threat [ALAGAPPA 1993:452], 
which could have been another strong argument for a more proactive stance on the part of ASEAN.  
But the issue that indeed troubled the ASEAN states remained to be the flow of refugees. It was 
made clear that the refugees caused political, economic, and social problems and affected ‘their 
National security’. Consequently, they called for assistance by developed countries “who have often 
expressed their concern for human suffering and the necessity of upholding humanitarian princi-
ples”. Only under the condition that third countries will ultimately accept them, Indonesia and the 
Philippines agreed to establish a UNHCR Processing centre [ASEAN 21.02.1979]. 
Another reason why ASEAN could have reacted more strongly, was, that Vietnam’s diplomats had 
given assurances, that no invasion was planned. This must have been perceived as undermining 
the Asian way of diplomacy [MORITZ 13.03.1980]. Unconcerned by the effects of the resulting loss 
of face it had already caused to ASEAN, Vietnam moreover insisted that ASEAN ought not to inter-
fere in Cambodia [MORITZ 23.03.1979]. Later, Singapore’s Foreign Minister described ASEAN’s 
January 1979 meeting as the ‘test case’ withstanding Vietnam’s efforts to break ASEAN’s solidarity 
on the matter [STERBA 04.05.1979]. EMMERSON underlines that assumption insofar as he ob-
serves the divergent positions of the ASEAN members. Whereas Thailand and Singapore supported 
a harder line, Indonesia and Malaysia opted for a softer policy toward Vietnam; the Philippines is 
seen as having played the role of an indifferent outlier [EMMERSON 1987:3], although it was the 
first state to call for a get-together to address the situation, as mentioned. 
When the refugee numbers had increased to 400.000 [KULKARNI 20.07.1979] the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers felt compelled to meet in July 1979. They agreed to take ‘firm and effective’ measures to 
prevent more refugees from landing at their shores. They furthermore made clear that they in-
tended to send away refugees already ashore if they are not accepted in the immediate future for 
resettlement elsewhere [CHAPMAN 03.07.1979]. 
According to GANESAN the evolving ASEAN policies vis-à-vis Vietnam became principally premised 
on two considerations: 
 
• that Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia made an ASEAN member – Thailand – a ‘front-line’ 
state [GANESAN 1995:214]. 
 
Though substantive differences existed among the ASEAN states they felt the pressure to overlook 
them in order to be able to defend the vital interests of threatened Thailand [LIM 1998:119-120]. 
Even so, existing divisions where highlighted in March 1980 when Indonesia and Malaysia an-
nounced the so-called Kuantan Principle. According to that principle the USSR and China should 
stay out of Indochina, and 
(…) thus accommodated Vietnam’s view of the conflict that made Vietnam’s withdrawal 
contingent on China’s non-involvement in the region. The Kuantan declaration owed its 
significance to the fact that two ASEAN members launched a bilateral initiative that ran 
counter to the previous ASEAN position. [NISCHALKE 2000:93] 
Besides contradicting the prior ASEAN stance, this initiative was also the result of both countries’ 
belief, that Vietnam would be principally open to negotiations. However, it turned out that Vietnam 
was not ready for such a response [SHARPE 2003:237]. 
 
                                                 
409 EMMERS has coined the term ‚status quo maintenance mechanism‘ for ASEAN [in: SIMON 2008:269]. 
410 As elaborated in the rather modern concept of ‘human security’, peace is more than the absence of observ-
able violence and military actions. GALTUNG is among the most outstanding scholars researching the quality of 
peace [see for instance GALTUNG 1997]. 
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ASEAN belatedly takes a stance 
It was only from June 1980 onwards that ASEAN found stronger language for Vietnam’s activities. 
The Vietnamese intrusions into Thai territory where finally perceived to pose a direct and grave 
threat to the country and were affecting the security of the ASEAN countries and generally endan-
gered the peace and security of the whole region. Additionally, the considerable refugee flows were 
judged by Thailand and Malaysia to be security threats in their own right [ALAGAPPA 1993:452-
453]. 
In the course of the occupation Thailand took to creating safe sanctuaries for Cambodian resistance 
fighters on its side of the shared border; however, this step although condoned by all other ASEAN 
members [GANESAN 2003:233], failed to trigger an outcry for constituting interference. 
Adequate to the graveness of the situation ASEAN now called Vietnam by name and classified the 
intrusion of troops an ‘aggression’, that was of ‘irresponsible and dangerous’ nature and will have 
‘far-reaching’ and ‘serious consequences’. ASEAN stated: 
The Foreign Ministers agreed that any incursion of foreign forces into Thailand directly af-
fects the security of the ASEAN member-states and endangers peace and security in the 
whole region. In this regard, they expressed ASEAN's firm support and solidarity with the 
government and people of Thailand in the preservation of Thai independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity. [ASEAN 25.06.1980] 
Compared to Vietnam’s view that a civil war was fought in Cambodia, ASEAN formulated its per-
spective quite frankly thus: 
The situation m [sic]  that country is a manifestation of the imposition of will on small in-
dependent states by foreign powers through the use of force in violation of international 
law and the principles and objectives of the non-aligned movement. The condoning of 
such imposition may usher in a dangerous trend whereby more regimes in the future may 
be set up through foreign military intervention. [ASEAN 09.07.1980] 
The last sentence highlighted ASEAN’s most important fear motivating their actions. ASEAN’s hard-
ened stance toward Vietnam is vividly observable once again by the change of language. ASEAN in 
February 1979 in its statement about the refugee problem merely called on Vietnam to cooperate 
with the UNHCR and the world community to eventually solve the refugee problem. In July 1980 
ASEAN explicitly said: 
…it should be noted that the Vietnamese are responsible for the creation of the Kampu-
chea refugee problem. [ASEAN 01.08.1980] 
At that time ASEAN requested the UN to station an Observer Team on the Thai side of the border. 
ASEAN also suggested that a demilitarized peace zones be established in Cambodia, under UN su-
pervision [ASEAN 01.08.1980]. 
In the following year ASEAN increased its diplomatic efforts. It hailed the appointment of Moham-
med Essaafi as special representative to the UN Secretary General tasked with touring the region in 
search of a solution to the Cambodian situation, as realization of its proposal voiced earlier. But 
ASEAN’s main initiative consisted in a call to hold a regional conference on the Cambodian conflict 
[ASEAN 10.04.1981]. The conference was to be convened under the auspices of the UN and even 
in the event that Vietnam and its backer, the USSR, would refuse to attend. The conference was 
intended to put further pressure on Vietnam and to promote another Cambodian government, dis-
tinct from the former dictatorial one under Pol Pot [BRANIGIN 28.04.1981]. ASEAN held out the 
prospect of economic cooperation to assist the build-up of its economy to Hanoi in return for its 
withdrawal from Cambodia. Meaningfully, Singapore’s Foreign Minister made clear: 
Vietnam will continue to be isolated, aid to them from the international community op-
posed and denied and every nationalist group resisting Vietnamese occupation will be en-
couraged. [qtd. in: BRANIGIN 18.06.1981] 
ASEAN envisaged three initial steps for the conference: the sending of a UN peacekeeping force; 
the withdrawal of the Vietnamese Army, and the disarmament of the warring Cambodian factions. 
Additionally, Cambodia would opt for neutrality, reducing Vietnam’s security concerns [KAMM 
19.06.1981]. In the meantime the ASEAN nations had also gained military leverage and ‘quietly 
doubled defense spending’ since 1975, when South Vietnam had fallen [BRACKMAN 09.07.1981]. 
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However, the conference itself saw some disagreement among ASEAN and its two main supporters: 
China and the US. Whereas ASEAN intended to invite the Vietnamese installed Cambodian govern-
ment, China blocked that proposal. Further disarray411
The outstanding achievement of ASEAN was it to have played a leading role in initiating and orga-
nizing the conference and with guiding the negotiations
 was observed as the US representative 
walked out of the conference when a speaker of the deposed Pol Pot regime rose to speak [NYT 
14.07.1981]. The main sticking point turned out to be China’s opposition to a plan proposed by 
ASEAN and supported by the US. This plan foresaw that the ending of hostilities will be followed by 
the establishment of an interim government and finally by the holding of free elections. China on 
the other hand backed Pol Pot and did not agree with the planned disarmament of Pol Pot’s fight-
ers. The creation of an interim government was also deemed undermine Pol Pot’s claim that it con-
stituted the legitimate Cambodian government [DAHLBY 16.07.1981]. 
Irrespective of those disagreements the conference succeeded in finding a compromise, although 
at the expense of substance. The two issues of the installation of an interim government and the 
disarmament of the warring factions were altogether dropped from the conference declaration due 
to Chinese wishes. The conference itself initiated an Ad Hoc Committee, chaired by Masamba Sarre 
of Senegal [ASEAN 16.06.1982]. The Ad Hoc Committee, which was established in July 1981, was 
to assist the international conference to find a political settlement in accordance with the relevant 
UN resolutions [XINHUA 23.06.1986]. 
412
And also in the aftermath of the conference ASEAN was strenuously trying to keep unity among the 
various Cambodian opposition groups [BRANIGIN 27.08.1981; CT 11.12.1981]. At the end of 1981 
the idea of military aid to the Cambodian opposition groups gained currency. However, ASEAN fi-
nally agreed to abstain from it. Nevertheless some ASEAN nations themselves voiced their willing-
ness to provide military aid on an individual basis
 [DAHLBY 18.07.1981]. 
413
Thai senior officials and the Thai press interpreted this rapprochement between Indonesia and 
Vietnam as the latest initiative at dividing ASEAN [XINHUA 09.03.1984; XINHUA 18.03.1984]. But 
Indonesia insisted that it did not deviate from the ASEAN position [TEFFT 18.07.1984]. Indonesia’s 
Foreign Minister explicitly made clear that there had been “speculation that Indonesia has a differ-
ent policy to ASEAN. This is not true. Indonesia is firmly with ASEAN” [qtd. in: XINHUA 
21.03.1984]. That position were again shifting closer was underlined when the ASEAN Foreign Min-
isters declared that they will continue their most recent effort in the search for a political solution 
‘undertaken by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia’ [ASEAN 10.07.1984]. They moreover “noted the 
tireless efforts of the Indonesian Foreign Minister to explore and broaden the options and opportu-
nities, Available [sic] in the search for a political solution to the Kampuchean problem. They there-
fore, expressed their warm appreciation to their Indonesian colleague and encouraged him to per-
 [BRANIGIN 11.12.1981]. Indeed, Thailand 
allowed China to use its territory to assist the Cambodian resistance [NARINE 2005:476] – a step 
clearly in contravention of regionally as well as internationally cherished principles of non-
interference. 
The increasing pressure on the Vietnamese regime made it to resort to diverse tactics, ranging 
from a carrot and stick approach [MORITZ 14.07.1982] to explicit threats and on to retaliations 
[WP 20.07.1982]. So, when Vietnamese troops crossed the Thai border and clashed with Thai 
troops in 1983, ASEAN condemned Vietnam and urged it to respect Thailand’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity [WP 03.04.1983]. 
The autumn of the same year saw a new ASEAN initiative. The proposal foresaw a partial troop 
withdrawal from the Cambodian province that shares its border with Thailand as a first step. In 
those areas a ceasefire should then be observed. Peace-keepers and observer groups shall monitor 
and verify the ceasefire. This initiative was understood to be part of a comprehensive political solu-
tion to the situation of Cambodia [ASEAN 20.09.1983]. Vietnam, however, did signal that it had no 
interest in the proposal [WIZNITZER 11.10.1983]. 
A potential threat emanated in Indonesia’s assertiveness regarding its own national foreign policy. 
The Indonesian commander-in-chief made a four-day visit to Vietnam and caused eyebrows to 
raise across the South East Asian region when he toasted his host with the following words: “We 
hope that in the future, friendly relations between our two peoples and our armies will become 
even closer” [qtd. in: MANGUNO 07.03.1984]. This statement fitted into a pattern of Indonesia’s 
intention to make its stature as the largest country in the region being felt [WIZNITZER 
16.04.1984; TRUMBULL 22.04.1984], and thus collided somewhat with the implicit ASEAN spirit. 
                                                 
411 The atmosphere was additionally poisoned after ASEAN withdrew an invitation to Israel to a dinner, since 
Indonesia and Malaysia (both Muslim) opposed Israel’s policies. Consequently, the US Secretary of State boy-
cotted the dinner [WP 14.07.1981]. 
412 For some details of ASEAN’s manoeuvring behind the scenes see: MORITZ 20.07.1981. 
413 For a military shipment from Singapore see QUINN-JUDGE 23.12.1982. Alongside Singapore Thailand also 
continued to provide some measure of military support to the resistance fighters in Cambodia [BRANIGIN 
12.02.1985]. 
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severe in his efforts” [ASEAN 29.04.1986b]. In the following period Indonesia was designated to be 
the ‘interlocutor’ between ASEAN and Vietnam [ASEAN 09.07.1985]. Even so, the two rounds of 
direct talks held between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Vietnam at which the previous 
ASEAN proposal of a troop withdrawal was brought up once again, were classified by the latter to 
constitute a unilateral step and in so far was totally unacceptable to Vietnam [COOKE 13.03.1984; 
XINHUA 13.03.1984]. 
Although ASEAN was overall successful in closing its ranks it was no secret that divergent positions 
existed at that time inside the organization. The tough and uncompromising position was repre-
sented by Thailand, as a front-line state especially vulnerable to the numerous border incursions by 
the Vietnamese. In this regard Thailand was supported by Singapore. On the other hand Indonesia 
propagated a somewhat softer stance, viewing China as the real and long-term threat to the re-
gion. Malaysia, although to a lesser extent, shared this opinion. Indonesia and Malaysia rather 
viewed Vietnam as a buffer against Chinese expansionism [TASKER 03.12.1987]. 
An informal Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in May 1984 condemned the latest attacks on 
Thai and Cambodian territory, that i.a. had caused 75.000 people to flee into Thailand and ex-
pressed their fullest support for Thailand’s legitimate right to self-defence [ASEAN 08.05.1984]. 
Additionally, the Bangkok Post reported in June 1984 that ASEAN Foreign Ministry officials had 
visited resistance bases inside Cambodia in order to prepare for the following ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting [BBC MS 30.06.1984]. 
In early July 1984 a meeting of the Indochinese states Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia produced a 
communiqué that did propose a sort of ‘dialogue’ between themselves and ASEAN [XINHUA 
04.07.1984]. Consequently, the Thai government described the proposal to be a scheme to divert 
the international attention from the Cambodian situation [XINHUA 06.07.1984a]. A week later 
ASEAN called for the application of ‘Asian patience’ on the issue and it was assumed that this atti-
tude was based on the latest military successes scored by the anti-Vietnamese forces in Cambodia 
[WP 13.07.1984, compare also FT 19.06.1984; GWERTZMAN 13.07.1984]]. During the regular 
informal meeting with its Dialogue Partners following the annual AMM, the Cambodian occupation 
was discussed; however, the participants failed to reach an agreement about the proper way to go 
forward [JEN 16.07.1984]. Vietnam’s suggestion of a dialogue expressed earlier, arguably seemed 
to have been motivated only by expediency given the mounting military pressure it had faced. 
The tough stance of ASEAN was further bolstered when Singapore’s Defence Minister, Yeo Ning 
Hong, called on his ASEAN counterparts to redouble their military strength in order to meet any 
external threat, pointing to the Cambodian occupation and the incursions on Thai territory. Yeo 
Ning Hong on that occasion also proclaimed Singapore’s plans to step up joint military exercises 
with Indonesia and Malaysia [XINHUA 22.07.1984]. 
By October 1984 Vietnam showed a further change of mind and suggested an international confer-
ence on the matter. Vietnam then intended the participation of Cambodia, Laos, the US, China, the 
Soviet Union, Britain, France, India, and ASEAN in the conference [WP 03.10.1984]. In order to 
augment its new proposal Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, visited Bangkok. There, 
he indicated that Vietnam potentially was willing to accept a mediator and he “[s]eemed to open 
the possibility of allowing peace-keeping activity” in Cambodia [OXRESEARCH 09.10.1984]. How-
ever, Vietnam’s proposal was described not to be ‘in the cards’ by Malaysia, arguing that it would 
be a fruitless exercise from the ASEAN point of view, since Vietnam obviously did not seriously 
think of a respective policy change [OBERDORFER 22.11.1984]. Thailand voiced comparable 
statements, ruling out ASEAN talks with Vietnam, since Hanoi had seemingly not truly changed its 
position on the Cambodian situation [XINHUA 11.10.1984]. 
 
Taking the gloves off – rallying international support 
Military fortunes soon changed and Vietnam launched several successful offensives against the 
Cambodian rebels, now openly supported by ASEAN [SHERWELL 11.01.1985]. Consequently, the 
ASEAN countries went out of their usual informal and indirect way and felt the need to appeal to 
the great powers for help. The relevant part of their communiqué reads: 
The Foreign Ministers call upon the international community414
This development was meant to constitute a toughening of ASEAN’s position in its quest to increase 
the pressure on Vietnam [BRANIGIN 12.02.1985]. However, as the hoped for military aid was only 
slowly forthcoming, ASEAN started a new diplomatic initiative. It suggested ‘proximity talks’. A 
 to increase support and as-
sistance to the Kampuchean people in their political and military struggle to liberate their 
homeland from foreign occupation. [ASEAN 12.02.1985] 
                                                 
414 ASEAN diplomats conceded that the appeal was primarily directed at the US which previously had limited its 
support to the Cambodian resistance groups to mere diplomatic and humanitarian assistance [BRANIGIN 
12.02.1985]. 
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mediator was to facilitate negotiations between the resistance groups on the one hand and Vietnam 
and its client Cambodian government on the other415
• negotiations with Hanoi on the two-stage withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; 
. A joint US-Thai amphibious exercise was 
deemed to be of symbolic impact only. However, Hanoi reacted strongly calling the exercise a 
‘crude provocation’ that would ‘escalate tension’ [BRANIGIN 08.07.1985]. Not surprisingly Hanoi 
rejected the talks initiative [CUMMING-BRUCE 09.07.1985]. 
The 18th AMM reaffirmed the appeal to the international community. As SHERWELL, reporting for 
the Financial Times observed: 
On Kampuchea, the communique attacked Vietnam's pursuit of a military solution and re-
affirmed Asean's call in February -- without spelling it out -- for international military as-
sistance for the guerrillas. [SHERWELL 10.07.1985] 
US Secretary of State, George P. Shulz, subsequently ruled out that his country would be ready to 
supply military aid to the Cambodian resistance groups, citing the uncertain voting behaviour of the 
US Congress [OBERDORFER 11.07.1985]. Instead, he announced US plans to increase military aid 
to Thailand [CUMMING-BRUCE 13.07.1985]. Vietnam soon thereafter indicated its willingness to 
negotiate, albeit but not on ASEAN’s terms [CSM 16.07.1985]. Although the vision had been 
spelled out earlier, Vietnam’s announcement to pull its troops out of Kampuchea by 1990 at the 
latest, was the most unequivocal statement of that intention so far. On the same occasion Hanoi 
made clear that the withdrawal will be conditioned on the ‘elimination of the Pol Pot clique’ and an 
agreement that the Southeast Asian nations will not allow their territories to be used for aggres-
sions against one another [MULLIN 19.12.1985]. 
Having failed so far to shape or speed up decisively the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, 
ASEAN lent its weight to an 8 point proposal put forward by the Cambodian resistance coalition. 
The proposal, which Vietnam immediately rejected, consisted of: 
 
• a cease-fire; 
• UN recognition of the truce and troop withdrawal; 
• negotiations after the first stage of the pullout between the resistance coalition and the 
Vietnam-backed Heng Samrin government on establishing a four-party government; 
• free elections supervised by UN observers; 
• restoration of an independent and nonaligned Cambodia; 
• foreign aid for reconstruction; and 
• a non-aggression pact with Vietnam [BRANIGIN 30.04.1986]. 
 
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers urged the international community to join in their support for the 
eight-point proposal [ASEAN 29.04.1986a]. This is what the Ad Hoc Committee of the international 
conference on Kampuchea explicitly did after a meeting with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers [XINHUA 
23.06.1986]. ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners (at that time: Australia, Canada, the European Economic 
Community, Japan, New Zealand, and the US – for the status of Dialogue Partners and further de-
tails see further below) coming together with the ASEAN Members in the aftermath of their AMM in 
June 1986 also overwhelmingly expressed their support for ASEAN’s efforts aimed at a solution of 
the Cambodian situation [XINHUA 26.06.1986; YONGSUN 27.06.1986]. Hanoi immediately criti-
cized this statement of support by the Dialogue Partners [JEN 27.06.1986]. 
In the run-up to the General Assembly of the United Nations, ASEAN pursued an activist and ambi-
tious diplomacy with the aim of mustering support for the Cambodian opposition coalition. A num-
ber of ASEAN teams, each headed by an ASEAN member, travelled to diverse regions to further 
ASEAN’s agenda on the issue [XINHUA 19.07.1986]. Meanwhile, the regularly convened conference 
of the Indochinese states proclaimed the willingness to negotiate, however, on the condition that 
the Khmer Rouge group be excluded from the talks [JEM 19.08.1986]. ASEAN on the other hand 
reaffirmed that, in their judgment, Vietnam had not honestly changed its position toward the situa-
tion in Cambodia [XINHUA 19.09.1986]. 
While perestroika and glasnost slowly took hold in the Soviet Union, the main backer of the Viet-
namese rulers, the latter made clear its willingness to negotiate about an end to the Cambodian 
occupation with ASEAN and its adversary China. This policy shift was embodied by the Doi Moi416
                                                 
415 The proposal was first formulated by Malaysia and foresaw indirect contacts merely between the rebels and 
the Hanoi-backed Cambodian regime [SHERWELL 09.07.1985] 
416 For a comprehensive overview of Doi Moi see NGUYEN 2002. 
 
(Renovation) policy which the Vietnamese had declared at the end of 1986. Doi Moi intended to 
move away from central planning toward a more market oriented economy, which also hinged on 
an end of Cambodia's occupation and an improvement in relations with other ASEAN nations [EM-
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MERS 2005:73]. That position was also officially supported by the USSR417
ASEAN reinvigorated the idea of the cocktail party talks in summer 1988; however, Vietnam in-
sisted that ASEAN ought not to try to transform those talks into negotiations between Vietnam and 
Cambodia. Instead, Vietnam insisted that the informal talks have to be based on the so-called Ho 
Chi Minh City Understanding of July 1987, which foresaw that in the first stage of the cocktail party 
 [LAT 13.03.1987] 
whose Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was quoted as having said that Indochina must ac-
cept talks with ASEAN and China if it wants peace in the region [AP 15.03.1987]. This development 
was countered by ASEAN’s change of position toward the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge had 
been ousted from power by the Vietnamese in 1978 and had been responsible for a massive geno-
cide. In May 1987 ASEAN for the first time ever distanced itself publicly from the Khmer Rouge. 
Since Vietnam had always maintained that it will not negotiate with the Khmer Rouge the ASEAN 
statement can be viewed as an act of rapprochement [SMH 01.05.1987]. 
The Twentieth AMM underlined that a settlement of the Cambodian situation was more likely than 
further defiance on the Vietnamese part. At the same time ASEAN upheld its notion that the occu-
pation was the ‘major security problem’ of ASEAN [ASEAN 16.06.1987]. 
 
Diplomatic lead is gradually slipping out of ASEAN hands 
Generally, ASEAN seemed by mid-1987 to lose its grip on the Cambodian occupation. BYRNES, 
reporting for the Australian Financial Review, observed after the annual AMM: 
The Gorbachev revolution seems to be diluting significantly ASEAN's role as international 
pacemaker on the key political issue of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea (…) 
(…) all the indications are there that behind the scenes developments on Kampuchea are 
beginning to bypass the ASEAN countries. [BYRNES 17.06.1987] 
Although ASEAN did not halt its efforts entirely, its impetus was clearly diminishing. So when the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister travelled to Hanoi in August 1987as ASEAN ‘interlocutor’, all he was 
able to arrange was an informal meeting, described to be a ‘cocktail party’ between the Vietnam-
backed Cambodian regime and the Cambodian opposition. The Sydney Morning Herald observed 
‘[t]hat hardly suggests a concession by Hanoi’ [SMH 05.08.1987]. That comment was underlined 
by the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Salvador Laurel, who said, when asked about the talks opined: 
“I would not say there has been a forward development … but I would say there has been move-
ment” [qtd. in: JEN 07.08.1987]. 
Nevertheless the talks resulted in an ad hoc ASEAN meeting that was supposed to reach consensus 
on the matter; again the Thai and Singaporeans seemed sceptical of Indonesia’s initiative 
[REUTERS 14.08.1987]. The meeting finally came out with a joint stance on the Cambodian situa-
tion and supported the proposal for informal talks between the Cambodian opposition groups and 
the Cambodian regime but maintained that Vietnam has to join the talks ultimately [ASEAN 
16.08.1987]. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister was eager to proclaim that “[t]he Bangkok meeting 
erased the doubt and rumours that there was disagreement within ASEAN” [qtd. in: AP 
16.08.1987]. Still, the initiative failed to bear fruit with the Indochinese countries claiming that the 
ASEAN proposal was deviating from the one they had agreed to earlier in the talks with Indonesia 
[JEN 28.08.1987]. Also in other capitals of the region some discontent with the ASEAN approach 
was voiced and Western diplomats said that they regard the cocktail party initiative as dead [CLIFT 
20.08.1987]. 
In the following December the current Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, as well as the chief of 
the Cambodian coalition, Prince Sihanouk, met and signed an accord, urging all concerned Cambo-
dian parties to take part in the negotiations [JEN 10.12.1987]. Both agreed to meet again in Janu-
ary 1988 [JEN 12.12.1987a] but later Sihanouk changed his mind and insisted that the other pro-
ponents of his coalition would have to join the talks [JEN 14.12.1987]. 
After the third ASEAN summit that underlined the participants’ disappointment with the cancelation 
of the talks, Sihanouk again vowed to take part in the next round of negotiations [KATIGBAK 
16.12.1987]. When he finally met with the current Cambodian Prime Minister in Paris in January 
1988, both sides signalled their readiness to make some concessions [JEN 22.01.1988]. However, 
ASEAN played no significant role in this round of talks. In May 1988 Vietnam announced that it will 
further withdraw 50.000 troops from Kampuchea in 1988, signalling its willingness to contribute to 
the settlement of the situation. In order to retain some say over the developments ASEAN invited 
Sihanouk to attend the annual AMM [REUTERS 27.05.1988]. 
Meanwhile, the charm offensive of the Soviet regime toward the region started to leave its marks 
in so far as ASEAN turned gradually more receptive to the USSR than it had been ever before 
[BYRNES 20.06.1988; QUINN-JUDGE 03.03.1988]. 
                                                 
417 For a brief but insightful description of the then Soviet foreign policy in the Pacific area see OXRESEARCH 
22.08.1986. 
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talks the Cambodian warring factions shall meet; the second stage should see the participation of 
other countries concerned – including Vietnam and the ASEAN nations [JEN 07.07.1988]. Subse-
quently, Indonesia was quick to assure Vietnam that the talks would take place according to the Ho 
Chi Minh City understanding [REUTERS 08.07.1988]. 
The talks, later to be known under the term ‘Jakarta Informal Meeting’ (JIM)418
• the setting up of a national reconciliation council chaired by Prince Sihanouk; 
, resulted in partial 
success. On the one hand a communiqué was signed with the following items: 
 
• the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops to be synchronised with neutralisation of the Khmer 
Rouge units; 
• general elections to be held under international supervision. 
 
On the other hand, however, the Khmer Rouge faction refused to support the agreement; a move 
that weighed heavily, since the Khmer Rouge maintained the biggest force on Cambodian soil – 
supplied by its ally China and estimated to consist of 40.000 fighters [FAWTHROP 29.07.1988]. 
This refusal ‘virtually scuttled any chances of useful results’ as diplomats opined [RIENZO 
19.10.1988]. Consequently, the following months were without significant progress. However, In-
donesia proposed to the participating states of the JIM to establish a working group that would 
have to prepare a report for the next round of negotiations [JEN 13.08.1988]. Ali Alatas, Indone-
sia’s Foreign Minister, argued that the working group ‘is meant to keep the momentum of the Ja-
karta informal meeting’ [qtd. in: XINHUA 14.08.1988]. The working group finally met in October to 
hammer out an acceptable formula for the negotiating process – however – the Khmer Rouge did 
not attend the meeting [TIMES 21.10.1988]. At the meeting ASEAN’s refusal to accept the linkage 
between the troop withdrawal of Vietnam and the cessation of support for the Cambodian resis-
tance force was prominent and divisive [XINHUA 20.10.1988b] The working group nevertheless 
suggested that it shall meet again in mid-December [XINHUA 20.10.1988a]. No details apart from 
the statement that the parties exchanged views for the second JIM were made public [XINHUA 
16.12.1988]. In December Indonesia’s Foreign Ministers stated that the next round of the JIM will 
be held in February 1989 [REUTERS 06.12.1988]. 
ASEAN in that year pushed, as it did ever since the Vietnamese invasion, for a UNGA resolution 
that differed from those sponsored in previous years. The resolution stated that there ought to be 
‘no return to universally condemned policies of the recent past’ referring to the bloody Pol Pot re-
gime between 1975 and 1978/9.; furthermore the text called for the establishment of an interim 
administering authority headed by Prince Sihanouk. The ASEAN sponsored resolution that year 
received the widest margin compared to all others formulated since having embarked on its anti-
Vietnamese campaign. It was being supported by 122 countries with only 19 voting against and 13 
abstaining [MCCARTHY 05.11.1988]. 
 
Vietnam’s ASEAN membership as incentive 
Meanwhile the Vietnamese position had softened remarkably and in November 1988 Deputy For-
eign Minister Tran Quang Co stated that Vietnam was in favour of becoming an ASEAN member. 
This outgoing stance was underlined when he said that the Cam Ranh Bay base might also be 
opened for the US navy, as part of Vietnam’s search to make the region ‘non-aligned’ [TIMES 
28.11.1988]. 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister reacted to the membership proposal with a call on Vietnam to stop send-
ing its troops to other countries, obviously referring to the Cambodian invasion. Vietnam’s stance 
toward its neighbours would have to change before it can seek membership in the Association [JEN 
16.12.1988]. Meanwhile, senior ASEAN officials met the Cambodian opposition groups to prepare 
for the scheduled second round of the ‘Jakarta Informal Meeting’. An idea was propagated that 
foresaw that the JIM talks should lay the groundwork for the next broad based international con-
ference on Cambodia. Along the 5 veto powers of the UNSC other interested countries might also 
be invited [JEM 21.12.1988]. 
In the meantime Thailand had increased its cooperation with China, which in the preceding period 
had resulted amongst others in the joint creation of sanctuaries along the Thai-Cambodian border, 
designed for Cambodian opposition fighters to attack the Vietnamese occupation forces [GANESAN 
2006:136]. 
In order to coordinate their common position ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers met in January 1989. Dip-
lomatic moves, like the bilateral talks between Vietnam and China as well as between Vietnam and 
Thailand made such a meeting necessary. The Foreign Ministers agreed to support Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk to be leader of the future Cambodian government. In its endeavour to further interna-
                                                 
418 A proposal on using the JIM blueprint for dealing also with the military regime of Burma has been critically 
evaluated by HAACKE 2008:368-370. 
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tionalize the issue, Indonesia proposed that countries like the USSR, the US, or China might take 
part in future JIMs as well [KIN 22.01.1989]. 
The second JIM, or JIM-2419
Slowly but surely the ASEAN states realized their ever more waning power in forming the process. 
Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister in July 1989 was quoted as conceding that the “accelerated 
pace of events has forced us to face up to the fact that there is no more time to continue the JIM 
process” [qtd. in: JACOB & YEONG 05.07.1989]. Although the Paris meeting failed to bring imme-
diate resolution to the Cambodia conflict, a significant by-product of the ongoing over-arching rap-
prochement
 started on 16th February 1989 – this time with the participation of the 
Khmer Rouge. Nevertheless, reconciliation was not forthcoming easily. One of the stumbling blocks 
constituted the current Cambodian government’s opposition toward an international supervision of 
the pullout of the Vietnamese troops. Although the hoped for comprehensive agreement could not 
be accomplished, a ‘consensus statement’ supported the idea of an International Control Mecha-
nism to observe the troop pullout and the envisioned general elections. It was also agreed that the 
participants shall meet in the near future [JEN 21.02.1989]. 
In February the ASEAN nations – as was only revealed later – unofficially had discussed the crea-
tion of an ASEAN force. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Abu Hassan bin Omar disclosed that: 
We are thinking of an ASEAN force. We are prepared to come in as a collective team or 
individually. [qtd. in: CHUA 04.05.1989] 
However, at the time ASEAN had already forfeit its lead role in settling the conflict. With the an-
nouncement and organization by France of a Conference on Cambodia scheduled to take place in 
Paris, ASEAN irreversibly lost its former influence over the political developments. The Paris Con-
ference was to be attended by the five permanent SCUN members, the ASEAN states, the Cambo-
dian factions, as well as Vietnam and Laos [SHUTTLEWORTH 06.07.1989]. ASEAN’s urge to first 
solve the main differences between the warring Cambodian factions before holding such an interna-
tional conference remained unheeded. The organization’s position was expressed in an ASEAN pa-
per containing the sentence: 
ASEAN should not be pressured by the international conference … to abandon its goal of a 
comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem. [qtd. in: WAGSTAFF 
02.07.1989] 
ASEAN suggested that the Paris conference ought to ‘complement’ earlier efforts by ASEAN and 
enshrined in UN resolutions [KIN 04.07.1989, compare also ASEAN 03.07.1989]. And when the 
shape of the political solution started to emerge, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Wong Kan Seng, 
warned: 
A settlement that leaves the regime installed by the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh will make 
a mockery of the results of ASEAN’s 10 years of solidarity and collective effort to undo the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia [qtd. in: JEN 04.07.1989]. 
420
While the Paris peace process was stuck, ASEAN, or more specifically Indonesia, offered to hold 
another round of JIM
 in the region was that Indonesia and China started to normalize their relations, that 
had been hampered since 1967 when the first had accused the latter to have been involved in a 
communist coup attempt [ST 05.08.1989]. 
421
                                                 
419 The Thai Newspaper ‘The Nation’ reported that opinions inside ASEAN about the format of JIM-2 where di-
vergent. While Indonesia supported the same pattern that was used in JIM-1 (the Cambodian factions discuss-
ing the domestic dimension; and ASEAN plus Vietnam and Laos discussing the external aspects), Thailand, 
Singapore, and Malaysia thought that JIM-2 should consist of a single plenary session [BBC MS 17.02.1989]. 
420 For some details of the rapprochement see OXRESEARCH 26.04.1988. 
421 However, Indonesia had to make the concession to call the meeting Informal Meeting on Kampuchea [JEN 
05.02.1990] as a reference to the wider international involvement in the ongoing peace process. 
 in January 1990 [JEN 03.01.1990]. However, an initiative launched by at 
around the same time appeared more promising. The proposal foresaw a UN administration for 
Cambodia. However, the respective meeting that was attended next to ASEAN by the four Cambo-
dian factions, Vietnam, Laos, France, and Australia ended in failure [MAGISTAD 01.03.1990; 
RICHBURG 01.03.1990]. 
However, another attempt at boosting the Paris resolution design was able to accumulate more 
traction. Although mainly driven and directed by outside powers, Indonesia was accorded a co-
chair role  as ASEAN interlocutor interlocutor Indonesia [USDSD 03.08.1992].  
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When the peace process was well on track the idea that ASEAN might contribute to the UN peace-
keepers was aired again [see above], this time by Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Wong Kan Seng 
[JEN 21.11.1990a]. However, the suggestion did not materialize. And instead of the early sketched 
ASEAN peacekeeping force the members later decided to contribute to the UN blue helmets on a 
bilateral basis. Contributors were i.a. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore [Reuters 31.03.1992]. 
They were finally joined by the Philippines and Thailand, leaving only tiny Brunei as a non-
contributing ASEAN state [IPS 14.02.1994]. 
 
On reviewing the Association’s overall reaction NARINE concludes that after Vietnam had invaded 
Cambodia on 25th December 1978 ASEAN became the vanguard of a coalition (backed primarily by 
the US and China) opposed to the invasion. What was more, the whole Association became highly 
absorbed by finding a resolution to the conflict and in organizing the rest of the international com-
munity against Vietnam: 
From 1978 to 1990, this single issue was the primary focus of ASEAN’s activities. [NARINE 
1998a:34] 
However, this focus furthered also the impression of ASEAN to be a ‘single issue organisation’422
Once the Cambodian (Kampuchean) problem is behind us, ASEAN will have to find new 
rallying points or risk drifting apart
 
that was specializing in condemning Hanoi, as AWANOHARA opined for the FEER [AWANOHARA 
03.12.1987]. 
Indeed, when the Cambodian situation normalized through the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991 
ASEAN was briefly faced with a crisis of purpose, being robbed of its long-time objective of most of 
its efforts and energies [NARINE 1998a:34, compare also: CHUA 22.06.1989 who reports about the 
prevalence of that assumption in the political science research community]. 
This development had been predicted as early as March 1989 by the then Singapore Foreign Minis-
ter Wong Kang Seng, when he said: 
423
Still, in an overall-evaluation one benefit of the anti-Vietnam campaign was that  ASEAN members 
improved their cooperation and coordination substantially during that period – irrespective of dif-
ferences persisting below the surface
. [qtd. in: REUTERS 17.03.1989] 
424. Still, the claim was voiced that ASEAN was “a grouping 
more of form rather than substance” and that only the communist victories in Indochina resulted in 
jolting it into real cooperation [TASKER 03.12.1987]. ASEAN experienced the influence it was able 
to exercise425, but at the same time had to acknowledge how circumscribed its power was, espe-
cially through the major powers (China, US426
In the end, dealing with the Cambodian invasion both defined ASEAN and highlighted its 
real limitations
, USSR). NARINE summed it up with the following 
words: 
427
• it rallied opposition to Vietnam’s action in the UN
. [NARINE 1998a:34] 
The main achievements of ASEAN’s anti-Vietnam campaign are considered to be the following: 
 
428
                                                 
422 Noordin SOPIEE, director of the Malaysian Institute of Strategic and International Studies, a quasi-
government think- tank, called it a ‘Cambodia fixation’ [qtd. in: KATIGBAK 31.05.1989]. 
423 Wong Kan Seng repeated this position when addressing the opening session of the 22nd AMM in July 1989 
[JACOB & YEONG 04.07.1989]. 
424 For the differing positions toward Vietnam see NARINE 1998b:205-207. 
425 STERBA reported for the NYT “[a]nd somewhat to their [ASEAN’s, my remark] own surprise, they have found 
themselves being listened to and catered by the major powers” [STERBA 94.05.1979]. 
426 A case in point was the ASEAN outcry when the US made an about face in its foreign policy. In July 1990 the 
US dropped its support for the ASEAN backed Cambodian factions and instead decided to negotiate directly with 
Vietnam [SCMP 22.07.1990; JOHNSON 24.07.1990]. Steven ERLANGER interpreted the US policy shift thus: 
“[t]he American move was a sign of Washington's break with its longstanding willingness, since Vietnam in-
vaded Cambodia in December 1978 and expelled the Khmer Rouge, to let Asean take the lead on Cambodia 
policy” [qtd. in: ERLANGER 24.07.1990]. 
427 ALAGAPPA argues similarly when he recognizes the valuable role ASEAN played in the Vietnamese-
Cambodian conflict but still states ‘[y]et ASEAN’s need for international support suggests the limitations’ [ALA-
GAPPA 1993:467]. 
, the Organization of Islamic Confer-
ence, and the British Commonwealth and kept the Cambodian conflict at the forefront of 
the international agenda; 
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• it structured the international debate of the issue on the terms articulated by ASEAN429
• it was largely successful
; 
430 in denying international recognition to the new Cambodian gov-
ernment431
• it was effective in cutting Vietnam off economic assistance
; 
432
• it mobilized the resources of key external actors in support of its strategy; 
; 
• it created the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea433 as an alternative to the 
Vietnamese-appointed Cambodian regime434
• it sponsored the Jakarta Information Meetings which contributed to the eventual settlement 
of the conflict [NARINE 1998b:205; ALAGAPPA 1993:455-458; AMER 2004:536; XINHUA 
09.01.1984].
 and used its leverage to up-old its unity; and 
435
 
ASEAN’s policy of isolating Vietnam was popularly known as ‘bleed Vietnam white’ policy [JEN 
17.01.1990]. As has been pointed out above ASEAN had also given tacit support for a Sino-Thai 
arrangement to arm and train Cambodian resistance guerrillas for conducting forays into Cambodia 
and engage Vietnamese troops [GANESAN 1995:215]. 
 
However, ASEAN’s performance received also critical assessment. For example, SIMON cautiously 
argues that ASEAN’s behaviour could be, at best, be characterized as mere ‘diplomatic alliance’ 
within the UN, shunning any military actions to forcefully chase Vietnam out of Cambodia [SIMON 
1998:64, original emphasis]. 
 
LEIFER finds that ASEAN’s activities on the matter were superseded by the activities of the perma-
nent members of the SCUN436
                                                                                                                                                        
428 Singapore’s Foreign Ministers claimed that the SCUN “…waited for the ASEAN point of view and, more or less 
adopted the ASEAN resolution…” [qtd. in: STERBA 04.05.1979]. 
429 Compare for instance the UN General Assembly’s debates concerning the ASEAN sponsored draft on the one 
hand and the limited room the Vietnamese initiated agenda item on the other hand – both concerned with the 
Cambodian situation – received [XINHUA 17.11.1984]. 
430 When the Indian government recognized the Vietnamese inspired Heng Samrin government, ASEAN reacted 
sharply and voiced its ‘profound disappointment’ about the step that undermined the international endeavours 
to find a just and peaceful solution to the Cambodian conflict [ASEAN 09.07.1980]. 
431 For the heated endeavours in the struggle about which Cambodian government shall be representing the 
country in the UN see i.a. MORITZ 03.09.1980. 
432 When France decided to resume limited economic aid in early 1982 ASEAN diplomats reacted strongly and 
argued that assistance to Vietnam will only put it in a position to further divert its resources for the Cambodian 
occupation [BRANIGIN 09.01.1982]. ASEAN reacted similarly critical when Australia took ambiguous steps to-
ward Vietnam, among them the decision to grant Hanoi $ 500.000 in disaster relief [BRANIGIN 23.11.1983]. 
Protests were also addressed to the Australian government when it emerged that an agreement between Viet-
nam and Australia had been signed to build a earth satellite station on Vietnamese soil. ASEAN stated that this 
move is against the concept of solidarity for Kampuchea [XINHUA 05.11.1986]. When it was made public that a 
Japanese firm was about to extend assistance and long-term credits to Vietnam, the chairman of ASEAN’s 
standing committee said that all six ASEAN nations would summon the Japanese ambassadors to express their 
concern and that a protest note would be delivered to the Japanese Government [XINHUA 15.04.1987]. 
433 The coalition consisted of the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, and the royalist 
Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne [BACH 07.05.1986; compare also AMER 2004:536]. 
434 TASKER calls ASEAN’s success in bringing the three factions, mutually suspicious of each other, together 
‘something of a political coup’ [TASKER 03.12.1987]. 
435 Singapore’s Foreign Minister Supiah Dhanabalan described ASEAN’s activities aimed at the Vietnamese inva-
sion with the following words: “[a]s an organisation we have sustained, refined and successfully carried out a 
collective diplomatic strategy to mobilise international support and prevent the Vietnamese from imposing their 
will on Cambodia” [qtd. in: CLIFT 06.07.1988]. 
436 ALAGAPPA has argued that the hard-line position of ASEAN was undermined by various political develop-
ments and breakthroughs as well as the change of government in Thailand where Chatichai initiated a step-by-
step approach, and thus weakening the tough position of ASEAN [ALAGAPPA 1993:426]. 
 [LEIFER 1999:26, 31]. Nevertheless he agrees with NARINE that the 
invasion of Cambodia necessitated a common policy and “… reinforced the emerging quality of in-
tra-mural security community” [LEIFER 1999:30]. Other scholars equally have pointed out that 
that ASEAN’s policy vis-à-vis Vietnam ‘has furthered a stable subregional environment’ [EMMER-
SON 1987:2]. 
Among them ALAGAPPA underlines the ASEAN success in containing the conflict: 
Overall, ASEAN was successful in this containment role. By early 1984 the Vietnamese se-
curity threat to Thailand had all but disappeared, and Hanoi was politically and militarily 
stalemated in Cambodia. 
However, ALAGAPPA continues: 
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ASEAN could contain Vietnam, but it could not end the conflict. [ALAGAPPA 1993:458]. 
Among the relevant factors that made ASEAN unable to end the conflict its lack of power and influ-
ence to shape the goals of the conflict parties or to change the underlying capabilities and dynam-
ics of the situation are cited [ALAGAPPA 1993:458]. 
A constructivist scholar has argued that ASEAN’s motivation to act against Vietnam’s invasion was 
rooted in the organization’s collective identity, encompassing norms like non-interference and the 
renunciation of force [BUSSE 1999:49]. 
And Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, underlines the unifying and rallying 
impact the anti-Vietnam campaign acquired for ASEAN, asking 
I wonder if ASEAN would have continued to exist in a political sense437
ASEAN is not a security organization and it is unlikely it will become one.
. [qtd. in: TEFFT 
18.07.1984] 
Thus, ASEAN’s purpose and identity was felt to be due for a redefinition after the occupation had 
come to a close. However, it was clarified that this search will not usher in a stronger mili-
tary/security posture. 
In mid-1989 an ASEAN diplomat explained the improbability of a military dimension of the organi-
zation thus: 
In the short run, I don't see a military grouping...There is still a certain amount of distrust 
among Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. That's why there's no military pact. [qtd. in: 
THATCHER 16.08.1989] 
And Singapore’s Foreign Minister had underlined somewhat earlier: 
438
• the possibility of forging further links with the ‘major’ powers to supplement existing dia-
logues; 
 [qtd. in: JEN 
23.03.1989] 
Instead, the Singaporean Foreign Minister suggested the following quite vague areas ASEAN should 
aim at in order to ensure its viability: 
 
• to find new rallying points for ASEAN once the Cambodian situation had normalised; and 
• to look at new methods and forms of cooperation among the ASEAN member countries 
[XINHUA 24.03.1989]. 
 
On top of that the dawning realisation that the region’s overall conception of being a distinct area 
following its own guidelines – as outlined in the ZOPFAN idea – made some politicians have second 
thoughts. For example General Try Sutrisno, Indonesia’s armed forces chief, put it in the phrase: 
“[w]e want ASEAN to create regional resilience through military cooperation but not military pacts” 
[qtd. in: REUTERS 04.10.1989]. In the same vein the Philippines’ Defence Secretary, Fidel Ramos, 
explained in 1990: “[t]ogether with our allies, the Philippines can strongly promote regional stabil-
ity through enhanced defence cooperation particularly in the field of complementation ... within the 
ASEAN umbrella” [qtd. in: REUTERS 28.06.1990]. Especially in the run-up to the renegotiations of 
the base agreements between the Philippines and the US in 1990 the Philippines urged its fellow 
ASEAN members to consider regional security arrangements reasoning that the reliance on outside 
powers in defence matters should not be prolonged indefinitely [XINHUA 14.07.1990]. 
BUSSE explains the disinclination to any form of military alliance with constructivist thinking, argu-
ing that ASEAN acted according to its norms that foresaw a rejection of the use of force generally 
and a deep-seated dislike for confrontational policies [BUSSE 1999:50]. 
 
As regards the Association’s relations with Vietnam, the nation witnessed a convincing regional 
embrace. Thus, Vietnam signed the TAC as early as 1992 and by 1995 ultimately became ASEAN’s 
seventh member [SINGH 1997:215]. 
                                                 
437 Oxford Analytica’s researchers come to a similar conclusion, when they argue “…ASEAN as an organisation 
has stayed together for political rather than economic reasons” alluding to the Cambodian occupation [OXRE-
SEARCH 01.11.1990]. 
438 Similarly, the Malaysian Commodore, Ahmad Ramli Nor, explained: “[t]he creation of a collective security 
system within the framework of ASEAN is unlikely, at least in the foreseeable period” [qtd. in: JEN 24.03.1989]. 
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3.9 Track Two – ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP 
The category named ‘Track II’ specifies, according to EVANS, ‘a kind of unofficial diplomacy’ [EV-
ANS 2001:115]; and he elaborates: 
The concept of “track two” emerged coeval with the concept of cooperative security in Asia 
in the early 1990s. It refers to policy-relevant discussions involving academics and other 
policy experts along with government | officials present in their personal or private capaci-
ties. Organized on an ad hoc basis or as part of permanent institutions for regional coop-
eration ... track two has been one of the defining elements of bilateral and multilateral se-
curity discussions in the region. [EVANS 2001:99-100 FN 3] 
Those Track II activities, explicitly referred to at the Second ARF meeting in 1995, have their roots 
farther back. Within the original ASEAN members a network of strategic institutes, known under 
the acronym ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies) had evolved, 
founded for the most part in the 1980s. In 1984 those institutes inaugurated regular meetings, 
among them the annual Kuala Lumpur Roundtable, later a forum for the Council for Security Coop-
eration in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) [SIMON 2002:173]. However, only in 1988 ASEAN-ISIS439
The CSCAP was linking think tanks with close government ties from the following countries: ASEAN 
states with the exception of Brunei plus the US, South Korea, Japan, Canada and Australia
 was 
officially launched; and it was later registered with the ASEAN Secretariat as an NGO [RÜHLE 
2002:86]. One year earlier, key players had come together for the so-called annual Asia-Pacific 
Roundtable (APR) conference. At those conferences issues were discussed and formulated regard-
ing the multilateral cooperation that was later materialized in the shape of the ARF [KATSUMATA 
2006:189-190]. And ACHARYA & TAN argue that the 'folding of the Cold war' as well as the Asso-
ciation's success with regard to influencing Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia led to an increased 
interest in Track II for helping to redefine security [ACHARYA & TAN 2006:41-42]. 
Outlining the development of Track II generally and of ASEAN-ISIS specifically, the later met in 
1991, recommending that a meeting be held between ASEAN Foreign Ministers and its dialogue 
partners. At the AMM in July 1993 ASEAN in turn commended the effort to explore and develop 
ideas for promoting and enhancing security cooperation among ASEAN members [ASEAN 
24.07.1993]. In 1993 ASEAN-ISIS met representatives from think-tanks of the Asia Pacific and it 
was agreed to create a coordinating body, namely the already mentioned Council for Security Co-
operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). This Council would have the aim of contributing to regional 
confidence building and to the enhancement of regional security. 
440
Still, attention has been also drawn to the complementary functions fulfilled by ASEAN-
ISIS/CSCAP: Track II’s unofficial consultative meetings tend to focus on such matters that are con-
sidered too ‘sensitive’ or ‘disputatious’ for the Track I level [CHUNG 1999:23]. HELLER has called 
 
[CHING 30.06.1994]. ASEAN, however, took the lead in that broadened structure; thus one of the 
two co-chairs of the entity’s Steering Committee and Working and Study Groups is always coming 
from an ASEAN state [SIMON 2002:173].  
LEWIS comments on the CSCAP’s essential function for ASEAN/ARF: 
In a situation possibly unique to Southeast Asia, a non-governmental organization 
(CSCAP) fills an important role in enriching ARF dialogue by suggesting confidence build-
ing, transparency and preventive diplomacy measures in advance of official thinking. 
[LEWIS 1999:154] 
The work of ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP consists, among other things, in writing papers on security 
policy issues like transparency and peacekeeping that are then discussed at the regular ARF meet-
ings. GAROFANO has termed such discussions to fall under ‘Track 1 1/2’ since the scholars and 
institutes maintain close relations with their respective host governments [GAROFANO 1999:78]. 
But that fact also curtails the independence of those experts and contributes to the overall rather 
conservative approach most Track II bodies have propagated [RÜHLE 2002:93]. 
                                                 
439 For the four founding institutes of ASEAN-ISIS see RÜHLE 2002:86 FN 3. 
440 Specifically the following institutes were among the founders: the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 
(SDSC) at the Australian National University, Australia; the Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies at the  Univer-
sity of Toronto-York, Canada; the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; the Japan 
Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Japan; the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, Republic of Korea; the 
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; the Institute for Strategic and Development 
Studies, Philippines; the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore; the Institute for Security 
and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand; and the Pacific Forum/CSIS in the United States [MACK & KERR 
1995, FN 40]. 
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this the 'testing-ground function'. Additionally, members keen on accelerating and deepening col-
laborative progress are kept interested in the process, the so-called 'integrative function' of Track 
II. Finally, the 'neutralizing function' enables convincing proposals to make their way to Track I, 
even if they would otherwise have been found all-out unacceptable [HELLER 2005:127]. 
Track II was in 1996 supplemented with the establishment of the Council of Asia-Europe Coopera-
tion (CAEC), bringing together 12 European and Asian institutes; it was originally conceptualized 
for supporting cooperation between intellectuals of the two continents to further discussion of fu-
ture Asia-Europe ties [RÜHLE 2002:87]. 
It has been argued that the ARF leaders indeed tend to delegate the most difficult and complex 
problems to Track II. However, GAROFANO highlights that this is done without providing the envi-
ronment where inputs of Track II can meaningfully influence political decisions [GAROFANO 
1999:87]. Similarly, Track II has also been described as ‘a favoured vehicle that allows govern-
ments to participate without committing themselves to the outcome’ [WAIN 30.06.1995]. For in-
stance, the so-called ‘Chinese threat’ was primarily discussed at Track II level [VILLEGAS 
02.08.1996]. 
In 1997 the concept of the so-called ‘Pacific Concord’ as developed by Track II was handed over to 
ASEAN. That proposal, designed and fleshed out by ASEAN-ISIS, was to distil the principles and 
norms that are to guide the region’s security cooperation. It included, among others, the reitera-
tion of the most common and cherished principles: non-interference, renunciation of the threat or 
use of force, restraint in cases of territorial disputes, as well as the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
[WAIN 07.03.1997]. However, reportedly because of the resistance of Vietnam regarding another 
clause, requiring countries to promote the fundamental rights of the people, the initiative was 
shelved for some time [WAIN 14.08.1998]. 
At the 7th ARF meeting in 1999 the progress made in the ongoing drafting of the Pacific Concord 
was recognized. Additionally, “[h]ope was expressed that further efforts would be made with a 
view to advancing the idea of a Pacific Concord within the ARF framework” [ASEAN 2003:261]. 
However, since then nothing much was heard of the proposal. As matters stand the project seems 
to have been replaced by the comprehensive wave of accession to the TAC by ARF participants. 
The impact of Track II on ASEAN/ARF was by design always bound to be limited. However, it man-
aged to give impulses, time and again proofing its ambition to function as a potential corrective. 
For instance ahead of the admission of Burma, a country with a dismal human rights record, 
ASEAN-ISIS not only privately expressed concern about the lacking reconciliation among the re-
gime and the opposition, but additionally submitted a confidential memo to ASEAN with the warn-
ing that its reputation was at risk, and that it should request Burma to demonstrate ‘reasonable-
ness’ as a future member [WAIN 06.06.1997]. 
 
As regards the prospect of Track II, the institutional reform encompassed in the ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC), or rather in the Plan of Action thereof,  listed among the envisioned activities in 
the field of 'political development' among others to further encourage 'the contribution of ASEAN-
ISIS to political development' [ASEAN 2005:53]. An additional acknowledgment of Track II’s sig-
nificance, is the effort pursued by ART to achieve stronger cooperation between Track I and II. 
Although it has been observed that the notion of the ASEAN Security Community and its approach 
to comprehensive security had been originally drafted by a scholar of an ASEAN-ISIS affiliate [EM-
MERSON 2005:178-180; HAACKE 2005:202-203], the concrete recommendations441
• establishment of an ASEAN Court of Justice; 
 formulated for 
the umbrella document of the ASEAN Charter remained largely unheeded. The paper contained the 
following proposals: 
 
• creation of an ASEAN Peace and Reconciliation Council; and 
• ASEAN should be transformed into a legal entity [HARI 19.04.2007]. 
 
In fact the Charter took into account only the last of these recommendations (see above). 
3.10 ASEAN’s Outreach 
ASEAN realized relatively quickly that to establish and maintain strong relations with the outside 
world is a promising route to sustain cooperation with partners it deemed essential for its own con-
cerns and interests. ASEAN’s first vehicle for that purpose was the formal arrangements of en-
hanced bi-lateral relationships with individual countries, by way of conferring them the status of an 
ASEAN Dialogue Partner (DP). This advanced status was a mechanism allowing for strengthened 
                                                 
441 For the text of the ASEAN-ISIS paper see: www.siiaonline.org/uploads/693/AI-Memo-18April-
ASEAN_Charter.doc retrieved on 27.06.2007. 
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cooperation in technical and political fields. The selection and type of collaboration thus painted a 
picture of ASEAN’s geography of priorities. 
Later the Association found it useful to supplement its DP network with additional formats, com-
prising not single, but several other states to distinct cooperative groups442
3.10.1 Dialogue Partnerships 
. The format most 
prominent to the public in general, but also for this study’s purpose in particular was and is the 
ASEAN Regional Forum – in existence since 1994 with a focus on security issues is bringing to-
gether 17 extra-ASEAN participants with the Association’s member countries. 
Enhanced partnership with the immediate neighbourhood is furthered since 1997 by the ASEAN 
Plus Three (APT) consultation mechanism. It includes ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea 
and primarily deals with economic cooperation; over the years it enlarged its agenda to also in-
clude political and security matters. 
A further offspring of ASEAN’s cooperation endeavours’ is the launch of the East Asian Summit; it is 
bringing Australia, India, and New Zealand regularly together with China, Japan, and South Korea 
plus ASEAN. 
One substantial achievement of ASEAN in this type of diplomacy was its success in making external 
countries and entities accept the primacy of the Association in the new cooperative mechanisms 
(most notable in this regard is the ARF). With making it a pre-condition that EAS participants have 
first to sign ASEAN’s TAC, the Association was able to further entrench its most favoured behav-
ioural matrix as guide for extra-ASEAN powers. 
Starting in the 1970s, ASEAN established special bilateral ties with individual countries, conferring 
on them the status called Dialogue Partners (DPs). The first wave of DP admissions occurred in a 
smooth way. Among the first countries welcomed were only developed ones of which ASEAN could 
hope to receive economic concessions and developmental assistance.  Those topics were always 
marking the beginning of strengthened consultation and cooperation; only much later was the re-
sulting dialogue process enlarged by covering other areas, among them social, cultural, or security 
matters. 
In 1979 ASEAN started to meets its Dialogue Partners – on a regular basis immediately after the 
Association’s annual AMMs [JOHNSTONE 1995; WANANDI 16.01.1992].  At the beginning those so-
called Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) focused on economic issues, but gradually expanded to 
include political and security questions. Later ASEAN enlarged those consultations and today meets 
its dialogue partners on a regular basis also during the year [USDSD 31.07.1995]. 
Over the years and decades, many more countries besides the initial ones became interested in 
closer contact with the Association, fuelling the number of DPs and ASEANs outreach as a conse-
quence. 
3.10.1.1 Australia 
The first such DP was Australia. In 1974 the initiated dialogue focused on Australia rendering tech-
nical assistance to ASEAN in food related areas. The cooperation later broadened to also include 
economic issues, first and foremost access to the Australian market. The early 1990s saw a further 
expansion of discussion, now encompassing also education, environment, telecommunications, and 
science and technology. Only in 1993 the political and security subjects were added as dialogue 
topics. Current relations are dominated by economic and developmental assistance schemes, 
among them the ASEAN-Australian Development Cooperation443
3.10.1.2 European Economic Community (EEC) / EU 
 scheme. 
The European Economic Community/EU was the first multilateral organization to be granted dia-
logue status444
                                                 
442 For the sake of completeness mention shall be made of the so-called Closer Economic Relations group serv-
ing since 2002 as a platform for strengthened economic relationships between ASEAN with Australia and New 
Zealand. It’s purely and strictly economic orientation that in essence boils down to cooperation regarding tech-
nicalities of a free trade area, justifies its exclusion from the formats meriting detailed discussion in the frame-
work of this dissertation. 
443 Information on ASEAN-Australia ties from ASEAN’s homepage: http://www.aseansec.org/12974.htm re-
trieved on 09.10.2008. 
444 Information on the ASEAN-ECC dialogue is taken from the respective page at ASEAN’s homepage: 
http://www.aseansec.org/5612.htm as retrieved on 09.10.2008. 
 preceded by the informal relations established in 1972 via ASEAN’s Special Coordi-
nating Committee. Relations witnessed their formalization in 1977. However, the relations soon 
were lifted to a higher plane when both entities signed a Cooperation Agreement in 1980 which 
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dealt with commercial, economic, and developmental cooperation445. In the mid-1990s an Eminent 
Persons Group was established tasked with outlining an approach to security, economic, and cul-
tural ties between both organizations. In 1996 the first Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) took place, 
then comprising ASEAN, the EU as well as South Korea, Japan, and China. Later the group was 
joined by India, Mongolia and Pakistan. ASEM brings together the respective heads of state and 
governments each second year446 and aims at strengthening reciprocal understanding and finding 
common ground. Cooperation was to be based on the political, economic, and socio-cultural pil-
lars447
3.10.1.3 New Zealand 
. Since the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001, terrorism became a major discus-
sion item. ASEM also included environmental topics, chief among them climate change. Currently, 
the European Commission has plans to create a so-called Dialogue Facility designed to facilitate 
cooperation in Asia [FP 2007:8]. 
The EU has provided support for multiple projects (i.a. setting up of ASEAN research centres); ad-
ditionally, it made available funds in the framework of the Institutional Development Programme 
for the ASEAN Secretariat or on one occasion contributed € 4,5 million for ASEAN countries to 
strengthen their border security [VNAB 06.02.2006; http://www.aseansec.org/5612.htm retrieved 
on 16.10.2008]. 
New Zealand followed, in 1975448, to be welcomed as the next ASEAN DP. Due to the military pres-
ence of New Zealand in ASEAN the first phase of the dialogue was dominated by defence but also 
development assistance issues [CLARK 2005]. Discussions were soon to be enlarged to cover also 
economic ties [WND 16.07.1977] with ASEAN urging New Zealand to ease protectionist policies 
[WND 25.07.1986]. In the late 1980s also social and cultural topics were included in the dia-
logue449
3.10.1.4 Canada 
. 
In 1977 Canada became a DP of ASEAN. The first dialogue period was focused on economic issues 
and development assistance, culminating in 1982 in the signing of the ASEAN-Canada Economic 
Cooperation Agreement. New topics were added to the dialogue agenda in 1993, among them sci-
ence and technology as well as ecological cooperation. Later also further areas of common interest 
like counter-terrorism, inter-faith dialogue, or disaster management were incorporated as discus-
sion items. Regular ASEAN-Canada Joint Cooperation Committee meetings are discussing further 
cooperation, for instance regarding an update of the ASEAN-Canada Regional Training Pro-
gramme450
3.10.1.5 Japan 
. 
The year 1977 saw also Japan becoming a new DP after having maintained informal relations since 
1973. Also this Dialogue Partnership was first dominated by economic and development issues. 
Similar to most other DP ties, the range of coordination only later broadened451
                                                 
445 For the cooperation agreement go to: http://www.aseansec.org/1501.htm as retrieved on 09.10.2008. 
446 The first ASEM Summit took place in Thailand in 1996; the second followed in 1998 and was held in Great 
Britain; the third was organized in South Korea in 2002 and was followed by the forth Summit in Copenhagen in 
2002; in 2004 Vietnam hosted the fifth Summit [XINHUA 06.10.2004]. The sixth ASEM was held in September 
2006 and decided to welcome new members Bulgaria and Romania from Europe as well as India, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, and the ASEAN Secretariat [http://www.asem6.fi/en_GB/asem6/ retrieved on 16.10.2008]. 
447 ASEAN’s Concord II as agreed in 2003 interestingly also consisted of quite similar prongs: the ASEAN Secu-
rity Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Social and Cultural Community. 
448 The ASEAN homepage indicates the year 1975 [http://www.aseansec.org/5826.htm retrieved on 
09.10.2008]. New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states on one of its pages entitled „New Zealand and 
South / Southeast Asia“ this step to have been taken in 1974 [http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Asia-
South-and-Southeast/0-nz-southeast-asia.php retrieved on 09.10.2008]. However, another page of the Ministry 
– „New Zealand – ASEAN Relations“ confirms the year given by ASEAN as 1974 
[http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Features/ASEAN-meeting.php retrieved on 09.10.2008]. 
449 See for example the press release on occasion of the 9th ASEAN-New Zealand dialogue in November 1988. 
450 For an overview of the ASEAN-Canada dialogue see http://www.aseansec.org/5590.htm as retrieved on 
10.10.2008. Canada’s Foreign Ministry provides less comprehensive information at 
http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/asean-anase-en.aspx retrieved on 10.10.2008. 
451 For details on the ASEAN-Japan Dialogue process see http://www.aseansec.org/5740.htm or Japan’s Foreign 
Ministry homepage at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/relation/overview.html both retrieved on 
10.10.2008. 
. Japan’s endeav-
ours to enhance its relations with the Association manifested themselves only recently. It was in 
late 2003 that both parties signed the so-called Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring 
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Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium452
3.10.1.6 US 
. Apart from Japan vowing to accede to the TAC, 
the Declaration contained both parties’ intention to cooperate in fighting the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction, terrorism, piracy, illicit drug and human trafficking, and other transna-
tional crimes [XINHUA 12.12.2003]. 
Also the United States453
3.10.1.7 South Korea 
 joined the DP group in 1977. Again collaboration was aimed primarily at 
economic and developmental matters. Those were soon complemented by cooperation and assis-
tance extended by the US in the field of human resource development. Later environmental protec-
tion was added to the dialogue topic list to be followed by the areas of counter-terrorism and disas-
ter mitigation in recent years [USAID & USDS 2007]. In the framework of the ASEAN-US Enhanced 
Partnership vehicle agreed in 2005, the US provides regular funds, mainly dedicated to support 
economic integration [USSDPRD 01.10.2008]. 
In April 2008 the US showed its commitment to the region when as the very first DP it appointed 
an ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Scot Marciel, to work with the Secre-
tary-General of ASEAN and the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, as recom-
mended under the new institutional structure, enshrined in the ASEAN Charter [http://www.asean-
us-partnership.org/ retrieved on 16.10.2008; see also GIDA 14.04.2008]. However, it has been 
pointed out that Marcel, due to his other duties, will still spend most of his time in Washington 
[SIMON 2008:287]. 
However, the US decision to accede to the TAC – which it finally did in July 2009 – lifted US-ASEAN 
relations on a higher plane [NT 25.08.2009]. 
In Summer 1989 South Korea was accepted as ‘sectoral dialogue partner’ – discussions were to be 
restricted to trade, investment, and tourism [BBC MS 05.07.1989] - but with  the possibility of 
expanding the relations to include other areas such as development cooperation, transfer of tech-
nology, and human resources development [ASEAN 04.07.1989a]. South Korea’s efforts to become 
full DP [JEN 10.01.1991] bore fruit in January 1991 when Malaysia’s Foreign Minister in his capacity 
as chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, officially confirmed South Korea’s admittance [JEN 
17.01.1991]. 
3.10.1.8 Soviet Union / Russia and China 
In the late 1980s the Soviet Union increased its activities to also attain the status of an ASEAN 
Dialogue Partner [OXREARCH 13.03.1989]. In 1991 ASEAN signalled that the Soviet Union/Russia 
and China might together join the rest of its current DPs [JEN 10.01.1991]. China officially re-
quested to become DP in May 1991 [JEN 07.06.1991]. Consequently, China and the Soviet Union 
were invited for talks by ASEAN in mid-1991 for the first time ever454 [WHITING 18.07.1991]. Rus-
sia had had its first consultative meeting with ASEAN in 1992; at a preparatory meeting for the 
upcoming AMM, ASEAN senior officials decided to recommend upgrading Russia to a full DP. One 
month earlier during a consultative meeting with China455
Being less central for the Association, Russia had to struggle more to improve and strengthen its 
relations with ASEAN after having received DP status. One outcome of Russia’s striving in that re-
gard was the ‘Partnership for Peace and Security and Prosperity and Development in Asia Pacific’ 
signed by both sides in mid-2003. Therein they i.a. pledged their support for disarmament and the 
reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime. They also agreed to cooperate on fighting terrorism. 
At that time the possibility of a regular ASEAN-Russia summit was also pondered [KN 19.06.2003]. 
In December 2005 the very first such Summit took place and it was agreed that this would hence-
forth be repeated on a regular basis. On that occasion both sides agreed their comprehensive part-
, ASEAN had agreed to upgrade Beijing 
also to a full DP [BW 16.05.1996; JEN 09.07.1996] In 1996 both countries were finally elevated to 
full DPs. 
Given China’s essential role in the region, the country was engaged on various fronts and gradually 
ASEAN-China ties became a strongly entrenched mainstay of the regional political structure. 
                                                 
452 The ECONOMIST holds that Japan’s engine to engage with ASEAN was partly fuelled by its rivalry with China 
[ECONOMIST 11.12.2004]. 
453 While cooperation with ASEAN’s closer neighbours had moved to a much higher plane, the US voiced its wish 
to enhance US-ASEAN relations as well. The US envisioned ties similar to the ones established between the 
Association and China, India, or Japan [BP 31.01.2004]. 
454 The US thereupon expressed its reservations [VINES 25.07.1991]. 
455 For a detailed overview of ASEAN-China relations see the chapter ASEAN-China: the South China Sea and 
beyond. 
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nership was designed to facilitate cooperation for peace, stability, security and prosperity [INTER-
FAX 13.12.2005]. In the meantime Russia had also unsuccessfully lobbied to be part of the East 
Asian Summit scheduled for late 2005 [AFP 24.07.2005]. Due to conflicting views of other partici-
pants that maintained Russia is not satisfyingly fulfilling the criteria of trade and economic relations 
agreed to as a condition for participation at the East Asia Summit [INTERFAX 28.07.2005; HO 
03.10.2005], Russia was invited as 'special guest' only [WPS 14.12.2005; KN 19.05.2006]. 
3.10.1.9 India 
In March 1993 India was granted sectoral dialogue partner status, covering trade, investment, and 
tourism. The following year saw the establishment of the ASEAN-India Joint Sectoral Cooperation 
Committee that added the two topics science and technology to the dialogue relationship. Eventu-
ally, in late 1995 it was decided that India will become a fully fledged DP [JEN 15.12.1995], a step 
going back to a Singaporean sponsored initiative [EMMERS 2001:282]. However, it was not before 
1996 that India ultimately attained the DP status [see ASEAN hp]. Relations advanced when both 
sides agreed to set up a ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). The first meeting of that 
forum took place in November 1996. Dialogue was further strengthened two years later when a 
SOM took place on political discussions and consultations [TINGCHANG 02.11.2002]. In early 2001 
Jaswant Singh, the then External Affairs Minister of India mentioned that India might one day be-
come an ASEAN member, but added it was not in a hurry. His suggestion stemmed in part from the 
argument that India shared a 1.463 km border with ASEAN member Myanmar456
3.10.1.10 The Also-Rans 
 [BARUAH 
15.02.2001]. 
India’s request to join the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, South Korea) consultation mechanism was 
turned down in 2001. Instead, an annual summit between the Association and India was estab-
lished, the first of which was to take place in November 2002, resembling somewhat the status the 
three other countries enjoyed [VNAB 08.04.2002]. This move was certainly helped by India’s an-
nounced commitment to the SEANWFZ; especially given the other nuclear weapon powers’ reluc-
tance to act likewise [XINHUA 26.09.2002]. 
It was later announced that the ASEAN–India meeting – originally conceived to deal with economic 
issues – would be a permanent feature of their dialogue [AFP 10.09.2002]. However, when they 
finally met the first time both sides agreed also to strengthen cooperation against international 
terrorism and other non-traditional security threats. Additionally, they underlined their respect for 
each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and emphasized the principle of non-
interference [XINHUA 05.11.2002]. 
In May 2003 it was announced that both intended to sign a declaration on cooperation in combat-
ing terrorism; furthermore, information exchange, training cooperation, and institutional capacity 
building were discussed [AP 21.05.2003]. In October 2003 both sides signed the ASEAN-India Joint 
Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. At the same time India acceded to 
the TAC, which was a measure that comprehensively enhanced the ties to ASEAN [KN 08.10.2003]. 
On the occasion of their third summit meeting in 2004 another document was signed dealing with 
'peace, progress and prosperity’ and entitled ‘ASEAN-India Partnership Agreement’ [HT 
29.11.2004]. Amongst others, both pledged therein to cooperate in multilateral fora as well as in 
tackling challenges of economic, food, human, and energy security. Alongside the pact both sides 
also agreed to work together in fighting international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction [BBC MS 30.11.2004]. 
 
The enlargement process of the DP group motivated ASEAN in 1996 to change the format of con-
sultations. A proposal sponsored by Indonesia foresaw that the various Dialogue Partners would be 
faced with only one ASEAN minister, supported by senior officials from the other ASEAN members. 
Previously, three Foreign Ministers together with four senior officials from ASEAN had met with the 
Foreign Ministers of each DP country [AFP 15.07.1996a; JEN 15.07.1996]. Additionally, the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers meet their counterparts from all DPs at the PMC 7+10 [CHUAN 19.07.1996]. 
Pakistan 
Apart from the change in the consultation process, ASEAN also put stricter criteria on the admit-
tance of further DPs, making it conditional that the application of such aspirants be judged on the 
‘basis of mutual benefit and equitably shared responsibility’. That was to mean that among the 
current applications pending from Egypt, Mongolia, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Pakistan only the latter was likely to be admitted. Since Pakistan shared one major conflict with 
                                                 
456 India drew special attention to Myanmar when it embarked on its so-called „ASEAN diplomacy“; among other 
things that included the dropping of support for Myanmar’s political opposition [TINGCHANG 02.11.2002]. 
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already accepted India (Kashmir), it was regarded as useful to include it in the future as DP 
[CHUAN 19.07.1996]. This position was reemphasized at the 1996 AMM when the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers called for the strengthening of the existing sectoral dialogue relations with Pakistan [JEN 
21.07.1996a]. Pakistan’s formal request to become sectoral dialogue partner had originally been 
taken under consideration by senior ASEAN officials in July 1993 [KN 26.07.1993b]. The application 
of Pakistan was subsequently endorsed and regular talks on trade, investment, and tourism were 
established [KN 02.07.1993]. 
In 1997 sectoral dialogue relations were instituted, covering trade, industry, investment, environ-
ment, science and technology, drugs and narcotics, tourism and human resource development457
                                                 
457 See ASEAN homepage at: http://www.asean.org/5850.htm retrieved on 14.09.2009. 
. 
When India and Pakistan were both pursuing a path to the peaceful resolution of their conflict 
about the Kashmir region, ASEAN recommended that Pakistan be invited to the ARF [AP 
16.06.2003]. However, other ARF members were opposing that step and called for further review-
ing [AP 16.06.2003]. One of the fiercest opponents – unsurprisingly – was non-ASEAN but DP-
status holder India [AFP 18.06.2003]. Nonetheless Pakistan was eventually accepted as ARF mem-
ber in 2003. 
Besides, Pakistan’s president reemphasized his country’s wish to gain DP status [XINHUA 
16.12.2003] and to join the ARF [AFP 16.12.2003]. For that purpose Pakistan frequented all ARF 
members, including India [KN 14.04.2004]. It also pledged not to raise the Kashmir or any other 
bilateral issue between itself and its archrival India at the ARF, if invited to join [BBC MS 
09.05.2004], which it was eventually. Pakistan joined as ARF’s 24th member in July 2004 [OANA 
02.07.2004]. 
When ASEAN's Secretary-General, Ong Keng Yong, was visiting the capital of Pakistan he said that 
the country was eminently qualified to become a full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN [XINHUA 
06.06.2006]. Also Indonesia supported Pakistan's bid [AFP 31.01.2007]. Still, at the time of this 
writing (September 2009) Pakistan has not yet become DP, having on various occasions reiterated 
its view that the time was ripe for this upgrade of relations [PPI 10.08.2008; TNS 24.09.2009]. 
 
Taiwan 
Taiwan made known its wish to become ASEAN DP in mid-1992. However, due to Beijing’s one-
China policy, this request posed difficulties for ASEAN [REUTERS 22.07.1992]. In late July the 
same year Taiwan formally applied for the DP status. The Thai Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin re-
sponded: “[w]e took note of the Taiwanese request for some kind of relations with us but at the 
same time we have to be cautious because of its political ramifications” [qtd. in: KN 27.07.1992a]. 
Taiwanese endeavours to strengthen its ties with the Association were renewed after China had 
become full DP in 1996 [AT 18.07.1996]. But ASEAN maintained that Taiwan was regarded as an 
internal Chinese matter [JEN 25.07.1996]. In late 1998 Taiwan hoped its chances to be accepted 
as at least economic DP had increased through the financial crisis ASEAN was then confronted with. 
Taiwan was investing substantially in the region and announced its plan to inject another $ 300 
million to support the recovery [JEN 16.11.1998]. However, Taiwan’s hopes were again dashed; 
Chulacheeb CHINWANNO, associate professor of political science at the Thammasat University in 
Bangkok commented: “Taiwan's only active role in Southeast Asia will be through its money” [qtd. 
in: YS 30.03.2000]. 
The only minor concession to Taiwan’s aspirations seemed to confirm that judgment. Since 1996 
Taiwan was invited to participate in the working group meetings of the Council for Security Coop-
eration in the Asia Pacific region (Track II), but it was neither made a member of it, nor was it al-
lowed to raise the issue of cross-strait relations between itself and Beijing at the forum [BBC MS 
12.01.2001]. 
 
Latin America 
The Latin American Rio Group (at that time comprising Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) was suggested to become DP 
by Malaysia in May 1993 [KN 24.05.1993]. Mexico had also individually asked for sectoral DP 
status [KN 02.07.1993] and later revised its request insofar as to ask for fully fledged DP status 
[JEN 02.07.1996]. 
After a three-day visit to Malaysia in late 1996 the then Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori sug-
gested a dialogue partnership between the Andean Community (including Bolivia, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, Peru, and Venezuela) and ASEAN, similar to that ASEAN already maintained with the European 
Union [AFP 22.11.1996]. Neither the Rio Group nor the Andean Community ever received the DP 
status as collective bodies. However, later the establishment of a ‘strategic partnership’ between 
ASEAN and the Andean Region was envisioned as a realizable objective  in the framework of the 
First Symposium of the two entities conducted in May 2000 [JEN 08.05.2000]. 
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Also other countries and multilateral groups showed their interest in enhanced cooperation with 
ASEAN: 
 
• In early 2001 Bangladesh aired its wish to become a Dialogue Partner in talks with Cam-
bodia, requesting its support to lobby for that purpose among its fellow ASEAN partners 
[AFP 21.01.2001]. However, for the years ahead this wish remained unfulfilled [DK 
22.08.2008]. 
• Iran announced its wish to strengthen its ties with ASEAN in late 1999, having already ap-
plied officially to be granted sectoral dialogue status with the Association [APN 
22.11.1999]. 
• In late 2002 Sri Lanka applied to become an ASEAN DP– or preferably even to have a 
similar relationship like India which the same year had had held its first time ever ASEAN-
India Summit [OANA 26.11.2002]. 
• After talks with Malaysia Kazakhstan declared in September 2003 its wish to become full 
member of ASEAN, or/and the ARF [INTERFAX 12.09.2003]. 
 
As witnessed with the Latin region, not only individual countries endeavoured to strengthen coop-
eration with the Association but also various multilateral entities, i.a.: 
 
• The then South African President Nelson Mandela called in 1997 for closer cooperation be-
tween ASEAN and the Southern African Development Community (SADC, comprising 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swazi-
land, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) [REUTERS 04.03.1997; AFP 04.02.1997]. How-
ever, although both bodies convened consultations on economic matters in October 1997, 
DP status was no agenda item [see: http://www.aseansec.org/7918.htm retrieved on 
01.09.2008].  
• In late 1998 Jose Estrada, then Philippine’s President announced that the G7 group of na-
tions might become another DP and hinted that also Latin American nations might be 
awarded that status in future [GARCIA 17.12.1998a]. 
• Although not mentioning the status of DP in May 2000 ASEAN endeavoured to strengthen 
its ties with the OSCE in a bid to increase ASEAN’s role as a security body [BERNAMA 
17.05.2000]. 
• In April 2005 the Executive Secretary Zhang Deguang of the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganisation458
 
 (SCO) and ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on developing comprehensive cooperation [ZUEV 21.04.2005]. In Janu-
ary 2007 ASEAN reiterated its wish to strengthen the ties to the SCO, calling it 'a potential 
partner in promoting peace, security and prosperity in the region' [qtd. in: XINHUA 
15.01.2007a]. 
However, until the time of writing (September 2009) the UN Development Programme – apart 
from the inter-government EEC/EU – remained the only multilateral entity to have been accorded 
the DP status. The cooperative relationship between both organizations has a considerable tradi-
tion, reaching back to the Association’s early period of existence. 1977 was a not only the year in 
which the UNDP became ASEAN’s DP; also the Sub-Regional Programme was launched to improve 
cooperation. UNDP also supported the institutionalization of ASEAN via a study it funded on 
strengthening the role of the Association’s Secretariat. Both bodies continue to maintain strong 
relations up to date459
                                                 
458 The SCO has its roots in "The Shanghai Five": China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan. With the 
additional participation of Uzbekistan the first SCO summit was held in mid 2001 [XINHUA 15.06.2006]. 
459 On ASEAN-UNDP Dialogue advances see http://www.aseansec.org/20979.htm retrieved on 10.10.2008. 
. 
 
The cooperative track as encapsulated in mainly bilaterally designed Dialogue Partnerships was one 
of the earliest routinized attempts at building sustainable relationships with the rest of the world. 
ASEAN in this case offered more leverage as its individual members would have been able to mus-
ter. Ties established via such partnerships were primarily focused on the most strongly felt need – 
that of economic development – as perceived in the first years of the Association’s existence. The 
channels established over the course of time with the DPs have later been used to prepare the 
ground for ensuring ASEAN’s embeddedness in the wider region and in the world. This inter-
connectedness was also holding out the potential for ASEAN to take over a disproportionate leader-
ship-role which did clearly exceeded the relative and added-up importance of the single ASEAN 
member states; especially, given that giant China and India as most immediate neighbours, would 
very likely dwarf their significance additionally. 
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As will be demonstrated, ASEAN proved highly effective as a cooperative hub, establishing various 
multilateral consultation mechanisms, the most important being for the purpose of this study the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, dealing with security questions. 
3.10.2 The ASEAN Regional Forum460
The ASEAN Regional Forum goes back to a Canadian proposal in 1990 envisioning that the coun-
tries of the Asia-Pacific region create a security forum. While Australia strongly backed the idea the 
US
 
461 and Japan voiced some reservations [JOHNSON 29.07.1990] and only later supported the 
idea [NARINE 1998a:35]. The original notion was based on the model of the CSCE/OSCE and the 
positive consequences it had brought about for the East-West confrontation. However, to copy the 
CSCE was unacceptable for the ASEAN countries, partly because they rejected stronger institution-
alization [KATSUMATA 2006:191]. In July 1991 Japan proposed that ASEAN and selected other 
countries should meet 3 to 4 times a year to discuss regional security issues. It suggested that 
ASEAN’s Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) should be used as a forum [CHIPELLO 19.07.1991]. 
Inside of ASEAN the Philippines endorsed the idea to some extent [JOHNSON 29.07.1990], espe-
cially after it had turned out that the US leases for the two big military bases in the Philippines 
would not be renewed462
Along the ASEAN states the forum today brings together a wide range of countries that originate or 
border the Asia-Pacific or have vital interests in the region
. 
463
However, at the beginning ASEAN had shown no explicit intention to take part – let alone of initiat-
ing - a regional security dialogue
. NARINE has called the ARF ‘ASEAN’s 
greatest effort’ and the ‘centerpiece’ of its activities’ [NARINE 1998a:35; 42]. 
LEIFER views the creation of the ARF from a self-restrictive angle: 
One of the significant features of the advent of the ARF on an Asia-Pacific-wide basis is 
that it registered a recognition by ASEAN that it was not competent on its own to provide 
for regional security in a context in which Southeast and Northeast Asia were subject to a 
strategic fusion. [LEIFER 1999:34] 
464. VATIKIOTIS even observed an outright resistance to the ‘no-
tion of a multilateral approach to regional security’ [VATIKIOTIS 16.01.1992a]. The eventual 
change of mind was informed by two insights: first, the fact that if ASEAN does not act, it will be 
pushed to the side-lines465
                                                 
460 Note should be taken of the fact, that ARF activities in the field of disaster relief and rescue cooperation, 
being not covered by the definitional area of this thesis, will not be covered in this chapter. 
461 For the US opposition see MACK & KERR 1995. 
462 Among the suggestions promoted was the establishment of ASEAN defence cooperation presented by Philip-
pines’ President Corazon Aquino in January 1992 [AFP 27.01.1992]. 
463 According to the ARF homepage [www.aseanregionalforum.org; retrieved on 14.09.2009] those members 
are: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zea-
land, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, 
United States, Vietnam. 
464 VATIKIOTIS, writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review, reported that the proposals for a security dialogue 
were not ‘warmly received by ASEAN’ [VATIKIOTIS 20.06.1991]. 
465 Similarly the Thai Commerce Minister, Pinkhayan Subin, explained that ASEAN would naturally form the core 
of an Asia-Pacific Cooperation trade scheme, initiated by Australia (the body was later to be known under the 
acronym APEC - Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) [For the creation of APEC in Nov. 1989 see REES 
16.11.1989]. Subin declared: “We are not ready launch [sic] for another regional body since we already have 
ASEAN and we believe that ASEAN can be extended to cover larger regional cooperation in economic matters” 
[qtd. in: JEN 11.09.1989]. His view was reaffirmed by the Thai Foreign Minister who insisted that the planned 
structure will only be supported by Thailand as long as it does not diminish ASEAN’s role [JEN 09.10.1989]. Due 
to those ‘political sensitivities’ APEC was created rather as a forum without an organizational structure [OXRE-
SEARCH 29.11.1989]. ALOMONTE later observed that APEC had adopted the typical ASEAN Way in its search 
for consultation and consensus [ALMONTE 1997/1998:81]. Another author highlighted the fact that trade issues 
are gradually replaced with security issues on APEC's agenda [SMITH 2004421-422]. And the Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung judged in November 2006 that APEC “ist eher zur Plattform verkommen, wo Probleme angesprochen 
werden und Bilaterales kurz erörtert und gelöst wird, oder auch nicht“ [NZZ 20.11.2006]. 
It remains to be seen how ASEAN will respond to another initiative Australia is advocating; the so-called Asia 
Pacific Community is aimed at changing the region’s diplomatic architecture to better reflect the currently 
emerging power structure. Hence, the Asia Pacific Community is thought to include the US, China, Japan, and 
India and thus might be designed to sideline the role played by ASEAN [ECONOMIST 28.03.2009b]. 
 [NARINE 1998a:36; VATIKIOTIS 13.12.1990; LIM 1998:117], and sec-
ond, the acknowledgement of changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, among them also 
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the (re-)activation of a number of regional tensions and conflicts466
APEC’s formation heightening ASEAN’s fear of being bypassed and consolidated its willingness to 
agree to the setting up of the ARF
. This development in turn re-
sulted in a regional arms race, making the area still more volatile [KN 28.12.1992]. A Singaporean 
diplomat formulated the dilemma faced by ASEAN with the following words: ‘[w]e are nudging our-
selves, or being nudged, into this way of thinking’ [qtd. in: VATIKIOTIS 20.06.1991].  
Comparable to LEIFER, SMITH has argued that the creation of the ARF was a consequence of 
ASEAN’s realization that it is not able to resolve security in the wider area alone [SMITH 
1999:259], whereas EMMERS opines that the Forum was conceived as a two-pronged instrument: 
on the one hand ensuring continued US involvement in the area, on the other hand to integrate 
China in a rules-based arrangement and to encourage it in the practice of ‘good international be-
haviour’ [EMMERS 2001:275-276]. KATSUMATA attributes the first argument to realist thinking and 
the second to neoliberal theories; alternatively constructivists, according to him, would argue that 
the establishment of the ARF was informed by ASEAN's interests and its efforts to promote the ARF 
was inspired by the Association's norms [KATSUMATA 2006:183]. 
467
In the meantime Canada invited the ASEAN states to a meeting on the matter in October 1990. As 
already mentioned Canada
 [LIM 1998:121]. However, in stark contrast to ASEAN’s obvi-
ous reluctance, the Thai Foreign Minister, Prasong Soonsiri declared the ushering in of the ARF a 
‘historic event’ and stated: “[i]t was ASEAN, we may recall which took the initiative and leading 
role in setting up the ARF” [qtd. in: P&PM Nov./Dec. 1994:48]. Indeed, the Philippines had asked 
Thailand in September 1990 to join in the effort to establish a security forum. However, the Thai 
Foreign Minister preferred to postpone the project to 1991 [JEN 13.09.1990]. 
468 and Australia back then had visualized a CSCE-like security organiza-
tion469
At the beginning there was no uniform or clear vision about the design of the envisioned dialogue 
framework. The first official ASEAN support for the forum was voiced at the AMM in 1991. In line 
 for the region [REGENSTREIF 03.10.1990; OXRESEARCH 19.03.1991; LIM 1998:120]. 
ASEAN balked at those proposals, classifying them as inappropriate and foreign, and thought the 
concept will be ‘foisted’ on them [LIM 1998:120]. 
ALMONTE explains why ASEAN was nevertheless in an fine position to play a leading role in such an 
undertaking: 
By simply being already in place, ASEAN offered a convenient forum for major power dia-
logue at the end of the Cold War. Because ASEAN is non-threatening – it is seen as having 
no hidden agenda – and because their own relationships are still unstable, the great pow-
ers with interests in the Asia-Pacific are content to let ASEAN take the initiative on re-
gional-security problems. Thus ASEAN has become the hub of confidence-building activi-
ties and preventative diplomacy in the region [ALMONTE 1997/98:81]. 
Indeed for quite some time, ASEAN has had maintained informal dialogues with important coun-
tries of the region, including the US, the then European Community, Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand  [EMMERSON 1987:2]. With initiating the ARF, ASEAN assumed a ‘managerial role’ and 
secured itself a ‘novel diplomatic centrality’. However, the ASEAN countries remained conscious of 
the risk entailed in engaging ASEAN within a wider forum, where outside powers could wield con-
siderable influence [LEIFER 1999:34]. GAROFANO has explicitly questioned the usefulness of the 
approach: 
Obviously the ARF hamstrings itself with its requirement of region-wide inclusion. Includ-
ing the great powers in dialogue on conventional arms limitations is like including OPEC 
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in a global climate convention (which has 
been done) – states will join but the agreement is not likely to make much progress. [GA-
ROFANO 1999:84] 
                                                 
466 Singapore’s Defence Minister, Yeo Ning Hong, explained that the end of the Cold War “… unmasked other 
tensions with the potential for regional conflicts resulting from age-old territorial, religious and ethnic differ-
ences” [qtd. in: KN 28.12.1992]. When the ARF was finally being established in mid-1994 Singapore’s Foreign 
Minister, S. Jayakumar, highlighted another aspect : “…ASEAN has recognised that a predictable pattern of rela-
tionships in the Asia-Pacific region is a vital pre-requisite to managing the strains and tensions that come with 
rapid growth and change” [qtd. in: TASKER & SCHWARZ 04.08.1994]. 
467 Others have argued that one purpose of creating the ARF was ASEAN's wish to keep the US engaged in the 
region in order to a counterbalance a rising China [KHOO 2004:141]. 
468 Geographically, Canada’s proposal was limited to the North Pacific [MACK & KERR 1995]. 
469 In 1999 the idea to create a CSCE-like organization for establishing a collective security organization was 
revitalized by the Philippine Senate President Tempore Blas Ople. That organization would have had ASEAN as 
its core, and would primarily be designed to contain Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea [VEGA & 
BENGCO 31.01.1999]. 
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with the Japanese proposal the ASEAN members agreed to use its PMCs as a base for the projected 
forum to discuss Asia-Pacific security issues [PURA 22.07.1991; MACK & KERR 1995]. But, as usu-
ally they balked at accepting increased institutionalization in the immediate future. An ASEAN dip-
lomat argued that a time span of ‘a few years’ might be needed for a formal structure. At the same 
time he underlined that ASEAN wanted to shape a security framework, not leaving it to Japan or 
the US [PURA 24.07.1991]. The general reluctance of the organization was evident when the Asso-
ciation’s long-known credo, that economic prosperity should guarantee security in the region, was 
reiterated once again by the Thai Foreign Minister [REUTERS 04.11.1991a]. 
ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and Security Studies) preparatory endeavours regard-
ing the design of a multilateral security dialogue were presented to the AMM in July 1991 under the 
heading: 'A Time for Initiative'. This paper argued that security of the region is indivisible and 
should be promoted through an explicitly 'inclusive' security dialogue. It also suggested that the 
framework should function in line with the ASEAN Way of diplomacy [KATSUMATA 2006:192]. 
ACHARYA argues that this paper was trying to make proposals coming from extra-regional powers 
‘appear as a local initiative’, thus increasing acceptability of the outside norm of cooperative secu-
rity across the Southeast Asian region [ACHARYA 2004:257]. 
In the meantime a broader security related tableau was thought achievable by using means al-
ready in place. Hence, in early 1992 Thailand suggested that the world’s five biggest military pow-
ers shall be invited to sign the TAC. Thailand’s then Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun planned in 
this regard to call on his fellow ASEAN partners to issue respective invitations to those powers – 
namely Britain, China, France, Russia, and the US [HS 20.01.1992; AFP 19.01.1992]. However, 
seemingly because of opposition from Indonesia, ASEAN declined to issue the invitations. Indonesia 
instead would have preferred that the said countries should adhere to the ZOPFAN concept [NAM-
BIAR 23.01.1992; on the intra-ASEAN divisions see also SCMP 24.01.1992]. 
When the ASEAN states prepared for the following ASEAN summit, they opted for expressing their 
wish to support the United Nations and strengthen ASEAN-UN ties. This move was intended to em-
phasize the world body’s competence in regard of safeguarding the current international order. 
With regard to the outright establishment of a security forum for ASEAN any form of institutionali-
zation remained unwelcome. A Singaporean Foreign Ministry Official was eager to stress: 
There is no proposal to change the PMC into a security forum. There was consideration 
and discussion of the possibility of using established forums including the PMC for more 
discussions on security. [qtd. in: BOHAN 24.01.1992] 
However, the 1992 ASEAN summit saw the member states vowing in face of the end of the Cold 
War to “seek avenues to engage member states in new areas of cooperation in security matters” 
and to “intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conferences” [qtd. in: AFP 28.01.1992]. 
Furthermore, the summit declaration included the following proposal: “ASEAN could use estab-
lished fora to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region as well as intra-
ASEAN dialogues on ASEAN security cooperation (such as the regional security seminars held in 
Manila and Bangkok in 1991, and the workshops on the South China Sea held in Bali in 1990 and 
Bandung in 1991)” [ASEAN 28.01.1992]. ASEAN-ISIS contributed to that shift with a memorandum 
it had submitted to the summit, which had called for the creation of an Asia-Pacific Political Dia-
logue [RÜHLE 2002:88]. 
 
On top of the policy directions given, two events can be viewed as direct results of the January 
ASEAN summit: 
 
• between June 25th and 26th 1992 a Special Meeting of the ASEAN Senior Officials on Re-
gional Security was convened in Manila and 
• the Working Group of ZOPFAN and of the envisioned Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zone (SEANWFZ) were reconvened and urged to complete its work [ASEAN 22.07.1992a]. 
 
The following 25th AMM consequently saw some security issues being discussed, most prominent 
among those the contested Spratly Islands. The US pullout of Asia in general and from the Philip-
pines specifically was also on the agenda as well as the deployment of Japanese peacekeepers 
overseas (in light of its aggressive colonial past, this step was watched closely by Japan’s 
neighbours) [MCDONALD 20.07.1992]. 
At the PMC in July 1992 South Korea joined the supporters of the idea of security consultations [KN 
27.07.1992b]. ASEAN tentatively started to accept the idea and agreed to hold working-level meet-
ings on security and politics in the Asia-Pacific region in the months ahead. In those meetings one 
of the ASEAN member countries was to represent the organization in separate talks with the seven 
dialogue partners [KN 03.08.1992]. 
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And while ASEAN still insisted that there shall be no new formal structures, Indonesia in late 1992 - 
although still opposing the idea of an Asian OSCE, started to support some form of institutionalized 
consultation, when its Foreign Minister Ali Alatas observed: 
While Europe's institutional processes may not be easily transposed onto the Asia-Pacific 
region, we could and we should cultivate the habit and devise the mechanisms for closer 
and more structured mutual consultations on security issues in the region. [qtd. in: KN 
02.11.1992] 
That period also witnessed the belated support by the US470
In November 1992 Asia-Pacific think-tanks declared their intention to set up a non-governmental 
security forum. This forum was planned to function as a platform for academics and policymakers 
and to provide recommendations for the region’s governments. The most immediate participating 
nations were the ASEAN members together with their Dialogue Partners (except the EC). In each 
participating state national committees were to be established, consisting of academics, military 
strategists, and senior government officials
 for the idea. US State Department 
official Rust Demming suggested that a ‘very healthy’ security dialogue could be developed via the 
regular PMCs [KN 16.11.1992]. 
471
3.10.2.1 ARF in the Making 
. The creation of those national committees was to be 
understood as ‘confidence-building measure’. It was conceptualized as ‘sounding board’, supporting 
and furthering the public discussions of security issues [KN 23.11.1992], and setting the stage for 
the governmental scheme which was about to emerge. 
In May 1993 senior ASEAN officials met (later joined by their DPs) for nine days and made two 
recommendations: alongside ASEAN’s current DPs (at that time Australia, the EU, Canada, Japan, 
South Korea, New Zealand, and the US) China and Russia472
Subsequently, in line with the recommendations of the May meeting of ASEAN’s senior officials, 18 
governments
 should also be invited to the security 
discussions [IPS 10.05.1993; NAMBIA 20.05.1993; CHING 12.05.1994], and second, that non-
military issues should be discussed, including preventive diplomacy, conflict management, confi-
dence building measures, and non-proliferation. These talks were the first-ever full-scale formal 
talks on security in the region. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister explained: 
It's going to be a brainstorming session to see how in the changed circumstances of today 
the countries of the region can put together new regional security arrangements. [qtd. in: 
IPS 10.05.1993] 
473 [ASEAN 24.07.1993] gathered for a special meeting in July 1993. There it was 
decided to hold separate meetings of Foreign Ministers. LEWIS calls that occasion the ‘origin’ of the 
ARF474
Sitting and talking and holding meetings also increases transparency and as such can be 
seen as confidence building. [qtd. in: BOHAN 18.07.1993] 
 [LEWIS 1999:144f.]. Indeed it was around this time that the term ‘ASEAN Regional Forum’ 
was first used by the press [e.g. CHAU 23.07.1993; BTS 23.07.1993; ST 23.07.1993], replacing 
the till then circulating ‘Asian Regional Forum’. The joint communiqué of the AMM cited the ASEAN 
Regional Forum – although using quotation-marks [ASEAN 24.07.1993], signalling the still fluid 
state of wording. In the run-up to that meeting, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, gave a 
sketch about the shape of the envisioned security dialogue, ruling out a ‘premature’ institutional 
framework. Instead, a senior Southeast Asian official propagated the ASEAN style, when he said: 
                                                 
470 Washington has initially been sceptical about the idea of a regional dialogue, fearing that this would under-
mine its bilateral arrangements with various countries in the region. However, the US changed this foreign pol-
icy stance and the then US President Bill Clinton argued that such multilateral arrangements “can function like 
overlapping plates of armour, covering the full body of our common security concerns” [qtd. in: CHING 
12.08.1993]. For a detailed argument explaining the US's early opposition to the ARF see KASUMATA 2006:185. 
471 The proposed non-governmental security forum was to be created along the lines of the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference (PECC). The PECC had been formed in 1980 and had been constituted as a tripartite 
non-governmental grouping, comprising academics, business leaders, and senior government officials [KN 
23.11.1992]. 
472 Philippine President Ramos lobbied also for the participation of Vietnam [REUTERS 17.06.1993]. 
473 Alongside the ASEAN members and its seven dialogue partners, Vietnam, Laos, Papua New Guinea as ob-
servers as well as China and Russia as guests were attending [AFP 07.07.1993]. 
474 Birth to the ARF was in effect given exactly when all 18 governments met to a dinner party on Sunday, 25th 
July 1993, in Singapore – hosted by ASEAN [STEWART 26.07.1993]. 
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However, during the initial phase “…there was | no common understanding among participants as 
to what its actual role would be, except that it could create a congenial atmosphere through regular 
multilateral interactions” [NAIDU 2000:2-3]. 
The 26th AMM also agreed that the first ARF meeting would take place the following year in Bang-
kok475
3.10.2.2 ARF Sees the Light of Day 
 [SCMP 25.07.1993]. The establishment was said to be prescribed “on the realization that 
the security of Southeast Asia cannot be separated from that of the larger Asia-Pacific region” 
[TENORIO 16.05.1997]. 
During the ensuing PMC, taking place after the AMM, the discussion of security issues, foremost the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, were prominent on the agenda [BP 27.07.1993]. 
Datuk Ajit Singh, the then ASEAN Secretary General, had high hopes at the ushering in of the AFR. 
Singh commented: 
In the long term, the forum will generate its own momentum and become the focus of all 
matters relating to political and security issues. [qtd. in: VATIKIOTIS 05.08.1993] 
Singh also implied that the forum was effectively designed along the lines of the ASEAN Way, when 
he said that it was not intended to discuss issues that were too divisive [VATIKIOTIS 05.08.1993]. 
GANESAN voiced his scepticism, pointing out that: 
It remains to be seen if this proliferation of concentric security forums | will ease bilateral 
tensions and enhance ASEAN’s absorptive capacity without diluting its regional distinct-
ness and organizational consciousness. However, it might be noted that macro-regional 
security forums are unlikely to be able to deal with the specifics of regional dynamics, 
which are often quite discrete and independent of external considerations. [GANESAN 
1995:219-220] 
Before the first official ARF meeting took place North Korea and Israel made their interest in the 
forum known and asked to be invited [KN 14.02.1994], thus acknowledging the potential of the 
evolving consultation mechanism. 
The ARF participants476 met in May 1994 to prepare for the first meeting [JP 23.05.1994]; on that 
occasion the representatives agreed that the ARF will take place every year, in-between the AMM 
and the PMC. Various procedural characteristics were endorsed that clearly carried the ASEAN fin-
gerprints. Thai Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary Pracha Kuna-kasem for instance, detailed 
that progress was scheduled to occur ‘step by step’477
                                                 
475 Mistakenly, the Joint Communiqué of the 26th AMM in point 8 states ‘next week’ instead of ‘next year’ 
[ASEAN 24.07.1993]. 
476 Finally bringing together the ASEAN nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thai-
land) with the Association’s Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, 
the United States), the ASEAN observers (Laos, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam) plus China and Russia [CHING 
12.05.1994]. 
477 The same phrase was used by Singapore’s Foreign Minister Shanmugam Jayakumar, when commenting on 
the procedure best suited for the ARF [KN 25.07.1994b]. 
. Moreover, he emphasized that detailed dis-
cussions of sensitive issues would be avoided [KN 30.05.1994]. 
The establishment of the ARF was hailed by Frank CHING, reporting for the weekly Far Eastern 
Economic Review: 
The launching of ARF is an extraordinary achievement for ASEAN, providing as it does a 
place to discuss issues before they turn into crises. [CHING 12.05.1994] 
Among the issues discussed at the first ARF meeting in July 1994 was the situation in and policy 
vis-à-vis Burma. In this regard a new approach was announced that oscillated around human 
rights- and political freedom-benchmarks as a condition for the improvement of Western relations 
with Burma [MAKABENTA 28.07.1994]  
This development motivated an ASEAN official to claim – later to prove premature - that: 
ASEAN is no longer divided from its dialogue partners on this issue. [qtd. in: KN 
01.08.1994b] 
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One of the issues that were to be high on the ARF agenda in the coming years was also discussed: 
the conflicting claims about the Spratly Islands, although China, as one of the claimants, main-
tained that it preferred bilateral negotiations. It was reported, however, that some ASEAN states 
rather opted for accommodation with China, brushing aside an Indonesian proposal for the dis-
puted area (‘doughnut formula’) [CHANDA 11.08.1994]. China’s refusal to discuss the issue at the 
ARF meeting was explained by the weakening of China’s weigh through internationalization of the 
conflict [BUSZYNSKI 2003:352]. 
All those discussions notwithstanding, North Korea was the only potential flashpoint that the final 
statement mentioned; due perhaps to the non-attendance – since non-invitation – of North Korea. 
The participants welcomed the continuation of the US talks with Pyongyang about its suspected 
nuclear weapons [GRATTON 29.07.1994]. At the joint press conference after the 1994 PMC North 
Korea was urged to resume the talks as soon as possible [KN 01.08.1994c]. 
The singling out of only one hot-topic was an indication that ASEAN was implementing its way of 
doing business. In line with that the ARF project as was designed rather to deal with security gen-
erally and gradually instead of trying to tackle specific trouble-spots directly and head on.  
The participants of the first ARF meeting also agreed to endorse the TAC’s principles and pur-
poses478
• confidence and security building
, i.a. mutual respect for sovereignty, equality, independence, territorial integrity, and na-
tional identity of all states as well as non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, renunciation 
of the threat and use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes [KN 01.08.1994a], as a code 
of conduct and thus successfully saw to it that those key ASEAN norms receive official subscription 
by extra-regional powers, without the latter’s formal accession to the TAC. 
Procedurally, agreement was reached to hold annual meetings [LEWIS 1999:144-145.]. Those 
were to take place immediately after the PMCs [AFP 21.07.1993]. It was, however, criticized that 
the meeting, not lasting longer than three hours and followed by a working dinner, did not give 
enough room for in-depth discussion. The participants were accorded a mere ten minutes for their 
presentations. However, a positive side effect of the get-together was observed to be the numer-
ous bilateral discussions taking place and ‘a number of chats in corridors and so on’ [CHING 
11.08.1994]. 
The Chairman’s Statement outlined the type of fruits the participating states hoped to reap, argu-
ing: 
…as a high-level consultative forum, the ARF had enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and secu-
rity issues of common interest and concern. In this respect, the ARF would be in a position 
to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive di-
plomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. [ARF 25.07.1994] 
The participants moreover termed the following subjects as meriting further study until the next 
ARF meeting, scheduled for 1995: 
 
479
• nuclear non-proliferation; 
; 
• peacekeeping cooperation, including regional peacekeeping training centres; 
• exchanges of non-classified military information; 
• maritime security issues;  
• preventive diplomacy; 
• a comprehensive security concept, including economic and social aspects; and 
• relevant international norms and principles pertaining to regional political and security co-
operation [ARF 24.07.1994]. 
 
The Chairman’s Statement also singled out the general objectives of the ARF (according to the ARF 
homepage480
• to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common 
interest and concern; and 
): 
 
• to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive di-
plomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
                                                 
478 ASEAN had from the outset intended to make the TAC a regional code of conduct [VATIKIOTIS 05.08.1993]. 
479 MACK & KERR pointed out that ASEAN usually puts emphasis on the non-military dimension of confidence 
and security building [MACK & KERR 1995]. 
480 ARF homepage: www.aseanregionalforum.org. 
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The procedure of accepting new participants to the ARF entailed the ARF’s chairman consulting all 
other ARF members for their endorsement during a meeting of senior officials. At the second ARF 
meeting Cambodia became the 19th ARF participating state [JEN 21.05.1995b]. On the other hand 
the applications by Britain, France, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, North Korea481
During the year between 1994 and 1995 three track II seminars were conducted: on confidence 
building, peacekeeping
, and 
Pakistan had been put on hold [AFP 22.05.1995]. However, the ARF decided to prepare complete 
membership guidelines, giving it breathing time for the next enlargement [WAIN 30.06.1995]. 
Pura, reporting for the Asian Wall Street Journal, pointed out the following in regard of such a long 
list of applications: 
…some Asean officials worry that success might have its downside, diluting Asean's ability 
to set its own agenda. With so many comparative strangers -- some powerful and unfamil-
iar with Asean's decorous diplomatic protocol -- holding invitations to Asean's annual talk-
fest, they wonder, what happens if the guests want to fiddle with the agenda, change the 
seating arrangements or even tamper with the guest list [PURA 28.07.1995]. 
482
3.10.3 2nd ARF Meeting – ASEAN Re-asserts itself 
, and preventive diplomacy respectively [WAIN 30.06.1995]. 
Shortly before the second ARF meeting Burma released the main opposition politician, Aung San 
Suu Kyi, a step that ASEAN interpreted as success of its ‘constructive engagement’ approach 
[WAGSTAFF 11.07.1995]. This again later turned out to have been too hasty an assessment. 
However, the first ARF Meeting has been judged a success by the Far Eastern Economic Review for 
both bringing together potential adversaries and raising trans-regional security issues [CHING 
11.08.1994].  
When the ARF representatives met in August 1995 they decided that the security dialogue should 
continue along two tracks: Track I activities would be carried out by the ARF governments; and 
Track II activities by strategic institutes and relevant NGOs to which all ARF members shall be eli-
gible. The current ARF Chairman was to function as the main link between Track I and II, also en-
suring that Track II activities result from consultation with ARF participants [ASEAN 2003:11]. 
The attending states additionally agreed to generally move forward in an evolutionary manner – 
consisting of the following stages: 
 
Stage 1:  promotion of confidence building483
Stage 2:   development of preventative diplomacy
 – the ARF participants see themselves on that 
stage momentarily; 
484
                                                 
481 North Korea’s application was reportedly supported by Thailand in mid-1995 [JEN 24.07.1995]. 
 – this stage might be proceeding in tan-
dem with Stage 1; and 
Stage 3: elaboration of approaches to conflicts – is defined as the eventual goal of the ARF 
process [ASEAN 2003:10]. 
 
Along that outline the ARF agreed to make decisions through consensus ‘after careful and extensive 
consultations’ among all participants. About the speed of the process the ARF’s Chairman’s state-
ment included the paradigmatic sentence: 
The ARF process shall move at a pace comfortable to all participants. [ASEAN 2003:10] 
The second ARF meeting created two structures to be co-chaired by ASEAN and non-ASEAN par-
ticipants:  
an Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building (ISG), focusing on dialogue about security percep-
tions and defence policy papers and two Inter-Sessional Meetings on Cooperative Activities (ISMs), 
one focused on peacekeeping and the other on search and rescue coordination [ASEAN 2003:12; 
LEWIS 1999:146-147]. 
482 For the issues discussed during the seminar entitled “Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities for the 
ASEAN Regional Forum” held in Brunei on 7th-9th March 1995 see MARNIKA 1995. 
483 ACHARYA contrasts the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) agreed to by the ARF to those relevant for the 
OSCE: „[u]nlike the OSCE’s intrusive and constraining CBMs backed by an inspection regime, the ARF’s CBM 
agenda remains „ASEAN-like“ in being noninstrusive and nonlegalistic, providing for voluntary compliance“ 
[ACHARYA 2004:259]. 
484 For the definition and scope of the concept of preventive diplomacy see TAY & TALIB 1997:253-255. 
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Most of the finally agreed to proposals had been part of an ASEAN concept paper circulating well 
before the actual ARF meeting took place [LEWIS 1999:146; GAROFANO 1999:78; WAIN 
30.06.1995], thus also manifesting ASEAN’s lead role in the ARF as regards the conceptional input. 
The participants of the Second ARF meeting highlighted the following to be among the main re-
gional security issues: 
 
• their concern on overlapping sovereignty claims in the region. The adherence to interna-
tional law, including the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea was encouraged; 
• the observance that the divided Korean peninsula has direct bearing on regional peace and 
security. All efforts intended to resolve the situation were welcomed; 
• the encouragement of Cambodia’s endeavours to achieve security, promote stability, and 
economic recovery; and  
• the importance of nuclear non-proliferation as a mean to further peace and stability in the 
region [ARF 01.08.1995]. 
 
In regard of the South China Sea, developments since the last ARF meeting had underlined the 
volatility of the situation. In March 1995 China had raided Mischief Reef, a part of the Spratly Is-
land that is also claimed by the Philippines. Thus, the spotlight fell also on the issue’s inherent se-
curity complexity ASEAN had to face: 
China's recent Spratly adventure exposed a widely peddled fallacy: that the increasing in-
tegration of Asia's economies with each other and with the outside world could somehow 
make the region immune to the insecurities that have plagued it in the past. In reality, 
rapidly increasing defence spending by Asian countries (not just China), made possible by 
rapid economic growth, has started to threaten the stability on which continued prosperity 
depends. Meanwhile, modernisation has given several countries the capacity to build the 
sorts of modern weapons--from warships to missiles--that make conflicts harder to con-
tain. [ECONOMIST 29.04.1995] 
Also the second ARF was explicitly used by the Association to re-emphasize its claim to leadership, 
an assumption obviously not contested by the other participants. Thus, the chairman’s statement 
pointed out that: 
A successful ARF requires the active, full and equal participation and cooperation of all 
participants. However, ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary driving force”. 
[ASEAN 2003:10, emphasis added] 
ASEAN’s role of being such a ‘primary driving force’ was also embodied the modalities governing 
the ARF chairmanship; it rotated along the lines of the annually changed chairmanship of ASEAN’s 
Standing Committee [TAY & TALIB 1997:264]. 
3.10.4 3rd ARF Meeting – Extending Outreach and Stabilizing the 
‘Comfort Level’ 
In the run-up to the third ARF gathering one of the most hotly discussed issue was the enlarge-
ment of the forum. This turned out to be a subject that made visible the influence of the various 
ARF members. Debating specifically about the participation of India – recently being welcomed as 
ASEAN DP - the Philippines’ Foreign Affairs Secretary Rodolfo Severino explained: 
We still have to consult the others... Some non-ASEAN countries insist that ASEAN should 
not decide on the composition of ARF participants alone. [qtd. in: BW 28.03.1996] 
Along India Mongolia, Myanmar, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; since 1994 Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) as well as Britain and France had officially applied to participate [KN 15.04.1996]. Indone-
sia had been asked at the 2nd ARF to work out criteria for enlarging the forum [KN 15.04.1996]. 
Around the same time the participation of the EU, as the only non-national member in the ARF was 
debated. On the one hand it was argued that the position of the EU is often conflicting with views 
of single European governments [TARRANT 23.07.1996]; however, on the other hand the regularly 
outspoken foreign policy position (e.g. vis-à-vis Burma) that was often contrary to those supported 
by ASEAN, might also have spurred that criticism. 
The application of prospective ASEAN member Myanmar – opposed by most Western countries – 
was generally supported by ASEAN. Thailand’s Foreign Minister Kasem S. Kasemsri was quite out-
spoken on the contentious issue when he said: 
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Some might object, but we in ASEAN think that it's necessary that all our members and all 
those eligible to become members are in the ARF, unconditionally. … Who participates in 
the ARF is a matter for ASEAN to decide. … The ARF addresses only those issues relevant 
to us, East Asia and Asia-Pacific, and no other areas. [qtd. in: SAWATSAWANG 
03.05.1996] 
Also an ASEAN SOM in May 1996 reiterated this position and recommended the invitation to 
Myanmar and India [AWSJ 10.05.1996]. ARF officials met the same month and approved those 
recommendations, underlining that ASEAN indeed upheld the claim to have a decisive say in the 
forum [GOPALAKRISHNAN 10.05.1996]. 
Among other issues discussed at that preparatory meeting the tense situation on the Korean pen-
insula was most prominent. 
The head of the Chinese ARF delegation, Chen Jian, emphasized his country’s insistence that two 
other regional hot spots are not to be meaningfully internationalized, saying: “Taiwan is an internal 
matter of China. ... The South China Sea problem is being discussed bilaterally. So there is no need 
for the ARF to intervene. But we are happy to discuss our views on the matter” [qtd. in: 
GOPALAKRISHNAN 10.05.1996]. And Indonesia’s foreign minister underlined that ASEAN shared 
this position on Taiwan, agreeing that it constituted an internal affair [JEN 25.07.1996]. This came 
in a delicate period of heightened tensions. In March of the same year China had test-fired missiles 
off the Taiwan Strait, seemingly meant as an intimidation shortly before the presidential elections 
on the island, in which a more pro-independence candidate was likely to win [WND 14.03.1996]. 
The stance ASEAN adopted vis-à-vis the question of Taiwan was described by LIM: 
The ASEAN states have already signalled capitulation on the Taiwan issue. [LIM 1998:116] 
However, if ASEAN had hoped its pro-China stance would be followed by a quid pro quo regarding 
its pet project of as Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone then those hopes were dashed. 
No nuclear weapons power was ready to endorse the SANWFZ at the ARF meeting [AWSJ 
13.05.1996]. 
 
Concerning decisions taken earlier on general matters, it was agreed that Track I activities would 
be carried out in the first half of the calendar year, whereas Track II activities would be undertaken 
in the second half of the year. 
Regarding the 3-step evolutionary process outlined earlier, common ground was reached that al-
though the ARF focus would still be on confidence building, preventive diplomacy endeavours could 
proceed in tandem [LEWIS 1999: 147]. Commenting on the progress of the gradual ARF approach, 
the Philippines foreign affairs secretary Domingo Siazon explained: 
A subtle evolution of the ARF is that all along we have been talking about CBMs, but to a 
certain extent we probably have moved somewhat forward toward preventive diplomacy. 
Maybe not too openly, but in a subtle manner we have moved into that stage. How soon 
we can move into actual dispute settlement remains to be seen. [qtd. in: VILLEGAS 
02.08.1996] 
The meeting’s final document listed among the discussed issues with relevance to peace and secu-
rity in the region i.a.: 
 
• the signing of the SEANWFZ the previous year was described as an ‘important contribution’ 
for the maintenance of world peace and security; 
• the expected completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was hailed; 
• the decision of several states to impose moratoria and bans on the production, export, and 
use of anti-personnel land mines was welcomed485
• a peaceful solution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea on the basis of interna-
tional law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was urged– the positive contribu-
tion of the workshop series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea was ac-
knowledged; 
; 
• the need to transform the current Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953 into a peace 
mechanism was underlined and the resumption of dialogue between the two Koreas was 
                                                 
485 Ironically, among the ARF participants as well as among the ASEAN members no consensus to sign an 
agreement banning the use of land mines was obtainable. The only one of the then seven ASEAN states com-
mitted to a comprehensive ban was the Philippines [JEN 25.02.1997]. 
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noted; additionally, the importance of the Korean Energy Development Agency was recog-
nized [ARF 23.07.1996]. 
 
The Chairman’s Statement of the meeting also spelled out the principles and criteria for future 
enlargement of the ARF. The latter oscillated among the following requirements: commitment, 
relevance, gradual expansion, and consultations [ARF 23.07.1996]. 
 
Among the relevant Track I activities the Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures  
and the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations had met during the year. The ARF 
participants endorsed the following proposal of the Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building 
Measures (ISG CBMs): 
 
• the ongoing dialogue on security perceptions shall be continued - information sharing shall 
be based on the voluntarily submitted papers; 
• the submission of annual defence policy statements and similar papers on a voluntary basis 
is encouraged - the exchanges of views shall be furthered at the ARF meetings; 
• high-level defence contacts and the participation of defence officials at Inter-Sessional ac-
tivities are encouraged - personnel and information exchanges between national defence 
colleges are hailed; 
• the participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA) is encouraged; 
• the participation in internationally recognized global arms control and disarmament legal 
agreements is recommended; and  
• the work of the ISG CBMs is extended for another year. 
 
With regard to the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations (ISM PO) the ARF partici-
pants underline 
 
• the importance of sharing experience in peacekeeping activities; 
• the commitment to support the UN peacekeeping capacity; and 
• the extension of ISM PO for another year [ARF 23.07.1996]. 
 
Commenting on the results of the 3rd ARF, the Jakarta Post argued that positions remained ‘as far 
apart as they began on many issue’ alluding to questions on the SEANWFZ, Myanmar, and human 
rights. Exemplary, ASEAN’s reluctance to discuss Myanmar was such that the item did not even 
appear at ARF’s formal agenda to the surprise of the US Secretary of State [JP 26.07.1996]. 
As one would expect the chairman’s statement came to another conclusion, cited here in full to 
present the position adequately and capture the prevailing overall perception: 
It was noted that the discussions throughout the Meeting remained positive, although 
there was some divergence of views on the subjects discussed. The participants were 
open and candid in expressing their views but this did not generate tension or dissension 
in the room. Instead, there was a tendency towards creating a harmonious environment. 
This positive mood demonstrated that the overall trend remains encouraging.  
The participants also displayed a high degree of comfort in their interactions with each 
other. The ARF is still a fairly young process. Its success was never pre-ordained. It is 
therefore worth noting that the increasing comfort level among the participants at the 
Third ARF demonstrates that the ARF is progressing at a good pace. Future meetings 
should try to build upon this demonstrated base of friendly and frank discussions among 
the participants as this will in turn pave the way for agreements on substantive issues in 
the coming years. [ARF 23.07.1996] 
3.10.5 4th ARF Meeting – ASEAN as Cambodia Negotiator, Approval 
of its ‘constructive Engagement’ 
At the fourth ARF Meeting, taking place in Malaysia, the ARF-vehicle had progressed insofar as the 
participants clarified their self-perception and identity as a forum for ‘multilateral security dialogue 
and co-operation’.  
The ARF participants further recognized that the Forum has encouraged ‘habits of co-operation’ and 
has instilled a ‘pattern of constructive behavior’. It was further noted that the Forum contributed to 
mutual understanding and trust, greater transparency, and a strengthened commitment to main-
tain peace and stability in the region [ARF 27.07.1997]. The meeting highlighted also the tradi-
tional ASEAN argument that economic development contributes to and results in stability. Further-
more the importance of making decisions based on consensus – an ASEAN Way feature – was 
noted favourably [LEWIS 1999:148-149]. This type of support ASEAN did receive undoubtedly 
strengthened its prerogative of interpretation, extending beyond its organisational border into the 
wider region. 
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But ASEAN also succeeded in other matters, pertaining to its immediate neighbourhood: not only 
did the ARF express its support for ASEAN’s efforts to mediate in Cambodia’s internal conflict (see 
relevant chapter below). Additionally, ASEAN’s approach vis-à-vis Burma486
• efforts to maintain regional security shall be based on such principles as peaceful coexis-
tence, amity, and cooperation among states, respect for national sovereignty, peaceful so-
lution of disputes, comprehensive views of security as well as on the principles and pur-
poses of the UN Charter; 
 was recognized: 
The ministers commended the increasingly close cooperation and mutual assistance by 
countries in Southeast Asia in promoting a prosperous and peaceful community of nations, 
including ASEAN's efforts at constructive engagement with Myanmar. In this connection, 
they welcomed the positive role played by ASEAN in enhancing regional peace and stabil-
ity. The expansion of ASEAN membership contributes to these objectives. [qtd. in: JEN 
27.07.1997; ARF 27.07.1997] 
Among the additional region-wide security issues highlighted at the meeting were the entry into 
force of the SEANWFZ; the situation on the Korean Peninsula; and the trans-boundary movement 
of nuclear waste; and the progress made on endeavours limiting the use of weapons of mass de-
struction (atomic, biological, and chemical); [ARF 27.07.1997]. 
At the meeting Track I attention was primarily focused, like in the previous year, on the Inter-
Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG CBMs) and the Inter-Sessional Meeting on 
Peacekeeping Operations (ISM PO). 
 
Simultaneously to extending the ISG CBMs’ mandate for another year two completely novel rec-
ommendations were formulated:  
 
• demining and rehabilitation of victims shall be supported [ASEAN 2003:93-96]. 
 
In the framework of the ISM PO a Workshop on ‘Train the Trainers’ was conducted in March 1997 
and a Demining Seminar was held in April 1997. Irrespective thereof the ISM PO had recom-
mended that peacekeeping cooperation shall continue only among interested ARF countries ‘with-
out the requirement for a formal extension’ of the ISM PO. This recommendation was subsequently 
endorsed by the annual ARF meeting [ASEAN 2003:108; ARF 27.07.1997], showcasing its low-
profile approach to concretized (any form of militarized) action. 
 
Track II activities encompassed a Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy and a Seminar on Non-
Proliferation. The Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy took place in November 1996, and was ar-
ranged by the Institute Francais des Relations Internationales and Centre for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies of Indonesia. Agreement was reached to adopt Bhoutros Bhoutros Ghali’s definition 
of preventive diplomacy, formulated in his Agenda for Peace: action to prevent existing disputes 
from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. 
The need for an annual security outlook in order to gather relevant information and analyses was 
stressed by the ARF participants. As preventive diplomacy measures, available to ARF, the follow-
ing were listed: fact-finding, good offices, mediation, moral suasion as well as third party mediation 
[ASEAN 2003:117-119]. The meeting also arrived at the decision not only to include territorial dis-
putes, the proliferation of conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction but also non-
traditional security issues, covering amongst others drug trafficking, terrorism, or maritime safety 
[YUZAWA 2006:787-788]. With this the ARF members signalling the Forum’s comprehensive secu-
rity approach. 
Preventive diplomacy, as will be remembered, constitutes Stage II of ARF’s conceived theoretical 
evolution – as defined at the second ARF meeting. TAY and TALIB have worked out what makes the 
formula of preventive diplomacy487
                                                 
486 The forth ARF was an occasion of mockery by the ECONOMIST. It argued that instead of addressing security 
issues emanating from China’s claims, the ARF „risks becoming a forum for voicing concerns about the internal 
politics of Neanderthal regimes, such as those in Myanmar and Cambodia” [ECONOMIST 19.07.1997]. A com-
pletely different judgment was delivered by Murray HIEBERT, reporting for the FEER, stating “[d]espite differ-
ences over aid to Cambodia and the handling of Burma, the meeting demonstrated that the ARF is becoming an 
important forum for handling the region's security problems” [HIEBERT 07.08.1997]. 
487 TAY & TALIB have specified five principles that might be used to distinguish between preventive diplomacy 
from interference: a) a threshold for ARF activity; b) the nature of the action or intervention; c) the scale and 
proportionality of the intervention; d) the consent of the involved states; and e) the authorization for action 
[TAY & TALIB 2003:258-259]. 
 so attractive to ASEAN: 
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The premise of one form of prevention – preventive diplomacy – moreover, is that the 
counterweight of force or other coercive measures is not needed; that diplomatic meas-
ures will suffice. Preventive diplomacy, as such, is a tempting prescription. It promises to 
continue the peace. Yet it does not require the heavy resources of finance, manpower or 
political will or military or other forms of intervention – resources which the ARF does not 
have and perhaps cannot muster from among its diverse members. [TAY & TALIB 
1997:253] 
The Seminar on Non-Proliferation had been jointly organized by the Centre for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies - Jakarta, the Peace Research Centre – Canberra and the Stiftung für Wissenschaft 
und Politik – Munich in December 1996. Basically, the signing and ratification of existing regimes to 
contain weapons of mass destruction and promote disarmament by ARF participants was urged. 
Furthermore, the threat of cross-regional spill-overs of proliferation was discussed. 
Moreover the seminar urged Track II to create a study group on a mechanism to assure non-
nuclear weapon states against the threat and use of nuclear weapons [ASEAN 2003:121-124]. 
3.10.6 5th ARF Meeting – Reacting to nuclear Armament and eco-
nomic Crisis 
The backdrop to the Fifth meeting of the ARF in 1998 was highly charged. On the one hand the 
severe Asian financial crisis and its consequences were being felt throughout the region. On the 
other hand the nuclear tests conducted during the period by India and Pakistan were contravening 
the anti-nuclear stance of the ARF. However, since no consensus could be reached on criticizing 
India’s nuclear tests, due mainly to India’s objections [DJIN 22.05.1998], the Foreign Ministers 
agreed on a careful wording of the ARF statement. The nuclear tests where described by the ARF 
Meeting as creating a ‘situation that is highly dangerous not only to Southeast Asia but to the en-
tire world as well’488; India specifically distanced itself from that very paragraph489
However, at the preparatory meeting of senior ARF officials merely the membership of Mongolia 
was endorsed [VILLAVIRAY 22.05.1998]. ASEAN nevertheless left open the door for North Korea 
 [qtd. in: GN 
28.07.1998]. 
Instead of condemning the nuclear tests, the attendees only ‘strongly deplored’ them. Moreover, 
no states were directly named, although it was clear who was addressed. LEWIS describes the rea-
son for this cautious line: 
The concern for the comfort level of the participants and an unwillingness to officially de-
nounce the tests are indicative of the ASEAN way which is at the heart of ARF. [LEWIS 
1999:151] 
Overall the financial crisis dominated the agenda of ARF’s fifth meeting. The Chairman’s Statement 
insofar noted that certain aspects of the financial crisis ‘could impact on the peace and security of 
the region’. At the same time it was acknowledged that the ARF would have an important role to 
play in addressing this impact [ARF 27.07.1998]. 
Alongside the security issues touched upon regularly by the ARF meetings (Korean Peninsula, Non-
Proliferation etc.), figured the political situation in Cambodia. The elections held the day before 
were welcomed as was the contribution of the FOC (Friends of Cambodia) and the UN to enhance 
peace in the country [ASEAN 2003: 136]. 
 
On the question of new participants and after having had curtailed the rapid expansion of the fo-
rum for a period, ASEAN announced in May 1998 its willingness to invite Mongolia to join the ARF 
[AFP 19.05.1998]. Also North Korea, as the only relevant Asian country missing in the body, re-
newed its wish to join [AFP 21.05.1998]. At that time altogether eleven countries had expressed 
their readiness to be ARF participants. Pakistan’s request was supported by China but also Japan, 
after Pakistan’s arch rival India had tested nuclear bombs the previous May [JEN 21.05.1998; 
VIILAVIRAY 22.07.1998]. In turn India was one of the most outspoken ARF participants that re-
jected an invitation to Pakistan [JEN 06.07.1998]. Originally, ASEAN was reported to have ap-
proached Pakistan to discuss the nuclear stand-off at the ARF meeting; an initiative that failed 
again upon India’s objection [FEER 09.07.1998]. 
                                                 
488 That wording was a result of a compromise between a softer line supported by ASEAN and a stronger one 
pushed by developed countries [APN 03.08.1998]. 
489 Nevertheless India vowed to remain part of the ARF, expressing its wish that discussions shall not be con-
frontational in nature [GN 28.07.1998]. 
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albeit requesting a formal application490
• an enhanced role for the ARF Chairman, particularly his role in offering good offices; 
 and its declared willingness to abide by the ARF’s decisions 
[VILLAVIRAY 24.05.1998]. 
 
Regarding Track I activities the ARF Foreign Ministers requested the ISG CBMs to further consider 
the following four proposals – as it had itself recommended - at their upcoming meetings: 
 
• the development of a register of experts or eminent persons among ARF participating 
states; 
• an Annual Security Outlook; and 
• voluntary background briefings on regional security issues. 
 
Finally, the ISG CBM was asked to prepare an annexed list of CBMs to be realized in the near future 
(Basket 1) and of CBMs to be implemented over the medium term (Basket 2)491
• the codification of principles regulating international behaviour in the region; 
 [ASEAN 2003: 
136]. 
In view of the Forum’s evolutionary approach the ISG CBMs was to address the overlap between 
CBMs and preventive diplomacy. 
As regards the military dimension of cooperation, the ARF also welcomed the first ARF Meeting of 
Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions, held during the previous year and attested its contribu-
tion to enhancing confidence building in the region [ASEAN 2003:137]; a second such meeting was 
scheduled to take place in September 1998 [LEWIS 1999:149-152]. HELLER has cited the introduc-
tion of such meetings as decisive step in the ARF's development [HELLER 2005:140-141]. 
Generally, the ARF noted that the current meeting had focused on ‘core military and defense-
related issues’; however, it was underlined that also non-military issues are to be addressed – hav-
ing a significant impact on regional security in their own right.  
 
As regards Track II activities the ARF noted the Conference on Preventive Diplomacy, organized by 
Singapore’s Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies and the UK’s International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies, as well as a Seminar on ‘The future of ARF’. The ISG CBM was asked to consider the 
recommendations of those two meetings [ASEAN 2003:137]. The Conference on Preventive Diplo-
macy had forwarded the following proposals to the ARF SOM: 
 
• an enhanced role for the ARF chair or other third parties in providing good offices in certain 
circumstances; 
• exploring the relevance of Sino-Indian and Sino-Russian experience in CBMs for Preventive 
Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region; 
• multilateral co-operation as a form of Prevention Diplomacy regarding trans-national issues 
such as drug trafficking; shipment, storage, and disposal of nuclear waste; major move-
ments of population etc. where directly linked to security; and 
• an annual Security Outlook to be discussed in Track One, but produced at a Track Two level 
[ASEAN 2003:186]. 
 
Assessing the value of the forum after its fifth meeting, Philippines’ Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Domingo Siazon, as ASEAN’s Chairman of the Standing Committee opined: 
… once again we have proven that peace and security in our region is indivisible and can 
be advanced through active dialogue and coordination. … As we conclude the Fifth ASEAN 
Regional Forum, I can say that all of us have contributed to the evolution of the ARF as a 
process for building trust and confidence, for creating a favorable climate for peace and 
understanding and for fostering the habit of consultation. … the ARF works and it has 
evolved as a mechanism for addressing regional peace and security issues while at the 
                                                 
490 North Korea instead had sent a letter, dated 2nd May 1998, stating the withdrawal of its application, issued in 
1994, because of the ARF’s lack of understanding of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the non-existent 
diplomatic links with a number of ARF members, and the doubtable impartiality of the dialogue forum [JEN 
22.07.1999]. 
491 The ISG CBM categorized the following into basket I: encouraging ARF members to exchange visits of their 
naval vessels; multilateral exchanges and cooperation in military logistics and academic research; compilation 
of publications and contact points on CBMs; multilateral communications network; ARF Foreign Affairs and De-
fense officials training; seminar on creating defense policy documents; encouraging visits to military establish-
ments; media support for ARF activities and defence language schools conference. Basket II was considered to 
consist of: ARF liaison with other regional fora; a second ARF SOM; a counter-narcotics project; prevention and 
combating of illicit trafficking in conventional small arms; and a shoot fest among ARF riflemen [ASEAN 
2003:177-178]. 
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same time bridging gaps in the diverse interests of its participants [qtd. in: XINHUA 
27.07.1998b] 
Also the Far Eastern Economic Review lauded the meeting: “[t]he ARF sessions were, by all ac-
counts, the most open and candid ever held since they started five years ago” [CHING 
13.08.1998]. 
3.10.7 6th ARF Meeting – Engaging China multilaterally, ASEAN’s 
Leadership Role Contested 
In early June 1999 the President of the Philippines, Jose Estrada, urged ASEAN to expand its man-
date insofar as to see it as its competence to prevent and resolve conflicts in East Asia. That out-
lined agenda should be part of the ARF dialogue and considered as a confidence building measure 
[MS 03.06.1999]. Later another dialogue mechanism, the ASEAN plus Three, which excluded par-
ticipation of Western countries, was described as the most appropriate forum to handle such is-
sues. [JP 08.10.1999]. 
However, also Japan presented plans to empower the ARF as an arbitrator, strengthening the role 
of the ARF Chairman in particular. In the event of conflicts the parties should have the possibility to 
argue their case, and if the chairing nation is one of the parties, a co-chair would take over [MURA-
YAMA 22.07.1999]. 
Among other tense security issues ranged the territorial conflict between newly nuclear India and 
Pakistan. However, in order to overcome the prevalent inconclusiveness, Pakistan’s ARF application 
was again tabled during the run-up to the 6th ARF Meeting. At the same time, however, scepticism 
about the usefulness of the ARF in that regard was voiced. The Foreign Minister of the Philippines, 
Siazon, described the Kashmir conflict between the two nations but also the dispute existing be-
tween the two Koreas as ‘too advanced for ARF’ [GN 21.06.1999]. 
Nevertheless, both the Kashmir conflict as well as India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear armaments were 
discussed during the ARF meeting. Both parties were urged to act in line with the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and to revive the so-called Lahore peace process on the contested territory of 
Kashmir [AFP 26.07.1999c] 
With regard to North Korea the country was urged to reapply amid flaring tensions on the Korean 
Peninsula, focusing on a potential missile launch by Pyongyang. South Korea announced that such 
an application would not meet any opposition from ARF’s participants [AFP 26.07.1999b]. 
The sixth ARF Meeting brought another win for ASEAN when its participants recognized the TAC as 
a “key regional instrument for strengthening security in the region”. Furthermore, the meeting 
noted that also non-Southeast Asian countries ‘were now in the process of considering acceding to 
the TAC’, after the Second TAC amendment had entered into force [ASEAN 2002:194]. 
ASEAN was also successful as regards territorial disputes between some of its members and China. 
ASEAN was able to gather support among ARF members to support a multilateral approach to the 
issue, a route that was objected by China492
• a good offices role of the ARF Chairman: good offices would contribute to the promotion of 
trust and confidence among ARF participants. It was envisioned that a set of principles, 
procedures, and modalities would be created incrementally that would facilitate such good 
offices. It was agreed that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference would be re-
spected. Consensus was also reached that the ARF Chairman would be requested to extend 
. However, at the same time, the ARF statement re-
mained silent on the situation between China and Taiwan [BW 28.07.1999]. The relations between 
the two had soured after a new political establishment had taken over in Taiwan which advocated 
more strongly for the independence of the island triggering Chinese ensuing sabre-rattling [com-
pare WND 18.02.1999; WND 15.07.1999]. The ARF’s silence was in some contrast to the preceding 
AMM, that had explicitly reaffirmed the One-China-Policy [CASTELLANO 1999]. 
The Forum regretted the recent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo by NATO forces recog-
nizing “that the state of relations among the major powers in the Asia-Pacific was effected by 
events in other regions” [qtd. in: AE 31.07.1999]; thus it functioned as a diplomatic vehicle to fur-
ther the interests of the region’s member states also in locations far away from the Asia Pacific. 
Regarding further enlargement the ARF agreed that henceforth only sovereign states will be ac-
cepted as new members [ABAD 2003]. 
 
The ISG CBM had met twice during the year: in November 1998 in the US and in March 1999 in 
Thailand. As had been requested by the previous ARF Meeting, the ISG CBM did consider the four 
proposals made and fleshed out the following: 
                                                 
492 Under the generally sombre heading ‘ARF also had its good news’ the Bangkok Post termed this step a ‘sig-
nificant achievement’ [BP 03.08.1999]. 
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its good offices only on a case-by-case basis. The consent of the parties and ARF consulta-
tion beforehand were to be preconditions. 
• agreement was reached on developing a register of experts or eminent persons as a pool 
regarding CBMs as well as preventive diplomacy. That pool was to be made available to 
ARF participants. 
• with regard to the Annual Security Outlook (ASO) three proposals on how they could be 
compiled were suggested: 
o individual participants could produce an ASO on a voluntary basis (Track I) – with-
out editing by the ARF Chairman; 
o individual participants could produce an ASO – again on a voluntary basis (Track I) 
and without any editing by the ARF Chairman, but he would add an overview of a 
regional security outlook based on individual contributions; 
o the ASO would continue to be compiled by Track II institutions. 
• as regards the voluntary background briefings on regional security issues the participants 
agreed that it constituted an on-going exercise, that should be intensified during and in-
between ARF meetings [ASEAN 2002:217-221]. 
 
The leading role ASEAN continued to claim for the ARF had gradually started to be contested. For 
instance Japan urged that the ARF Chairmanship should forthwith rotate among all Forum mem-
bers, instead of being confined to the ASEAN members [MURAYAMA 22.07.1999]. The Bangkok 
Post commented on the Association’s attempt at a balancing act: 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations yesterday asserted its desire to be a driving 
force in talks regarding its security, while opening up some room for major powers' asser-
tiveness of their agenda. [ASHAYAGACHAT 27.07.1999] 
However, for the time being, ASEAN considered itself to remain the main actor. In order to ad-
vance the ARF process and for ‘maintaining ASEAN’s position as its driving force’ the Association 
undertook an internal review of the ARF progress achieved so far. The issues addressed in that 
review included: 
 
• organizational matters like the need for a secretariat or depository of ARF documents; 
• the implementation of projects; 
• ASEAN’s role and additional participation in the ARF; 
• the pace of the ARF process; 
• the move towards preventive diplomacy; and finally 
• the future direction of the ARF. 
 
ASEAN member states later agreed that the ASEAN Secretariat should provide the support re-
quested by the ARF Chair, monitor and follow up the ARF activities, and serve as a repository for 
ARF documents [ASEAN AR 1999]. The deliberation revealed that some sort of diversion from the 
ASEAN Way was necessary in order to keep the ARF’s momentum. 
3.10.8 7th ARF Meeting – Embracing North Korea, Elaborating Con-
flict Approach 
In September 1999 Japan re-tabled its reform proposals concerning the structure and procedure of 
the ARF. Those regarded i.a. the competencies of the chair nation. The suggestion focused on the 
right to call emergency meetings and to arbitrate in cases of regional conflicts [YS 02.09.1999]. 
Concerning ARF’s approach toward preventive diplomacy, the senior working level meeting – taking 
place in November 1999 - brought to the fore more clearly the existing division among ARF’s par-
ticipants. Whereas the US and Canada supported a comprehensive approach, China favoured a 
much more careful stance [JEN 14.11.1999]. 
To nobody’s surprise North Korea attempted anew to join the Forum, contacting the Philippines on 
the matter; however the missing diplomatic relations with the ASEAN states in general, and with 
the Philippines in particular, turned out to be one bottleneck on North Korea’s road to the ARF493
                                                 
493 The Philippines Foreign Undersecretary Baja explained that North Korean officials ‘have manifested their 
intention to join the ARF in time for the ARF meeting in July if they have established diplomatic relations with all 
the ASEAN members’ [qtd. in: AFP 06.04.2000]. The requirement that North Korea maintains diplomatic rela-
tions with all ASEAN members, however, was a prerequisite for the Association that a country can join the ARF 
[JEN 06.07.2000]. 
 
[APN 13.03.2000]. During a state visit to Laos and Vietnam, the North Korean Foreign Minister 
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Paek Nam Sun, also lobbied for both countries’ support for its bid to join the ARF [JEN 28.03.2000; 
JEN 01.04.2000]. However, at that time North Korea still had not sent a formal application to the 
ARF [JEN 11.04.2000]. Eventually Thailand – chairing the Standing Committee of ASEAN at the 
time – invited North Korea to the ARF, but in a somewhat ambiguous fashion. The Thai Foreign 
Minister Pitsuwan, confronted with the volatile developments on the Korean Peninsula, pondered: 
We are working out (how) Pyongyang can participate in the event...the chairman could 
report on the presence of the North Korean minister in Bangkok and pass information 
from him to members. [qtd. in: JEN 19.04.2000] 
Finally, it was agreed to invite North Korea to the next ARF meeting as an observer, envisioning a 
regular membership for future meetings [BBC MS 22.04.2000]. However, after North Korea had 
issued a formal application to join the ARF in a letter, dated 29th April 2000, the Thai Foreign Minis-
ter explained that the country will participate not as observer, but as formal member at the upcom-
ing ARF Meeting [JP 10.05.2000]. The application was to be discussed ahead of the ARF meeting at 
the ARF SOM, scheduled for 17th-19th May 2000 [JOINS 15.05.2000]. 
The Philippine Foreign Secretary, Siazon explained on the importance that North Korea494
However, the ARF attendance by North Korea resulted in that country’s normalization of relations 
with Canada and New Zealand. Generally and in line of ASEAN’s assertions, the step was hailed as 
contributing to ease North Korea’s isolation [PENNINGTON 29.07.2000]. Of particular significance 
were the ensuing North Korean-US talks during the ARF meeting which were said to have brought 
about the most essential breakthrough in their relations in years [ENG 24.07.2001]. The future 
participation of the reclusive country in ARF meetings also held the prospect of enabling intensified 
contacts with South Korea on security matters [ECONOMIST 01.04.2000]. On the other hand, 
though, the overblown attention the admission of North Korea 
 takes 
part in the ARF process: 
It is better to engage (North Korea). By engaging them they can participate in collective 
economic, security and political discussions. Therefore, they become a more responsible 
member of the East Asian community, rather than isolated. … If you isolate them, they 
take action (that may have adverse) impact on (the region), especially on Japan and 
South Korea. [qtd. in: JEN 06.07.2000] 
The signing of an agreement between the Philippines and North Korea in mid-July 2000 about the 
setting up of diplomatic ties eventually cleared the way for the latter’s participation in the ARF [AFP 
12.07.2000]. However, Professor Desmond BALL of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in 
Canberra, cautioned the optimism in conjunction with North Korea’s ARF participation, when he 
stressed: “[i]t is certainly the case that the question of North Korea's accession to the ARF will be 
one of the major subjects, but that doesn't mean they are all going to sit down and discuss security 
on the Korean peninsula. … They would regard that as being improper” [qtd. in: EATON 
24.07.2000]. 
495
Interestingly, the position of ASEAN  since the ARF’s inception which hence usually had been de-
scribed as being the ‘primary driving force’ was rewritten in that year’s chairman statement to be 
merely the ‘leading role’; it was added: “[a]t the same time, they also concurred that it was in-
cumbent upon each ARF participant to contribute to advancing the ARF process” [ASEAN 
received, contributed to the 
judgement that the forum meeting itself had been ‘hollow’ [NT 01.01.2001]. 
Shortly before the 7th ARF Meeting another country’s controversial participation, that of Pakistan, 
was propagated by the Philippines. Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon explained: 
It would provide an additional forum for India and Pakistan to talk about their problems. 
They did not have a sufficient opportunity to resolve their differences. Hopefully, this fo-
rum can serve as a breakthrough ... The more opportunities they have to talk with each 
other the better. [qtd. in: MS 20.07.2000] 
However, that attitude was not commonly shared among ASEAN members. ASEAN’s SG Severino 
accordingly hinted at the need for further consolidation of the ARF and underlined that at the very 
moment no expansion of the dialogue system was planned [XINHUA 23.07.2000]. The emphasis on 
consolidation was also included in the Chairman’s statement [ASEAN 2003:251]. 
                                                 
494 On some details about the security menace North Korea was perceived to be at that time see FOSTER-
CARTER 07.08.2000. 
495 Hopes in fostered integration of the North Korean regime where somewhat dashed when it skipped the first 
ISG Meeting in November 2000 due to lacking preparation and budget problems [KH 16.04.2001]. 
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2003:252]. This change of language signalled the softening of ASEAN’s claim to be the unquestion-
able leader of the Forum, probably brought about also by Japan’s advocating of a broader, more 
inclusive approach, ensuring also extra-ASEAN representation. 
Concerning the enhanced role of the ARF Chairman in liaising with external actors, informal contact 
with the UN, the OAS, and the OSCE on the one hand, and with the Track II Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) had been established during the year [ASEAN 2003:252]. 
The same period saw the establishment of the envisioned ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons 
[ASEAN 2003:253]. The ISG CBM meetings had earlier reached consensus concerning the pool of 
Experts/Eminent Persons insofar as that ARF members might only nominate their nationals and 
that no ARF member can veto the nominees of another ARF participant [ASEAN 2003:275].  
During the 7th ARF Meeting the security implications of the phenomenon of globalization were dis-
cussed; at the same time it was recognized that regional security issues have to give adequate 
consideration to economic, social, and human components of security [ASEAN 2003:254], thus 
indicating that the ARF members conceived security as multidimensional, instead of solely being 
based in peace as defined in military terms. 
Similarly to the ASEAN AMM the ARF emphasized that a united democratic Indonesia – witnessing 
internal turmoil at that time - was vital for the maintenance of regional security and underlined 
their support for its territorial integrity [ASEAN 2003:256]. The concrete backdrop thereto was the 
breakaway and declaration of independence of East Timor. 
 
Also on the conceptual line to be taken regarding ARF’s development, the meeting saw some 
movement. Singapore had prepared a paper entitled ‘ARF Concept on Principles of Preventive Di-
plomacy’ that was forwarded to the ARF Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers accepted the 
document as ‘basis for ARF’s evolving consensus on this subject’ [ASEAN 2003:262]. While noting 
the controversial nature of the subject, the following definitional paragraphs on what preventive 
diplomacy entailed were presented: 
To help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States that could potentially 
pose a threat to regional peace and stability; 
To help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and 
To help minimise the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region. [ASEAN 
2003:289] 
The paper listed the following activities to be in the realm of preventive diplomacy: 
 
• Confidence Building Efforts: building mutual trust and confidence between states; focus 
should be directed at strengthening the habit of cooperation in order to pre-empt disputes 
or their escalation. 
• Norms Building: norms and codes of behaviour would strengthen cooperation in ensuring 
regional peace. Norms building would also enhance trust between the participants. Being 
consistent with the TAC and UN Charta, a ARF code of conduct governing the member’s re-
lations could be established. 
• Enhancing Channels of Communication: easy, open, and direct communications/channels 
among ARF participants would help to avoid misperceptions and support information-
sharing as well as early warning while also facilitating dialogue. 
• ARF Chairman: that role would be determined by the ARF members [ASEAN 2003:289-
290]. 
 
Eight key principles of ARF’s preventive diplomacy were finally distilled: 
 
• it relies on peaceful methods such as diplomacy, negotiation, enquiry, mediation and con-
ciliation; 
• it is non-coercive, making no use of military action; 
• it shall be pre-emptive instead of curative to show its maximum effectiveness; 
• it is to be based on neutrality, justice, and impartiality not to damage the existing trust and 
confidence among the participants; 
• it depends on the procedures of consultation and consensus; 
• it shall only be employed if all parties directly involved request it; 
• it applies to conflicts between and among states; and 
• it is practiced in accordance with basic principles of international law (explicitly mentioned: 
UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence496
                                                 
496 The Five Principles of Peace and Co-existence was presented by China at the Bandung Conference of non-
aligned nations in 1955. The concept called for respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; 
 and the TAC) - including respect 
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for sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and non-interference in domestic affairs [ASEAN 
2003:291-292]. 
 
Numerous expert meetings / seminars had taken place during the previous year thus substantiat-
ing closer cooperation and familiarity between senior professional staff of the participating member 
states497
For the first time ever the previously discussed Annual Security Outlook was compiled. However, 
only 13 of the 23 ARF participants had prepared such papers - Thailand and Singapore being the 
only ASEAN states among them
. 
498
It is the only security forum, but it is very much only a talk shop. … What they have 
achieved so far is a whole lot of stage one ... Where they are stuck at the moment is mov-
ing into phase two, preventive diplomacy. It is going to be some years before the ARF 
gets round to stage three.
. WAIN observed: 
Just two of Asean's 10 members contributed to "Annual Security Outlook 2000," hardly 
setting an example in an institution Asean purports to lead. While some of the newer 
Asean countries, such as Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, might be hampered by a lack of 
resources, the others have no such excuse. Their reluctance to take part suggests a lack 
of enthusiasm for regionalism as well as a hesitation to embrace openness. [WAIN 
17.11.2000] 
Upon the progress made so far and in face of ARF’s envisioned evolution, Professor Desmond BALL 
of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in Canberra, commented on the occasion of the 7th 
ARF: 
499
3.10.9 8th ARF Meeting – Taking on preventive Diplomacy 
 [qtd. in: EATON 24.07.2000] 
Around the 8th ARF Meeting the issue of the US planned National Missile Defence (NMD) project, 
foreseeing a shield that would repel enemy missile attacks, figured high on the international 
agenda. Particularly China, Russia, and North Korea opposed the project and were expected to 
raise the contentious question during an ISG Meeting in April 2001 [KH 16.02.2001]. 
At the same time the meeting reportedly offered an opportunity for both Koreas to hold close con-
sultations [KT 25.04.2001]. However, doubts later were emerged about the attendance of the 
North Korean Foreign Minister at the upcoming regular ARF Meeting scheduled for July 2001 
[REUTERS 19.07.2001]. The official explanation that the foreign minister would be ‘too busy’ to 
attend was dismissed by diplomats. And although North Korea announced it would send a senior 
official as a replacement, South Korea expressed its ‘deep disappointment’ over the issue [KIRBY 
19.07.2001]. 
As the meeting advanced it was made clear that ASEAN would not favour one position or another 
on the missile defence shield topic, most hotly debated between the US and China500
                                                                                                                                                        
non-intervention in internal affairs; equal and mutual opportunity; as well as for peaceful co-existence [LAW 
YUK FUN 2009]. 
497 The meetings included: a Meeting of Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions in Ulan Bator in 
September 1999; an ARF Professional Training Programme on China's Security Policy in Beijing in October 
1999; an ARF Seminar on the Law of Armed Conflict in Newcastle in December 1999; an ARF Defence Language 
School Seminar in Melbourne in March 2000; an ARF Expert Group Meeting on Transnational Crime in April 
2000; an ARF Professional Development Programme in Bandar Seri Begawan in April 2000; and a Seminar on 
Common Approaches to Training in Disaster Relief was held in Bangkok in January 2000 [ASEAN AR 2000]. 
498 The Annual Security Outlook 2000 is available at: http://www.aseansec.org/12660.htm retrieved on 
30.08.2006. 
499 A similar assessment is found in WAIN 17.11.2000. 
500 Relations between those two countries have had already been strained due to an incidence on 1st April 2001 
in which a US surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter jet, killing the pilot. The three US crew mem-
bers, however, survived the accident but had to make an unauthorized emergency landing on the southern 
island of Hainan [FEER 12.07.2001]. 
 at that time. 
A paragraph that expressed their hope that the relations between the US and China remain stable 
was inserted but no stronger language could be agreed upon. However, an official, commenting on 
the developments, explained that instead of taking sides, ASEAN entertained another self-
conception: 
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That is the role of ASEAN in the ARF501
• Paper on Concepts and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy; 
 -- provide another opportunity as a forum for the 
major powers to engage each other on the subject. [qtd. in: AFP 20.07.2001] 
During the ARF Meeting itself another hot topic, the issue of Myanmar, was fervently debated, leav-
ing the EU to criticize the ARF statement which acknowledged the current progress demonstrated 
by the release of political prisoners and some dialogue between the junta and the political opposi-
tion [KIRBY 25.07.2001]. 
Among other issues discussed during the one-day event were East Timor as well as the Indonesian 
changeover (due to the domestic situation the Indonesian foreign minister was unable to attend 
the meeting [KAZMIN 23.07.2001]), the South Pacific Islands, the Korean Peninsula, and the Paki-
stani-Indian summit [BBC MS 27.07.2001]. 
Although no tangible results could be reaped from the meeting directly, ASEAN’s Secretary General 
Rodolfo Severino pointed out that this years’ meeting: 
was much more relaxed and calm than any of the previous ARF meetings, which means 
the issues that used to be contentious have achieved some kind of progress in terms of 
mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. [qtd. in: BBC MS 28.07.2006] 
Numerous Track I events took place during the previous inter-sessional year, mostly in the form of 
thematic seminars ranging from ‘law of armed conflict’ to ‘economic security for Asia-Pacific’ [ARF 
25.07.2001]. 
As regards Track II the past year saw meetings of the CSCAP Maritime Co-operation Working 
Group that produced the draft Memorandum on a Common Understanding of the Law of the Sea in 
the Asia-Pacific; the 8th Meeting of CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime, and the 9th 
Meeting of CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive and Co-operative Security [ARF 25.07.2001]. 
 
As a further step bringing the Forum from confidence building to preventive diplomacy the follow-
ing three documents were adopted: 
 
• Terms of Reference for the ARF Experts/ Eminent Persons Register; 
• Paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair at the annual session [BBC MS 25.07.2001]. 
 
The Paper on Concepts and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy did not go beyond the results al-
ready presented at the 7th ARF, but merely repeated them. However, at the 8th ARF meeting they 
were formally adopted [ARF CPPD]. 
The Terms of Reference for the ARF Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs) Register contained technical 
details for that body. Inter alia its remit was defined as to provide ‚non-binding’ and professional 
views and recommendations on ‚issues of relevance’, or to conduct in-depth studies if so re-
quested. Any ARF participant or the Chair might propose the activation of the EEPs and if no objec-
tions are raised, it is to be considered effective. The participant engaging the services of the EEPs 
is also to carry the costs thereof. However, the paper does not dwell on procedures that are to be 
employed in cases of lacking consensus [ARF EEPs]. 
Finally, the paper on the „Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair (Shared perspectives among the ARF 
members)” detailed the roles of the ARF Chair as follows: 
 
a) Promoting confidence building among ARF members by facilitating information exchange 
and dialogue between and among ARF members, such as by holding conferences and work-
shops.  
b) Fostering cooperation between ARF members by facilitating discussion on potential areas of 
cooperation.  
c) Facilitating discussion on norms building in the ARF to enhance mutual trust and under-
standing.  
d) Encouraging exchange of information and highlighting issues that can impact on regional 
security for consideration by the ARF by serving as a conduit for information sharing in be-
tween ARF meetings.  
e) Serving as a focal point for consultations among ARF members on the basis of consensus of 
all the ARF members. Upon prior consent of directly involved states and the consensus of 
all ARF members, the ARF Chair may convene an ad hoc meeting of all ARF members at an 
appropriate level.  
                                                 
501 For a glimpse on the assessment of the ARF by some of its participants see: AFP 25.07.2001b. 
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f) Liaising with external parties, such as heads of international organisations, and Track II or-
ganisations on an informal basis and with prior consultation with all ARF members and their 
consent [ARF ERAC]. 
 
YUZAWA notes on the presentation of those three papers: 
…the adoption of the PD [Preventive Diplomacy, my remark] papers was a result neither 
of the emergence of a common understanding nor of a compromise between activist and 
reluctant countries. The ASEAN secretariat reportedly stated that the ARF needed to adopt 
the PD papers to deflect criticism that no concrete progress had been made. [YUZAWA 
2006:800] 
The Financial Times – being well aware of the Forum’s drawbacks - nevertheless took the ARF 
meeting as an occasion to call it ‘Asia's nascent security structure’ [FT 23.07.2001]. 
3.10.10 9th ARF Meeting – Confronting international Terrorism 
When the 9th ARF Meeting approached, the participation of North Korea again looked doubtful. In-
donesia’s President Megawati Sukarnoputri on a state visit explicitly invited the country to take 
part; however, she was not able to obtain any sort of immediate confirmation of the ever more 
reclusive state [BBC MS 10.04.2002]. Only in early July was Indonesia able to report that North 
Korea in fact is going to take part in the meeting [AP 11.07.2002]. 
As it turned out the occasion then was made use of by the US’ and North Korea’s Foreign Ministers 
for a brief informal chat, being the highest-level contact between the two nations that were at log-
gerheads over i.a. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions for more than two years [CA 31.07.2002]. The 
Far Eastern Economic Review commented on the encounter: “[a]nd with that triumph, providing 
the appropriate venue at the right time for a ‘spontaneous’ encounter, Asean let it be known that it 
was back” [WAIN 15.08.2002]. Also Tobias NISCHALKE found that the occasion “proved that it [the 
ARF, my remark] could serve as a useful forum for facilitation” [NISCHALKE 31.07.2002]. 
Separately, the ARF statement made mention of the recent clash between South Korea and North 
Korea in the yellow sea. The participants emphasized the importance of avoiding such incidents in 
future and underlined the significance of confidence building measures [BB 05.09.2002]. 
Other topics discussed ranged from welcoming the formation of Afghanistan’s transitional govern-
ment, hailing the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement502 and the various achievements in 
the realm of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction [ARF 31.07.2002]. Another 
development, namely the US announcement in mid-2002 that it planned to pull out of the Anti-
Ballistic-Missile Treaty503
                                                 
502 The Agreement was signed by the Papua New Guinea government and the representatives of the people of 
Bougainville in August 2001 [for the text see: 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/documents/bougainville/PDF/BougainvillePeaceAgreement29Aug01.pdf as 
retrieved on 24.09.2009. 
503 The ABM Treaty was signed in 1972 and limited the anti-missile defences of both nations to two sites each. 
In 1974 those where reduced to one site each [KRIEGER 2001] 
 it had concluded with the then Soviet Union, was not discussed at the 
meeting. This, although ASEAN had had expressed its fear that this move might have the potential 
to trigger an arms race [GOMEZ 01.07.2002; ARF 31.07.2002]. 
Most prominent on the agenda of the 9th Meeting figured terrorism owing to the 9/11 attacks in the 
US that had occurred since the last ARF meeting. At the SOM preparing the ARF Meeting it was 
announced that measures to combat international terrorism where to be consolidated and 
strengthened; including, amongst others, the sharing of intelligence, of expertise and training, 
police cooperation and financial measures. Furthermore, it was stated that an ‘Inter-Sessional 
Group on International Terrorism and Transnational Crimes’ were to be created [KN 16.05.2002a]. 
Patrick MCDOWELL reported for the Associated Press on the accompanying momentum: 
The terror threat has fuelled a drive by some ASEAN members to transform the forum - 
seen largely as a toothless talk shop since its inception in 1994 - into an effective security 
grouping. [MCDOWELL 27.07.2002] 
The ARF also adopted a range of measures that mainly targeted the financial transactions of terror-
ists in the region. Among them was the setting up of a Financial Intelligence Unit and a Financial 
Actions Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). Additionally, cooperation with multilateral finan-
cial organizations – IMF, WB etc. – was vowed [APN 05.08.2002]. Handling the terrorist threat was 
considered to have preventive quality [ARF 31.07.2002]. 
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As regards Track I developments in whose framework several expert meetings had taken place 
during the year, the members agreed that the ARF is to intensify the implementation of the four 
measures that overlap confidence building measures (stage one) and preventive diplomacy (stage 
two) as elaborated in the past: enhanced ARF Chair role, ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons, 
Annual Security Outlook and voluntary background briefing on security issues [GARIP 05.09.2002]. 
The ASEAN Secretariat was assigned to support the ARF Chair in coordinating the work of the ARF 
[ARF 31.07.2002]. 
The ARF members also approved the idea to integrate high ranking defence officials in the Forum in 
order to strengthen the ARF process [GARIP 05.09.2002]. 
Furthermore the progressing enhancement of linkages between Track I and Track II with special 
emphasis on ASEAN-ISIS was welcomed; Track II inputs were to be more thoroughly discussed by 
Track I in future [ARF 31.07.2002]. 
As regards the enlargement of the forum no consensus could be reached at. The possible inclusion 
of Pakistan and East Timor was postponed to be dealt with by the next ARF chair [BBC MS 
31.07.2002]. Instead, Pakistan was called on to curb cross-border terrorism, an allusion to an In-
dia-inspired proposal relating to the hotly contested Kashmir area [BBC MS 01.08.2002]. Regarding 
East Timor the country’s newly acquired independence was welcomed [BB 05.09.2002]. 
3.10.11 10th ARF Meeting - Progress and Leadership Revisited 
The inter-sessional year 2002-2003 saw a conference of ARF security experts taking place in Aus-
tralia in mid-2003. However, as was to be expected for such a first get-together the aims were 
quite limited. Australia’s Foreign Minister Alexander Downer explained that the meeting ‘…will lay 
the basis for a common understanding of the complex issues involved in managing the aftermath of 
a major terrorist attack in the region’ [qtd. in: AP 03.06.2003a], alluding to the Bali bombing that 
had killed many Australian tourists in October 2002. 
A multiplicity of other activities took place during the year covering defence cooperation, maritime 
security and, counter-terrorism measures [ARF 18.06.2003]. The meeting on counter-terrorism 
was classified to have proved 'ASEAN's willingness to seek aid outside its membership' [CHOW 
2005:318]. 
On the question of enlargement the 36th AMM and subsequently the 10th ARF lifted the moratorium 
on further enlargement of the ARF. ASEAN issued a statement that they had ‘agreed to accept 
Pakistan as a new participant in the ARF’. The vote at the ARF itself, though, was effectively 
blocked by India by its raising a ‘procedural matter’. It was agreed that other applications were 
henceforth to be reviewed on a ‘case-by-case’ basis [ASEAN 17.06.2003; MILLS 19.06.2003; ARF 
18.06.2003]. Besides Pakistan also East Timor and Bangladesh had submitted their application to 
join the ARF [ARF 18.06.2003]. 
Most prominent among the discussed topics at the 10th ARF was the issue of North Korea’s with-
drawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea – sensing that the subject will be 
discussed at the ARF – had refused to send its Foreign Minister. North Korea accused the ARF of 
having succumbed to US pressure after the Forum had called on it to reverse the withdrawal 
[VAPRD 19.06.2003] and subsequently decided to send only a low-level representative [NIS-
CHALKE 18.06.2003]. Intensive deliberation was also accorded to the overshadowing global subject 
of terrorism and transnational crime. Thus participants welcomed the establishment of the newly 
opened Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur. An ARF 
Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security was approved, envisioning 
further general cooperative activities for that issue area.504
                                                 
504 See http://www.aseansec.org/14835.htm, retrieved on 19.03.2007. 
 
With regard to the Burmese domestic situation the Forum did not go farther than the previous AMM 
with urging the regime to resume its national reconciliation efforts [ARF 18.06.2003]. 
The gathering underlined their support for Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in light 
of the violence occurring in Aceh province. Moreover the participants pledged to deny “the separa-
tist movement access to means of violence” and expressed hope that a peaceful solution ‘based on 
special autonomy’ can be found [ARF 18.06.2003]. 
The peace talks undertaken by the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) were welcomed and both parties were encouraged to reach an enduring peace that safe-
guards “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and is satisfactory to all its communities” 
[ARF 18.06.2003]. 
 
Regarding Track I activities again various events had taken place during the year; those covered 
issues like counter-terrorism, maritime security, and cooperation of defence officials. Once again 
the interaction of Track I and II was encouraged [ARF 18.06.2003]. 
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As regards the ARF’s evolution (3-stages) the participants clarified their modest self-assessment, 
referring to preventive diplomacy when expressing: 
The Ministers considered that the ARF’s work on preventive diplomacy was being ad-
vanced through, among other measures, the actions that it had taken to address the 
situation on the Korean peninsula and to enhance confidence and cooperation in address-
ing common security threats, including international terrorism, transnational crime, piracy 
and other maritime crimes, and the support given to the ARF Chairman in carrying out the 
enhanced role of the Chair. [ARF 18.06.2003] 
On procedural subjects the disappointing incremental development of the Forum was captured in 
underscoring that “the ARF must keep pace with the times by adapting itself to the evolving situa-
tion, develop a greater sense of common security and build a more effective regional security 
framework” [ARF 18.06.2003] – being a bold concession in its own right – especially in light of the 
self-assuredness the ARF in general, but ASEAN in particular, have had displayed until then. Most 
notably, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Jayakumar, had urged that the group henceforth ought to 
act more quickly to new security challenges. However, when calling on the Forum to address issues 
of global significance instead of country specific issues [CNA 18.06.2003] he confirmed the wide-
spread impression that the ARF was unable to deliver concrete problem-solving in cases of con-
flicts. Still, this approach reflected the ASEAN’s understanding of its function as assuring the crea-
tion of a general atmosphere of confidence which in turn would be designed to enable the handling 
of individual conflicts. 
Remarkably, this meeting’s statement – reflecting ASEAN’s increasing and ongoing power erosion 
in the ARF framework - did also not include the usual phrase of ASEAN being the primary driving 
force – instead stating that  
In advancing the development of the ARF process, the Ministers acknowledged ASEAN’s 
continued leading role in the ARF and the need proceed at a pace comfortable to all. [ARF 
18.06.2003] 
This formulation seemed to qualify ASEAN’s sole leadership claim, as did the paragraph which ex-
plicated the participants’ readiness to 
... support the ARF Chair to have Friends of the chair to assist the Chair in dealing with in-
ternational situations, which affect the peace and security of the region. [ARF 18.06.2003] 
3.10.12 11th ARF Meeting – Careful Institutionalization, Confirming its 
Dialogue-Enabling Function 
In the run-up to the 11th ARF the membership of Pakistan was again tabled by ASEAN – announc-
ing that the bid will be formally proposed at the up-coming ARF; in the end the country could be 
welcomed as a new ARF member. This development was classified to have been an ASEAN success 
by SMITH [SMITH 2004:422]. Marty Natalegawa, an official of Indonesia which played host to the 
ARF meeting, explained the underlying aspirations, much in line with the traditional ASEAN ap-
proach to disputes: 
The fact Pakistan is here together with India provides another venue for them to have 
conversations. [qtd. in: DONNAN & WARD 03.07.2004] 
The other membership candidate, East Timor, meanwhile was to attend as a special guest [XINHUA 
11.06.2004; ODJCW 02.07.2004]. 
The 11th ARF endorsed the ASEAN Security Community concept designed to provide an over-haul of 
the regional organization which was originally proposed by Indonesia. It was approved by ASEAN, 
albeit strongly watered down version. And amongst others, the attending Ministers also signed the 
'Statement on Strengthening Transport Security against International Terrorism', vowing i.a. to 
cooperate on maritime security [JCIE IoM 2004]. 
Although ASEAN at that time had once again decided to tone down its criticism vis-à-vis Myanmar, 
some Western participants insisted to discuss the issue [compare for example MILLS & CHANDA 
02.07.2004]. The relevant paragraph of the meeting’s statement is carefully worded:  
The Ministers urged Myanmar to take every action that will add substance to the expres-
sion of its democratic aspirations. [ASEAN 2005:105] 
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Mention was also made of the Pacific Islands' Forum Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI)505
The participants’ approach to the Forum in general showed some signs of reluctance, showcased by 
the obvious unwillingness to create an ARF secretariat. This situation was utilized by ASEAN to 
underpin their dominant position on the front of administrative support via establishing of an “ARF 
Unit” within the ASEAN Secretariat, which was to act as ARF register of CBMs and serve as a re-
pository of ARF documents [ARF 02.07.2004]. As one of its first tasks it had prepared a ‘Matrix of 
ARF Decisions and Status’, which the 11th ARF meeting decided to be updated on an annual basis in 
order to contribute to an ‘ARF institutional memory’ [ARF 02.07.2004]. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister 
Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar also offered some clarification of future institutional plans by holding 
; terming it a 'Pacific solution to a Pacific problem' [ASEAN 2005:107], resound-
ing the principle of regional resilience as upheld by ASEAN. 
Having among its participants also countries with major Muslim populations, Iraq was among the 
subjects discussed. The re-assertion of the nation’s sovereignty was welcomed and the UN’s ‘cen-
tral role’ in the transitional period was underlining [ARF 02.07.2004]. 
In a separate item the participants welcomed the condemnation of terror by a meeting of the In-
ternational Conference of Islamic Scholars held in February 2004.  
China's proposition to set up a forum for defence officials of participating nations to discuss security 
policy won approval [AS 06.07.2004]. It was agreed to hold the first meeting of this forum in No-
vember 2004 – irrespective of the fact that the venture was widely perceived to be an attempt by 
China to increase its influence [VATIKIOTIS 05.08.2004]. 
While the ARF meeting was once again used as opportunity for the Foreign Ministers of the US and 
North Korea to have a face-to-face encounter, the Forum also welcomed the new round of six-party 
talks on North Korea’s nuclear programme [MILLS & CHANDA 02.07.2004]. However, having al-
ways been outspoken on their interest in a denuclearized North Korea and thus implicitly taking 
sides, they underlined this bias by urging relevant steps ‘as soon as possible’, only relativized by 
the following phrase stressing reciprocity: 
The Ministers emphasized the importance of a step-by-step process of “words for words” 
and “action for action” in search of a peaceful solution to the nuclear issues. [ARF 
02.07.2004] 
Various Track I activities were carried out i.a. a meeting of Heads of Defence Institutions, a Work-
shop on “Civil-Military Relations and the Rule of Law” as well as a workshop on preventive diplo-
macy [ARF 02.07.2004]. 
On a technical level the meeting adopted the Guidelines for the Operation of the ARF Ex-
perts/Eminent Persons; it was also agreed that the EEPs would be tasked with conducting a study 
on measures to carry out preventive diplomacy [ASEAN AR 2005:14]. 
As regards the ARF’s self-definition and that of its role the attending ministers delivered the follow-
ing important clarification: 
The Ministers discussed extensively issues of common concern and reiterated the impor-
tance of maintaining peace and stability in the region. The Ministers also stressed the im-
portance of ARF focusing its deliberations on regional issues, particularly in the Asia-Pacific 
region, as well as global/international issues with regional repercussion, and excluding is-
sues of a bilateral nature. [ARF 02.07.2004, emphasis added] 
This clause for once expressed the limits the ARF, especially in light of the inclusion of Pakistan – 
arch-enemy of India - into the Forum. Although the Forum from its inception was never considered 
as a classical security body as the West would conceive it, it was frequently criticized for not acting 
like one. However, with such clarification the ARF underlined what it saw as its real purpose: not 
meddling in bilateral conflicts, but instead addressing security issues of common concern. This 
process is deemed to broaden the understanding and familiarity among the participants and thus to 
enable constructive problem and conflict resolution. 
The Chairman’s statement brought another, more sublime revelation. Although the classification of 
ASEAN being the ‘primary driving force’ of the ARF was re-introduced in the 11th meeting’s state-
ment after being left out at in the previous such documents, a significant formulation was added: 
“the contribution of all ARF participants in moving the ARF process forward” was encouraged [ARF 
02.07.2004], echoing the 7th ARF’s statement that it was “incumbent upon each ARF participant to 
contribute to advancing the ARF process” [ASEAN 2003:252]. 
                                                 
505 RAMSI was deployed in July 2003 with the assignment to help the Solomon Government to restore law and 
order. Fifteen countries contributed to the mission with ASEAN taking the lead role [see RAMSI homepage at: 
www.ramsi.org]. 
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that the ARF Unit was established “with the possibility that it may be upgraded to become a sepa-
rate secretariat” [qtd. in: LOH 04.07.2004]. 
3.10.13 12th ARF Meeting – Empowering the Forum amid a Lull of 
great Power Attention 
Well ahead of the following ARF Meeting, scheduled for June 2005, it was reported that East Timor 
would finally become a member [KN 06.10.2004]. At the ARF Meeting East Timor in fact was wel-
comed as its 25th participant. 
Generally, the meeting received somewhat of a damp when the US and Japanese foreign ministers 
announced they will not attend it. It was rumoured but not confirmed that this step was taken as 
expressing opposition to Myanmar’s scheduled taking-over of the ASEAN chairmanship the forth-
coming year [CHANDA 25.07.2005]. Later also India’s Foreign Minister decided not to attend [AP 
27.07.2005]. Dana DILLON of the Heritage Foundation, a Washington think-tank, commented on 
the importance of the Forum the following: 
Convenience is a good reason to attend ARF when other venues are not available, but that 
is hardly an endorsement of ARF itself. ... The fact that all other major powers dropped 
out when Rice [US Secretary of State, my remark] did demonstrates [sic] that they saw 
ARF the same way. [qtd. in: CROPLEY 02.08.2005] 
However, on another front the ARF received a boost emanating from ASEAN developments when 
ASEAN’s Security Community Plan of Action was published; even though the document only reiter-
ated earlier agreed on measures:  
 
• establishing an ARF Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat; 
• enhancing the role of the ARF Chair; 
• strengthening ASEAN's role in addressing the issues of CBMs and preventive diplomacy: 
enhanced role of the ARF Chair, the Annual Security Outlook, the Register of Experts / 
Eminent Persons, Voluntary Briefing on Regional Issues; and 
• moving the ARF to the stage of preventive diplomacy and beyond [ASEAN 2005:54]. 
 
Shortly before the 2005 ARF took place, ARF spokesman M. C. Abad Jr. announced that this year’s 
gathering is expected to 'advance the agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum from confidence build-
ing to preventive diplomacy' thus transforming the Forum into a 'proactive' body [AP 27.07.2005]. 
No adequate elaboration on the strengthening of the ARF was given – said to have to be worked 
out later. However, it was indicated that the Chairman is set to be empowered in order to be able 
to convene committees with the aim of heading off simmering conflicts [KURTENBACH 
29.07.2005]. Abad, with an implicit concession regarding ARF’s limited role so far, explained fur-
ther about the approach taken: 
In that concept we envision the ARF chair to play a role in times of emergency that it 
should be able to convene ad hoc meetings and do something. So ARF will be more than a 
conference diplomacy organization that meets once a year. [qtd. in: AP 27.07.2005] 
Consequently, as further evidence of the evolutionary progress, the 12th ARF followed the recom-
mendation to rename the erstwhile Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures into the 
ISG on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy [ASEAN AR 2005:14]. 
As regards other Track I events their number was almost doubled compared with the previous 
year.  All in all 17 meetings were organized; they ranged from a Seminar on Alternative Develop-
ment to a Seminar on Cyber Terrorism506
                                                 
506 Find a complete list at: 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFActivities/ListofARFTrackIActivities/tabid/93/Default.aspx 
. Among the most noteworthy events was the first ARF 
Security Policy Conference (ASPC), going back to a Chinese proposal of November 2004; it defined 
as the areas of cooperation i.a.: intelligence and information sharing, capacity building, training, 
consequence management as well 'the sharing of experiences on the legal aspects of the role of 
the armed forces in dealing with non-traditional security threats’. The second ASPC followed in May 
2005 and focused on the appropriate response to the terrorist threat [ASEAN AR 2005:15]. In view 
of those meetings the ministers underlined that 
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[T]he high-level interaction among the ARF defence policy officials contributed further to 
building confidence and fostering mutual understanding, thus contributing to the mainte-
nance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. [ARF 29.07.2005] 
Prominent among the discussed topics at this year’s meeting was the tsunami that had taken place 
on 26th December 2004 and its consequences as well as the honouring of international diplomatic 
efforts that were convened upon the disaster. 
As usual also the North Korean nuclear issue was discussed and the restart of the six-party talks 
(the two Koreas, the US, Russia, Japan and China) was welcomed; also the inter-Korean dialogue 
resumption was hailed. 
With regard to Myanmar 'concern of the pace of the democratization process' was expressed; and 
the lifting of imposed restrictions was urged, as well as the re-admittance of the UNSG Special 
Representative to the country. 
The implementation of the  Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which 
ASEAN and China had concluded earlier, was welcomed as was the Senior Officials Meeting of both 
parties that had taken place in December 2004. 
Along the welcoming of the elections in Iraq of January 2005, another extra-regional issue, the 
resumption of the Palestinian-Israeli talks was welcomed. Revealing the ARF’s opinion on the con-
flict, the statement added: 
The Ministers look forward to a final, just and comprehensive settlement with the realiza-
tion of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace within secured and 
recognized borders, based on the Roadmap and relevant United Nations Security Resolu-
tions. [ARF 29.07.2005] 
Concern was also expressed with regard to the globally increasing trend of trafficking in persons as 
well as the spread of the avian influenza. ASEAN’s anti-terrorism efforts, for example the conclu-
sion of a number of relevant declarations with various countries (i.a. New Zealand, Pakistan) were 
hailed [ARF 28.07.2005]. The meeting moreover issued the 'ARF Statement on Information Sharing 
and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Com-
bat Terrorism and other Transnational Crimes'. In this paper the participants pledged to intensify 
cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, to combat document fraud, and to strengthen 
law enforcement collaboration [ASEAN 2006:63-64]. 
The 12th ARF meeting additionally highlighted the necessity of a reform of the UN in order to 
broaden its representativeness, effectiveness, and transparency. In view of the forthcoming filling 
of the post of UN Secretary General ASEAN made an attempt at utilizing the ARF as a platform for 
the Association’s diplomatic ambitions. The chairman’s statement notes: 
In this regard, the Ministers were informed of ASEAN’s strong support for the ASEAN can-
didate from Thailand, Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, for this important post. [ARF 29.07.2005] 
As regards the ARF process the participants decided to draft the standard operating procedures for 
the ARF Chair, as envisioned by the paper 'Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair' [see chapter on 8th 
ARF]; agreement was also reached to establish the 'Friends of the Chair', conceived as an ad hoc 
entity for providing the Chair with advice. The participants furthermore 'commended' the estab-
lishment of an ARF Unit (as envisioned by the ASC Plan of Action) for developing ARF's institutional 
memory. And for the purpose of implementing projects, activities, and decisions the Terms of Ref-
erence for the ARF Fund were adopted [see ASEAN 2006:65-66]. 
Lastly, the ARF Chairman's Statement welcomed ASEAN's unanimity to admit Bangladesh as the 
26th participant which would be officiated at the 13th ARF [ASEAN 2006:58-62]. 
3.10.14 13th ARF Meeting – Unanimity Principle Softened, Tackling 
North Korea 
In the run-up to the 13th ARF Meeting it was announced that Bangladesh is to be officially admitted 
to the Forum at the gathering [XINHUA 02.07.2006], which so happened eventually [ARF 
28.07.2006]. Moreover, ASEAN announced that it had agreed to invite Sri Lanka to the Forum 
[DJIN 25.07.2006]. 
However, the danger that membership could be reduced dawned, when North Korea threatened to 
withdraw, if plans that the ARF statement would criticise the country's recent launch of ballistic 
missiles, would be realized [BBC MS 28.07.2006]. To appease North Korea, the draft was toned 
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down. Instead of 'all minister' now ‘most ministers' expressed concern and left out a phrase urging 
the parties to show restraint [CHANG 28.07.2006; ARF 28.07.2006]. However, the Chairman's 
statement called on North Korea to reinstate a moratorium on missile test-firing507
With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, heightened by Israel’s Lebanon war, this year’s 
meeting could obviously not reach consensus
 [ARF 
28.07.2006]. 
Victor MALLET from the FT opined that the ARF, ‘that dog that does not bark’, failed to ‘seriously 
rebuke North Korea for its recent missile launches or its nuclear weapons programmes’ [MALLET 
02.08.2006]. This judgement was rejected in a letter to the FT editor by former ASEANSG R.C. 
Severino who contended: 
All those that make up the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear problem are part 
of the ARF, including North Korea itself. Although Pyongyang refused to join any resump-
tion of the Six-Party Talks in Kuala Lumpur, the other five parties, plus five other ARF par-
ticipants, met to discuss the problem. This, plus the statement issued by the Asean for-
eign ministers calling for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, further isolated North Ko-
rea on the nuclear issue. [SEVERINO 09.08.2006] 
On Myanmar the ARF – in remarkably clear language - stated i.a.: 
The Ministers expressed concern on the pace of the national reconciliation process and 
hope to see tangible progress that would lead to peaceful transition to democracy in the 
near future. The Ministers reiterated their calls for the early release of those placed under 
detention and for effective dialogue with all parties concerned [ARF 28.07.2006] 
508
                                                 
507 On this diplomatic tit-for-tat MILLS commented the following: „[t]his sort of rhetoric from North Korea is 
standard, and has failed to stop ARF from raising the issue of missile testing. It is debatable whether North 
Korea will pull out of ARF, but if it does so, another line of engagement between the international community 
and the regime will be severed. What ARF has provided is a forum for the remaining five nations in the six-
party talks to meet and consider their next strategy” [MILLS 28.07.2006]. 
508 The US Secretary of State was heavily criticized for not applying pressure on Israel to agree to an immediate 
ceasefire in Lebanon [BURTON 29.07.2006]. 
, which is why only ‘some Ministers’ expressed 
grave concern over the deteriorating situation, noting 
particularly the disproportionate, indiscriminate and excessive use of force in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories and in Lebanon. These actions would gravely threaten any efforts 
towards reviving the Peace Process. [ARF 29.07.2006] 
On their anti-terrorism position some differentiation was made on occasion of the 13th meeting. 
While having condemned terrorist activities in general and the terrorist attack that had taken place 
in India on 11th July in particular, again only ‘some Ministers’ underlined that the root causes of 
terrorism needed to be addressed. However, unanimity was attainable on the statement to “pre-
vent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures” in the battle against terror 
[ARF 28.07.2006]. Evidencing the participants’ commitment to continued cooperation in countering 
terrorism they adopted the ARF Statement on Cooperation in Fighting Cyber Attack and Terrorist 
Misuse of Cyber Space as well as the ARF Statement on Promoting a People-Centered Approach to 
Counter-Terrorism [ARF 28.07.2006]. 
Among the multiplicity of Track I activities having taken place during the inter-sessional period was 
the Third ARF Security Policy Conference that was convened in March 2006 and which was classi-
fied to constitute a furtherance of mutual confidence [ARF 28.07.2006]. Another important get-
together was the first Meeting of ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEP), held between 28th and 
30th June 2006 [ARF 28.07.2006]. 
With regard to two regularly voiced commitments the submission of the concept paper ‘Enhancing 
Ties between Track I and Track II in the ARF, and between the ARF and Other Regional and Inter-
national Security Organisations’ by Thailand was welcomed. The Ministers “entrusted the relevant 
ARF bodies to proceed in accordance with the guidelines and format contained therein” [ARF 
28.07.2006]. 
However, the importance attached to the ARF as vital dialogue mechanism by a number of partici-
pants remained generally substantive. Thus, China's Foreign Minister judged it to be the most im-
portant channel for official and multilateral security dialogues and called for strengthening the ARF 
by way of deepening confidence building measures and incrementally making progress on preven-
tive diplomacy [BBC MS 29.07.2006].  
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In the aftermath of ARF’s 13th meeting, Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, 
Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, explained what the Forum was expected to achieve: 
The Asia-Pacific region is not free from conflicts either. There are on-going sensitive secu-
rity issues around us such as overlapping claims on the Spratlys, nuclear proliferation and 
transnational security issues. Through this forum, we can sit down together to understand 
the root causes of these security issues, create awareness and build up confidence which 
will allow us to narrow the gap of uncertainty. [qtd. in: BBC MS 05.09.2006] 
In contrast to this assessment the Jakarta Post published an article which found strong words on 
the ARF’s perceived shortcomings. The ARF was characterized as an ‘obese assembly bloated with 
pompous rigidity’. Achieving no tangible results, is was merely proving that ‘talk is cheap’, adding: 
As it presently stands, the forum is nothing more than a publicity tool to give host ASEAN 
member states a sense of (undue) self-importance on the world stage. [JP 31.07.2006] 
3.10.15 14th ARF Meeting – Establishing the Friends of the Chair 
The 14th ARF Meeting saw the welcoming of Sri Lanka as its 27th member [ARF 02.08.2007]. 
US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, skipped the meeting for visits in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
This decision triggered considerations if the US was losing its grip on the region, making room for 
an self-assertive China interested in increasing its influence in the area and beyond [VESTER-
GAARD 01.08.2007; BURTON & LANDINGIN 01.08.2007]. 
Among the regional security issues discussed at the meeting was once again North Korea. The 
shutdown of the North Korean Yongbyon nuclear facility was welcomed, as well as the country’s 
announcement to ‘earnestly’ implement its declaratory and denuclearizing commitments [ARF 
02.08.2007]. 
The stance vis-à-vis Myanmar remained largely the same like the one expressed one year earlier, 
urging the country to accelerate its democratic transition [ARF 02.08.2007]. 
On the situation in Thailand that had witnessed a military coup since the last meeting, the partici-
pants welcomed the briefing delivered by the Thai Foreign Minister and “expressed their encour-
agement for general election in Thailand which is expected to be held by December 2007” [ARF 
02.08.2007]. 
On the Middle East conflict the members registered their concern and their support for the conflict 
resolution efforts provided by the Quartet (US, Russia, UN, and EU) [ARF 02.08.2007]. 
The Forum voiced its ‘deep concern’ about the IAEA report on Iran that detailed that the country 
did not suspend its enrichment activities as demanded. The Ministers stressed 
the urgent need for a diplomatic solution which addresses the concerns of the interna-
tional community, while respecting Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy under 
safeguards and in accordance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [ARF 
02.08.2007] 
Also the situation in Afghanistan was discussed and the significance of the nation’s stability for the 
region was underlined [ARF 02.08.2007]. 
Another new subject addressed was energy security. On that item the participants stressed the 
need to develop renewable and alternative energy as well as energy-efficient technology. Further-
more they also called for the security of energy transit routes [ARF 02.08.2007]. 
Among the inter-sessional activities was i.a. a simulated sea exercise in Singapore, bringing to-
gether representatives of 21 countries. The exercise was simulating a ship that was hijacked by 
terrorists. The task was generally expected to acquaint the participants with the distinct national 
protocols; SIMON arrives at the assessment that this multilateral exercise “suggests that there 
may still be hope for innovation” [SIMON 2008:280]. 
The Forum’s ongoing quest of proving its continued significance characterized the Senior Officials 
Meeting taking place in February 2007. There a discussion paper circulated that aimed at increas-
ing the relevancy of the Forum, inter alia by using its meetings as platform to discuss serious secu-
rity issues more meaningfully, among them the denuclearization of North Korea. Notably the Terms 
of Reference for the Friends of the Chair were to be utilized for enabling the ARF Chairman to act 
on pressing security matters. The Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Erlinda Basilio explained: 
If there's a situation in country X, ARF will select a non-ASEAN ARF minister who is 
friendly with that government and who can open doors for the ARF current chair to be able 
to do something about bringing about a solution to the crisis. [qtd. in: AGNOTE 
23.05.2007] 
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The ARF Meeting in fact later adopted the Terms of Reference for the Friends of the Chair. That 
paper eventually outlined that the Friends of the Chair will be an ad-hoc group building a troika of 
the Foreign Ministers of the incoming ARF Chair, a non-ASEAN ARF member, and of the previous 
ARF Chair. The body would be assigned limited tasks, employing good offices509
3.10.16 15th ARF Meeting – Footing the Forum to Make it more re-
sponsive 
, facilitation, nego-
tiations, and discussions. The entity is to work in accordance with the TAC and “the core principles 
of consensus, respect for national sovereignty, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of one 
another” [qtd. in: AGNOTE 27.07.2007]. Before the ARF Chair decides to convene the Friends of 
the Chair it will inform all other ARF members thereof. In performing its duties the Friends of the 
Chair are going to make recommendations and submit reports to the ARF Chair upon which the 
latter will make further decisions [AGNOTE 27.07.2007]. Malcolm Cook, programme director for 
Asia-Pacific at the Lowy Institute, observed 
I suppose where the Friends of the Chair might help is to have regional responses to is-
sues like another tsunami or a major earthquake in the Philippines, where there's not 
those issues of sovereignty [sic]…  At the moment, in politically sensitive issues, you 
would probably say it's still a talking shop and ASEAN or ARF hasn't shown the ability to 
get members to change policies that they are not unilaterally willing to change. [qtd. in: 
GOPALAKRISHNAN 03.08.2007] 
Other Track I events in the year among others were one of the regular ARF Inter-Sessional Meet-
ings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, the Inaugural Meeting of ARF’s Peace Opera-
tions Network, or the ARF Security Policy Conference.  
In the run-up to the 15th ARF Meeting, scheduled for late July 2008, the announcement that North 
Korea intended to sign the TAC was regarded as an improvement in the country’s international 
standing [KAZMI 15.07.2008]. Besides signing the TAC North Korea’s Foreign Minister also came 
together with representatives of the other participants of the 6-party-talks, a diplomatic mecha-
nism endeavouring to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme [KAZMI 24.07.2008]. A bor-
der incident in which a South Korean tourist was killed at North Korea’s Mount Geumgang was also 
a matter for discussion at the meeting. Some upheaval was caused when a phrase in the Chair-
man’s Statement calling for a swift resolution of the issue, was later reportedly scrapped [KBS 
25.07.2008; RAHIL 25.07.2008]. The South Korean daily Dong-A Ilbo commented about the dip-
lomatic tit-for-tat taking place between the two protagonists behind the scenes: 
What is more worrying is the impact this incident will have on inter-Korean relations. It 
has certainly raised the wall between both sides. Unfortunately, finding a breakthrough in 
the tourist killing just got harder, not to mention resumption of inter-Korean talks. Both 
sides will get hurt if either tries to stand against the other on the international stage. 
[BHANG 28.07.2008] 
With regard to Myanmar, the ARF participants took to a more outspoken language, when they 
stated: 
The Ministers urged Myanmar to take bolder steps towards a peaceful transition to democ-
racy in the near future, and working towards the holding of free and fair General Elections 
in 2010. While recognising the steps undertaken by the Government of Myanmar to con-
duct meetings with all concerned parties, including the NLD leadership, the Ministers reit-
erated their calls for the release of all political detainees, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 
to pave the way for meaningful dialogue involving all parties concerned. [ARF 24.07.2008] 
Regarding a demarcation dispute between Thailand and Cambodia focusing on the Temple of Preah 
Vihear510
                                                 
509 This proposal might have been put forward in lieu of the former suggestion to accord the Chair such en-
hanced authority, since the latter was defeated by objections from several ASEAN countries and China [compare 
SIMON 2008:280]. 
, the representatives voiced their concern and urged the parties to ‘exercise utmost re-
510 The stand-off between the two countries, involving at least several hundred troops from each side, was 
sparked by the decision of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to designate the 
temple – which is easily accessible only from the Thai territory -  a Cambodian world heritage site. This raised 
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straint and resolve this issue amicably’ [KAZMI 24.07.2008; ARF 24.07.2008]. While Cambodia had 
called for ASEAN action on the issue, Thailand had refused such. Four days after the ARF meeting 
both countries reached an agreement, albeit an imperfect one which failed to handle the demarca-
tion question or set a deadline for the troop withdrawal [WND 31.07.2008]. 
During the year a string of Track I activities had taken place; among them the 2nd ARF Peacekeep-
ing Expert Meeting, an ARF Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy 
in Asia and Europe, or an ARF Maritime Security Training Programme. Moreover, the Work Plan on 
Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime, listing specific areas for relevant cooperation, received 
the ARF’s members’ support [ARF 24.07.2008]. 
In the ‘Statement Promoting Collaboration on the Prevention of Diversion of Precursors into Illicit 
Drug Manufacture’ the ARF members vow to promote pertaining collaboration and strengthen exist-
ing controls [HOTLAND & PURBA 24.07.2008]. 
Already ahead of the gathering it was expected that the Forum’s 15th anniversary will be used as 
an occasion to “transform it from a platform for dialogue to a body enabling concrete forms of co-
operation”. The following four issue areas were set to be made the main subjects of cooperation in 
future: disaster relief; counterterrorism and transnational crime; maritime safety; and non-
proliferation and disarmament [TANG 24.07.2008]. 
Acknowledging the need for reform, the Chairman’s statement, while as always underlining the 
importance of non-interference and consensus in decision-making, added: 
(...) the Ministers agreed that the ARF should undertake more concrete cooperation to ad-
dress both traditional and non-traditional security challenges confronting the region. [ARF 
24.07.2008] 
Also the next paragraph which traditionally emphasized only that challenges are becoming more 
complex and inter-related, saw another significant sentence added in this year’s version: 
Given the wide range of issues involved, such as counter terrorism, non-proliferation, dis-
aster relief, maritime security, avian and pandemic influenza, human and drugs traffick-
ing, the Ministers agreed on the need for the ARF to strengthen its efforts and carefully 
consider how to focus on those issues most relevant to its mandate, capabilities and 
membership. [ARF 24.07.2008] 
Procedurally the ARF participants agreed to introduce the ASEAN Vice-Chair as the ARF Vice-Chair. 
Additionally the Ministers adopted the ‘Singapore Declaration on the 15th ARF’. This declaration was 
inspired by the participants’ concern that the ARF in its present form might not be ideally designed 
to address complex security challenges facing the region. It reaffirmed ARF members’ commitment 
to ‘practical cooperation’ and to strengthen the Forum’s existing ‘organisational mechanisms’ (ARF 
Chair, Friends of the Chair, ARF Unit, ARF Fund) for that purpose. In a review paper of the ARF the 
Forum’s future direction was outlined and several of the made recommendations were subse-
quently adopted by the ARF Meeting; among them: 
 
• the need to strengthen the role of all ARF participants (obviously an allusion to the widely 
felt under-representation of extra-ASEAN countries); 
• enhance practical cooperation; 
• maintain the moratorium on membership511
• focus on concrete areas of cooperation; 
; 
• enhance the role of the ARF Chair and the ARF Unit; 
• develop an ARF Vision Statement; 
• standardise the format of the voluntary Annual Security Outlook; 
• enhance cooperation with Track II organisations; and 
• and improve the ARF's operating mechanisms [ARF 24.07.2008]. 
 
Kristina KAZMI, writing for Global Insight Daily Analysis judged after the 15th ARF meeting and 
annual string of conferences: 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thai concerns that the surrounding land could also be awarded to its neighbour [WND 31.07.2008; AP 
31.05.2003]. 
511 Among the pending applications at the time were the ones of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Afghanistan. 
The moratorium was to ensure that the Forum would not get more unwieldy. However, in order to maintain the 
ARF’s relevancy, the idea of establishing an observer status was mooted [AGNOTE 20.07.2008]. 
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ASEAN and the ARF have long been seen as little more than a talking shop. This summit, 
under the Singaporean presidency, marks a positive step towards a more substantive as-
sociation, tackling some of the serious issues in the region more vocally (...) [KAZMI 
24.07.2007] 
3.10.17 ARF Assessment 
 
If one follows NARINE who observes that, 
[m]ost of ASEAN’s energies go into dealing with security-related issues. [NARINE 
1998a:41] 
then the ASEAN Regional Forum has to be considered as one major focal point of this trend. 
From the very beginning did ASEAN signal its intentions that the ARF should employ its ‘ASEAN 
Way’. However, this was designed – sooner or later - to pose a reasonable impediment, since it 
was unlikely that all of the participating states would be willing to accept this style of doing busi-
ness. Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, the ASEAN Way implicitly invites states to be obstruc-
tionist if it is in their national interest [NARINE 1998b:209]. Comparably, COSSA, executive direc-
tor of the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum CSIS, termed the ARF style of procedure ‘consensus cen-
sorship’, since it enables any country to hinder sole discussion from taking place if deemed too 
sensitive in nature. COSSA hinted in that regard to China’s unwillingness to discuss the Taiwan 
issue at the forum [WAIN 28.07.2000]. This opinion is shared by Walden BELLO, a Filipino aca-
demic and author who heads the Focus on the Global South program at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn 
University who opined: 
I don't think regional security would suffer if the ARF disappeared tomorrow. … They don't 
like to talk about conflict amongst themselves, the border wars, the fishing wars, the in-
ternal problems. [qtd. in: EATON 24.07.2000] 
And NAIDU predicts that to further hold on to the ‘ASEAN Way’ will in the end prove inadequate to 
tackle a new regional security structure [NAIDU 2000:8]. 
LEWIS on the other hand argues that the creation of the ARF itself can be viewed as the formaliza-
tion of the ‘ASEAN Way’ in handling regional security matters [LEWIS 1999:140]. In its endeavour 
to create a ‘comfort level’ for trust and confidence to flourish, especially the experience of the ear-
lier years support this notion. However, the growing dissatisfaction and the recent call for ‘practical’ 
cooperation attest that the ASEAN Way was increasingly felt to be too complacent an approach.  
Nevertheless, ASEAN accomplished its aim anyway as GAROFANO has observed by underlining the 
more subtle effects of the ARF project: 
The ARF experiment is essentially one of identity-building. By concentrating on process, 
dialogue should lead to socialization which, in turn, will lead to the dissipation of conflicts 
of interests. [GAROFANO 1999:78] 
Still, the author is critical about the absence of enforcement in ARF’s security vision. And he con-
cludes that only the quite ‘nebulous’ nature of the agreements reached by the ARF so far, makes 
defection at this stage unlikely [GAROFANO 1999:85]. HELLER agrees when pointing out that the 
non-binding and consensual approach was the only fit engaging all regional actors, and helped to 
socialize them and increase the cost of defection and refusal [HELLER 2005:passim]. In this regard 
it remains to be seen what results the newly created mechanism of Friends of the Chair will be able 
to achieve. Since also this instrument is restricted by requiring consensus it might suffer the des-
tiny of mere paper tiger never to be applied. 
Still, other features seem not to receive adequate evaluation when assessing the ARF’s efficacy. 
Among them is the discretionary though implicit power of ARF chairs to “declare a consensus even 
when it is unclear one actually exists”, gaining weigh by the practice of the participating states to 
leave the ARF chair’s authority unchallenged [JOHNSTON 2005:1019]. 
 
Operationally, the ARF functions as two organizations; one being the annual ministerial meetings, 
providing opportunities for frank discussions covering a wide-range and producing a positive elite-
chemistry. The other being the in-depth activities of Senior Officials, meeting regularly once a year 
to support the ARF get-togethers  but also appearing in the shape of various topical meetings dur-
ing the year (e.g. the panoply of Inter-Sessional Meetings) [EVANS 2001:108-109; HELLER 
2005:125; SIMON 2008:279]. It has been argued that ARF’s numerous activities established vari-
ous networks. Those networks form “social capital”, ‘a stock of trust, familiarity, and ease and 
comfort, which could become crucial assets at critical moments’ [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 
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2002:536]. This impact is comparable to the achievements reached among ASEAN members by 
employing their characteristic style of diplomacy. 
Confidence building was the primary cornerstone of the ARF’s evolution. HELLER outlines that those 
efforts rested on two pillars. Pillar one are the regular meetings – deemed to reduce potential sus-
picion – together with the respect of the TAC (non-interference, renunciation of force, cooperative 
spirit) and ASEAN Way norms (goodwill, consensual negotiations style). Pillar two is made up of the 
concrete Confidence Building Measures; HELLER summarized the most important of them to be: 
 
• circulation of position papers regarding regional security and national security; 
• publication of national defence white papers; 
• participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms; 
• prior notification on military manoeuvres; 
• participation in mechanisms of arms control; 
• joint workshops to further educate and mutually introduce defence officials; 
• mutual visits of military facilities; 
• exchange of defence staff; and 
• annual meetings of the chairs of the respective National Defence Colleges [HELLER 2005]. 
 
LIM has argued that the linchpin of ARF’s inability to significantly influence security in the Asia-
Pacific lies in fact in ASEAN’s insistence on its primacy (‘primary driving force’ in ASEAN’s lan-
guage) in the forum. In this regards he views China as the major threat. The author identifies the 
ARF as a vehicle China uses to promote its multi-polarity concept, most significantly with regard to 
the US [LIM 1998:116]. 
The Janus face of ARF-China relations has been captured by Robert Karniol, Asia-Pacific editor of 
Jane's Defence Weekly: 
If this mechanism (the ARF, my remark) is to be at all effective it must engage China. The 
conundrum is that the only reason that China is participating is to stop the ARF from being 
effective. [qtd. in: KAZMIN 23.07.2001] 
However, Adam WARD of the International Institute for Security Studies argues more strongly: 
instead of ASEAN using the ARF to manage China, the reverse is true [ECONOMIST 10.07.2004].  
Controversially, tough, it was exactly ASEAN’s centrality within the ARF that ensured continued 
engagement of China. It is this causality which makes changes of the balance so difficult to obtain 
[YUZAWA 2006:800-801]. 
However, as the conflicting claims in the South China Sea amply demonstrate, the ASEAN states 
have had a hard time integrating China into multilateral negotiations, but finally succeeded. This 
was the only option to confront mighty China in a substantive way on the issue. How else could any 
single ASEAN claimant state have been expected to face the superpower of tomorrow, and reap 
meaningful results let alone concessions on the issue. 
However, times and again concrete failures to act were reason to dismiss the Forum. When the 
financial crisis of 1997/1998 had abated a new arms race was witnessed in the region. Confronted 
with such a development, the usefulness of the ARF was questioned. Asia-Pacific editor of Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, Robert KARNIOL, emphasized that the forum had been ‘virtually useless’, since it 
was not able to set up a regional arms-control mechanism, including a respective arms register - 
requiring participating states to report weapon holdings and domestic production [CRISPIN 
05.10.2000]. 
Attention has been also drawn to the fact that the ARF encountered considerable difficulties with 
moving ahead its own evolutionally constructed path, as outlined in the three stages: confidence 
building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution. The cumbersome and belated arrival at 
stage two – although announced, to date still unproven – is an outcome of ASEAN’s insistence to 
follow its favoured strategy of consensual diplomacy on the broader ARF stage [SIMON 2008:279]. 
Another point for criticism was the lacking institutionalization of the Forum and the widespread 
unwillingness of many participants to furnish it with any form of secretariat. This, it was argued, 
inhibited any real progress regarding the Forum's declared goal of preventive diplomacy [YUZAWA 
2006:801]. 
NAIDU, reviewing the developments surrounding the independence of East Timor laments this lost 
chance at also materially bolstering the ARF: 
Had the ARF been able to play some role relating to the peacekeeping operations in East 
Timor, this could have established a precedent and foundation for further such activities in 
the future. However, the opportunity was missed, to the disappointment of many ARF 
supporters. [NAIDU 2000:7] 
Although the record of the ARF with regard to concrete results is warranting scepticism, HELLER 
finds that the ARF nevertheless fulfils the criteria of a regime, as originally defined by Krasner: 
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• it consists of principles (TAC), norms (ASEAN Way) and procedural rules; 
• it brings about a higher predictability of members' future actions; 
• ARF's CBMs increase otherwise unavailable information, thus adding to transparency; 
• ARF works with modest transaction costs; and finally 
• the ARF is an important information channel for governments in the region [HELLER 
2005:135]. 
 
Michael VATIKIOTIS, a long-time observer of the region, draws attention to the general cleavage 
which exists between what the West would expect from the Forum, and what its creators actually 
aimed at: 
Predictably, the informal and unstructured of the ARF frustrated Western dialogue part-
ners… The ARF was conceived as a forum where sensitive security issues might be raised 
politely, over tea; not in the form of formal communiqués and submissions. The aim of the 
ARF is to diffuse potential conflict and allow Southeast Asia a say in its own security with-
out having to rely on one side or another. [VATIKIOTIS 1999:81] 
Reviewing the capacity of the ARF, KATANYUU claims the following: 
ASEAN merits its key role by being a peace and security broker. The ARF is the only global 
security arrangement that boasts the presence of some of the world's fiercest rivals, in-
cluding India and Pakistan, India and China, the U.S. and China, and Japan and China.  
And KATANYUU instructively continues: 
Although ARF does not directly address the conflicts among these powers, the forum pro-
vides an opportunity for them to come into contact with each other and to discuss their 
security concerns. [KATANYUU 2006:843] 
The ARF meetings to date in fact show that they have become a regular opportunity of interested 
states to review the security of the broader Asia Pacific region512
3.11 ASEAN Plus Three – China, Japan, South Korea
. Each year various additional 
meetings of two or more countries are taking place at the sidelines of the ARF meeting. Most of 
them do not receive the attention which is accorded to the US-North Korea talks, but irrespective 
thereof they definitely contribute to an increased understanding among the ARF participants. 
ASEAN’s plan to press its stamp of diplomacy on the ARF proved to have been too short-sighted. 
Applying it these days has even come under pressure within ASEAN proper. It carried a measure of 
naivety to think that so many countries from afar – used to their own style of procedure – would 
accept that condition in the long-run. The Forum’s development so far seems to be responsive to 
this clash of approaches, albeit in a very cautious and slow fashion. But as long as no alternatives 
emerge the ARF seems to have a future, notwithstanding its current flaws and deficiencies. 
513
In December 1997 the ASEAN heads of state and government started to meet regularly and infor-
mally with their three counterparts from China, Japan, and South Korea
 
514
                                                 
512 Also the usually critically assessing ECONOMIST conceded that the ARF „has become the principal platform 
for discussing security issues in the Asia-Pacific region” [ECONOMIST 31.03.2007]. 
513 At around the turn of the century India had requested to join the conference format; however this was 
turned down by ASEAN [SLATER & DHUME 01.03.2001]. Somewhat later also Australia was reported to have 
aired a request to hold a summit with ASEAN similar to the ASEAN-plus-Three conference; however also this 
request was not answered positively [BBC MN 05.11.2002]. This rejection might well have been inspired by 
Australia’s heavy-handed reaction on its own Muslims after the Bali bombing, in which many Australians had 
been killed. Australia’s reaction was criticized by some ASEAN countries [AFP 06.11.2002]. The most deter-
mined blow later was dealt to the proposal when Australia’s Premier announced that he would not hesitate to 
launch pre-emptive strikes on its neighbours in case they house terrorists [AFP 09.12.2002]. However, a Thai 
newspaper report held Thailand’s opposition – rooted in a diplomatic tit-for-tat action towards Australia - re-
sponsible for the turning down of the request [NT 06.11.2002]. 
514 The gathering was at that time nick-named ‘9-plus-3’ summit [JEN 02.12.1997]. 
 on the one hand, and 
separately with each of them individually on the other (ASEAN Plus One) [SINGH 09.12.1997; 
ASEAN AR 1999]. Those meetings coincided with the annual ASEAN informal summits [ALMONTE 
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1997/98:82]. As NABERS has explained in some detail, raison d’être of the 13-country forum had 
been the financial crisis, ravaging the region at that time515
Originally a conference concept
 [NABERS 2003]. 
516
In mid-1999 ASEAN envisioned that the following ASEAN plus Three meeting would be the occasion 
to sign the code of conduct for the South China Sea, drafted by the Philippines and Vietnam – using 
the framework also as a means to stabilize the volatile situation there [WT 23.07.1999]. Other 
 that included those three countries had been sponsored by Ma-
laysia as early as 1990. However, Prime Minister Mahathir had at first proposed an East Asian Eco-
nomic Grouping, excluding outside powers. That venture was rejected by the ASEAN Economic 
Ministers at a meeting in October the following year primarily since most of them favoured the US 
– which was opposed to the plan -  to continue to play a role in the region The idea was reshaped 
to an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) – nevertheless, Mahathir again failed to win approval from 
his ASEAN partners [NISCHALKE 2000:96], and was later to be satisfied with the dialogue format 
ASEAN plus Three and that the EAEC henceforth should be a caucus of Asia Pacific Economic Coop-
eration (APEC) forum, a solution the ECONOMIST termed a ‘meaningless face-saving compromise’ 
[ECONOMIST 23.07.1994]. However, Mahatir explained: 
When we proposed the East Asian Economic Caucus, there was open objection. Although 
other areas in the world can form their own unions, we are not allowed to talk to each 
other even. Now, of course, we have to call it Asean plus three (...) [qtd. in: FT 
05.10.2000] 
ASEAN’s motivation of taking such a step was seen in its increasingly obvious lack of leverage and 
as a ‘way of buttressing its relevancy’ [NT 01.01.2001]. 
China viewed the ASEAN Plus Three gathering favourably as a “movement toward multipolarization 
in the world after the end of the Cold War” that “reflects the rise in the international status of 
Asia”, as foreign ministry spokesman Tang Guoqiang noted. This trend was viewed favourably by 
China to run counter to the uni-polarization the US was perceived to pursue [qtd. in: JEN 
02.12.1997]. 
The first such meeting, originally set to focus on security issues, was dominated by the then finan-
cial turmoil in the region [JIN 02.12.1997]. However MACKENZIE observed that the meeting 
“ended with little concrete progress towards settling a financial crisis that sent several regional 
currencies plunging to new lows through the day” [MACKENZIE 16.12.1997]; nevertheless, the first 
coming-together of such a selection of Asian nations was viewed as historic event. As regards secu-
rity two quite different notes where struck. Whereas China pointed out that it will not seek hegem-
ony and that it “will forever be a good neighbor, a good partner and a good friend with ASEAN”, 
Japan underlined “[i]t is necessary to secure the American presence in the Asia-Pacific region ... 
This is a must” [qtd. in: AFP 16.12.1997b]. 
When Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, announced that this type of meetings would 
very likely be repeated, probably on a regular basis, CHING concluded for the Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review: 
Such meetings are of far-reaching significance because they may, over time, foster a 
sense of unity among the nations of East Asia. At the very least, they should enhance un-
derstanding and alleviate suspicions of each other's intentions. [CHING 08.01.1998] 
At the second informal meeting between ASEAN and the three East Asian nations, taking place in 
mid-December 1998, one of the issues to exchange views about was recorded to be the mainte-
nance of peace and stability in the region as well as good-neighbourliness and mutual trust [BBC 
MS 03.12.1998; KH 09.12.1998]. One of the meeting’s outflows was the invitation South Korea 
extended to North Korea to join the ARF, a measure that was hoped to cultivate regular discussions 
with the isolationist North Korean regime [KT 16.12.1998]. 
During the following year ASEAN plus Three met in-between the annual gatherings, this time on 
the functional field of finance [XINHUA 18.03.1999], signalling the increasing momentousness of 
the young framework. Without resulting in concrete policies, the representatives agreed to monitor 
capital flows and to decrease the volatility and vulnerability of their national economies, a charac-
teristic which had led to the previous financial crisis in the first place [DJIN 18.03.1999]. 
                                                 
515 Also the ECONOMIST finds that the financial crisis has been a catalyst for unifying the APT region [ECONO-
MIST 12.02.2000]. Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s Foreign Minister similarly concludes that the crisis had „high-
lighted the need to strengthen the interdependence between countries of the region” [qtd. in: MONTAGNON 
21.07.2000]. 
516 The mechanism, when approaching its 10th year of existence was called by Malaysia’s prime minister a 'fra-
ternity', highlighting the strengthening of ties between participating countries that it had brought about [qtd. 
in: BBC MS 27.01.2007]. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | ASEAN PLUS THREE – CHINA, JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA512F 
246 
proposals, sponsored by the Philippines the previous months, also foresaw to broaden the regular 
meeting to henceforth also discuss security related issues (compare Chapter Security Concept). 
The Chairman’s Statement of the Informal Summit stated in that regard: 
The HOS/G [Heads of State and Government, my remark] were of the view that ASEAN 
made a significant contribution to the progress of multilateral regional cooperation to 
promote security through the ASEAN Regional Forum. They agreed to complement ARF 
initiatives by engaging neighboring countries in East Asia to more regular summit dia-
logues on political and security issues. [ASEAN 28.11.1999a] 
A decision was taken to invite the three Northeast Asian countries to participate at the annual 
ASEAN summits, although that had already been the case in the previous years, the difference – as 
the Philippine’s foreign minister pointed out – would be that henceforth they will not have to be 
invited expressly, but they would participate automatically [HOOKWAY 25.11.1999]. Additionally, 
the setting up of a mechanism between ASEAN and the three countries was considered which was 
expected to prevent economic crises, as witnessed in the area during 1997/98 [JP 25.11.1999]. 
The ASEAN plus Three meeting also inspired a trilateral summit meeting in November 1999 be-
tween China, Japan, and South Korea. A forum that was intended to enable progress on dialogue 
issues of common concern, including security [YS 19.11.1999]. Although eventually it was decided 
to leave out the sensitive security related questions517
But for the time being no immediate expansion was envisioned by the majority of the countries 
involved. In mid-2000 ASEAN Plus Three agreed to officially hold formal annual meetings of their 
foreign ministers to solidify consultation in East Asia. M.C. Abad, chief of staff of the ASEAN Secre-
tariat, commenting on the formalization, stated it ‘is merely a ratification of what is already hap-
pening on the ground’ [qtd. in: ABBUGAO 25.07.2000]. Although Thailand called it an ‘East Asian 
Community’ and Seoul a ‘Community of Cooperative Neighbors’ it henceforth remained known un-
der the term ASEAN + Three [WAIN 11.08.2000] or APT. That year’s AMM statement reiterated the 
Association’s view that ASEAN Plus Three contributes significantly to the political and economic 
stability of East Asia [XINHUA 25.07.2000]. The joint statement of ASEAN Plus Three voiced sup-
port for Indonesia’s territorial integrity and political unity - along the lines of the AMM communiqué 
 and focus on economic matters only [KH 
30.11.1999] – later trilateral summits again put security concerns on their agenda, i.a. the North 
Korean nuclear programme. For instance, in October 2003, the three countries met on the sidelines 
of the ASEAN annual Summit and expressly agreed to cooperate on the nuclear standoff with North 
Korea [BRUMMITT 07.10.2003; APN 29.11.2004]. 
Another outgrowth of the ASEAN plus Three meeting in November was the agreement to designate 
a Troika to liaise with other members in case of problems with cross-border implications; the con-
cept being modelled on the Troika engaged after the bloody coup in Cambodia (see Chapter Cam-
bodia 1997) [MORELLA 28.11.1999]. 
ASEAN’s move to strengthen the integration with the three northern countries was observed by 
WAIN to have the following certainly welcome impact: “by linking its fortunes to the heavyweights 
of Northeast Asia, Asean should be able to leverage its current limited clout” [WAIN 03.12.1999]. 
The ASEAN Plus Three Meeting of 28th November 1999, however, did not yield any remarkable 
results in the field of security and conflict resolution. Instead already known language was em-
ployed when the participants vowed to “continue dialogue, coordination, and cooperation to in-
crease mutual understanding and trust towards forging lasting peace and stability in East Asia” 
[ASEAN 28.11.1999b]. Overall emphasis, however, was placed on economic cooperation; for ex-
ample in March 2000 the idea to establish a regional fund to serve as a facility during economic or 
financial crises was floated [JEN 24.03.2000]. That fund was to be part of the so-called Chiang Mai 
Initiative, that also included the monitoring of capital in- and outflows to the region, a surveillance 
system, and a peer review of economic developments in each other’s national economies. 
[CHAITRONG 09.05.2000]. SIMON calls the Chiang Mai Initiative ‘APT’s major achievement to date’ 
[SIMON 2008:281]. The project resembled somewhat the provisions and procedures already set up 
in the ASEAN-only context (Surveillance Process) two years earlier. At the same occasion it was 
agreed that henceforth ASEAN Plus Three’s finance ministers would meet bi-annually [CHAITRONG 
09.05.2000]. 
When North Korea increased its efforts to join the ARF, and its membership was considered only a 
formality, the Philippine foreign secretary, Domingo Siazon, suggested that ASEAN Plus Three 
might become ASEAN Plus Four ‘to make a framework on a more meaningful East Asian security 
dialogue’ [qtd. in: JEN 06.07.2000]. The idea was several months later taken up again by China 
who supported strongly North Korea’s inclusion into the framework [KN 25.11.2000]. 
                                                 
517 Specifically, the trilateral meeting carefully avoided the contentious issue of North Korea. Since Bejing being 
an ally and the other two being adversaries to the reclusive state the subject was ignored in order not to ‘dis-
turb’ non-represented North Korea [MORELLA 28.11.1999]. 
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-, while also hailing Jakarta’s efforts to peacefully solve the volatile situation in Aceh and Papua 
(Irian Jaya) [BBC MS 24.07.2000; ASEAN+3 25.07.2000]; thus the dialogue mechanism was once 
again used as a platform for shaping and reiterating common opinion on issues with security rele-
vancy. 
The following October saw another step of regularization, when ASEAN Plus Three agreed to for-
malize their meetings of economic ministers and senior officials [BBC MS 07.10.2000]. One month 
later ASEAN stated its intention to form a political and economic/investment grouping with the 
three partners, however, emphasis was laid on the fact that this grouping would have to retain the 
Southeast Asian character of ASEAN [REUTERS 24.11.2000]. 
The general trend among that enlarged cooperation, though, predominantly was and remained 
focused on economic aspects, as was re-emphasized when they again met in May 2001 and agreed 
to foster their cooperation in the fields of information technology, small and midsize companies, 
and trade and investment [ASIA PULSE 06.05.2001]. As is demonstrated elsewhere in this thesis 
that kind economic cooperation and networking in ASEAN’s view naturally brought with it a climate 
conducive to peace and stability. 
Thus, the establishment of regional swap arrangement to fend off future financial turmoil in 2001 is 
to be seen in this light while at the same time recognizing that it bolstered the claim of auton-
omy518
In mid-2002 Malaysia stepped up its efforts to be host to the ASEAN + 3 Secretariat [BBC MS 
04.06.2002], considering itself to have been the format’s principal midwife. However, the Malay-
sian idea, accompanied by a $ 10 million commitment, was – although generally recognized – not 
taken up right away; an outgrowth of the mainly held view that the time was not ripe for institu-
tionalization of the consultation forum in the immediate future [KN 24.07.2002]. Among the coun-
tries against the proposal were said to have been Indonesia
 – to a degree comparable to what was the nucleus of the ZOPFAN concept. 
The ASEAN Plus Three meeting taking place in late July 2001, however, published a statement that 
elucidated the participants’ position on two security issues articulately: it voiced its satisfaction 
about the first inter-Korean summit meeting and emphasized the need for a second such gather-
ing; and it welcomed the peaceful changeover in Indonesia and congratulated its newly elected 
President [JOINS 25.07.2001]. 
After the terrorist attacks that shook the US in September 2001, the ASEAN + 3 Meeting was prin-
cipally expected to make a statement on the issue. However, this was thrown into doubt after 
China objected the move, arguing that this would dilute a corresponding statement APEC had is-
sued the previous October during a meeting that was hosted by China [JP 04.11.2001]. As a com-
promise ASEAN + 3 decided not to issue a separate statement on terrorism but to incorporate in 
their normal statement its condemnation of the 11/9 attacks along the worries associated with the 
fate of civilians in Afghanistan due to the military campaign there [JP 05.11.2001]. 
519
‘A permanent body has been established to help build an East Asian community,’ one par-
ticipant said, adding the new forum will be like the secretariat of the multi-layered ASEAN 
Plus Three processes. [OANA 30.08.2002] 
, Singapore, and Thailand. An ASEAN 
diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, pointed out the dilemma: 
If you institutionalise ASEAN plus three, ASEAN will lose its lustre as a regional entity. ... 
We'll be 'neutralised' by the North Asian giants, especially China. [qtd. in: PARAMES-
WARAN 26.07.2002] 
Hence, no decision was reached; Anuraj MANIBHANDU, reporting for the Bangkok Post instead 
noted about Malaysia’s proposal: ”none of the nine other Asean member states seemed to support 
it” [MANIBHANDU 06.08.2002]. 
The sole mention made about the issue in the foreign ministers’ joint communiqué read: “[w]e 
noted the need to strengthen the Asean Secretariat in Jakarta and Malaysia's offer to host the 
Asean-plus-Three Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur” capturing the prevailing dissent [qtd. in: MNIB-
HANDU 06.08.2002]. Meanwhile, Malaysia reemphasized that it will continue to campaign for the 
proposed secretariat [AP 13.08.2002]. It seemed to score a point in late August 2002 when the 
ASEAN Plus Three announced they would strengthen their cooperation in the economic, financial, 
political, security, and transnational fields – holding two or three meetings a year. OANA reported: 
                                                 
518 The Director of the IDA Yoshihiro Iwasaki opined about the establishment of the swap mechanism: „From the 
Asian point of view there is a stronger recognition that regional initiatives can help maximise the benefits of 
globalisation while minimising the disruptive effects of global financial markets” [qtd. in: LUCE & THORNHILL 
14.05.2001]. 
519 For an informative viewpoint, summing up some essential concerns prevailing about the issue, see the 
stance of former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas in: SUWARNI 27.07.2002. 
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At the sidelines of the ASEAN meetings the foreign ministers of China, Japan, and South Korea met 
for the first time ever as agreed earlier and pledged to foster cooperation on the issue of terrorism 
and piracy. For that purpose China proposed that there should be a ministerial-level meeting of all 
13 participants. The occasion was also used for bilateral meetings between the plus Three coun-
tries, thus following and fostering a constructive approach to their existing disputes [SUZUKI 
31.07.2002]. 
In November 2002 on the occasion of the ASEAN Summit, the 13 nations declared their consensus 
that North Korea is supposed to stop its nuclear weapons programme immediately. Yet the ques-
tion was to be solved by peaceful means. Thus dialogue process again provided a forum to table 
and converge opinions and positions on security issues [NG 04.11.2002; KN 04.11.2002a]. 
Even so, devastating criticism was formulated in the press when Kornelius PURBA commented: 
The annual ASEAN summit with China, Japan and South Korea is often perceived to be the 
platform of the three guest nations, and ASEAN a poor host who must entertain its [sic] 
much more prosperous guests, for a few benefits in return for its warm welcome. When 
the three guests talk about the threat of North Korea, ASEAN smiles politely on, although 
it has little interest in the Korean Peninsula. [PURBA 12.11.2002] 
However, the get-together at least provided for an exchange of opinions and voicing of positions, 
also with regard to security relevant issues. Thus, encouraging to set also other hot topics on fu-
ture APT agendas. For instance at their meeting in June 2003 Japan urged ASEAN to assist in the 
resolution of North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese citizens, calling the abductions a ‘major threat 
to the peace’. ASEAN + 3 at this meeting at least reiterated the participants’ concern about the 
North Korean nuclear crisis and called for its peaceful resolution [JP 18.06.2003]. 
In late 2003 ASEAN obviously sensed the time ripe to open a new chapter, signalling its support for 
the creation of an East Asia Community (EAC) – encompassing ASEAN and its + 3 partners [OANA 
10.12.2003]. In the meantime cooperation was to be extended to further fields, among them the 
fight of transnational crime. The 13 countries met on this topic for the first time in early 2004; the 
initiative had originally been sponsored by China [XINHUA 10.01.2004]. 
Energy security was also recognized as an issue area demanding cooperation; consequently the 
Energy Ministers of ASEAN + 10 met for the first time in June 2004 and vowed to enhance energy 
security forthwith [XINHUA 09.06.2004]. 
In mid-2004 Japan presented a proposal to also consider the participation of New Zealand, Austra-
lia, and India in the envisioned East Asian Community [KN 28.06.2004]. Japan was among the 
countries dissatisfied with the APT forum so far, criticizing that it had proved unable to tackle im-
portant questions. Though also China was said to be a strong supporter of the East Asian Commu-
nity [DONNAN & IBISON & MCGREGOR 05.08.2004], it favoured the original APT membership 
[ACHARYA 13.12.2005]. 
A possible milestone for ASEAN Plus Three relations was the idea to hold the first ever East Asian 
Summit in 2005 – despite some reservations especially harboured by Indonesia [RAHIL 
29.11.2004]. The step – as well as the suggestion by Malaysia and Japan to host such a summit for 
the meantime obviously was too controversial as having allowed a final decision [APN 29.11.2004]. 
The objections raised by Indonesia, however, turned out to be surmountable and it was agreed 
that the East Asia Summit (EAS) be held the coming year in Kuala Lumpur. The notion was also 
circulated that this new framework might replace the ASEAN Plus Three forum and might eventu-
ally include India, Australia, or New Zealand [JT 19.12.204]. 
As regards security policy concerns South Korea once again raised the North Korean nuclear issue 
during the November 2004 ASEAN Plus Three meeting, urging the countries to support a peaceful 
resolution of the matter [BBC MS 29.11.2004]. 
The question on the range of participants of the first East Asia Summit was meanwhile growing into 
a matter of substantial controversy. Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei favoured the ASEAN 
Plus 3 membership, whereas other ASEAN countries opted for an enlargement [WAIN 05.04.2005]. 
During discussions ASEAN's position was somewhat clarified when it was underlined that it would 
be necessary for NZ and Australia to sign on to the TAC before being eligible for participation at the 
Summit [A 12.04.2005]. 
The retreat of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in April 2005 decided that besides having to have signed 
the TAC, participants ought to be full DPs and have substantive relations with ASEAN. At the infor-
mal get-together agreement was also reached that the EAS would be a distinct format and would 
not replace the ASEAN + Three framework [BBC MS 19.04.2005]. And it was reaffirmed that the 
ASEAN + Three mechanism shall remain the main vehicle to attain the goal of an East Asian Com-
munity [MINHLONG 11.10.2005]. 
In the meantime security concerns gained ever more importance in ASEAN + Three talks; reaching 
from the support of the 6-party talks on the North Korean nuclear programme to other interna-
tional issues (i.a. terrorism, Middle East peace process etc.) [XINHUA 27.07.2005]. 
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However, the forum evidenced a setback when China cancelled the regular summit with Korea and 
Japan scheduled for December 2005, as a reaction to the visit of Japan's prime minister to the Ya-
sukuni shrine, where also war criminals were honoured [JOINS 04.12.2005]. 
The 11th APT Summit held in November 2007 phrased the relationship between ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT) and the East Asian Summit thus: “the APT is an integral part of the evolving regional archi-
tecture, mutually reinforcing and complementary to the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional 
Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and other regional fora” [ASEAN 20.11.2007]. The par-
ticipants furthermore indicated the range and topics and course to be taken when they 
(...) agreed to work together to tackle transboundary challenges such as climate change, 
terrorism, traditional and non-traditional security issues, pandemic diseases and natural 
disasters. [ASEAN 20.11.2007] 
The 13-country-club showed their resolve: when faced with the world-wide financial crisis in Octo-
ber 2008 they decided to increase the swap arrangements facility from $ 6 billion to $ 80 billion, 
80% thereof coming from the extra-ASEAN nations. The facility was to be run by a new macroeco-
nomic and finance surveillance office at the ASEAN Secretariat [AGLIONBY 17.10.2008]. 
 
The impression of the forum adding to the value of ASEAN vis-à-vis external actors was once more 
voiced on that occasion by Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong who said: "There is this sense that 
this partnership has over the years given us some strategic value...” [qtd. in: CA 20.11.2007]. 
And long-time observer earlier Michael Leifer framed this constellation from a different angle, sug-
gesting “I see it as a subconscious expression of Asean's own limitations and of the need that it's 
got to go beyond its own ambit” [qtd. in: MONTAGNON 21.07.2000]. 
Others, however, view the project more positively. Analyzing the institutionalization of APT at some 
length, NABER arrives at the following conclusion: 
…many observers contend that a process of enhanced cooperation between the ASEAN 
members and China, Japan and South Korea could erode long-held animosity and distrust, 
and build confidence over time. … I would go a step further in arguing that region-wide 
community-building and the formation of a collective iden-|tity is under way. [NABERS 
2003:130-131] 
This assessment broadly captures the harboured intentions of ASEAN’s approach to cooperation 
and in a further step to the transformation of conflicts and thus classifies the strategy chosen to be 
a successful one. 
As is true with the system of Dialogue Partnerships also the establishment of the APT mechanism 
assured a key role for the Association in the wider region. Providing for regular contact, information 
exchange, and implemented cooperation makes for a decisive degree of familiarity and trust. This 
is of particular importance given the many existing disputes regarding border questions – primarily 
locatable in the South China Sea – and involving a multiplicity of states. This potential volatility 
ASEAN is endeavouring to contain with establishing ties that not only would be of such sustainable 
quality as to weather erupting political crises, but make such developments unlikely in the first 
place. Especially given the increasing coverage of security relevant topics into the APT consultation 
format, the probability of mitigating if not avoiding violent escalation of conflicts has definitely in-
creased through the APT framework. 
Such effects were also hoped for to take hold for relations among the three extra-ASEAN powers, 
since relations between Japan, South Korea, and China were historically strained by the Japan’s 
colonial record in the other two countries that left bitter feelings which up to date have not been 
satisfyingly ameliorated520
3.12 East Asia Summit 
 and continue to breed deep seated discontents. 
As already outlined some members of the APT felt the need for increased contact with a somewhat 
enlarged number of participants. However, in order to satisfy also the countries insisting on an 
Asian-only mechanism, instead of enlarging the APT, the design of a Summit with extended partici-
pation was developed. However, the concrete direction the EAS was to take remained squarely 
undefined, although Malaysia suggested that it be the pre-mechanism for an eventual East Asian 
Community [ECONOMIST 11.12.2004; compare also ECONOMIST 10.12.2005]. 
                                                 
520 Compare for example MONTAGNON 21.07.2001 reporting for the FT. 
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Three pre-conditions for eventual EAS participation were spelled out. Eligibility would be given only 
in case a country acceded to ASEAN’s TAC, was enjoying full DP status; and entertained substantial 
ties to the Association. An while heated discussions were going on about the question on who ex-
actly would participate along the ASEAN + Three countries, New Zealand signalled its readiness to 
sign the TAC, fulfilling one of the criteria set earlier [AP 09.05.2005a].  
Meanwhile, Malaysia announced that ASEAN had reached agreement to invite India since it had 
found that the country satisfied all criteria [AP 09.05.2005b]. While the summit drew nearer also 
Russia and Pakistan signalled their interest to take part; however, a high-ranking ASEAN official 
cautioned that the inaugural EAS was intended not to grow too large [RAHIL 24.07.2005]. 
After Australia had also indicated its readiness to sign the TAC, the foreign ministers of ASEAN an-
nounced at their AMM in July 2005, that as things stand 16 countries would participate: ASEAN + 3 
joined by New Zealand, Australia, and India. Australia eventually acceded to the TAC only days 
before the Summit took place, after having resisted that step during the preceding 15 years521
It was re-iterated that the new mechanism will remain distinct from the ASEAN + 3 forum and was 
considered to offer a regular opportunity to discuss regional and global issues in a more freewheel-
ing manner
.  
522. Moreover, it was agreed that the EAS was to be held every three years, and – as 
within the ARF – ASEAN should be its 'driving force'523
Russia's request to participate as well as the EU's request to obtain observer status at the EAS, 
however, seemed – at least for the time being – to remain unheeded
 [TORSRICHAROEN & RAHIL 26.07.2005; 
DJIN 10.12.2005]. This contradicted expectations circulating ahead of the initiation of the Summit. 
Back then the Thai foreign minister had stated that in the EAS “Asean would no longer be monopo-
lising the process. All the stakeholders are equal”, giving East Asia a multilateral voice [qtd. in: 
KAZMIN 30.11.2004]. Also the provisions that the Summits can be hosted by extra-ASEAN nations 
indicated a dilution of an ASEAN pre-eminence [ECONOMIST 11.12.2008]. 
524
Since disagreement on the question of Russia's participation continued, it was decided that the 
membership be frozen to the current number for two years
 [KN 28.07.2005]. The 
same was true for the verbally expressed requests of Pakistan and Mongolia [HO 13.08.2005]. In a 
last-ditch effort to balance the conflicting opinions of all fixed EAS participants regarding the Sum-
mit’s membership, it was decided to invite Russia as a 'special guest' to the first Summit [JP 
29.11.2007]. 
The gathering itself – which decided to henceforth meet annually - produced a fairly general com-
muniqué, stating that the “East Asia Summit as a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political 
and economic issues of common interest” was to aim at “promoting peace, stability and economic 
prosperity in East Asia” [CODY 15.12.2005]. 
525
In January 2007 the second EAS took place. Besides issuing a declaration on energy security – 
termed to be the most significant outcome of the summit [BURTON & LANDINGIN 15.01.2007] -  
major issues of discussion among the 16 members were energy, finance, education, avian influ-
enza, national disaster mitigation, and the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization [XINHUA 
 [KN 19.05.2006]. Earlier, a similar 
moratorium had been taken for the ARF and remained in effect for some time. This notwithstanding 
the EU made its wish known to outright join the EAS; that is why it proposed to sign the TAC in 
order to meet that very pre-condition [BBC MS 27.06.2007]. 
In order to make the EAS more of an impacting gathering, it was agreed in mid-2006 to establish 
an implementation and follow-up mechanism [TNS 31.07.2006], a remarkable and early step for 
an ASEAN-inspired outfit, which would be rather expected to be left as informal as possible. 
                                                 
521 Australia's refusal to sign was motivated by the fact that the TAC might be conflicting with the country's 
earlier international commitments. Hence, Australia's foreign minister Alexander Downer explained on occasion 
of the signing, that his country had “negotiated an understanding with ASEAN countries to the extent that we 
feel we can sign it without disrupting relations with countries beyond the region, specifically the U.S.” [qtd. in: 
DJIN 10.12.2005]. 
522 SIMON terms the EAS to be the ‚most contentious addition‘ to ASEAN’s various dialogue formats [SIMON 
2008:265]. 
523 That it was somewhat out of proportion that ASEAN should fulfil that function is discussed in an article by the 
Jakarta Post: BAYUNI 14.11.2006. 
524 George Yeo, Singapore's Foreign Minister, had explained that the Association's foreign ministers "have de-
cided that we need to get the first East Asia Summit launched, get the modalities properly in place, make sure 
that ASEAN is securely in the driver's seat before we talk about enlargement or bring in observers" [qtd. in: KN 
28.07.2005]. ASEAN officials later said that Russia's ties with ASEAN were not substantive enough to warrant 
its participation [HO 13.08.2005]. However, this question remained hotly discussed. Reportedly, the US was 
strictly against a Russian participation, regarding it as a down-grade of its own position. The issue remained 
contentious with Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, along with Japan against Russia's bid [RAHIL 
16.09.2005]. 
525 Some commentators argued that the EAS format was a deliberate attempt by China to diminish the US’s 
clout in the region – ruling out the latter’s participation a priori [ECONOMIST 11.12.2004; LIU 12.09.2005]. 
However, China had had to accept that the EAS membership was enlarged beyond the limits of the EAS, since 
many others were eager to counterbalance China’s influence [THOMAS 21.11.2007]. 
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15.01.2007b]. The security issue most extensively discussed was North Korea; the participants 
expressed their 'grave concern' about the nuclear test conducted earlier and urged the country to 
go back to the six-party talks [KN 15.01.2007]. 
The Third EAS taking place in November 2007 witnessed a setback regarding its relevancy in secu-
rity matters. After an earlier crackdown on Myanmar’s pro-democracy protesters, the UN Special 
Adviser to the Secretary-General Gambari was to attend the EAS to brief the participants on the 
situation in the country [RAHIL 18.11.2007]; ultimately Gambari’s attendance was scrapped, obvi-
ously due to pressure coming from Myanmar and its allies [TORODE 21.11.2007]. 
However, the Myanmar regime was at least urged to release opposition politician Aung Sun Suu Kyi 
[AWSJ 22.11.2007]. 
The EAS decided to establish the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia – a think 
tank modelled on the OECD and designed to “provide intellectual and capacity building support”526
The Foreign Ministers also discussed the Future Directions of the EAS. While preserving 
the EAS' unique strategic and Leaders-led nature, it is also important to ensure that the 
Leaders' discussions translate into tangible projects and concrete results. ASEAN will con-
tinue as the driving force while EAS cooperation will also be utilized to strengthen ASEAN 
Community-building. Besides continuing to explore possible structures, the Ministers also 
noted, in particular, the need to strengthen the EAS Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat.
. 
Moreover the EAS pattern was applied to other levels below the Heads of State and Government, 
for example bringing together the EAS Energy Ministers in mid-2007, the EAS Foreign Ministers for 
informal consultations in July 2008, or the EAS Environment Ministers in October 2008. 
The Foreign Ministers’ informal consultation meeting  discussed i.a. the North Korea Six-Party talks, 
hailed the invitation to the UNSG Special Adviser by the Myanmar government, and urged Thailand 
and Cambodia to resolve their dispute regarding the Temple of Preah Vihear amicably. On the fu-
ture direction of the EAS process the Chairman’s Statement reads: 
527
3.13 ASEAN-China: the South China Sea
 
Thus, while like in the ARF context ASEAN entrenched its position by providing administrative ca-
pacity, the evolution of the EAS format seems to suggest that the Association is having to accept to 
be not so much in the driver’s seat as to be one among equals. However, its sheer composition as 
representing 10 states, will always remain a distinguishing feature. Also the fact that ASEAN had 
taken the initiative will not easily be levelled in the immediate future. 
However, the EAS project, once again showcased ASEAN’s unbending endeavour to make itself into 
an essential diplomatic hub, not to be by-passed easily. It will be intriguing to observe if the EAS 
membership will also in the years to come remain focused on the Asia-Pacific, or if existing and 
comprehensive pressures to incorporate Western states will succeed, flouting the original idea of an 
essentially ASEAN-centred dialogue trajectory as envisioned by states like Malaysia. 
528
Apart from being a natural factor to deal with – due to its geographic location, sheer size, and con-
siderable power – China also posed a security challenge to ASEAN. The hottest potential flashpoint 
between the ASEAN member nations and their huge neighbour China is the South China Sea. It is 
claimed in full by China (as well as Taiwan) with the argument that it constitutes an ‘internal lake’.  
 and beyond 
However in the mid-1990s, Vietnam had 27, the Philippines 8, Malaysia 8 and Brunei one 
reefs/islands of the South China Sea under their authority. The conflicting claims led to clashes 
between China and Vietnam first in 1974 [BP 24.02.1995] and again in March 1988 that left three 
Vietnamese dead and 70 missing529
Broadly speaking the main tensions focus primarily on the Spratly Islands group, and secondarily 
on the Paracel Islands, and mainly involved China versus one or the other (future) ASEAN member. 
; eight years later China occupied Mischief Reef (or Panganiban 
Reef, as it is known in the Philippines) – located in the Philippine claim area [BUSZYNSKI 
2003:348] - and constructed concrete army structures there [GAROFANO 1999:82; Reuters 
28.02.1992]. Indonesia since then carries out major air and naval exercises around the Natuna 
Islands, intended to deter China expansive efforts [GAROFANO 1999:83]. 
                                                 
526 For the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia see ASEAN’s press release at 
http://www.aseansec.org/21608.htm retrieved on 22.1.2008. 
527 The Chairman’s Statement is available at: 
http://www.41amm.sg/amm/index.php/web/info_for_delegates/statements/chairman_s_statement_of_the_eas
_foreign_ministers_informal_consultations_22_july_2008_singapore retrieved on 22.10.2008. 
528 The South China Morning Post called the South China Sea an ‘acid test for ASEAN unity’, emphasizing the 
potentially explosive overlap of claims [SCMP 24.07.1994]. 
529 CHUNG, however, claims that all 72 Vietnamese soldiers died in the incidence [CHUNG 1999:19]. 
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However, also between ASEAN members themselves did the conflicting claims clash from time to 
time (for instance: Malaysia vs. the Philippines in April 1998 [DJIN 15.04.1998]). 
The Spratly Islands530 are claimed by China531, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and part 
of them also by Brunei. They are strategically located and are thought to be rich in oil and mineral 
resources. Already in 1990 had Indonesia initiated a multilateral effort, – informal meetings532
In mid-1992 the six claimant countries met to hold discussions
 un-
der the heading ‘Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea’ (MPC) - to find a solution to 
the overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. The project’s aim was to develop avenues 
for cooperative activities and to intensify dialogue among the claimants [HEARNS&STORMONT 
177:1996]. In the first round only the six ASEAN nations participated; due to its incomplete repre-
sentation such talks were inherently not designed to find a long-term resolution. The second round 
in 1991 was attended by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan - along with 
Thailand, Laos, Singapore, and Indonesia; but again it produced no tangible results [JEN 
01.07.1992]. Still, the meeting was perceived as furthering confidence among the concerned 
states. One participant argued that “[a]s long as we are talking, we can work to avoid conflict” 
[qtd. in: TYSON 15.07.1996]. HEARNS & STORMONT also uphold that the MPCs ‘promote coopera-
tion and understanding’ among the claimant states of the South China Sea region [HEARNS & 
STORMONT 1996:180]. 
533
When in early 1992 China proclaimed its ‘irrefutable sovereignty’ over the Spratlys
. The format of the talks re-
mained informal and they were termed ‘workshop’. What was remarkable was that, like at the sec-
ond Managing Potential Conflicts (MPC) workshop round, next to the directly affected states also 
Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the ASEAN aspirant Laos had participated. Indonesia for one, 
perceived the dispute over the Spratly Islands to have the potential of developing  into the next 
major regional conflict (after the occupation of Cambodia) [Suwastoyo 28.06.1992]. To that per-
ception also contributed that 25% of shipping transport moves through the South China Sea [WU & 
REN 2003:312], having as such arguably also an extra-regional dimension. 
534 and a vice-
governor of China's southernmost province of Hainan together with three major-generals travelled 
to the area to erect a marker there, the Philippines announced that ASEAN will encourage the 
peaceful solution of the conflicting claims [IHLWAN 24.01.1992; KIN 26.01.1992], signalling the 
organization’s willingness to contribute to the conflicting claims’ resolution. Tensions mounted 
again in July 1992, after China had signed a contract with an oil exploration firm to screen the 
Spratly islands’ area and even assured the company that the whole Chinese Navy would be de-
ployed to back up their contract [CHUNG 1999:21]. Upon this, the Philippines President, Fidel 
Ramos535
The proposal was subsequently taken up by Indonesia [REUTERS 14.07.1992] and included as an 
agenda item of the following 25th AMM
, reiterated that the Spratly issue be handled by ASEAN [AFP 10.07.1992].  
536
In the Asian context, some things are best discussed in private...there are better results 
to achieve that way. … This is a delicate issue. It should be handled delicately and it 
 [MCDONALD 20.07.1992]. However, China rejected the 
idea of ‘internationalizing’ the Spratly dispute and rather preferred bilateral negotiations [KN 
20.07.1992]. 
In a private meeting on the occasion of the 25th AMM, China and the ASEAN states agreed to dis-
cuss the matter in a low-key fashion. ASEAN spokesman Romualdo Ong of the Philippines ex-
plained this development to the press with emphasizing the inherent Asian/ASEAN Way: 
                                                 
530 The Spratly Islands Chain comprises 33 Islands and 400 Islets [KN 09.03.1992]. WU & REN number the 
Spratlys as ‘…96 small islands, cays, atolls, shallow banks, shoals and reefs’ [WU & REN 2003:312]. 
531 For a brief review of China’s actions to bolster its claim see FEER 13.08.1992. 
532 HEARNS & STORMONT have described the MPCs with the following words: “The MPC project is structured as 
a series of technical working groups (TWG) and annual workshops which are attended by both academics  and 
government officials in their private capacities. Simply put, the TWG meetings are convened to examine in 
greater detail those issues identified at the workshops as warranting further consideration. Although the meet-
ings do not ignore issues such as outstanding territorial and jurisdictional disputes, discussions focus on less 
contentious topics where the potential for cooperation is greater” [HEARNS & STORMONT 1996:177]. 
533 Although the talks were conducted under the title: ‘Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea’; 
however the main topic was the resolution of the conflict(s) surrounding the Spratlys [Suwastoyo 28.06.1992]. 
534 The Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone was enacted by China on 25th  February 1992 and 
stated i.a. that the Chinese territorial land ‘includes … the Dongsha (Pratas) Islands, the Xisha (Paracel) Is-
lands, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands…’ [WU & REN 2003:312]. BUSZYNSKI lists some of the rights the law ac-
corded to China, for instance that naval vessels ought to obtain Beijing’s permission before proceeding through 
the South China Sea [BUSYNSKI 2003:347]. 
535 The Philippines, with a 95% dependency on imported oil, was among the prime movers behind the forthcom-
ing DOTSCS, pressing with vigour for the joint exploration and development of the area [CHUNG 1999:23]. 
536 The Far Eastern Economic Review observed the following: “Ironically, China’s southward thrust could also 
inject new life into ASEAN as a political entity just when the UN-brokered peace settlement in Cambodia 
seemed to have removed a unified ASEAN diplomatic stance [FEER 13.08.1992]”. 
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should not be handled by strong words said in public because that will not solve anything. 
[qtd. in: PASTOR 21.07.1992] 
3.13.1 ASEAN Declaration On The South China Sea 
Notwithstanding China’s concession, ASEAN adopted a declaration calling for restraint among the 
claimants, continued dialogue, and joint activities to defuse existing tensions [COLOMA 
22.07.1992]. The wording of the ASEAN Declaration On The South China Sea (DOTSCS), signed 
exclusively by ASEAN members, i.a. reads that the signatories: 
1.  EMPHASIZE the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining 
to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force;  
2.  URGE all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive 
climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes;  
3. RESOLVE, without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having direct 
interests in the area, to explore the possibility of cooperation in the South China Sea relat-
ing to the safety of maritime navigation and communication, protection against pollution 
of the marine environment, coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards 
combatting [sic] piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign 
against illicit trafficking in drugs;  
4. COMMEND all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international 
conduct over the South China Sea;  
5. INVITE all parties concerned to subscribe to this Declaration of principles [ASEAN 
22.07.1992b]. 
The DOTSCS was subsequently supported by Vietnam, Japan, and ASEAN’s Western DPs. China – 
although it later acceded to the DOTSCS [TASKER 06.04.1995] - restricted its support to some 
principles contained in the declaration [FEER 13.08.1992]. However, at the same time the Chinese 
attachment to the DOTSCS stated its commitment to a negotiated solution and suggested to 
‘shelve’ the dispute until ‘conditions are ripe’ [BUSZYNSKI 2003:360 FN 36] – a course strongly 
resembling the ASEAN Way of doing things. 
Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Wong Kan Seng explained ASEAN’s approach toward China with the 
words: “We have to massage China – that is the Asian style” [qtd. in: TASKER 06.08.1992]. How-
ever, also other voices could be heard. Malaysia for one, argued that to settle the conflicting claims 
in the South China Sea bilateral (ergo not multilateral) talks should be held [KN 21.06.1993], sig-
nalling acquiescence with the Chinese position [BUSZYNSKI 2003:351-352]. 
The Twenty-sixth AMM in July 1993 reiterated the invitation to all states concerned to subscribe to 
the DOTSCS [ASEAN 24.07.1993]. Around the same time Indonesia stated its aspiration to up-
grade the regularly convened MPCs onto the intergovernmental level [SUWASTOYO 23.08.1993] In 
the following years ASEAN kept trying to find an acceptable code of conduct for the disputed area. 
In April 1995 the first formal ASEAN-China dialogue was scheduled to be held. ASEAN’s primary 
intention was to bring about a solution for the disputed Spratly Islands. However, it was reported 
that the dialogue proposal had to be made ‘acceptable’ to China with increasing the discussion top-
ics, including e.g. trade and investment [JEN 10.01.1995]. 
A setback was encountered when in 1995 the Philippines detected Chinese-built concrete struc-
tures537 on Mischief Reef538. Mischief Reef was located inside the Philippines’ the 200-mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ)539
                                                 
537 The Philippines as well as some Western intelligence officials claimed that those structures were military in 
nature. However, the Chinese maintained that the buildings were “aimed at ensuring the safety and lives, as 
well as production operations, of the fishermen” working in the area [qtd. in: CHANDA et.al. 23.02.1995]. 
538 After detecting the structures which they interpreted to be naval facilities, the Philippines demolished them. 
Later the Philippines seized four Chinese fishing boats and arrested 62 fishermen along with quantities of dy-
namite, cyanide, and an international protected species of sea turtle. The fishermen were to be prosecuted for 
illegal entry, poaching, as well as for the possession of explosives [WAIN 07.04.1995]. 
539 The UN Law of the Sea Convention that went into effect in November 2004 (and which was signed by the 
Philippines in May 1984 but by China only in June 1996) foresees a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone 
adjacent to a coastal state, defined in Arts. 55-75. According to the Convention the respective state shall have 
sovereign rights over the zone for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing the living 
and nonliving resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil within it [MARTIN 2002a; for ratifications of UNCLOS 
see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nation
s%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea retrieved on 23.10.2008]. 
 but 1.000 miles from the Chinese mainland [DILLON 07.10.2004]. Still, 
ASEAN issued a statement, condemning the Chinese action that contravened the DOTSCS [CHUNG 
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1999:29] and urging an early resolution of the Mischief reef incidence540
The threat of damaging its relations with the ASEAN region made China
 [AFP 18.03.1995]. This 
move was interpreted as rebuking China and establishing ASEAN unity on the issue [WAIN 
07.04.1995]. 
541 first, to assure the Phil-
ippines privately542
• China thought the arrangement might enable smaller powers to 'gang up on China' and 
 that it will not build any further structures in the area claimed by both and sec-
ond, to offer ASEAN to discuss the issue at its 1995 Summit in Bangkok; thus signalling for the first 
time that it will not insist on negotiating bilaterally [CHUNG 1999:30]. 
The Asian Wall Street Journal opined that China miscalculated when it took Mischief Reef, since 
Beijing thus “provoked ASEAN and lost the struggle to confine the South China Sea to bilateral 
channels” [WAIN 07.04.1995]. That this route would finally be taken was made even more likely 
with China's participation in the newly created ASEAN Regional Forum. According to BA China, 
however, was sceptical about this new dialogue structure because: 
 
• it might pose avenues for the US to dominate the region's agenda [BA 2006:163]. 
 
The ASEAN-China talks of April 1995 ultimately did not result in any substantive progress on the 
Spratly question [JEN 03.04.1995]; the only ASEAN success being that the issue was discussed at 
all [WAIN 07.04.1995]. Still, the Philippine Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino claimed 
after the talks: “China had a better depth of the ASEAN's concerns and ASEAN had a better idea of 
China's position” [qtd. in: LIM 04.04.1995]. ASEAN’s position was somewhat ambiguous, when at a 
preparatory meeting for the second ARF get-together it was agreed to refrain from raising territo-
rial disputes in the South China Sea at that occasion but regarding each ARF member free to do so 
on an individual basis [JEN 20.05.1995]. This decision was taken although the Philippines vigor-
ously had advocated bringing the issue up on a multilateral basis. A senior ASEAN official com-
mented on the move, when he said: ‘We must settle the issue in the spirit of ASEAN’ – arguing in 
favour of accommodation instead of confrontation [qtd. in: AFP 22.05.1995]. 
The ASEAN Foreign Minister did not fail to issue their common position on the occasion of their next 
AMM: 
The Foreign Ministers expressed their concern over recent events in the South China Sea. 
They encouraged all parties concerned to reaffirm their commitment to the principles con-
tained in the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, which urges all claimants 
to resolve their differences by peaceful means and to exercise self-restraint. They also 
called on them to refrain from taking actions that could destabilise the region, including 
                                                 
540 The ECONOMIST commented on why ASEAN was caught unawares by the Mischief Reef event: “Because 
China's previous punch-ups in the area have bloodied only Vietnam, itself once a bit of a bully, and because 
Indonesia thought it had persuaded all claimants to abjure the use of force and explore ways of jointly develop-
ing the gas and oil beneath the Spratlys, the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations thought 
they had their China problem under control” [ECONOMIST 29.04.1995]. 
541 B.A. HAMZAH, director-general of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs, explained: “China may have 
the military means to capture the islands, but we must raise the political costs” [qtd. in: CHANDA et.al. 
23.02.1995]. 
542 China and the Philippines in August 1995 issued a joint statement that read: 
„Pending the resolution of the dispute, the two sides agreed to abide by the following principles for a code of 
conduct on the area:  
- Territorial disputes between the two sides should not affect the normal development of their relations. Dis-
putes shall be settled in a peaceful and friendly manner through consultations on the basis of equality and mu-
tual respect.  
- Efforts must be undertaken to build confidence and trust between the two parties, to enhance an atmosphere 
of peace and stability in the region and to refrain from using force or threat of force to resolve disputes.  
- In the spirit of expanding common ground and narrowing differences, a gradual and progressive process of 
cooperation shall be adopted with a view to eventually negotiating a settlement of the bilateral disputes.  
- The two sides agree to settle their bilateral disputes in accordance with the recognized principles of interna-
tional law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
- Both sides shall keep an open-minded attitude on the constructive initiatives and proposals of regional states 
to pursue multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea at the appropriate time.  
- The two sides agree to promote cooperation in fields such as protection of the marine environment, safety of 
navigation, prevention of piracy, marine scientific research, disaster mitigation and control, search and rescue 
operations, meteorology and maritime pollution control. They also agree that on some of the above-mentioned 
issues, multilateral cooperation could eventually be conducted.  
- All parties concerned shall cooperate in the protection and conservation of the marine resources of the South 
China Sea.  
- Disputes shall be settled by the countries directly concerned without prejudice to the freedom of navigation in 
the South China Sea” [text in: BBC MS 12.08.1995]. 
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possibly undermining the freedom of navigation and aviation in the affected areas. They 
also encouraged the claimants to address the issue in various bilateral and multilateral 
fora. In this regard, they reiterated the significance of promoting confidence-building 
measures (CBMs) and mutually beneficial cooperative ventures in the ongoing Informal 
Workshop Series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea initiated by Indo-
nesia. [ASEAN 30.07.1995] 
3.13.2 Moving on to Multilateralization of the Issue 
During the 1995 AMM an ASEAN report on a Chinese policy-shift circulated. China in talks with 
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had earlier vowed explicitly to settle the territorial disputes 
through peaceful means based on international laws, including the UN Convention on the Laws of 
the Sea. China had also indicated that it might be willing to further discuss the issue multilaterally; 
and most specifically, to do so at the periodic SOMs between ASEAN and China [EMR 28.07.1995; 
PURA 31.07.1995]. 
Tony WALKER, reporting for the Financial Times, however, pointed out that China – although hav-
ing been party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea had at that time still not ratified the 
treaty [WALKER 31.07.1995]. 
In December 1995 the ASEAN Heads of State and Government met for their Fifth Summit and de-
clared that in accordance with the TAC, the DOTSCS and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
ASEAN shall seek an early, peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute and shall 
continue to explore ways and means to prevent conflict and enhance cooperation in the 
South China Sea. [ASEAN 15.12.1995b] 
On 15th May 1996 China eventually ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [JEN 
20.07.1996a], underlining its stated commitment to resolve the pending disputes peacefully. At 
about the same time the idea of concluding a ‘code of conduct’ for the South China Sea was en-
dorsed by the ASEAN member states [JEN 17.07.1996]. However, that venture was interrupted by 
China’s extension of the baseline of its territorial waters by 370 km to take in the Paracel Islands, 
making ASEAN to raise the issue at the 1996 AMM in search of clarification – contrary to China’s 
general preference to deal with the South China Sea on bilateral levels [LEAHY 19.07.1996]. 
ASEAN succeeded on that occasion insofar as China agreed to hold further talks for the purpose of 
explaining Beijing’s extension of its maritime borders [AFP 24.07.1996]. 
The Philippines called in 1997 on the ARF to endorse the DOTSCS; however the proposal was re-
ceived only rather coolly by the other ARF participants [JEN 10.03.1997]. The Philippines, having 
been numerously negatively affected by Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea, voiced discon-
tent with ASEAN’s approach. Accordingly, the Philippine foreign minister, Siazon, at the annual ARF 
meeting in July 1997 exclaimed: “[t]he law is not enough ... calls for `self-restraint' are not 
enough” [qtd. in: TORODE 28.07.1997] and instead demanded that the following additionally fac-
tors are being considered in the matter: 
 
• the impact of any actions on regional stability and international perceptions;  
• the need to ensure the freedom and safety of passage through the area;  
• the sensitivities of states concerning seas near key cities; as well as  
• the need for maximum transparency of any moves in the area [TORODE 28.07.1997]. 
 
Tensions continued to run high in the South China Sea. In March 1997 Vietnam reported drilling 
activities of China in an area 64.5 nautical miles off the shoreline of central Vietnam [REUTERS 
20.03.1997]. Vietnam subsequently won the support of its fellow ASEAN partners. They upheld 
that the Chinese drilling activity should stop and both parties should start negotiations to solve the 
dispute [REUTERS 21.03.1997]. A small but nevertheless significant victory was scored when 
ASEAN reached agreement with China to put the South China Sea officially on the agenda of their 
dialogue meeting543
                                                 
543 For a brief sketch of the developments since ASEAN started its regular consultations with China, described as 
resulting in a ‘sea change’ see YING 18.04.1997. 
, scheduled for April 1997 [AFP 17.04.1997]. Also regarding the substance it-
self, some progress could be observed when Vietnam and China agreed to speed up the negotia-
tions regarding their common land and maritime border [REUTERS 21.04.1997]. The collective 
stance China had to face made it eventually to withdraw the rig. NISCHALKE noted: 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | ASEAN-CHINA: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA527F  AND BEYOND 
256 
However, the main rallying point for ASEAN unity in support for Vietnam was the defence 
of the status quo principles, not an antagonistic relationship with Beijing. [NISCHALKE 
2002:104] 
Despite this step, China obviously continued its expansionist activities. The Philippines detected 
new structures on a reef six miles northeast of Kota Island; additionally, two Chinese navy frigates 
were sighted in the area. The Philippines sent a diplomatic protest to China and informed its ASEAN 
counterparts of these events [LUGO 30.04.1997]. These consultations underlined ASEAN’s position 
as an ever more important framework for considering simmering tensions and conflicts in and 
around its membership area. 
One of the numerous occasions when China vowed peaceful means to solve the territorial disputes 
in the South China Sea, was the ASEAN + China summit544
The Association’s reaction was routinely lukewarm
, the first of its kind, taking place in 
December 1997, and putting their relationship on a more regularized footing. There, China and 
ASEAN besides the routinely repeated phrases also underlined that "[w]hile continuing efforts to 
find solutions, they agreed to explore ways for cooperation in the areas concerned. … They further 
agreed not to allow existing differences to hamper the development of friendly relations and coop-
eration” [text in: AFP 16.12.1997]. 
That commitment alone had not the impact to contain Chinese activities in the area. In late 1998 
China expanded its structures on Mischief Reef. Remarkably, however, China had informed the 
Philippines about that move beforehand [DOLVEN & HOLLAND 10.06.1999]. In ensuing and intensi-
fied patrols of the area, the Philippines arrested twenty Chinese fishermen – prompting China to 
demand their release. The escalating tensions led to the Philippines’ requesting the UN to monitor 
the developments in the Spratlys; a measure rejected by China [AFP 13.12.1998]. Philippines’ de-
fence minister, Orlando Mercado, described the activities of the approximately 100 workers on the 
reef as ‘a creeping invasion’ [SHERRY 19.11.1998]; additionally, some Philippine representatives 
pressed ASEAN to condemn those ‘naval intrusions’ and lobbied for that aim at the ASEAN Summit 
in December 1998 [BW 14.12.1998]. In late November 1998 both conflict parties’ foreign ministers 
met and reportedly agreed in principle to jointly use the structures and jointly exploit the natural 
resources; however, by March 1999 the Philippines reiterated that the structures be demolished 
and China denied that it had ever proposed a  joint use of them [ZHA & VALENCIA 2001:89]. 
545
One issue that should have been taken up forcefully with Beijing is China's expansion of 
facilities on Mischief Reef in a part of the Spratly Islands claimed by the Philippines. As it 
is, the matter got hardly a mention, and the Chinese were able to brush it aside with 
soothing words, as they usually do. If Asean doesn't stand behind its members who have 
claims in the South China Sea, Beijing is going to pick them off, one at a time
. WAIN commented for the Asian Wall Street 
Journal on the ASEAN plus Three meeting (bringing together ASEAN with China, Japan, and South 
Korea) in late 1998: 
546
3.13.3 The Evolving Code of Conduct 
. [WAIN 
24.12.1998] 
Clearly it did not help that ASEAN was at that time weakened by the economic crisis in the region.  
Thus, ASEAN’s Secretary-General, Rodolfo Severino, when asked why the Mischief Reef develop-
ment did not receive the expected attention, replied: “[w]e have bigger problems to deal with, 
particularly the economy” [qtd. in: TIGLAO et.al. 24.12.1998]. 
However, in early 1999 the Philippines launched the idea of organizing a workshop – using the 
already established Indonesian inspired workshop framework – to accomplish and implement the 
joint use of the Spratlys [TING-WU 13.01.1999]. Another Filipino initiative was to internationalize 
the issue further, insofar as to include it in discussions between ASEAN and the EU [AFP 
15.03.1999b]; and on the occasion of an ASEAN SOM the Philippines succeeded in convincing the 
other ASEAN members to draft a Code of Conduct, guiding the activities in the area that was even-
                                                 
544 The ASEAN-China Summits are taking place on a yearly basis [XINHUA 24.11.2004; 
http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm retrieved on 23.10.2008]. 
545 The Ha Noi Declaration simply contained the following phrase: “we shall promote efforts to settle disputes in 
the South China Sea by peaceful means in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and in the spirit of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. We 
call on all parties concerned to exercise restraint and to refrain from taking actions that are inimical to the 
peace, security and stability of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region” [ASEAN 16.12.1998]. 
546 On how the improving relations between China and the ASEAN nations did contribute to the latter’s accom-
modative position to the former see DOLVEN & HOLLAND 10.06.1999. 
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tually to be also signed by China [AFP 16.03.1999; GARCIA 15.04.1999]. Thereupon, the Philip-
pines started to prepared the text of the code of conduct, including i.a. the vow to resolve conflicts 
peacefully, develop the area jointly and promote trust and confidence, and barring occupational 
activities [JEN 08.05.1999]. The next ASEAN-China meeting only resulted in the regular concilia-
tory vow that the differences would be resolved peacefully [AP 06.04.1999]. However, the idea of a 
Code of Conduct was at first flatly rejected by China. Disillusionment with the lack of progress re-
sulted in the following modest statement of the Philippines’ Foreign Undersecretary Lauro Baja: 
We should be prepared to work on the Mischief Reef problem by ourselves. Other coun-
tries, including our ASEAN allies, can only go as far in understanding our position in the 
dispute. We cannot really expect them to go all out and support us. [qtd. in: BBC MS 
15.04.1999] 
On the same occasion Baja announced that his country might be forced to present the dispute to 
the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea [BBC MS 15.04.1999]. Baja as well caused some 
embarrassment among his ASEAN fellows when he compared the Philippines to an orphan in its 
search to find a solution to the Mischief Reef dispute, and claimed that “even our ASEAN friends are 
either mute, timid or cannot go beyond espousal of general principle of peaceful settlement of dis-
putes and polite words of understanding given in the corridors of meeting rooms” [qtd. in: GARCIA 
26.04.1999]. The lack of unity vis-à-vis China was showcased when the Thai Prime Minister at 
around the same time praised China for its role in promoting security in the region [XINHUA 
30.04.1999a]. 
In the meantime also Vietnam, being another main ASEAN claimant, had started to draft a Code of 
Conduct, parallel to the Philippines’ endeavours, which had already been endorsed by an ASEAN 
SOM in May 1999547 [BBC MS 26.05.1999]. While tensions continued – with the Philippine navy 
sinking a Chinese fishing vessel in a collision – the draft of the Code of Conduct progressed and the 
Philippines548
The progressing occupation
 urged all fellow claimants to sign the code once finalized [AFP 01.07.1999] but 
stressed that the support of all ASEAN members would not be required [JEN 20.07.1999]. At an 
informal meeting of ASEAN’s foreign ministers, preceding the regular AMM, it was called for ‘for-
ward momentum’ in concluding the Code of Conduct. The hope was expressed to be able to adopt 
such a document as soon as November the same year [AFP 22.07.1999b]. 
549
Finally, the AMM decided to support the Code of Conduct, albeit not the draft in its current version. 
The Philippines were urged to simplify the text
 of various Spratly islets and rocks by the claimants put additional 
pressure on ASEAN to resolve the conflicting claims before they would possibly escalate. Especially 
Malaysia had recently set out to construct buildings on Investigator Shoal in utmost secrecy. 
Hereby it had clearly acted against the DOTSCS [WAIN 23.07.1999]. 
550
                                                 
547 For some background information on the history of the Code of Conduct and the drafting process compare 
WU & REN 2003. 
548 Although the tension between the Philippines and China were among the highest in that period of time, the 
Philippines apprehensively backed away to compromise its One-China-Policy, having established diplomatic ties 
with China to the disadvantage of Taiwan since 1975 [GN 15.07.1999]. 
549 At that time Vietnam was known to have occupied 24 positions, the Philippines nine, China seven, Malaysia 
five and Taiwan one [WAIN 23.07.1999]. 
550 On the progress concerning changes to the draft done by the Philippines compare: BW 14.09.1999; AFP 
16.11.1999. 
 that consisted of 15 main issues and 36 subdivi-
sions and was judged to be to legalistic in nature [GECKER 24.07.1999]. A working group was 
formed to study and elaborate the draft at its first meeting, scheduled to take place the following 
October [APN 26.07.1999a]. ASEAN urged China to closely collaborate on the compiling of the 
draft, since it would be expected to sign it as one of the main claimants [AFP 27.07.1999]. In Oc-
tober China made known that it also undertook the drafting of a separate Code of Conduct, while 
cooperating with the Philippines to reach a mutually satisfying result [JEN 27.10.1999]. 
Following the AMM the Philippines planed to arrange a separate meeting with China at the sidelines 
of the ensuing PMC. The Philippine foreign minister was expected to personally apologize for the 
sinking of the Chinese fishing vessel [APN 26.07.1999b]. Such a step was deemed to have a de-
escalating impact on the volatile situation. 
In October 1999 the Vietnamese were active at some spots in the Spratlys, provoking a protest 
note from the Philippines. Vietnam claimed that it did not build any new structures, but only re-
paired the already existing ones after a typhoon had damaged them. The incident also had resulted 
in Vietnam firing on a Philippine air force plane. Filipino Foreign Affairs Secretary, Siazon, reas-
sured the press when he intriguingly explained: “... you know, in this game, we always protest for 
the record... (so that) once you go to litigation (before an international forum) it can be (said) that 
you maintained your claim” [qtd. in: BW 13.10.1999; AFP 29.10.1999].  
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Progress on the Code of Conduct was not forthcoming at the pace originally envisioned. The Philip-
pines announced that China’s request, mainly its wish for a more general type of wording, would 
delay the finalization [BW 28.10.1999]. At least the Philippines succeeded in finding unanimous 
ASEAN support551 for its draft – declaring: ‘[w]e have an ASEAN draft’ - briefly before it could be 
presented to China at the November informal Summit552
Taiwan was left out of any negotiations, although being a considerable claimant in the South China 
Sea. However, since ASEAN had opted for the One-China-policy, viewing Taiwan as a renegade 
province of China, it was not considered to be an actor in its own right
 [GOMEZ 24.11.1999]. 
However, China dashed hopes for immediate approval of the draft, arguing that various differences 
had to be ironed out first. Zhu Bangzhao, the spokesman for the Chinese delegation at the informal 
Summit argued: “[t]he formulation of such a document is a big event and it is very important, so it 
should be approached in a gradual manner with all the seriousness and prudence” [qtd. in: GOMEZ 
26.11.1999]. One of the main incompatibilities between ASEAN and China remained the geographi-
cal scope that China still wanted to see restricted to the Spratlys only [JEN 26.11.1999]. 
553
According to WU & REN the following two meetings were of significant importance, taking place in 
mid-March 2000 in Thailand: the ASEAN Task Force meeting on the Regional Code of Conduct on 
the South China Sea and the ASEAN-China Working Group on the Regional Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea. The idea of a Code of Conduct was endorsed in the governmental fora (AMMs, 
ARFs, ASEAN summits – Track I) and in Track II, for example in ASEAN-ISIS’ Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific or the Indonesia’s
. The Taiwanese daily, 
China News, commented on that outmanoeuvring of its claims: 
At the summit, an agenda on guidelines for conduct in the South China Sea provided 
ground for a discussion on joint development on the islands in that sea zone. It is ridicu-
lous that Taiwan, whose government since the end of World War II has had exclusive ju-
risdiction over the biggest island there - Taiping Island - and since the end of the war has 
had a garrison there, was not invited to the discussion. As the agenda stressed joint de-
velopment of those islands, a smooth procession will be unlikely without the participation 
of the owner of the biggest piece of territory there. [CN 30.11.1999] 
554
The relations between ASEAN and China improved noticeably in the 1990s, resulting for instance in 
the decision to establish a partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust oriented towards 
the 21st century between China and ASEAN. Apart from that diverse other regular meetings were 
taking place covering various fields of cooperation
 sponsored informal Workshop on Managing 
Potential Conflicts (MPC) in the South China Sea,  [WU & REN 2003: 313]. It has been rightly ob-
served that those Workshops constituted a diplomatic initiative fully in line with the ASEAN Way. 
The workshop series remained from the outset informal, participants attended simply in their pri-
vate capacities and they ended up in talking rather about scientific issues like biodiversity than 
about the clashing claims themselves, “[b]ut this is part of the ‘ASEAN way’: from this point of 
view, one should try to find common ground first and deal with contentious issues later” concludes 
BUSSE [BUSSE 1999:53]. 
Indonesia was accepted as ‘neutral facilitator’ being on the one hand the largest ASEAN member 
and having no direct stake in the dispute [CHUNG 1999:24] on the other. CHUNG has also ob-
served that those Workshops mirror the typical ASEAN Way inasmuch as they rely on informal con-
tacts, controversy avoidance, and incremental results [CHUNG 1999:27]. 
555
                                                 
551 Especially the geographical scope of the area to be covered by the Code of Conduct was controversial. Viet-
nam insisted the Paracel Islands to be included, Malaysia on the other hand objected to this in face of a sepa-
rate security arrangement it had signed with China [DJIN 24.11.1999]. 
552 Consensus could be reached after Vietnam and Malaysia had dropped their request to name the Paracel or 
Spratly islands expressis verbis but instead agreed to accept the formulation of ‘disputed areas in the South 
China Sea’ [APN 29.11.1999]. 
553 This position was regularly re-emphasized by the Chinese government [see e.g. AFP 18.07.2001]. 
554 Those Workshops were organized annually since 1990 with Canadian support [BUSZYNSKI 2003:348]. 
555 WU & REN list five parallel such frameworks for dialogue between China and ASEAN: China-ASEAN political 
consultation at senior level; the China-ASEAN Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation; the China-
ASEAN Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation; the China-ASEAN Joint Committee on 
Cooperation and the ASEAN Beijing Committee [WU & REN 2003:316]. 
 [WU & REN 2003: 315-316]. 
At an informal ASEAN summit the issue of the South China Sea was debated and it was called for 
an ‘early peaceful solution’ of the conflicting claims on the basis of international law, including not 
only the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea but also principles of ASEAN’s TAC [JEN 
30.11.1996]. 
BUSZYNSKI explains ASEAN’s approach: 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | ASEAN-CHINA: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA527F  AND BEYOND 
259 
The expectation was that dialogue would effectively communicate to the Chinese the 
probable consequence of the further occupation of islands, in which case the Chinese 
would become aware of the costs of their actions in terms of the loss of friendly relations 
with the ASEAN countries. The negotiation of mutually acceptable norms in a code of con-
duct would make their relationship more predictable and ordered. [BUSZYNSKI 2003:350] 
3.13.4 Working jointly on the Code of Conduct 
In February 2000 China made known its own version of the Code of Conduct. That draft foresaw 
the banning of military exercises and patrols in the disputed areas – obviously aimed at exercises 
the Philippines conducted jointly with the US. Additionally, the proposal included a ban to seize 
fishing boats and arrest their crews – again a provision that was directed against past Philippine 
activities against Chinese fishing vessels. The geographic scope excluded the Paracel Islands con-
tested by China and Vietnam [GOMEZ 20.02.2000]. 
At a meeting of Senior ASEAN Officials with China both parties resolved to frame a common Code 
of Conduct; at the same time agreement was reached that disputes between states with conflicting 
claims should be dealt with on a bilateral basis. This provision was a clear set-back for the ASEAN 
claimants, robbing them of the collective muscle and leverage of the Association in such a decisive 
question [SIVASOMBOON 15.03.2000]. 
Still, on the issue of the envisioned Code of Conduct some agreement was cumbersomely reached. 
Whereas China still insisted on the limited geographical scope of the code, it was willing at the 
same time to include a phrase alluding to the erection of structures. Additionally, China signalled 
its willingness to relax on the ban of military exercises in the region [APN 17.07.2000]. That con-
structive atmosphere certainly positively swayed the Association to reaffirm its ‘one China’ policy at 
its AMM in July 2000 [BBC MS 25.07.2000]. 
When Vietnam took over the Chairmanship of ASEAN’s Standing Committee in mid-2000 it an-
nounced its intention to conclude the Code of Conduct in the current year. A similar urge to hasten 
the process had been also voiced by China somewhat earlier [BBC MS 14.08.2000]. Vietnam’s in-
tentions, however, suffered a setback when no progress was achieved at an ASEAN-China meeting 
in August, due to lacking mandates of the attending representatives, as the Philippines reported 
[AFP 29.08.2000]. Contrary to that, China explained that the parties came closer to each other and 
existing differences556
However, China continued to show its vital over-all interests in the Association, making various 
proposals
 where reduced - but the remaining contentious issues would not lie on the 
Chinese side [AFP 30.08.2000]. In November it became clear that the respective negotiations 
would not be finalized as quickly as Vietnam had wished [AFP 08.11.2000]. 
557
During the 34th AMM in July 2001 the foreign ministers reportedly felt constrained to urge the 
tasked senior officials to expedite the completion of the code. At around the same time the Philip-
pines proposed to drop all geographical references in the text, as to overcome the antagonism 
about the diverse areas to be covered by the Code [AFP 23.07.2001]. During the Association’s an-
nual round of meetings, although having been discussed as a topic, no ultimate progress on the 
code could be achieved [AFP 25.07.2001a]. However, ties between ASEAN and China were im-
proved in the meantime and culminated in the announcement in November 2001 of the intention to 
establish a free trade zone [CA 06.11.2001] in the next 10 years
 to strengthen respective ties [BBC MS 25.11.2000]. 
558
It was during a Retreat of ASEAN’s foreign ministers that Vietnam and Malaysia
 [HOLLAND 15.11.2001]. 
Later ASEAN’s spokesman, M. C. Abad, told reporters about the hoped-for impact of the free trade 
zone: 
We believe that economic interdependence between ASEAN and China will forge shared 
stakes in keeping the peace and security in the region. [qtd in: ABBUGAO 13.09.2002] 
559
                                                 
556 For details on the persisting differences between the two circulating Codes of Conduct at the time see WAIN 
06.10.2000. 
557 The Chinese 6-point proposal presented in November 2000 encompassed the following: to strengthen politi-
cal cooperation; to intensify efforts for human resource development; to strengthen infrastructure buildings in 
the Mekong River Basin; to cooperate in the field of hi-tech; to deepen agricultural cooperation; and to 
strengthen trade and investment links [BBC MS 25.11.2000]. 
558 For a sketch of what the free trade area project might bring for the parties concerned see: KN 04.01.2002. 
 agreed to over-
come their differences regarding the Code. This brought the project a vital step forward, although 
559 Malaysia’s procurement of submarines, joining Singapore as the one and only ASEAN state possessing such, 
was raising fears that this might trigger an arms race in the region. An Asian diplomat pointed out: “ ... I think 
Malaysia's decision is based on its need to protect its vital marine resources, including its joint claim for the 
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meetings between senior officials with the Chinese side were still deemed necessary [MARFIL 
26.02.2002]. Also China indicated the positive progress made on the Code [ANTARA 22.05.2002]. 
And although the negotiation process seemed to go on smoothly, a Philippine highly-classified mili-
tary report detailed Chinese measures counteracting that progress. Further steps to build struc-
tures on some of the islands and enforced surveillance efforts were particularly highlighted; as such 
and in the face of Beijing’s purported diplomatic willingness to negotiate, the Chinese approach 
taken was judged to be double-edged by the said report [OANA 12.07.2002]. 
A border skirmish, resulting in 1 killed and 5 injured on the Vietnamese-Chinese560
Finally, in November 2002, ASEAN and China agreed on the so-called Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOCPSCS)
 border in mid-
July 2002, although not improving the overall climate, was played down by both countries [KN 
16.07.2002]. Shortly before the annual ASEAN meeting was to take place, impatience character-
ized the mood on both sides. The Philippines even went so far as to threaten to halt its spearhead-
ing of the Code, refusing to present another draft if the current one would not be finalized in the 
near future [SINGH 25.07.2002]. That announcement seemed to have pressured the ASEAN coun-
tries to adopt a common front, accepting the Philippine proposal on the contentious geographical 
coverage question: ‘without prejudice to territorial claims and maritime regimes or jurisdictions’ 
recognized under UNCLOS [ABBUGAO 26.07.2002]. However, some last-minute disputes about the 
wording of the text and the title of the document prevented the document to be signed by ASEAN 
members and presented to the Chinese side at the upcoming meetings [ABBUGAO 29.07.2002]. 
Nevertheless, the relations between ASEAN and China were further enhanced when both sides 
agreed to step up cooperation on transnational security threats. Similar to an agreement reached 
with the US, the document to be signed foresaw information exchange and training cooperation. 
Alongside fighting terrorism, the document covered also non-traditional security issues (e.g. traf-
ficking in human beings, cyber terrorism) [KN 12.10.2002]. 
561 – ASEAN members having only a few days earlier 
reached agreement among themselves on it. THAO has pointed to the fact that the DOCPSCS holds 
only the status of a mere political document and as such is not legally binding [THAO 2003:281; AP 
01.11.2002]. However, at the time of its signing ASEAN officials upheld the view that it repre-
sented a commitment that would be difficult to bypass by any signatory562
Along the DOCPSCS ASEAN and China on the same occasion also signed another three cooperation 
agreements, signifying the enhanced quality of their relations
 [USSDPRT 02.11.2002]. 
Moreover, the conclusion of the DOCPSCS has been classified as “an ASEAN diplomatic exercise in 
socialising China and in promoting peaceful co-existence with Beijing” [EMMERS 2005:78]. 
563, one being the Joint Declaration of 
ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues564
3.13.5 Solidifying Relations 
 [WU & REN 
2003:311]. ASEAN classified the DOCPSCS as a ‘milestone’ changing China’s position from its insis-
tence on bilateralism to multilateralism [BUSZYNSKI 2003:343-344]. 
However, it remained unclear for the time being what would happen with the built structures on 
the Spratlys; the Foreign Affairs Undersecretary for the Philippines suggested that those will have 
to be dealt with in a separate document [LUGO 06.11.2002]. 
Over the following years ties between ASEAN and China increasingly improved. In late 2003 both 
agreed to form a ‘strategic partnership for peace and prosperity’ adding however, that this partner-
ship was non-aligned, non-military, and non-exclusive [BBC MS 08.10.2003]. This occasion was 
also used by China to accede to the TAC, being the Association’s first Dialogue Partner to do so565
                                                                                                                                                        
Spratly islands in the South China Sea” [qtd. in: JEGATHESAN 06.06.2002] an assessment of the purchase that 
saw in it everything but a confidence building measure. 
560 After the Vietnamese had moved into Cambodia and ousted the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge regime (see 
relevant chapter) in 1979, Beijing fought a brief but bloody war with Vietnam, as a sort of punishment [KN 
16.07.2002]. 
561 For details about the various draft proposals that were circulating before the agreed version was reached,  
see BUSZYNSKI 2003:354-357]. 
562 The Philippines additionally voiced their hope, that the DOCPSCS would constitute only one of many confi-
dence-building measures that might finally be followed by a more legally binding agreement [ASIA PULSE 
06.11.2002]. 
563 The other two agreements encompassed: Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation 
between ASEAN and China and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Agricultural Cooperation [WU & REN 
2003:311]. 
564 For some details on that declaration compare KN 04.11.2002b. 
565 See: http://www.aseansec.org/5874.htm as retrieved on 27.10.2008. 
. 
This move was complemented by a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation to fight transna-
tional crime (covering inter alia terrorism, money laundering, cyber crime, and international eco-
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nomic crime) in early 2004; cooperation was to be strengthened by way of information sharing, 
personnel exchange, and training and law-enforcement cooperation [XINHUA 10.01.2004]. 
With regard to the DOCPSCS the ASEAN claimant states held a meeting in April 2004 to deliberate 
the appropriate course of action for the realization of the Declaration [ASEAN AR 2004]. Around the 
same time Vietnam's decision to organize tourist tours to the Spratlys caused uproar, since being 
in clear contradiction to the vowed restraint as pledged in the DOCPSCS [BBC MS 23.04.2004]. 
Even so, ASEAN-China ties continued to improve, resulting inter alia in ASEAN's official recognition 
of China as a full market economy, thus helping to strengthen China's economic clout on the world 
scene [MB 07.09.2004]. 
Still, when the Philippines and China concluded a three-year joint exploration project in the Spratly 
Islands, Vietnam protested that move [IOD 13.09.2004]. Subsequently, the Philippines and China 
explained that no plans existed to drill for gas or oil and that the agreement merely covered pre-
liminary surveying [HURLE 15.09.2004]. 
When ASEAN drew up its Charter, the envisioned ASEAN Security Community – being one of three 
pillars of the ASEAN Community – also addressed ASEAN-China relations. The ASC Plan of Action 
foresaw that the implementation of the DOCPSCS be ensured i.a. through: 
 
• establishing an ASEAN-China Working Group on implementing the DOCPSCS; 
• establishing a review mechanism on the implementation; and 
• working towards the adoption of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea [ASEAN 
2005:53]. 
 
ASEAN and China had already agreed earlier to establish a ASEAN-China SOM on the implementa-
tion of the DOCPSCS; the first such meeting took place in December 2004 with the purpose of 
eventually establishing a Joint Working Group. It was decided that the Joint Working Group shall 
meet for the first time in August 2005 [ASEAEN AR 2005:17]. 
Meanwhile, the Philippines, Vietnam, and China signed an oil and gas exploration agreement for 
part of the disputed Spratly islands region, it being hailed as a 'historic breakthrough' by a Chinese 
publication [DJES 17.03.2005]. The deal foresaw data-collection for a 140.000 km2 area and was 
to cover a period of three years [EC 02.09.2005]. 
As scheduled the ASEAN-China Working Group on implementing the DOCPSCS met for the first 
time in August 2005 [AP 04.08.2005]. At their second gathering both sides agreed to jointly safe-
guard the peace and stability in the South China Sea and to promote pragmatic cooperation and 
thus strengthen the ASEAN-China strategic partnership [XINHUA 09.02.2006]. 
Cooperation was further enhanced when China and ASEAN organized a 4-day workshop, bringing 
together 30 senior defence officers to talk about security in the Asia-Pacific. The workshop was to 
cover East Asian maritime security cooperation, the militaries' role in international humanitarian 
aid, anti-terror and peace-keeping operations [BBC MS 18.07.2006]. 
Reviewing relations between the Association and China in 2006, Alice BA concludes:  
Improvements in relations have been dramatic, especially when compared to the hostility 
that characterized relations previously. [BA 2006:158] 
In October 2006 both sides agreed to transform the current into a stronger Code of Conduct, al-
though upon a request by China, still one of a non-binding nature [DJIN 26.10.2006]. Philippine 
President Gloria M. Arroyo, Chair of the Standing Committee at that time, classified the present ties 
to be in very good shape, declaring that: 
(...) relations between ASEAN and China have never been better or stronger. [qtd. in: 
LUCI 29.10.2006] 
This opinion was re-echoed during their commemorative summit (15 years of ASEAN-China dia-
logue relations) in late October 2006. Besides calling for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and a 
resumption of the six-party talks, China suggested to further promote joint development in the 
South China Sea and proposed to strengthen military ties; China's Premier, Wen Jiabao explained: 
We should expand military dialogue and exchanges (and) conduct and institutionalize de-
fense cooperation. [qtd. in: BRISTOW 30.10.2006] 
Apart from that the cooperation priority list earlier put together was increased to include now also: 
transportation, energy, culture, tourism, and public health. The Joint Statement of the ASEAN-
China Commemorative Summit reveals one dimension of their relationship, consisting of a kind of 
tat-for-tat: 
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China supports ASEAN’s role as the driving force in regional processes, such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit.  
The text reads on: 
ASEAN believes that a stable, developing and prosperous China will contribute to peace, 
stability and sustainable growth for the development of the region and reaffirms its One-
China Policy. [ASEAN 30.10.2006] 
At the 2007 ASEAN-China Summit, the priority list was once more enlarged to also incorporate 
environmental matters. On the Code of Conduct both parties reaffirmed their 
determination to the early and full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), towards the eventual adoption of a Regional Code 
of Conduct in the South China Sea [ASEAN 20.11.2007b]. 
Currently ‘Guidelines’ on the DOC are under preparation and ASEAN hopes that it and the Regional 
Code of Conduct would further support ‘mutual trust’ and ‘confidence’ between the parties which 
have already been increased through the DOCPSCS [TNS 24.07.2008]. 
To have achieved the introduction of China into a closely knit network of mutual agreements, 
commitments, pledges, regular meetings, and procedures has to be classified as not resulting from 
distinctly definable (economic) interests of the ASEAN nations, but rather as an overarching aim 
directed at ensuring a peaceful and friendly climate with their huge neighbour. Also China for its 
part considers the development a strong relationship as mutually beneficial. Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao, for example, deems the strengthening of ties with ASEAN an equivalent of ‘elevating our 
win-win relations’ [qtd. in: BERNAMA 21.11.2007].  
Also external powers commended the way ASEAN dealt with China on the question of the Spratly 
islands; for instance in 1998 – that is at a rather early stage of the diplomatic and political intensi-
fication of cooperation between the Association and China, the US already classified the approach 
taken positively. Frank Kramer of the US Defence Department, when asked about ongoing Chinese 
construction activities on the Spratlys replied: “We think, so far, that the ASEAN countries have 
done very well in dealing with that with the Chinese. Obviously, we are not in favor of any aggres-
sive development that would undercut the stability of the region, but we think the countries right 
now are working on it reasonably well” [qtd. in: PTFDCH 23.11.1998]. 
 
Former Secretary General of ASEAN, Rodolfo Severino conceives the situation the following way 
and offers his evaluation, when he says: 
South-East Asia's only choice has been to engage China. Its rapid economic advances awe 
people, who see this big presence in their midst. Yet this argues for viewing China not 
with concern but with a sense of caution. And if you ask whether the process of engage-
ment has had the effect of ‘socialising' China, the answer is certainly yes [qtd. in: 
ECONOMIST 31.03.2007]. 
3.14 A tough Call - Myanmar/Burma566
Since the 1980s
 
567 ASEAN had pursued a policy of constructive engagement568 with the military 
dictatorship of Myanmar569
The membership of Myanmar in ASEAN was desired by the latter so to withdraw it from China’s 
influence. Initially, the Philippines and Thailand wanted to go slow on Myanmar’s admission. How-
ever, once it was decided that it will be admitted as a member, the ASEAN countries closed ranks 
on the question [LEWIS 1999:100ff.] Anyway in 1989 even detractor Thailand argued that it pre-
. AMER has defined this approach as to entail also “a desire to influence 
domestic developments in Burma in a positive direction through increased economic and political 
interaction, as well as through the integration of that country into the mainstream of regional co-
operation in Southeast Asia” [AMER 1999:1039]. 
                                                 
566 Burma was renamed Myanmar in 1989 [WH Myanmar]; both terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
567 ENG, however, states that the policy was ushered in not earlier than 1991 [ENG 1999:58]. 
568 As will be shown in this chapter the meagre and often reversed results that were accrued by the ‚construc-
tive engagement’ approach, led it to be qualified by some observers as ‚complete failure’ [RAMCHARAN 
2000:67]. 
569 The ASEAN ‘constructive engagement’ approach originates from the Thai policy towards Burma and was only 
later adopted by the Association after being urged to do so by Thailand [HAACKE 1999:587-588]. 
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ferred maintaining official relations with Myanmar, believing that it would be unwise to isolate the 
country [JEN 09.10.1989]. 
3.14.1 ASEAN Efforts at Reconciling the West with the Burmese Re-
gime  
The military regime, supplied with weapons by China [CROSSETTE 19.11.1991], had refused to 
hand over power to the National League for Democracy (NLD) after the latter had won the elections 
in 1990. At the PMC following the AMM in 1991, ASEAN asked its DPs not to isolate Myanmar, since 
that would endanger the stability in the region [JP 23.07.1991] ASEAN preferred to continue a ‘pol-
icy of constructive engagement’, since that would be more in the interest of the Burmese people 
than isolation [AFP 02.10.1991]. 
ASEAN in July 1991 delegated the Philippines’ foreign minister to visit Myanmar. The visit was 
aimed at encouraging the regime to reform, and thus to improve the country’s standing on the 
global stage. Nevertheless, the chosen approach was quite restrictive in nature. Foreign minister 
Manglapus made that explicitly clear when he said: “I am not going to tell them to restore democ-
racy … We want to see how we can co-operate with them” [qtd. in: REUTERS 04.11.1991b]. 
Manglapus, however, also voiced his hope to get the opportunity to meet Aung San Suu Kyi, leader 
of the NLD and Nobel Peace Prize winner of 1991, whom the regime held under house arrest since 
1989 [REUTERS 29.11.1991]. 
Manglapus eventually did not succeed in meeting Aung San Suu Kyi and did not get any informa-
tion on the democratization process. Although he even suggested a Burmese ASEAN membership, 
Manglapus returned empty-handed [LIQUICIA 06.12.1991]. It was telling enough that Myanmar’s 
regime did not accept him as an Envoy of the Association, but instead insisted that the visit be 
treated as a bilateral one [KN 09.12.1991]. 
When the US and the European Community applied pressure on ASEAN to be tougher on the Bur-
mese military regime, Manglapus commented: 
We have to be given the right to do it our way … Not the American way, not the European 
way, but the Philippine and the Asian way570
The opinion in some of ASEAN’s capitals only changed when in March 1992 large scale suppression 
in Myanmar led to tens of thousands fleeing Burma
. [qtd. in: MACKLER 22.01.1992] 
However, also inside ASEAN there were notions aired – albeit coming mainly from the opposition 
benches - calling for action against the Burmese regime. Thus, for instance Malaysia’s opposition 
leader Lim Kit Siang urged the ASEAN leaders in the run-up to the Association’s 1992 summit to 
press for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi [AFP 25.01.1992]. 
571
                                                 
570 Arsa Sarasin, the Thai foreign minister argued very similarly, when he insisted: “[w]e have the Asian way to 
resolve this problem. We feel our way is the better way” [qtd. in: AFP 22.07.1992]. 
571 For an instructive account of the exodus see KAMALUDDIN 26.03.1992. 
 (the refugees reported about Burmese 
troops’ killing, looting, raping, and burning their homes) [Reuters 12.03.1992]. Similar to the case 
of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia the resulting refugees motivated ASEAN nations to raise 
their voice, since they considered the development to constitute a threat to regional security [VA-
TIKIOTIS&HANDLEY 26.03.1992]. Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand expressed their concern [AFP 
11.03.1992]. The following day Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas joined in the chorus when 
he pointed out that the issue was mainly an internal affair, 
[b]ut the recent developments show that the situation inside Myanmar has carried over 
into some international dimensions and tends to have an adverse effect on the peace and 
stability in Southeast Asia. [qtd. in: AFP 12.03.1992] 
At the same time Alatas ruled out using economic sanctions against the Burmese junta [Reuters 
12.03.1992]. As the fifth out of six ASEAN members at the time also Brunei criticized the activities 
leading to the vast refugee flows [JEN 19.03.1992]. ASEAN’s hope was that their “expression of 
concern in this strictly defined terms will persuade Burma to take account of the concerns of its 
neighbours in Southeast Asia” [VATIKIOTIS&HANDLEY 26.03.1992]. 
Consequently, when the Burmese government, after a change of its chairman, released 19 political 
prisoners, the Thai Foreign Minister, Pongpol Adireksarn, argued that this step might be attribut-
able to ASEAN’s constructive policy approach [JEN 27.04.1992]. At that time Thailand itself was 
ruled by the military. 
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At their yearly PMC in July 1992 the US together with the European Community and Canada once 
again pressured ASEAN to change its policy toward Myanmar. ASEAN, however, responded by reit-
erating in a communiqué that human rights are: 
governed by the distinct culture and history of...each country and that their expression 
and application in the national context are within the competence and responsibility of 
each country. [qtd. in: REUTERS 24.07.1992] 
Nevertheless some internal dynamics seemed to be at play. In October 1992, for instance, Thailand 
was urged to take the lead in pressing Burma to implement democratic reforms, being its closest 
ASEAN neighbour. Former Indonesian foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, explained: “[i]t 
has to be a neighbour because the Thais know the psychology of the Burmese better” [qtd. in: KIN 
10.10.1992]. 
When Myanmar was invited to take part as a guest at the AMM in July 1994, some parts of 
ASEAN’s civil society criticized the decision, arguing that such a step undeservingly gives respect-
ability and legitimacy to the military regime [KN 23.05.1994]. Burma eventually was invited by the 
host country Thailand and not by ASEAN itself [BP 29.11.1994]. Remarkably outspoken, Thailand 
on that occasion urged Burma’s regime to free Aung San Suu Kyi [WANNABOVORN 25.07.1994]. 
When the Western DPs had to admit that their policy of isolation was not bringing desirable results, 
ASEAN’s position – holding on to ‘constructive engagement’ seemed to have won some additional 
justifiability. As a consequence, some Western ASEAN allies took the opportunity to meet individu-
ally with the Burmese foreign minister during the ARF/PMC in Bangkok in July 1994 [COOPER 
28.07.1994]. The rapprochement seemed to progress, when at the first ARF meeting agreement 
was reached that improvements on the following benchmarks would henceforth guide the West’s 
relations with Burma: 
 
• the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners; 
• dialogue between political opponents; 
• access for the Red Cross and the UN to political detainees; 
• a constitutional reform through full and free participation; 
• legal rights for minorities; and 
• the repeal of laws restricting political freedom and free expression [MAKABENTA 
28.07.1994]. 
 
However, soon disillusion dominated again. Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans expressed the 
West’s disappointment and insisted: “[w]e continue to have a clear idea of what those benchmarks 
are and that no reward should be given to SLORC [acronym for the Burmese regime, my remark] 
by the international community until and unless these benchmarks have been met” [qtd. in: JEN 
20.02.1995]. 
When the regime released Aung San Suu Kyi shortly before the AMM in mid-1995, Thai foreign 
minister Surin Pitsuwan argued: 
I think certainly the release responded to the pervasive effort on the part of ASEAN or-
ganisation to pursue constructive engagement. [qtd. in: WAGSTAFF 11.07.1995] 
ASEAN members insisted that the release ought to convince its Western allies, that their ‘construc-
tive engagement’ policy was definitely more successful, than any steps designed to isolate the 
country [WAGSTAFF 11.07.1995]. Still, this position was not shared by the prominent opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was quoted as saying: 
I think it has to be recognised that constructive engagement doesn't work, and also a 
Burma led by a regime like SLORC is not going to be an asset to ASEAN. [qtd. in: AFP 
27.05.1996] 
In 1996 ASEAN endeavours recorded a setback to its policies when the Burmese regime arrested 
250 dissidents, and tried to block a congress of the Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy 
(NLD). Only individual nations, like the Thai and Philippines’ governments (as well as parts of Fili-
pino civil society) expressed concern about the large-scale arrest. Other ASEAN governments like 
ASEAN itself remained silent on the matter [BIRSEL 27.05.1996; AFP 28.05.1996; JEN 
29.05.1996]. 
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3.14.2 Rational Interests Outweighing moral Considerations 
This notwithstanding Malaysia and the Philippines made clear at a joint news conference that those 
internatl developments did not constitute a ‘setback’ to Myanmar’s efforts to join ASEAN [REUTERS 
31.05.1996]. However, upon pressure from Western governments and pro-democracy groups an 
SOM asked the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee at that time, Indonesia, to meet 
Burma’s military junta as well as Aung San Suu Kyi in order to express concern over the growing 
political tensions in that country. Indonesia rejected that request, arguing that ASEAN’ policy was 
one of non-interference [KN 17.06.1996]. It was also upheld that Burma was to gain observer 
status as originally planned at the upcoming AMM, regardless of the internal political upheavals 
[GOPALAKRISHNAN 15.07.1996]. 
ASEAN also resisted the EU’s pressure when the latter threatened that the eventual membership of 
Burma in ASEAN would jeopardize efforts to build closer relations between the two regional organi-
zations [PURA 19.07.1996]. NISCHALKE [NISCHALKE 2000:102] even goes so far as to argue that 
the recorded opposition to Burma’s membership as expressed in one way or the other by the Phil-
ippines, Thailand, and Singapore was squashed by Western pressure not to allow Myanmar to join 
– since it was felt that this constitutes undue external interference. Thus, in July 1996 Myanmar 
was accorded observer status, an important step on its road towards ASEAN membership 
[SPENCER 20.07.1996]. 
Asked in how far the ASEAN approach would influence the situation in Burma in a positive way, 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Siazon argued: 
If you can have a higher standard of living in Burma where there are investments, more 
foreign people going there, exposing them to foreign countries, then we will have im-
provements in Myanmar. [qtd. in: SON 23.07.1996] 
In the end the EU bogged down and refused to go for a showdown on the subject. Rather – as has 
had already happened in the past – Dick Spring, representing the EU explained: “I think it's impor-
tant that we'll have regular meetings [with Burma, my remark] where those concerns can be ex-
pressed” [qtd. in: CHUAN 23.07.1996; compare also AT 24.07.1996]. 
Subsequently, the Burmese regime felt free to put the political opposition under renewed pressure. 
In autumn 1996 again several hundred supporters of the NLD were detained in order to block party 
gatherings. These developments triggered some cracks in the unified pro-membership front among 
ASEAN states. Philippines’ President Fidel Ramos, for instance, voiced his expectation that Burma 
fulfils certain democratic standards [DJTES 02.10.1996]. The Philippines were joined by Thailand, 
which, although upholding that it was an internal affair of Myanmar, the situation ought to be ‘re-
solved in a positive way’, and ASEAN cannot overlook the recent crackdown [JEN 04.10.1996]. 
Malaysia, in its function as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, said: “[w]e view what is 
happening in Burma with some concern and hope the government of Burma will be able to deal 
with it in a manner acceptable to all” [qtd. in: REUTERS 03.10.1996]. 
Still, at an SOM held two weeks later, no objection whatsoever to Burma’s application to join 
ASEAN was witnessed [REUTERS 18.10.1996b]. Quite to the contrary, the Western renewal of ap-
plying pressure against Burma’s admission led once more to outright defiance on the side of 
ASEAN. After Washington had imposed a ban on US investments in Burma, Rodolfo Severino, un-
dersecretary of the Philippine foreign ministry, argued: “[e]ven if we were disposed to bend on 
Burma, how can we be now?” [qtd. in: VATIKIOTIS 08.05.1997]. NISCHALKE argues similarly: 
As it turned out, Western pressure has proven counterproductive. It galvanized ASEAN 
and evoked a strong sense of collective purpose and ‘we-feeling’. Misgivings about Myan-
mar’s human rights record on the side of some ASEAN members became secondary to a 
collective assertion that outsiders should not interfere in ASEAN affairs and a common 
purpose to fulfil the ASEAN-10 aspiration. [NISCHALKE 2002:105] 
Finally Burma was inducted into ASEAN in July 1997. 
Shortly before that, however, Malaysia’s foreign minister Badawi had paid a visit to Yangon submit-
ting three proposals to the junta designed to smooth the way for eventual democratic reforms. 
Those proposals consisted of: 
 
• work on Myanmar’s constitution shall be completed as soon as possible in order to hold leg-
islative elections; 
• the junta shall launch a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi; and 
• the regime ought to ensure that Myanmar’s Muslims and other minorities are treated fairly. 
 
The junta’s reaction to the proposals, however, became not known [JEN 26.07.1997], but later 
developments rendered Malaysia’s initiative ineffective. 
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Intra-ASEAN opposition to Burma’s accession, largely coming from the Philippines and Thailand, 
was silenced in favour of geopolitical reasons. LEIFER diagnoses that ASEAN displayed consistency, 
when it rated regional order before internal political order [LEIFER 1999:35].  
And SIMON analyses ASEAN’s underlying intentions: 
Over the past decade, Beijing has established a close political and military relationship 
with the Yangon regime. ASEAN leaders agree that Burma’s membership in the Associa-
tion will limit China’s penetration and firmly reposition Burma in Southeast Asia. [SIMON 
1998:65] 
3.14.3 Myanmar as a Problem within 
The EU’s opposition to the Burmese regime continued despite its entry into ASEAN. The EU an-
nounced that it will not allow Myanmar to participate at ASEAN-EU meetings that are to be held on 
EU territory. It was also reiterated that the existing cooperation agreement between the two or-
ganizations will not be extended to Burma as long as no progress toward democratisation was dis-
cernible [APN 04.08.1997]. Consequently, an ASEAN-EU cooperation meeting, scheduled for No-
vember 1997 had to be postponed [AFP 13.11.1997]. 
As a measure of ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister met Suu Kyi 
in March 1998. Malaysia was known to be one of the staunchest supporters of the Burmese regime. 
However, no details were made public on the contents of the meeting [AP 10.03.1998], leaving it 
difficult to ascertain the success achieved. When again the internal Burmese situation worsened, 
and Suu Kyi asked the ASEAN nations to support her demand for the recognition of the landslide 
victory in the previous election in 1990, Malaysia explained, that this would be quite difficult to do, 
and another way would have to be found [APN 27.07.1998]. Generally, the hoped for gradual 
change inside Burma was not forthcoming, resulting in some disillusion also among ASEAN mem-
bers. A Thai official noted: 
We thought we could ‘Aseanize' Burma and bring it more into the region. … But instead we 
find the military leaders there just as arrogant and brittle. [qtd. in: TASKER & HIEBERT 
23.07.1998] 
Somewhat later ASEAN could score a success when, in October 1998, the EU decided to allow 
Myanmar to attend the next meeting between itself and ASEAN572
As the EU-ASEAN meeting finally moved closer, the two bodies could not agree on the technicalities 
of the meeting. Whereas the EU insisted that Laos and Burma would sit behind a plaque reading 
‘new members’, Thailand had proposed the term ‘non-signatory’ (to the cooperation agreement 
with the EU) Additionally, ASEAN was unwilling to agree to the condition that Burma ought not 
speak at the meeting. In the end the meeting had to be postponed indefinitely
 [JEN 27.10.1998]. Two months 
later the EU signed an economic cooperation MOU with ASEAN – wherein the membership of Burma 
was not quoted as an obstacle [DJIN 31.12.1998]. 
Endeavours to make the Burmese regime more acceptable for its Western allies continued and in 
December 1998  the Philippine President urged Myanmar to speed up national reconciliation in or-
der to create healthy foundations for political stability and economic growth [AFP 16.12.1998]. 
However, that call - like others before - remained unheeded. 
573
Differences persisted when the next meeting, this time a ministerial one, scheduled for March 
1999, approached. Since that meeting would have taken place on EU soil, the participation of high 
level Burmese government officials was problematic given the existing EU visa ban [BRUNNSTROM 
15.02.1999]. Indonesia announced that if the EU would insist on not allowing Burma to participate, 
ASEAN would not attend the meeting [XINHUA 18.02.1999]. About two weeks before the meeting 
was to take place, both regional organizations still had not found common ground on the issue; and 
it increasingly looked likely that the meeting would be cancelled [GOMEZ 14.03.1999]. As a last 
ditch initiative the EU suggested to downgrade the ministerial meeting. The EU would be repre-
 [BP 23.01.1999]. 
ASEAN’s argument, that Burma had already participated in meetings with the EU, as at the PMC 
and the ARF, did not change the European position on the matter [XINHUA 28.01.1999]. 
                                                 
572 The success was neither substantially derogated through the applied formula – suggested by Thailand – that 
the Burmese delegates would refrain from speaking at the meeting, nor through the accompanying EU state-
ment, that read: “It is without prejudice to Burmese representation at future meetings held under that agree-
ment which will need to be decided in the light of the situation in Burma” [qtd. in: ASHAYAGACHAT 
28.10.1998]. 
573 On the EU’s problems with the new members Vietnam, Laos, and Burma regarding the issue of human 
rights, see LINTNER et.al. 28.01.1999. 
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sented by its leading troika, and ASEAN would send a 7-member delegation, without the participa-
tion of Myanmar [AFP 15.03.1999a]. In the end an ASEM (Asia-Europe-Meeting574
However, ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement approach’
) took place, 
albeit without the participation of Myanmar – although the fact was stressed that the country was 
no member of that consultative process. At about the same time the long delayed EU-ASEAN Joint 
Cooperation Committee Meeting was re-scheduled for May, to be held in Bangkok with the atten-
dance of Myanmar, albeit without it speaking during the meeting [AP 31.03.1999]. Alongside also 
Laos and Cambodia were to attend as observers, due to them not yet having signed the coopera-
tive agreement with the EU; a condition to be met before they would be in a position to fully par-
ticipate in the Joint Cooperation Committee [BBC 26.04.1999]. 
Upon the problems manifesting themselves, the Philippines urged the Burmese regime to hasten 
progress toward democratisation. Filipino foreign undersecretary Lauro Baja argued: 
We told them that Myanmar has to show some movement, some reforms because whether 
we like it or not, it is affecting our relations with the EU. [qtd. in: APN 22.03.1999] 
In the run-up to the 1999 AMM, the EU launched an initiative to break the deadlock concerning 
Myanmar. It suggested sending a fact-finding delegation that would encourage dialogue between 
the military junta and the political opposition [REUTERS 30.06.1999]. The idea did go nowhere and 
had to be postponed again in late 2000 [LANFRANCHI 09.12.2000]. 
575
When the International Labour Organisation (ILO) issued a sanctions’ recommendation against the 
practice of forced labour in Myanmar, all ASEAN states voted against it, except Thailand who ab-
stained. Burma voiced its regret but Thailand argued that there has not always to be a joint stand 
 did not bear any fruits in this period as 
well; instead, the Burmese military revamped its own resources, launched massive intelligence 
gathering and intense surveillance of its population, and also continued to intimidate and arrest 
opposition politicians. Any form of liberalisation remained completely out of sight [LINTNER 
02.09.1999]. 
Nevertheless, the EU signalled in March 2000 that Myanmar was to be invited to a SOM between 
itself and ASEAN, taking place in Portugal the following May. An ASEAN official stated that “the EU 
informed ASEAN that the meeting of senior officials would be held on a block-to-block basis, and 
that members of both sides enjoy rights in the meeting equally” [qtd. in: JEN 16.03.2000b]. That 
position was reaffirmed by the British foreign minister Cook who explained that the EU wants to 
revive its relations with ASEAN and he added “when we resume dialogue with ASEAN, we resume 
dialogue with all members of ASEAN”; however, no further explanation why that now would be the 
future modus operandi in dealing with Burma, was given [qtd. in: NATION 20.04.2000]. The EU 
later announced that it would hold a ‘critical dialogue’ with Myanmar – notwithstanding the contra-
diction this posed to the parallel exception made concerning the visa ban for Burma’s officials for 
the upcoming ASEAN-EU meeting in Lisbon [AFP 15.06.2000]. 
When in August 2000 tensions between the Burmese junta and the political opposition flared up 
once more, divisions among the ASEAN members were laid bare. Thailand voiced its concern about 
the confrontation, arguing (like it did earlier about the poor standing of human rights in the region) 
that this could pose an image problem for ASEAN. The Thai foreign minister said: “[i]t should end 
soon, otherwise it will reduce confidence in ASEAN among the international community” [qtd. in: 
KN 29.08.2000]. On the other side of the intra-ASEAN divide, Vietnam underlined that the situation 
constituted a ‘strictly’ internal affair, and insinuated that both sides were endowed with equal rights 
and possibilities, bringing forward the argument: “[i]t's up to the people of Myanmar to decide for 
themselves, without any outside interference” [qtd. in: TI 08.09.2000], pretending that the Bur-
mese population was enjoying any form of substantive democratic participation. Vietnam - as cur-
rent Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee - was also not welcoming the proposal presented 
by the UNSG to establish a Troika to handle the Myanmar crisis [KN 21.09.2000]. Even after Suu 
Kyi had again been put under house arrest, ASEAN SG Severino stated only “[a]t various levels, 
ASEAN members are keeping an eye on what's happening in Myanmar” and he clarified: “[b]ut 
there is no question of mediation or anything like that” [qtd. in: BRUNNSTROM 12.10.2000]. 
                                                 
574 The Asia-Europe-Meetings were sponsored by France and Singapore and had been initiated in 1996. Those 
meetings originally were designed to constitute a dialogue framework bringing together the EU and ASEAN and 
other Asian countries. Later, those gatherings were attended also by Myanmar [AA 01.08.1999]. 
575 David JARDINE wrote in August 2000 for the Jakarta Post the following: “[c]onstructive engagement is 
predicated on the assumption that the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council, the term for the Myanmar 
junta, my remark) can be persuaded to soften its lines if it is given sufficient incentives. But when it patently 
does not work, what then? If the policy itself is not intrinsically wrong then its continuation in the present cir-
cumstances must be seen as a form of taking sides against the NLD and the rest of the opposition. And taking 
sides is interference”, sounding out the widely felt disaffection and unease with the Association’s policy toward 
the Burmese regime [JARDINE 10.08.2000]. 
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on every issue.  Although the possibility that the question might be discussed formally by ASEAN 
was discounted, Win Aung, Burma’s foreign minister, pondered that “maybe when they meet in the 
corridors and they meet bilaterally they might talk about it” [qtd. in: AFP 23.11.2000a]. 
Finally, the EU agreed to organize the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM), on hold since Myan-
mar’s entry into ASEAN in 1997. When the meeting took place in December 2000, indignation in-
side ASEAN was obvious about the EU’ countries’ sending of only two Foreign Ministers [KN 
10.12.2000]. Although the human rights situation in Burma was contentiously discussed during the 
AEMM, both sides agreed in their assessment that the issue shall not impair the vital ties between 
the two regional organizations576
On one of his trips to Burma in early 2001 Razali Ismail was accompanied by Malaysia’s Prime Min-
ister Mahathir Mohamad
 [JOSHI 11.12.2000]. Thus, ASEAN succeeded in the EU’s coalesc-
ing its position with that of the Association and in neutralizing the latter’s former obstructive oppo-
sition on the matter. In their joint declaration both sides expressed their support for an ongoing 
mediation attempt by UNSG Special Envoy Razali Ismail, who had travelled twice to Burma two 
times in previous July and October to discuss the situation with leaders of the military junta and 
the opposition [APN 18.12.2000]. Earlier, the Special Envoy’s activities have also been welcomed 
by the 7th ARF in late July 2000 [ASEAN 2003:257]. 
577
During the following months the Burmese junta released some political prisoners and continued the 
resumed talks with the political opposition which had been started the previous October. And while 
ASEAN
. Changing his former stance, Mahathir urged the Burmese junta to al-
low elections in a clear deviation of his erstwhile maintained and strongly defended opinion that the 
non-interference principle be held up. Mahathir was even quoted as saying that it was ‘ASEAN’s 
role to foster democracy in Burma’ [qtd. in: STEWART 29.01.2001]. 
578
In early June 2003 the military again clamped down heavily on the democracy movement, closing 
offices of the National League for Democracy and arresting Suu Kyi once again. ASEAN’s first reac-
tion was diffident
 and Australia expressed their appreciation of those developments, the EU insisted that 
more progress will have to be witnessed, describing the 8th ARF’s statement as ‘rather weak’ on 
that issue [KIRBY 25.07.2001; LINDTNER 25.01.2001]. However, the impetus on national dialogue 
and democratic reforms seemed to fade soon thereafter, a development that dealt another blow to 
ASEAN’s efforts to re-integrate Myanmar into the international community [CRISPIN & LINDTNER 
10.05.2001]. 
Only when in May 2002 Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, was ASEAN together 
with the UN Special Envoy Razali credited for that step [MACAN-MARKAR 07.06.2002]. 
Reports about atrocities perpetrated by the Burmese regime continued to trickle out of the country. 
This time the charges came from Shan rebels that had been fighting for their cause already for 
several decades in the Thai-Burma border region. In mid-2002 Yawd Serk, a leading Shan urged 
the UN or ASEAN to help mediate in the conflict [WANNABOVORN 01.07.2002]. A report published 
by two Shan civil society organizations detailed that the regime was using massive rape campaigns 
against the Shan ethnic group. This triggered renewed outrage by the West about the Burmese 
leadership [PARAMESWARAN 25.07.2002]. 
But this upheaval did not undo the EU’s general trend toward establishing business-as-usual with 
ASEAN – in disregard of the Association’s membership. Thus, the EU again temporarily lifted a visa 
ban, so that the Myanmar junta leaders could attend a meeting in Brussels. This step was hailed as 
a ‘big breakthrough’ by ASEAN [SCMP 27.01.2003]. 
579
However, a cautionary change of mind seemed to take place when ASEAN announced that Myan-
mar had agreed to a ‘discussion on recent political developments in that country’, as ASEAN’s 
speaker announced; he continued: “[t]his is the first time that ASEAN will comment on this domes-
tic issue. Myanmar has accepted ASEAN's proactive stance on this subject of concern” [qtd. in: 
. The Secretary General Ong Keng Yong explained that although ASEAN will try 
to find out what was going on, “[b]ear in mind Myanmar is our member … You cannot go in and tell 
your family member you cannot do this, you cannot do that” [qtd. in: AP 03.06.2003b]. 
The Association’s reaction remained lukewarm; a communiqué was drafted supporting the UN Spe-
cial Representative Razali Ismail who was sent to the country, but at the same carefully shunned 
any regional effort at resolving the situation [KN 14.06.2003]. 
                                                 
576 A European diplomat expressed it this way: “[w]e do not want the Burmese tail to wag the ASEAN dog” [qtd. 
in: LINTNER 16.11.2000]. 
577 For their travel and dealings compare also: LINDTNER 25.01.2001. 
578 ASEAN’s foreign ministers stated at their 34th AMM in July 2001: „We noted encouraging developments in the 
Union of Myanmar and appreciated the efforts of the Government of Myanmar towards these developments and 
reiterated our support to the on-going process of national reconciliation in this country“[ASEAN 24.07.2001]. 
579 The Thai foreign minister, however, was said to have indicated the need for ASEAN’s involvement, arguing 
that the non-interference posture was in the process of being gradually changed [KN 06.06.2003]. But this 
position was neutralized when the Permanent Secretary of the Thai foreign minister, Tej Bunnang, referring to 
Myanmar’s comments on the occasion of the 2003 AMM stated: “[w]e just listened to the official briefing. No 
Asean official had any comment about the situation as it's a purely domestic affair” [qtd. in: NT 15.06.2003]. 
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LOVERING 15.06.2003, compare also JOSHI 14.06.2003]. The ASEAN Secretary General confirmed 
that Myanmar was told that its fellows in ASEAN would like to see an easing of tensions and an 
early release of Aung San Suu Kyi; and Singapore’s Foreign Minister Jayakumar noted about the 
AMM discussion on the matter: “a point was made that the recent developments were a setback 
not just for Myanmar but also for ASEAN” [qtd. in: GOMEZ 15.06.2003]. 
With the exception of the Philippines the rest of ASEAN soon showed their strong affiliation with the 
traditional hands-off attitude and explained they were satisfied by the information they had re-
ceived from the Burmese leadership [NT 17.06.2003]. While asking the Myanmar regime to resume 
its efforts at national reconciliation and once more calling for the early release of Aung San Suu 
Kyi, the 2003 AMM also underlined the commitment to the principle of non-interference [TNS 
20.06.2003]. Still, this was enough to prompt the Far Eastern Economic Review to comment that 
ASEAN “took the unprecedented step of criticizing and urging a member to change a domestic pol-
icy”580
Meanwhile, Thailand had drafted a ‘reconciliation roadmap’ and handed it over to the Burmese 
leadership, raising renewed hopes for the resolution of the crisis [OANA 24.07.2003]. No details of 
the roadmap – to be at the centre of the envisioned ‘Bangkok Process’ - were made public how-
ever
 [BORSUK 26.06.2003]. 
The Philippine Foreign Minister announced that as soon as Suu Kyi would be free, ASEAN intended 
to send a mission to Burma to push for political reform and freedom for the Burmese people [KN 
20.06.2003]; however, it remained in the dark why the junta would possibly welcome such a mis-
sion – or why this type of announcement was considered designed to persuade it to move in the 
desired direction. 
In the meantime also Thailand joined the Philippines, arguing that the behaviour of the Burmese 
regime was increasingly frustrating the Association as well as its DPs  [THEPGUMPANAT 
26.06.2003]. However, both countries had been traditionally in the vanguard of an activist ap-
proach.  But when Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, joined in the criticism this was a 
remarkable step for one of the more conservative proponents of non-interference. Although ruling 
out the imposition of sanctions, Syed Hamid Albar explained Malaysia’s concern: 
We have managed to convince people outside of our region that ASEAN's policy of 'con-
structive engagement' (with Myanmar) is working...but (the) recent event that has taken 
place in Myanmar has become a setback. … Myanmar has to help ASEAN to gain back its 
credibility. People are looking at whether ASEAN is doing enough. [qtd. in: KN 
26.06.2003] 
Even more outspoken was Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahatir in an interview a couple of days later, 
describing his deep disappointment with the developments. Touching on the non-interference pos-
ture, Mahatir explained: 
We don't criticise member states unless what one state does embarrasses us, causes a 
problem for us. We are thinking about ourselves as ASEAN, we are not criticising Myanmar 
for doing what is not related to us, but what they have done has affected us, our credibil-
ity. Because of that, we have voiced our views. [qtd. in: AFP 20.07.2003] 
Mahatir even went so far as to indicate the option of Myanmar’s expulsion from ASEAN [AFP 
20.07.2003]. However, this warning was considered to be premature, even by activist Thailand [AP 
21.07.2003]. 
But discontent was more widely expressed than usual; thus, also Singapore voiced its consterna-
tion about the not-forthcoming release of Aung San Suu Kyi [AFP 30.06.2003]. 
In the meantime is was up to Indonesia – having taken over the Chairmanship of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee - to prepare a mission that was to be sent to Myanmar; at that time the pos-
sibility was raised of the Indonesian foreign minister travelling alone to the country [BBC MN 
04.07.2003]. Amidst impatience also felt by Indonesia itself, it was clarified that the mission would 
have the task to help in bringing about the release of Suu Kyi. However, at that time Myanmar had 
not yet accepted to receive such a mission [EN-LAI 23.07.2003]. 
581
                                                 
580 It seems to have escaped the FEER’s memory that ASEAN had issued a statement on the domestic political 
situation of the Philippines in 1986 (see chapter). 
581 It was reported that the proposal had  not even been put down to paper [TASKER & LINTNER 14.08.2003]; 
however,  for somewhat of a notion of what the roadmap looked like, compare the excerpt of a Burmese news-
paper article by the BBC Monitoring Service [BBC MS 21.10.2003]. HAACKE outlined that the so-called 'Bang-
kok Process' foresaw the following five steps: 1. release of the political opposition's leadership; 2. confidence 
building between the political opposition and the government; 3. drafting and adoption of a new constitution; 4. 
transitional period and 5. organizing free elections [HAACKE 2005:193]. 
, although Thailand also signalled its willingness to hold a respective conference [OANA 
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29.09.2003]. Thailand was motivated by the fear of additional Burmese refugees and by a potential 
increase of illegal drug trafficking once the political situation in Burma further deteriorated 
[TASKER & LINTNER 14.08.2003]. The UN Special Representative called on ASEAN and the UN to 
cooperate closely in their effort to free Suu Kyi [SINGH 28.07.2003] – indicating prior ambivalence 
and a lack of coordination between the two organizations. 
And while international pressure mounted on the Burmese junta, for instance through the closure 
of US markets for Burmese imports, Indonesia announced that it had received the assurance that 
Suu Kyi would be free by October at the latest [KN 29.07.2003]. Impatience took hold in mid-
September, when the Burmese leadership sent no signals for its readiness to free Suu Kyi. Indone-
sia subsequently announced to eventually send a Special Envoy, former foreign minister Ali Alatas, 
in a ‘low profile way’, thus ensuring the effectiveness of the mission by transforming a contentious 
multilateral into a more welcome unilateral project [KN 12.09.2003; KN 18.09.2003]. 
Soon after Alatas had concluded the visit, Suu Kyi was transferred to house arrest, prompting In-
donesia to speak of a ‘not insignificant’ move in the right direction582
The first meeting in the framework of the Bangkok process
 [qtd. in: AFP 27.09.2003]. 
ASEAN also treaded more than carefully, when it welcomed the ‘positive developments’ and reiter-
ated its position that sanctions were deemed unhelpful [AFP 07.10.2003], despite of the fact that 
Suu Kyi was still under house arrest which ran counter to the promise Indonesia had received ear-
lier from the military junta. 
Only the Philippines spoke out against that timidity, explaining the widespread easing of positions 
with the hope that the Thai roadmap would finally succeed [AFP 08.10.2003a]. The US rejected 
such a roadmap as long as it did not foresee the participation by the opposition [AFP 10.08.2003b]. 
In order to pre-empt further initiatives the Burmese regime announced its own seven-step road 
map in late August 2003 – albeit without an accompanying timetable [HAACKE 2005:194].  
ASEAN in the meantime requested the Thai Prime Minister to use the upcoming APEC Summit to 
demand Suu Kyi’s release, functioning as ASEAN spokesman on the issue [NT 21.10.2003]. The 
announcement of the Burmese regime’s road-map together with the transformation of Suu Kyi's 
detention into house arrest had softened the tone inside the Association. Subsequently, the 2003 
Summit encouraged the Myanmar leadership, stating: 
The Leaders welcomed the recent positive developments in Myanmar and the Govern-
ment's pledge to bring about a transition to democracy through dialogue and reconcilia-
tion. The roadmap as outlined by the Prime Minister of Myanmar that would involve all 
strata of Myanmar society is a pragmatic approach and deserves understanding and sup-
port. The Leaders also agree that sanctions are not helpful in promoting peace and stabil-
ity essential for democracy to take root. [qtd. in: HAACKE 2005:194] 
The Burmese government’s own seven-point roadmap included the drafting of a constitution, the 
holding of a referendum, and the holding of a general election. However, KATANYUU noted: 
The seven-point road map reflects the junta's calculated plan to reduce international and 
regional pressure since it offers no clear time frame for national reconciliation. The plan 
also fails to lay out any commitment to a dialogue with the opposition or minorities. [KA-
TANYUU 2006:831] 
583
It was the EU that in mid 2004 again dragged the repressive regime into the spotlight, when it 
cancelled a meeting with ASEAN economic ministers, rejecting that Burmese officials take part 
therein [AWSJ 17.06.2004]. And after ASEAN released a carefully watered down version of its more 
 took place in mid-December 2003, 
but it failed to produce any significant movement on the Burmese side [HAACKE 2005:195]. A sec-
ond meeting, scheduled to take place in April 2004, had to be postponed due to Myanmar's 'busi-
ness' with regard to its political developments, including the convening of the National Convention 
that was to work out the constitution [TUN 22.04.2004]. In the following years no other meeting 
took place. As the Economist Intelligence Unit noted, the Thai leadership – remaining unsuccessful 
with this initiative – started to support the line taken by Myanmar’s leadership [EIU 13.09.2007]. 
Win MIN, a lecturer on Myanmar affairs at Chiang Mai University opines that the Bangkok process 
failed due to a lack of consultation among ASEAN nations, but also with India and China [TNA 
31.01.2008]. 
                                                 
582 Tellingly, Alatas stated that the Association does not want to be disturbed by ‘irrelevant issues’ at their up-
coming summit meeting [qtd. in: AFP 27.09.2003]. It remains unclear if this statement reflected simply the 
notion that ‘ASEAN does not want the relatively insignificant Myanmar to dominate discussion and tarnish the 
group's image’ [WMRCDA  30.09.2003], or rather the low profile democratic liberalization generally had in the 
ASEAN context. 
583 See an account of the meeting in KATANYUU 2006:832. 
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explicit draft on the issue after the 37th AMM, the EU was indignant – calling on the Association to 
press Myanmar for democratic change and citing the danger that the country might turn into a 
'failed state' [AFXA 01.07.2004]. ASEAN’s soft stance was also condemned by the US and Australia 
[DJIN 02.07.2004]. Later the UN's Special Envoy Razali joined the critics: “ASEAN should talk 
more, persuade or even cajole the government” [qtd. in: DJIN 06.07.2004]. 
An internal leadership power struggle, resulting in the ouster of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and the 
take-over by hardliner Than Shwe584
3.14.4 Countervailing Pressures Reloaded 
, did change nothing in the Association's approach to the coun-
try – on the contrary: 'constructive engagement' was reemphasized to be the appropriate policy 
toward the regime [AFXA 25.10.2004]. Promptly, the leadership assured the international commu-
nity that its own 'road map to democracy’ will be further pursued. The release of 7.000 prisoners 
was seen as being an attempt at appeasing the country's critics [AFXIF 26.11.2004]. 
The prospect of Burma taking over the ASEAN Standing Committee Chairmanship in 2006 as 
scheduled, raised international criticism as early as November 2004. It was argued that this step 
would be a legitimization of the military regime [AFP 29.11.2004]. One of the more prominent per-
sonalities among the critics was Zaid Ibrahim, Malaysian MP and interim president of the ASEAN 
Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar, arguing that in case progress is lacking until 2006, 
Burma ought to face penalties [MILLS 29.11.2004]. Still, when Thailand's Prime Minister seemed to 
support this stance, his words: “I think one year from now on, some things must be improved” 
sounded somewhat non-committal [qtd. in: AFP 30.11.2004]. Later it was learned that the issu-
ance of a critical statement on Burma at the ASEAN Summit had been sabotaged by Thailand [GO-
MEZ 01.12.2007]. 
However, as usual, criticism from outside was not received well. After the US had threatened to 
boycott ASEAN meetings and the EU had indicated likewise for the case that Myanmar takes over 
the chairmanship, Malaysia rejected the statement harshly, pointing to the sovereign equality of all 
ASEAN members [BBC MS 07.12.2004; GANESAN 2006:132]. However, amid indications that the 
house arrest of Suu Kyi might be extended another time, Indonesia's foreign minister said, that the 
hosting of the Summit 2006 has to be re-evaluated, since Myanmar might not be considered ‘wor-
thy’ to do that [qtd. in: TJANDRANINGSIH 09.12.2004]. 
ASEAN's overall inactivity on the matter was explained by reporters of the Financial Times thus: 
South-east Asian governments on Monday abandoned attempts to censure Burma publicly 
for its human rights abuses, with officials admitting in private that they could not take ef-
fective action against Burma's military regime without the support of China. [KAZMIN & 
MALLET 29.11.2004] 
However, opposition to Burma's scheduled take-over of the chairmanship did not die down; in early 
2005 ASEAN legislators, grouped in the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus585
Criticism was moreover voiced by the Singaporean leadership, also implying that the lack of re-
forms might easily throw into doubt that Myanmar was in a position to take over the chairmanship 
[REUTERS 04.03.2005]. Additional pressure from the EU resulted in a joint statement of both re-
gional organization requesting Myanmar to grant access to the UN representative
 did not only criticize 
Myanmar's domestic situation but also voiced their intention to send a fact-finding mission to the 
country; one legislator further explained that: 
We also agreed that unless there is improvement in the political situation in Burma (the 
former name of Myanmar), with meaningful democratization and improvement in national 
reconciliation, for example a meaningful National Convention, Burma is not qualified to be 
chairman of ASEAN in 2006 and this must be the concern of all ASEAN parliamentarians. 
[qtd. in: XINHUA 03.02.2005] 
586
                                                 
584 For some insight on why the move presented a setback to democratization see PERRIN & JAGAN 01.11.2004. 
585 For a short interview with one Malaysian legislator on the Myanmar issue see: JP 12.02.2005. 
586 Myanmar had started refusing to allow the UN Special Envoy, Razali Ismail, into the country in summer 2004 
[MANIBHANDU 02.08.2005]. 
 and to free the 
opposition leader [SUSANTI & SIMAMORA 12.03.2005]. Malaysia suggested the suspension of 
Myanmar's chairmanship [AFP 22.03.2005]. Malaysia, initially one of the strongest supporters of 
Burma’s admission, had meanwhile turned into a strong critic. SIMON explains this sea-change 
thus: 
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Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad had been the junta’s ardent advocate within the | Asso-
ciation. Subsequently, he felt personally betrayed by the military regime’s unyielding re-
sistance to ASEAN’s insistence on a pathway to democratization. [SIMON 2008:272-273] 
Cambodia, on the other hand, underlined its support for Burma, upholding that the issue consti-
tuted an internal problem only [KEA 28.03.2005]; also Vietnam and Laos shared this view [TORS-
RICHAROEN & AGNOTE 11.04.2005]. 
Amid rising pressure the Burmese regime decided to postpone further reforms, arguing that 
weather conditions would not allow the scheduled constitutional convention to take place [TNS 
06.04.2005]. However, in the meantime the rumour was floated that Myanmar might be willing to 
voluntarily pass on the 2006 chairmanship [TORSRICHAROEN & AGNOTE 11.04.2005]. During their 
April 2005 Retreat, the Foreign Ministers were not able to make a final decision on how to proceed, 
deferring it to the upcoming AMM [DJIN 18.04.2005]. Confronted with the idea of passing on the 
chairmanship, Burma's Foreign Minister Nyan Win responded: "We will continue to discuss that" 
[qtd. in: GOMEZ 12.04.2005]. 
The announcement of the US secretary of state not to attend the upcoming ARF, thought to be a 
reaction to the planned take-over of ASEAN's chairmanship by Myanmar, increased the stakes [BBC 
MS 07.07.2005]. Dewi Fortuna ANWAR, a foreign policy expert at the Indonesian Academy of Sci-
ences, commented: 
If Rice's [US Secretary of State at that time, my remark] absence is intended as a signal 
to Asean to be more forceful about Myanmar, and if Myanmar continues to be recalcitrant 
and insists on taking the chair, it could become problematic for Asean. [qtd. in: ENGLAND 
22.07.2005] 
It was to the relief of many587, when Burma finally announced that it would skip its turn as chair588
The Burmese situation continued to lead to diplomatic difficulties; in September 2005 ASEAN Eco-
nomic Ministers refused to attend an ASEM meeting after the Netherlands – hosting the meeting – 
refused to issue a visa for the Burmese Minister. Instead, only senior ASEAN officials were to at-
tend the gathering [BBC MS 16.09.2005]. When Burma tasked a National Convention with complet-
ing a constitution in December 2005, this met with widespread scepticism about the credibility of 
the venture [e.g. compare MILLS 05.12.2005]; especially so, after the house-arrest of Suu Kyi had 
been extended for another six month. ASEAN voiced its frustration and the current chairman, Ma-
 
in favour of the next in-line, the Philippines. Foreign Minister Nyan Win informed his colleagues that 
it had “decided to relinquish its turn to be the chair of ASEAN in 2006 because it would want to 
focus its attention on the ongoing national reconciliation and democratization process” [qtd. in: AP 
26.07.2005]. 
The ASEAN statement issued upon that step, stated the following: 
We would like to express our complete understanding of the decision by the government 
of Myanmar. We also express our sincere appreciation to the government of Myanmar for 
not allowing its national preoccupation to affect ASEAN's solidarity and cohesiveness. The 
government of Myanmar has shown its commitment to the well-being of ASEAN and its 
goal of advancing the interests of all member countries. 
And it added somewhat cryptically: 
We agreed that once Myanmar is ready to take its turn to be the ASEAN chair it can do so. 
[text of the statement in: AFP 26.07.2005] 
Although ASEAN countries definitely had put pressure on the regime, to judge that 'the group 
blocked the junta from taking up the rotation', as KATANYUU [2006:839] claims, seems over-
drawn. However, the Thai foreign minister's statement, that once democracy is restored in Burma 
'then we would allow them and welcome them to the chair, to come back and be at the front line,' 
seemed to reflect the Association’s position more accurately [qtd. in: KURTENBACH 29.07.2005]. 
                                                 
587 However, a commentary by the Jakarta Post made the "ASEAN Way" responsible for the more than inade-
quate response of the Association to the repressive Burmese regime. It moreover argued about the deferral of 
the chairmanship: "The outcome of the meeting in Vientiane provided no cure for ASEAN's ills vis-a-vis the 
Myanmar issue. It merely provided an opiate to temporarily ease a pressing pain. Like all opiates, however, this 
one is no less likely to become an addiction that will only contribute to a further deterioration in the patient's 
health." [JP 27.06.2005]. 
588 For some bits of theory on why the Burmese junta made that decision compare: MYDANS 30.08.2005. 
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laysia's Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar commented: “[e]ven though it is an internal affair of 
Myanmar, (the junta) itself must be able to show us movement in respect of the road map as well 
as on the position of Aung San Suu Kyi” [qtd. in: DJIN 09.12.2005]. 
Discontent among ASEAN nations was growing and the idea to send a delegation to Burma, in or-
der to speed up the democratization process, was proposed. Myanmar indicated that it would wel-
come such a delegation589
Later, April 2006 was given as the time horizon for the ASEAN Envoy to visit the country [AFP 
21.02.2006]; the visit was re-scheduled once more and finally took place in late March. But the 
Democratic Voice of Burma, based in Norway, reported that ASEAN Special Envoy Syed Hamid 
Albar, had cut short his visit, after being refused to meet the political opposition [BBC MS 
26.03.2006]. This allegation was denied by the Envoy, calling his visit a success, since having had 
the possibility to witness the regime's democratic endeavours [AP 26.03.2006]. That all was not 
well clearly emerged when the then Chair of ASEAN, Ong Keng Yong, demanded that India and 
China do their part in convincing Myanmar to make progress on its democratic path, ASEAN as 
such being constrained because of its non-interference policy
, whose composition at the time was not yet fixed [AFP 12.12.2005]. It 
later emerged that the current Chair, Malaysia’s foreign minister, was to make the visit. However, 
contrary to initial plans, Burma showed itself unwilling to receive him in January, arguing that the 
government simply was too busy moving its administrative capital at that point in time [AP 
06.01.2006]. Meanwhile UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail had refused to extend his contract with the 
world body, obviously due to disillusion with the Burmese regime’s recalcitrance [HO 16.01.2006]. 
590. Indeed, especially China had and 
has considerable influence over Burma591
3.14.5 Gradual Shifting of Opinion? 
, a factor gaining more weight after the West had imposed 
sanctions on Myanmar [KATANYUU 2006:844]. Elizabeth MILLS writing for Global Daily Insight 
Analysis concluded the following: 
However, the regime in Myanmar has become increasingly ostracised, and shows few 
signs of committing to the necessary democratic reform. ASEAN continues to favour en-
gagement as a means of effecting change, although it can be argued that the only way in 
which the junta could be persuaded to pursue a different path is if those states that sup-
port it - particularly financially - start to curtail their involvement. [MILLS 30.03.2006]  
ASEAN’s Special Envoy, Syed Hamid Albar somewhat later gave a more honest and plain assess-
ment; he was reported to have said, that the feeling is, that Myanmar ‘is dragging us down in 
terms of our credibility and image’ and expressed frustration with the country's slow progress on 
democratic reform [qtd. in: AFXIF 18.04.2006]. He later even stiffened his stance, stating: “ASEAN 
now has reached a stage where it is not possible to defend its member when that member is not 
making an attempt to cooperate or help itself” [qtd. in: YEHO 21.07.2006]. 
It also was revealed that the ASEAN Envoy had not been treated the way he had expected during 
his visit to Myanmar, creating the impression that the country instead favoured the UN as interme-
diary. Upon that Syed Albar announced that the Association no longer felt to be in a position to talk 
for Burma; a statement that was interpreted as an 'implied threat' [BBC MS 24.07.2006]. 
The 2006 AMM urged Myanmar to release political prisoners and to show 'tangible progress' on the 
road to democracy. Additionally, ASEAN members were reported to have sent a strong message 
privately to the Burmese regime [JOSHI 26.07.2007]. Ever more voices were heard, among them 
also initially reluctant Cambodia [BBC MS 30.08.2006], in favour of dealing with the issue on a 
regional basis. 
Prior to the ASEAN Summit in January 2007, Indonesia voiced it’s and the Association’s 'frustration' 
with the lack of progress of the democratisation process [REUTERS 08.01.2007]. While the US was 
preparing an UNSC resolution that would term the situation in Myanmar a risk to regional peace 
and call on the regime to free all political prisoners – an endeavour opposed by UNSC veto-wielding 
members Russia and China – the Philippines was reported to press the regime for further change 
[DJIN 10.01.2007]. On the question of the UNSC resolution no unanimity existed, however [AG-
NOTE&TORSRICHAROEN 11.01.2007]. Finally, Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN's Secretary General an-
                                                 
589 Vivian HO, reporting for Kyodo News, stated that “... Yangon was forced to accept a mission from ASEAN ...” 
[HO 12.12.2005]. 
590 It was not the only call of that type; for instance, Indonesia urged India, China, and South Korea – notwith-
standing their economic interests – to help bring Myanmar on the democratic path [ECKERT 19.05.2006]. Al-
though this urge contrasted sharply with Malaysia's call, that ASEAN countries would need to combat the rising 
influence of India and China in the region [AP 17.06.2006], experts upheld the assumption that Burma's trade 
with China alone would suffice to keep Myanmar's regime in power [USFN 05.12.2006]. 
591 Still, the prospect that one-party ruled and communist China might further the cause of democratization 
seemed very unlikely. See also: MADANI 21.01.2007. 
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nounced that the country is supposed to democratize and free political prisoners; it also emerged 
that the ASEAN member were unwilling to defend the regime in the face of the impending UNSC 
resolution [DJIN 11.01.2007]. 
Still, ASEAN's position was ambivalent: while it was not ready to call Burma a threat to security, it 
somehow was in support of the idea that the world body should handle the issue; especially, after 
the country had refused to react to the Association’s many warnings. Indonesia, as temporary 
member of the UNSC had no clear vision on how to act; as its foreign minister Hassan Wirayuda 
pointed out: 
We are in a dilemma because ASEAN's image is affected with Myanmar being brought to 
the Security Council. That's why we are trying to find ways for Myanmar to respond to the 
situation. It's already a fact that Myanmar has become an international issue. As a mem-
ber of the Security Council, we have some leverage but that depends on Myanmar itself. 
[qtd. in: KHALIK 12.01.2007] 
In the end, the UNSC resolution was defeated by the vetoes of Russia and China; still – as Abdullah 
Al Madani observed: 
For Washington, the blocking of the resolution was not totally a defeat. By forwarding 
such a draft resolution, it has succeeded, at least, in pushing Asean to escalate pressure 
on Myanmar and to draft rules - for the first times since its creation in 1967 - that could 
allow censure or expulsion of members and alter its policy of non-interference in member 
states' affairs. [MADANI 21.01.2007] 
The following ASEAN Summit reiterated the call on Myanmar to make progress on democratization, 
free political prisoners, and start negotiations with the political opposition [AGNOTE 14.01.2007]. 
Elizabeth MILLS offers the following analysis of those developments: 
ASEAN's policy towards Myanmar has altered significantly in recent years, changing from 
the historic bloc stance of non-interference or comment on domestic matters to regular 
criticism, albeit measured, of the junta and its policies. This however, has borne little real 
improvement, leading policy makers to question how they can effect change in Myanmar. 
[MILLS 01.08.2007] 
In August 2007 Burma once more caused obstacles for the Association’s external relations, when 
the EU insisted that Burma ought not to be included in a trade pact that was under discussion at 
the time, while ASEAN members advocated the country’s inclusion [LANDINGIN 03.08.2007]. But 
ASEAN solidarity was eroded when Burma violently cracked down on demonstrations led by Bud-
dhist monks in September 2007. The crackdown was classified to constitute the ‘biggest political 
crisis’ in ASEAN’s history. The Association also reacted rather outspokenly, expressing its ‘revul-
sion’ at the violent repression by the regime and underlined that those events have ‘a serious im-
pact on the reputation and credibility of Asean’592
However, notwithstanding the critical position taken by a single member, ASEAN itself was unable 
to put Myanmar meaningfully under pressure. Thus, a plan that UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari 
briefs them at the Summit was dropped, giving in to corresponding objections by the Burmese 
leadership [ECONOMIST 24.11.2007]. However, also Vietnam had opposed the Gambari briefing 
[HAACKE 2008:361]. And while political steps along the regime’s cumbersome road-map consid-
ered eventually to lead to a “discipline-flourishing democracy” as outlined by Burma’s military, was 
hardly forthcoming [see for example ECONOMIST 16.02.2008; BAJPAEE 10.04.2008], the pros-
. Mely CABALLERO-ANTHONY of the S. Rajarat-
nam School of International Studies in Singapore commented on that response thus: “It was the 
strongest statement that Asean has ever made against a member state in its 40-year history. This 
is a significant development for an organisation that has normally followed a policy of non-
interference in each other's internal affairs” [qtd. in: BURTON 28.09.2007]. Also HAACKE terms the 
reaction as ‘the sharpest rebuke of Myanmar ever sanctioned by ASEAN governments’ [HAACKE 
2008:354]. 
At the Summit marking ASEAN’s 40th anniversary, the Philippine President indicated that her coun-
try might not ratify the Charter, which was signed on that occasion, unless Burma makes progress 
on its road to democracy [ARNOLD 20.11.2007]. This move showcased considerably differing opin-
ions inside ASEAN, a rather rarely witnessed phenomenon. 
                                                 
592 The shadow the Burmese situation cast on the historic ASEAN Summit in November 2007 that saw also the 
signing of the landmark ASEAN Charter is captured by an article of FT journalists BURTON & KAZMIN 
19.11.2007. 
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pects that the Association might nevertheless head for a more activist or even interventionist 
course increased somewhat by the swearing-in of Surin Pitsuwan as ASEAN’s new Secretary Gen-
eral. Pitsuwan, known to be a critic of the Burmese junta, said on this occasion that the main items 
of his agenda would be: 
 
• making progress on addressing human rights; 
• bringing forward Myanmar’s democratic transition; 
• ensuring the ratification of the ASEAN Charter through all members; and 
• developing a blue print for the envisioned ASEAN Security Community [BAJPAEE 
09.01.2008]. 
 
However, when the fatal cyclone Nargis hit Burma’s Irrawaddy delta in May 2008, killing tens of 
thousands, political developments took the rear seat, the main problem being perceived as the 
regime’s reluctance to let in international aid and aid workers [ECONOMIST 17.05.2008]. While 
Myanmar later agreed at an ASEAN Summit to allow aid workers and the other members pledged 
to form an undefined “coalition of mercy”, the ECONOMIST not only suspected that the decisive 
influence came more from China than from the Association [ECONOMIST 24.05.2008b] and cap-
tured the situation thus: 
The regional block is good at phrasemaking but not so good at producing concrete results. 
And the junta knows from experience that ASEAN will not press it too hard. [ECONOMIST 
24.05.2008a] 
ASEAN’s pledge to coordinate the international relief effort was also viewed critically in view of its 
insufficient capacities for a project of such magnitude [KAZMIN & FIDLER 20.05.2008]. Indeed, the 
slow-motion speed displayed rendered the significance of ASEAN’s contribution negligent. One 
month after the cyclone had hit, ASEAN was announcing that its ‘emergency rapid assessment 
team’ would need another three weeks to compile its initial report [ECONOMIST 07.06.2008]. Still, 
ASEAN has been credited for having been instrumental for cajoling the Burmese leadership into 
cooperating with international relief efforts [HAACKE 2008:370-371]. 
 
If one is to understand why ASEAN adopted such a lenient course vis-à-vis Burma, taking into con-
sideration the “ASEAN Way” – as outlined above – will elucidate the chosen line. In the case of 
Burma the Association displayed an almost ignorant policy, turning a blind eye to the repression 
applied by the regime. As explained earlier, political conditions for the population of a member 
country, were commonly no item on ASEAN’s agenda of interests. Only if domestic developments 
had appreciable negative consequences for ASEAN, or members of it, was the need felt to act. 
Beside this inclination, Robin RAMCHARAN makes out a set of nine reasons that were responsible 
for ASEAN’s way to handle Myanmar and its decision to go for a ‚constructive engagement’ ap-
proach: 
 
• the close relationship between Myanmar and China which troubled some ASEAN states: es-
pecially those faced with Chinese demonstrations of power (e.g. Mischief Reef) in the South 
China Sea; 
• ASEAN’s assumption that Burma’s regime is fairly well entrenched and will remain for quite 
a while in place; 
• increased desirable internal stability thanks to various efforts of the regime to suppress the 
many insurgent movements; 
• the Association’s intention to create a Southeast Asian economic community; 
• some ASEAN members were looking for an outlet for their surplus capital and were eager 
to pour it into low-labour-costs Myanmar; 
• advantageous national legislation in Myanmar creating incentives for foreign investors; 
• the West’s ambivalent and incongruous position toward Myanmar, setting apart words from 
deeds; 
• the personal relationship between Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and still pow-
erful Ne Win, leader of the 1962 military coup; and 
• ASEAN’s wish to complete the ‚One Southeast Asia’ [RAMCHARAN 2000:70-74]. 
 
As a consequence of ASEAN’s hands-off policy, the Burmese regime was able to uphold its power 
and proceed at a snail’s pace with its window-dressing reform programme. ASEAN was the chief 
advocate for enhanced acceptability of the internationally rather isolated country. JONES and 
SMITH additionally underline the following on the impact membership had on Burma: 
[…] membership in ASEAN seems only to have deepened conflict along the Thai-Burmese 
border and encouraged the Yangon regime’s emergence as the world’s largest supplier of 
illicit heroin and yabba (methamphetamine). [JONES & SMITH 2002:104] 
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ASEAN’s approach has been congruous with its main objectives. As has already been detailed ear-
lier, in the Association’s view peace and security is not contingent on democratic conditions or the 
human rights situation prevailing in one of its member nations. Peace and security are considered 
attainable by strengthening the power of the elite, no matter the means applied by the leadership 
to guarantee tranquillity and thus political and economic stability.  
ASEAN felt only motivated to act, when it sensed that Burma tarnished the image of the whole 
region, having adverse effects on its primary interest by worsening external relations. Be that am-
bivalent from a moral perspective or not, the organization followed its own logic therein. It is also 
undeniable that, according to those standards, ASEAN contributed to the peace and security in the 
region, shrouding the looming conflict with the West on the international scene, and with the politi-
cal opposition on the domestic scene, into an atmosphere of qualified solidarity with the Burmese 
junta, that was cushioning and partly absorbing the most severe repercussions. 
However, to chart that course at times proved to be a tricky affair and resulted in appeasement 
gestures on both fronts. The most concrete result of influencing the regime was that ASEAN was to 
convince the regime to relinquish (for the time being) the Association’s chairmanship for 2006. 
However, given the dismal financial situation of Burma and the lacking resources to organize all 
accompanying meetings, this achievement’s significance has to be put into perspective. The now 
routinely rather less than more veiled criticism of Myanmar’s leadership should not be taken as 
evidence for the Association’s credentials for democracy and human rights promotion, but is obvi-
ously a policy embarked on allowing to assuage the West, while not really hurting the junta.    
3.15 Cambodia 1997 
When political tensions between the two partners of Cambodia’s ruling coalition increased, ASEAN 
voiced its concern about the situation. Instructively this concern at the beginning did not centre on 
the scheduled admission of Cambodia, but instead it was perceived to constitute ‘developments in 
a southeast Asian country’. This seemed to mark a change in ASEAN’s approach, never to touch on 
internal affairs of prospective member states [AFP 30.04.1997]. 
Instability persisted and although ASEAN had for quite a while maintained to invite Laos, Burma, 
and Cambodia simultaneously, doubts grew about the admission of Cambodia in May 1997 [AFP 
08.05.1997]. Nevertheless, when ASEAN’s foreign ministers met on 31st May, they confirmed their 
plan to admit the three countries in July [AFP 31.05.1997]. However, faced with political turmoil, 
ASEAN signalled its willingness to assist in preparing for the country’s upcoming elections. Malay-
sian foreign minister Abdullah Badawi suggested: “[i]f it is necessary, if Cambodia feels that ASEAN 
could help them in some way as a group, then we can do it, for example if they want us to help for 
example in the training of the officials for the holding of the elections” [qtd. in: AFP 01.07.1997]. 
This was the first time that help of such a kind was considered to be offered by ASEAN. 
During an informal meeting ASEAN decided to ask Indonesia and France, both instrumental players 
in the negotiations leading to the 1991 peace accord, to help resolve the political deadlock, caused 
by a power dispute between Cambodia’s two prime ministers (First Prime Minister Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen) [REUTERS 03.07.1997]. Indonesia, however, de-
nied that ASEAN was offering such assistance, arguing that Cambodia’s sovereignty will have to be 
respected [REUTERS 04.07.1997]. Similar comments came from Malaysia. Its foreign minister 
Badawi explained: 
The internal situation of Burma or any other country is not a criteria [sic] for membership. 
... We have other criteria such as whether they will be able to fulfill the requirements of 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and so on. [qtd. in: AP 07.07.1997a] 
Only the Philippines signalled the prospect of consequences, arguing that the fighting, which finally 
broke out between the troops loyal to the two Prime Ministers respectively, might force ASEAN to 
reconsider the issue [AP 07.07.1997b]. 
Finally, in deviation of ASEAN’s habit (with rare exceptions like in 1986 in the case of the Philip-
pines), ASEAN published a statement, that called for an immediate ceasefire, for the peaceful reso-
lution of the differences between the two Prime Ministers, and their respect for the Paris Peace 
Accord [AFP 08.07.1997a]. ASEAN additionally announced that it will continue to monitor the de-
velopments and convene a special meeting to ‘review the situation in all its aspects’ [AFP 
08.07.1997b]. 
This notwithstanding, Hun Sen deposed Prince Norodom Ranariddh (who subsequently fled the 
country ) in early July 1997 with a violent coup; this came as a matter of embarrassment to 
ASEAN. Cambodia had been expected to join the Association on the occasion of ASEAN’s thirtieth 
AMM. However, since ASEAN had endorsed the purged power-sharing arrangement as legitimate 
outcome of Cambodia’s peace process, the coup was perceived as an affront, and a more pro-
nounced need to take action on the part of the organization was felt [LEIFER 1999:34]. 
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On July 10th ASEAN decided to postpone Cambodia’s entry indefinitely. The Philippine foreign affairs 
secretary Domingo Siazon for one had argued that the Cambodian situation was linked to “the sta-
bility and security of the whole of Indochina and of course of ASEAN” [qtd. in: NG 10.07.1997]. 
Singapore’s Foreign Minister Jayakumar opined that the deference of the membership was abso-
lutely consistent with ASEAN’s past practice of condemning the use of force to change a govern-
ment or an internally recognized political order, citing the case of the Philippines in 1986 (see 
above). This confirmed once more ASEAN’s concern for regime-stability, which again is a far cry 
from any claim to protect democratic rule. Jayakumar further explained “ASEAN’s reputation would 
be tarnished if it did not register its dismay and displeasure at certain conduct unacceptable to the 
international community” [qtd. in: NT 25.07.1997b]. This statement includes the concession that it 
is not ASEAN that deems the ‘conduct unacceptable’. Again, like in the case of Myanmar, it is 
rather the opinion of the West and the potential troubles coming from that corner, that motivated 
the postponement of the accession. 
Indonesia and Malaysia substantiated ASEAN’s decision by referring to the use of force that had 
brought about the political situation in Cambodia. The joint statement of the special meeting con-
sequently noted: 
While reaffirming the commitment to the principle of non interference in the internal af-
fairs of other states, they decided that, in the light of unfortunate circumstances which 
have resulted from the use of force, the wisest course of action is to delay the admission 
of Cambodia into ASEAN until a later date. [ASEAN 10.07.1997] 
At the same time it was once more signalled that ASEAN might assist in finding a resolution to the 
conflict, floating the suggestion to send a delegation [KEYS 10.07.1997]. This delegation was in-
tended to hold talks with the two Prime Ministers as well as with the head of state, King Norodom 
Sihanouk. However, at that time the coup leader, Hun Sen, made clear that in case ASEAN should 
dare to interfere in Cambodia’s internal affairs, he would opt out of the membership bid [LOPEZ 
11.07.1997]. The eventual ASEAN mission was made up of Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, 
Philippine foreign secretary Domingo L. Siazon Jr., and Thai foreign minister Praphuab Chaisarn; 
Indonesia was designated as interlocutor for Hun Sen and Thailand for Prince Ranariddh [RAMCHA-
RAN 2000:67]. An unnamed diplomat pondered about the significance of sending such a high-
ranking mission: 
This shows the seriousness with which we are viewing the problem and also the sincerity 
of ASEAN to bring peace and stability to Cambodia. [qtd. in: AP 11.07.1997] 
In fact, the move to actively engage in the internal political turmoil of a prospective member was a 
major turn-around for ASEAN. Instead of acting according to the ever-cherished principle of non-
interference593, ASEAN took the initiative594
                                                 
593 Naturally, no member or representative of ASEAN was willing to say so aloud. Instead, Indonesia’s Foreign 
Minister, was eager to explain that the decision to shelve Cambodia’s membership was taken in the interest of 
ASEAN’s stability [JEN 15.07.1997]. 
594 TAY & TALIB  although arguing that ‘[w]here state consent is given, preventive diplomacy is clearly not inter-
ference’ cite the Cambodia engagement of ASEAN as an example. However, it has to be considered, that con-
sent did not exist at the start of ASEAN’s diplomatic activity [TAY & TALIB 1997:259]. 
. The Thai foreign minister, Prachuab Chaiyasarn, ex-
plained: 
ASEAN countries have a commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region. 
Cambodia was going to be admitted into our grouping, but we do not want it to be a de-
stabilizing factor in our region. So we have to help resolve this crisis ... 
Even the United Nations and many major powers have been waiting for a decision from 
ASEAN and we would not like to disappoint them [qtd. in: APN 14.07.1997]. 
In this context SON and MAGISTAD have argued that the lengthy engagement of ASEAN in forcing 
Vietnam out of Cambodia figured as commitment not to take a mere wait-and-see attitude [SON 
15.07.1997; NRP 18.07.1997]. 
ASEAN proposed a peace plan that foresaw a caretaker government with members of the parties of 
both Prime Ministers that would take over until the scheduled elections the following year. Addi-
tionally, the fighting would have to be stopped and King Sihanouk would be accorded power over 
the military until the elections [NPR 18.07.1997]. 
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However, Hun Sen, after meeting the ASEAN mission595, rejected the peace proposal; Hun Sen’s 
spokesman, Svay Sitha commented afterwards: “[w]e think that at present the royal government 
does not need ASEAN to take part in helping solve the issue” [qtd. in: DJIN 19.07.1997]. Upon that 
the head of ASEAN’s mission, Ali Alatas, made clear that this would cease the organization’s efforts 
to promote negotiations [BIRSEL 20.07.1997]. Only after Cambodia’s foreign minister Ung Huot, 
being originally a member of exiled First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s party Funcin-
pec - but having realigned himself later with strongmen Hun Sen [PURA 24.07.1997], said that 
Cambodia welcomed ASEAN’s ‘role in helping to restore political stability in the country’596
In the end ASEAN made the restoration of the political status quo a condition for admission
, ASEAN 
vowed to continue its effort for a peaceful solution of the conflict [ASEAN 25.07.1997; MANIB-
HANDU & TANSUBHAPOL 24.07.1997]. However, it was observed that this encounter still damaged 
ASEAN politically [RAMCHARAN 2000:68].  
However, the Association’s endeavours to position itself as a decisive broker received some inter-
national recognition. Thus, its concrete efforts to support the resolution of the Cambodian crisis 
received also support by some other ARF participants at a meeting held on 27th July 1997 [JEN 
27.07.1997]. 
597
However, upon this resistance ASEAN lost its ‘exclusive prerogative role’ in favour of the ‘Friends of 
Cambodia
, and 
the scheduled entry date was officially postponed. The principle of non-interference was in this case 
abandoned. [LEIFER 1999:35]. The Indonesian daily, Jakarta Post, answered the question if 
ASEAN’s activities grant the label ‘intervention’ the following way: 
ASEAN, after all, has not actually interceded in the conflict between Hun Sen and 
Ranariddh. But when one considers the fact that many people in this region regard sanc-
tions, or even vocal criticism of the situation in Myanmar, as intervention, then it would be 
hard to escape the impression that our own actions toward Cambodia can, indeed, be re-
garded as a form of intervention. [JP 29.07.1997] 
When the ASEAN mission finally met Hun Sen once more it was not immediately clear on which 
aspect consensus was reached [MCDOWELL 02.08.1997]. Later it was confirmed that agreement 
was attained on the need to end the conflict and on the holding the forthcoming elections. How-
ever, statements on the return of the First Prime Minister Ranariddh, remained inconclusive [CT 
03.08.1997]. When Ranariddh’s former ally Ung Huot was elected as is successor, he called on 
ASEAN not to recognize him as new First Prime Minister [AFP 10.08.1997]. Nevertheless, the num-
ber of signals increased that ASEAN would accept the new political order [PENNA 12.08.1997]. 
ASEAN held a special meeting on Cambodia on 11th August 1997; on that occasion they did not 
reaffirm a statement they had made a month earlier, explicitly recognizing Prince Ranariddh as 
First Prime Minister. Instead, Indonesia only noted that Ranariddh was regarded as an ‘important 
factor’ in restoring peace in the country. The question was insofar avoided as the ASEAN foreign 
ministers maintained that ASEAN member states ‘recognize states, not governments’. ASEAN, ad-
ditionally, announced its willingness to arrange negotiations between the warring factions 
[RICHARDSON 12.08.1997, APN 18.08.2006]. 
At the beginning of December the UN had proposed a plan in which ASEAN would help monitor 
developments in Cambodia ahead of the forthcoming elections – to ‘serve as the eyes and ears’ of 
the international community there [AFP 05.12.1997]. But again Hun Sen showed no enthusiasm for 
any ASEAN involvement, rejecting clearly their advice on human rights and democracy and con-
demning the admission of Burma to the Association while at the same time that of Cambodia was 
rejected [AFP 12.01.1998; JEN 12.01.1998]. 
598
                                                 
595 The Thai daily The Nation gave some details about the meeting: “During their meeting last Saturday with 
Hun Sen, the three Asean envoys did not have a chance to propose the peace formula as Hun Sen went to 
great lengths to explain his actions against Ranariddh and some royalist Funcinpec leaders, said Asean officials. 
During the long explanation, Hun Sen voiced his strong opposition to Asean's interference in what he consid-
ered as an internal Cambodian problem and termed his violence against Ranariddh as "legal". Hun Sen's tough 
stance prompted Asean ministers to call off the group's efforts” [NT 25.07.1997a]. 
596 For the text of a letter Cambodia’s foreign  minister sent to ASEAN around that time, asking to continue its 
engagement, see AP 29.07.1997. 
597 The incoming ASEAN Secretary-General, Rodolfo Severino clarified the circumstances that would have to be 
met before Cambodia would be admitted as a new member: “It depends on whether things have settled... that 
the government is effective and the coalition stays. The Constitution and the king must also be respected. Kill-
ings should stop and that the commitment to hold elections in May next year remains” [qtd. in: BW 
31.07.1997]. 
’ (FOC), with Japan taking the lead in facilitating ‘free and fair’ elections [LEIFER 
598 The ‚Friends of Cambodia’ (FOC) were made up of diplomats of the following countries: Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, Britain, and the United States [AFP 15.02.1998]. 
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1999:36]. The FOC originally had been designed to complement ASEAN’s efforts at restoring peace 
to Cambodia. In February ASEAN met with the FOC to ‘discuss matters of mutual concern’ [JEN 
06.02.1998], marking ASEAN’s waning influence. This impression was confirmed by the Thai for-
eign minister, Surin Pitsuwan, being part of the ASEAN Troika, who explained that if Hun Sen con-
siders the activities of the Troika as unnecessary, the team will not be able to fulfil its mandate, 
since that would be taken as interference in Cambodia’s internal affairs [AFP 18.02.1998]. Publicly 
however, the relationship between ASEAN and the FOC was portrayed as cordial. The ARF Chair-
man’s Statement of July 1998 welcomed the FOC’s efforts to restore political stability and the cli-
mate of peace in Cambodia [ARF 27.07.1998]. 
Although ASEAN’s efforts did not cease on the diplomatic front the FOC gained in importance. In 
early March a FOC initiative – ‘in coordination with ASEAN’ - pushed a Japanese peace plan pro-
posal. At that time a ceasefire between the two parties was in place, King Sihanouk declared his 
intention to return to Cambodia, and the trial against Prince Ranariddh for having conducted nego-
tiations with the Khmer Rouge was to begin. Regarding the forthcoming election ASEAN as well as 
the UN sent technical missions to the country to assess the situation [AFP 06.03.1998a]. Around 
the same time the ASEAN Troika, after consulting with the FOC, asked the UN to ensure 
Ranariddh’s safe return to Cambodia [AFP 06.03.1998b] as well as to support the monitoring of the 
existing ceasefire [AFP 06.03.1998c]. 
The only incentive that was left to ASEAN was the future membership in case the elections were 
conducted in a free and fair manner [AFP 16.03.1998]. The tiny contingent of election observers 
ASEAN was ready to send (eight from each member state), after being invited by Cambodia to do 
so, was more of a symbolic gesture, than of a strong commitment. Although the observers would 
be sent under ASEAN auspices, each ASEAN country was to bear the resulting costs; the financial 
expenses connected to the sending of the observers was posing a problem to some ASEAN states. 
Unsurprisingly thus, the hope for additional European observers was voiced by Malaysia [XINHUA 
03.04.1998; JEN 21.04.1998]. Eventually, the nine ASEAN members agreed to shoulder the ex-
pected costs of 75 observers that were to be sent [AP 19.05.1998], as part of a planned 400-
strong UN monitoring team [SHERER 20.05.1998], active under the acronym JIOG (Joint Interna-
tional Observer Group), that later was increased to number 500 observers [THAYER & TASKER 
13.08.1998]. Still, the coordinated sending of election monitors was a remarkable premier in 
ASEAN’s history. 
In the meantime the question of membership was postponed until after the scheduled elections, to 
see if “the outcome is positive in July 26 elections aimed at demonstrating Cambodia's political 
normalcy” [AP 07.07.1998]. 
The ASEAN Troika in April 1998 informed the Cambodian King about the results of discussion be-
tween ASEAN and the FOC, regarding the coming polls [AFP 19.04.1998]. In fact, ASEAN by that 
time had lost its autonomy on the issue, and had to closely coordinate with the FOC [e.g. JEN 
20.06.1998; CHAWLA 20.06.1998]. 
The Cambodian election campaign resulted prompted some critical assessments, citing violence 
and a climate of intimidation [THAYER 16.04.1998]. An analyst argued that this probably would not 
affect ASEAN’s decision, hinting at the much criticized admission of Myanmar the previous year 
[MORELLA 22.07.1998]. 
On 22nd July ASEAN’s representative, Lauro Baja, for the first time made clear expressis verbis, the 
importance the Association accrued to the elections, when he said: 
The question of the membership of Cambodia in the ASEAN will depend on the results of 
the elections of July 26. [qtd. in: XINHUA 22.07.1998] 
At their AMM shortly before the elections, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed their wish that 
the elections will be ‘free, fair, credible and peaceful’ [XINHUA 24.07.1998b]. 
The Cambodian parties shared the position that after the elections, Cambodia was to join the 
grouping [e.g. XINHUA 27.07.1998a]. Hun Sen, for example, argued: “[i]f after the election Cam-
bodia is left outside, the election would be meaningless” [qtd: in: JEN 26.07.1998]. However, 
ahead of  the results being published, Thailand’s foreign minister had made clear, that if Hun Sen 
fails to accept the results, the admission to ASEAN of the country would further be put on hold 
[KEYS 28.07.1998]. 
Since the situation was judged to be still ‘fluid’ for some time to come, the indefinite extension of 
the ASEAN Troika, with unchanged composition, was agreed on at the AMM of 24th to 25th July 
1998 [JEN 29.07.1998]. The Philippine delegation – later to be supported by the JIOG of the elec-
tion observers were the first to attest that the Cambodian elections were free and fair and conse-
                                                                                                                                                        
The FOC was formed after Hun Sen’s violent ouster of Ranariddh and brought together major signatories of the 
Paris Peace Accords of 1991 and important donor countries to Cambodia [JEN 06.02.1998]. 
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quently recommended that the country be invited into ASEAN [AFP 14.08.1998;THAYER & TASKER 
13.08.1998]. However, also other voices could be heard that articulated concern about the quality 
of the election599
Upon renewed escalating violence in the country – riot police brutally dispersed protesters – Prince 
Ranariddh expressed his disappointment about ASEAN’s position, disregarding the large scale hu-
man rights abuses [DJIN 11.09.1998]. However, this did not change ASEAN’s stand, and at a 
meeting of ASEAN’s Foreign Minister, the hope was expressed that ‘political stability in Cambodia 
will be restored quickly’ [qtd. in: AFP 24.09.1998]. At the same meeting the ASEAN Troika was 
disbanded, since it was felt, that it had completed its tasks, with attesting that the election was 
‘free and fair’ 
, but pointing out that ASEAN was among those actors that clearly pushed for a 
‘free and fair’ judgment [THAYER & TASKER 13.08.1998]. 
However, the two main opposition leaders, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy contested 
the election results and demanded that their complaints are adequately addressed. The ensuing 
uncertainty about the forming of a government prompted the Thai foreign ministry spokesman, 
Kobsak Chutikul, to warn: 
Any delay will create uncertainty and will affect the consideration of the admission of 
Cambodia into ASEAN. [qtd. in: JEN 18.08.1998] 
Before that, the Philippines’ Foreign Secretary had sent a letter to Ranariddh and Rainsy describing 
it as ‘highly immoral or irresponsible’ for the Cambodian political leaders not to form a government, 
provoking a strong reaction of the opposition leaders [JEN 18.08.1998]. 
In early September 1998, more than a month after the election had taken place, ASEAN supported 
the findings of the international election monitoring group that had stated that it considers the polls 
“free and fair to an extent that enables it to reflect, in a credible way, the will of the Cambodian 
people”. At the same time ASEAN asked the Cambodian parties to resolve their differences in a 
‘spirit of national reconciliation’ and announced that the Association is looking forward to “the time 
in the near future when Cambodia … could be embraced by their ASEAN brothers into their fold” 
[qtd. in: AFP 04.09.1998]; the most likely date, if the formation of a government would move 
smoothly, was given as the following December, at ASEAN’s informal summit [COCHRANE 
06.09.1998; REUTERS 08.09.1998]. 
600
When the two main political rivals – Hun Sen and Ranariddh – in mid-November did agree to even-
tually form a government the membership of ASEAN moved closer. Although Cambodia strenuously 
strived for it
[AFP 26.09.1998]. 
601, doubts602 remained about the timing of Cambodia’s incorporation, since the next 
ASEAN summit was only a couple of weeks away [JEN 13.11.1998; INDEPENDENT 17.11.1998]. 
Positions among the ASEAN states on the issue turned also out to be too far apart. Whereas Viet-
nam, Indonesia, Burma, Laos, and Malaysia supported immediate entry, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Singapore took a more cautious approach603
                                                 
599 THAYER & TASKER pointed out that the JIOG verdict came only a day after the polling and while the counting 
was still under way – far too early to assess the possible abuses during the whole election process [THAYER & 
TASKER 13.08.1998]. For another critical assessment of the quality of the election see ECONOMIST 
01.08.1998a. 
600 Overlooking the severe frictions the ASEAN Troika encountered with Hun Sen, THAYER commented: „In an 
act of historical revisionism they [ASEAN officials, my remark] asserted that the ASEAN troika had been a suc-
cess“ [THAYER 2000:29 FN 55]. 
601 The effort was not shared by another political leader – Sam Rainsy – who had been kept out of the govern-
ment. He instead warned that Cambodia’s admission would be to the detriment of ASEAN and the country itself, 
since that would motivate Hun Sen to further pay only lip service to systematic human rights abuses, a warlord 
system, and environmental degradation amongst others [JEN 08.12.1998]. 
602 Philippine foreign secretary Domingo Siazon articulated ASEAN’s scepticism, when he said: “Many ASEAN 
members are hesitant. There are still many problems. The political process is still going on. If we accept them 
as a new member now, then later, there (may be) another (round of) fighting among them. We will have to 
resolve it again ... Others are saying, 'didn't we get burned there already'? We were ready to accept them and 
then days before, they started fighting.” [qtd. in: AFP 21.11.1998]. 
603 The lack of consensus was the definite bottleneck. The administrative and legal preparations, as the then 
Secretary General of ASEAN, Rudolfo Severino, remarked, had been concluded to admit Cambodia right away 
[AFP 08.12.1998]. 
 [JEN 01.12.1998; JEN 07.12.1998; DJIN 
09.12.1998; MACARAIG & BALFOUR 11.12.1998]. Interestingly, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Ali 
Alatas remarked: 
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By the formation of the new government, in the view of Indonesia, there is no obstacle for 
Cambodia to be a full member. … If there are still other additional conditions, it will mean 
intervening in the internal affairs of Cambodia604
This contrasted with the view held inter alia by Singapore which argued that unless the coalition 
agreement is completed, there still remains a risk that the government could unravel [DJIN 
09.12.1998]. Five days before the scheduled summit, ASEAN decided to defer Cambodia’s admis-
sion, due to irreconcilable divergent views [MACARAIG & BALFOUR 11.12.1998]. Consequently, 
Cambodia attended the Summit as an observer only [AFP 15.12.1998]. However, while Singapore 
envisioned the time span for the admission be approximately six months [AFP 14.12.1998], Cam-
bodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen considered it to last three to five weeks only. As a face saving ges-
ture and to veil the underlying divergence, the ASEAN Heads of State and Government instructed 
their foreign ministers to arrange a special admission ceremony for Cambodia at an appropriate 
time in the foreseeable future
. [qtd. in: JEN 07.12.1998] 
605
Never before had ASEAN taken such direct action to pressure a Southeast Asian country – 
and one that was about to become an ASEAN member – to change policies whose causes 
and consequences were largely internal. ASEAN had not imposed any political conditions 
on the entry of any other state. [ENG 1999:54]
 [BERNAMA 15.12.1998a]. 
In February 1999, after Cambodia’s National Assembly finally had adopted a bill for the establish-
ment of the upper house – concluding the power-sharing deal reached between the two main po-
litical rivals – the country’s foreign minister, Hor Nam Hong urged ASEAN to finally schedule the 
planned admission ceremony for his country [JEN 05.03.1998a]. Subsequently, the Laotian foreign 
minister announced that Cambodia would be admitted the following April [JEN 05.03.1999b]. Later, 
the exact date was specified to be April 30th 1999 [EFE 08.04.1999]. Commenting on Cambodia’s 
admission, Malaysia’s foreign minister Seri Syed Hamid Albar optimistically concluded: “[t]he great 
effort has been done...May any problems arise (in the future), we will solve them with the group” 
[qtd. in: JEN 30.04.1999]. 
 
Scholars came to differing conclusions. LEIFER for one observes:  
The (…) sorry episode over Cambodia has not done much for the international standing of 
ASEAN …  [LEIFER 1999:36] 
On the other hand ENG argues: 
606
By the Association’s own standards, ASEAN’s reaction – sending a Troika, election observers, and 
postponing Cambodia’s admission – has to be called decisive and activist. It went out of its way to 
be idle and to publish lukewarm responses only. As evaluated, it was the first time ASEAN applied 
political conditionality for a prospective member. Still, it is true that ASEAN remained not the sole, 
 
PEOU attributes the limited success ASEAN had with regard to the resolution of the internal conflict 
to the divergent views inside ASEAN about the proper moment for Cambodia’s admission; what 
was more, ASEAN practically ended its mediation efforts, but insisted that elections are being car-
ried out, after Hun Sen’s warning of ASEAN it shall refrain from meddling in its internal affairs 
[PEOU 1998:444-445]. 
HAACKE tracks the motivation behind ASEAN’s reaction to the Cambodian coup, and makes the 
following observation: 
… the primary motivational dynamic | underlying the suspension of Phnom Penh’s mem-
bership was a moral grammar of outrage which sprang from the embarrassment suffered 
by ASEAN governments generally and President Suharto in particular as a consequence of 
Hun Sen’s timing of the coup. Significantly, though, this moral grammar could, for obvious 
reasons, not be translated into official explanations of ASEAN’s suspension of Cambodia’s 
membership, leaving all members to deal with the ‘political’ interpretation instead. 
[HAACKE 1999:589-599] 
                                                 
604 Compare also Alatas’ remarks cited in: MACARAIG & BALFOUR 11.12.1998. 
605 That step motivated the Wall Street Journal to the headline: ‘Asean Unofficially Admits Cambodia to Group-
ing’ [WSJ 16.12.1998] and the FEER to the article heading: ‘Awkward Admission’ [VATIKIOTIS 24.12.1998]. 
606 For a sketch of the major fault lines between pro- and contra-interventionist ASEAN nations see ECONOMIST 
01.08.1998b. 
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and maybe not even the most important mover of peace-making efforts. The Friends of Cambodia 
as well as the UN, and the EU considerably contributed to that aim. 
However, it would be an incomplete assessment not to take into consideration how strongly the 
attached conditionality of admission into ASEAN pressured the Cambodian strong-man Hun Sen 
into a political solution. The reactions – even if they at times reflect Hun Sen’s hot temper – even-
tually reveal the strong desirability of ASEAN membership among the country’s political leadership 
and the influence attributable to ASEAN’s actions on transforming Cambodia’s political conflict. 
3.16 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
The contribution of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) to security has been described to be two 
pronged. First, they make it more difficult to reverse the global anti-nuclear trend, and second, 
they generally de-legitimize the use of nuclear weapons [DAVIS 1996:16]. 
For the SEANWFZ ABAD has argued that it originally aimed at motivating the signatories to abstain 
from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place and second, that the official nuclear 
weapons states were to spare the region from risks of nuclear accidents or nuclear war activities 
[ABAD 2005:166]  
Among the strongest advocates for a South-East Asia free of nuclear weapons was ASEAN’s ‘gentle 
giant’ Indonesia which had started to lobby in 1983 for the distinct creation of a SEANWFZ [SMITH 
1999:241]. Malaysia, on the other hand, proclaimed the following year that ASEAN wanted to make 
Southeast Asia free of nuclear weapons in line with the creation of ZOPFAN. ASEAN met the first 
time to discuss the topic in November; the meeting interestingly took place not in the region, but in 
London [XINHUA 28.11.1984]. Progress was only slowly forthcoming and the Working Group on 
ZOPFAN was entrusted to study the concept of a Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SE-
ANWFZ)607
However, during the early period Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, still one of the most active support-
ers of the initiative
 [ASEAN 28.06.1986; ABAD 2005:169]. The fact that the new project was heavily inter-
twined with the neutrality claim of ZOPFAN was clear from the beginning and was later epitomized 
by the merger of the Working Group on ZOPFAN and the Drafting Committee on SEANWFZ in June 
1992 [ABAD 2005:170]. 
608
3.16.1 Fresh Impetus 
, argued that by making Southeast Asia a nuclear-weapons-free zone, ASEAN 
would serve the national and regional security interests and additionally contribute to international 
disarmament efforts [XINHUA 23.06.1986]. 
At the same time the US made clear its opposition to the project, arguing that peace rests on the 
nuclear deterrent [REUTERS 16.06.1987]. Although the Philippines, housing two big US military 
bases, had a constitution prohibiting the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, it was al-
leged that nuclear weapons indeed were stationed on the US facilities [OXRESEARCH 08.12.1987]. 
LIM is arguing that the SEANWFZ “risks eroding regional security by impeding American maritime 
capability”, maintaining that ASEAN needs the US to counter the Chinese growing power [LIM 
1998:128]. 
Notwithstanding the US position, however, ASEAN continued to work toward the establishment of 
the Nuclear Free Zone and Indonesia’s Foreign Minister declared that ‘substantial progress’ toward 
that aim is being made [SMH 17.06.1987]. However, the ultimate consensus on the matter was not 
forthcoming. The Thai Foreign Minister stressed that such a zone would not only have to involve 
the present six ASEAN nations, but would also to have to include prospective members Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. Additionally, he declared “as the kampuchean [sic] problem remains 
unsolved”, hinting at Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia , “and military bases still exist in the re-
gion, it is not the time for the declaration of the nuclear-free zone at present” [qtd. in: XINHUA 
21.06.1987]. 
Especially when the negotiations concerning the end of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia gained 
some substance, the initiative was put on hold in order to prepare also for the later inclusion of 
Indochina [KATIGBAK 12.12.1987]. By 1987 the Drafting Committee on SEANWFZ had produced 
two drafts; however, both remained untouched for five years [ABAD 2005:169]. 
Nevertheless Indonesia reaffirmed its commitment to the establishment of a nuclear weapons free 
zone in August 1989 [ST 19.08.1989] and reiterated that position in late 1992 [STEWART 
30.10.1992]. But its advance materialized only in 1995, when the ASEAN foreign ministers de-
                                                 
607 In retrospect the ECONOMIST called SEANFWZ the ‚son‘ of ZOPFAN [ECONOMIST 27.07.2004]. 
608 According to KATGIBAK the Indonesian initiative was based on the South Pacific nuclear-free zone enacted in 
1985. To this zone Australia, New Zealand, and several Pacific island states belong; it bans the ownership, test-
ing, manufacture, and storage of nuclear warheads [KATGIBAK 12.12.1987]. 
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clared that at the upcoming ASEAN summit a document on a nuclear weapons free zone would be 
signed [JEN 12.09.1995]. While the document was still being drafted, Indonesia revealed that 
along the seven ASEAN states, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar were to sign it [JP 13.10.1995]. In 
consequence, those three nations also took part in the deliberations on the treaty [BP 18.10.1995]. 
When the talks did not produce the expected progress, the Philippine’s foreign undersecretary 
Severino commented pessimistically: “We've been talking about this for 10 years or more ... If we 
don't come to an agreement this month, then it seems it's not going to be signed” [qtd. in: 
REUTERS 31.10.1995]. One of the most serious obstacles to the finalization was the US opposition 
toward the Zone. The US insisted on various provisions that would protect its maritime power and 
mobility, including the free passage of nuclear-powered ships [GIACOMO 08.12.1995]. 
Nonetheless, the idea of declaring a SEANWFZ was clearly having its merits for ASEAN, as VATI-
KIOTIS pointed out: 
Declaring Asean free of nuclear weapons could also be a timely way of reinforcing the or-
ganization's pivotal role in regional security. [VATIKIOTIS 07.12.1995] 
Finally, at the 1995 ASEAN Summit the SEANWFZ treaty was signed by the ASEAN members plus 
the three prospective members Cambodia, Laos, and Burma [AFP 15.12.1995]; only two weeks 
earlier had the text been finalized [ABAD 2005:170]. ASEAN – similar to the view originally put 
forward by chief-advocate Indonesia - saw the SEANWFZ as a contribution to the “strengthening of 
the security in the region and to the maintenance of world peace and stability” [ASEAN 
15.12.1995b]. However, since some of the then five declared nuclear powers (US, Great Britain, 
France, China, and Russia) still voiced their reluctance to sign the respective protocol to the treaty, 
as they were asked to by ASEAN, it was signalled that respective changes, allowing those states to 
put aside their reservations, could be made [JOHNSON 14.12.1995]. Along the objections of the US 
(see above), China voiced criticism about the area covered by the treaty609
(b) dispose radioactive material or wastes on land in the territory of or under the jurisdic-
tion of other States except as stipulated in Paragraph 2 (e) of Article 4
, which included large 
parts of the contested South China Sea [VATIKIOTIS & TASKER 28.12.1995]. 
 
The SEANWFZ treaty considers itself to contribute and promote the peace and security in the re-
gion, as numerously mentioned in its introducing paragraphs. Specifically, the treaty obligates the 
signatory states not to do and not to allow others to do the following on their territory: 
(a) develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear 
weapons; 
(b) station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; or  
(c) test or use nuclear weapons. 
and additionally not to undertake: 
(a) dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the Zone any radioac-
tive material or wastes;  
610
                                                 
609 The treaty stipulates that the SEANWFZ is covering the “…area comprising the territories of all States in 
Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Sin-
gapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and their respective continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)” 
[ASEAN 15.12.1995a]. 
610 In that paragraph the State Parties undertake: “to dispose radioactive wastes and other radioactive material 
in accordance with IAEA standards and procedures on land within its territory or on land within the territory of 
another State which has consented to such disposal” [ASEAN 15.12.1995a]. 
; or  
(c) allow, within its territory, any other State to dump at sea or discharge into the atmos-
phere any radioactive material or wastes. [ASEAN 15.12.1995a] 
However, in Art. 7 each State Party retains the right to allow so-called ‘innocent passage’ of foreign 
ships and aircraft. 
The SEANWFZ treaty moreover establishes a Commission to oversee the implementation and en-
sure the compliance of the provisions [Art. 8]. Additionally, a subsidiary Executive Committee is 
created to do clarification and fact-finding work in cases of such requests [Art. 9]. 
Finally, any party can withdraw from the SEANWFZ treaty, albeit giving a 12-month prior notice 
[MEDEIROS 1995]. 
 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | SOUTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE 
284 
Although ASEAN strenuously endeavoured to achieve that the five declared nuclear powers associ-
ate themselves with the SEANWFZ, their objections were such that talks had to be started to re-
negotiate the text of a respective protocol [JEN 20.07.1996c]. Merely Russia signalled its support 
for the project at the time [AFP 22.07.1996]. Efforts to accommodate the opposition of the official 
nuclear powers continued during the fall of 1996 [REUTERS 18.10.1996a]. Four issues of concern 
remained as main obstacles, according to DIAMOND and ABAD: 
 
• the consistency of the SEANWFZ with the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and the 
principle of free navigation enshrined therein; 
• the concise nature of legally binding negative security assurances of the prospective proto-
col parties; 
• permissibility of port calls by ships which may carry nuclear weapons;  
• procedural rights of the protocol parties before the treaty’s executive bodies; and 
• the zone of application of the SEANWFZ including also continental shelves and the 200-mile 
Exclusive Economic Zones [DIAMOND 1997; ABAD 2005:180-182]. 
 
The lack of the SEANWFZ to satisfyingly accommodate the concerns of the nuclear powers was 
interpreted by DAVIS: 
In the case of SEANWFZ, some regional powers were apparently more interested in a 
symbolic demonstration of non-aligned solidarity and regional autonomy than in establish-
ing a NWFZ that would secure the support of the nuclear-weapons states. [DAVIS 
1996:17] 
The only ASEAN country also voicing reservations to the SEANWFZ were the Philippines. It worried 
that the treaty ran counter to the Mutual Defense Treaty with Washington, signed in 1954. That 
treaty stipulates reciprocal military support – however, Art. 2 of the SEANWFZ containing the pro-
vision that “each state party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any 
state party to the treaty” was seen as to interfere with the Mutual Defense Treaty [YAP 
02.06.1997]. However, the Philippines did not succeed with its wish to revise the SEANWFZ treaty 
[YAP 17.06.1997]. At last the it came into effect in early-to-mid 1997611, after the seventh signa-
tory state had submitted its ratification612
3.16.2 Assuaging the official nuclear Weapons States 
. 
Only after months of unsuccessful deliberations did ASEAN consider to drop the so-called ‘negative 
security assurance’ from the draft protocol that was supposed to be signed by the official nuclear 
weapons states [JEN 11.11.1997]. Still, a meeting with those states in 1997 did not result in them 
supporting the protocol, even though ASEAN was willing to concede precedence of the right of each 
party to grant or deny port visits and over-flights to foreign vessels/aircraft instead of the provision 
calling on the signatories not to allow in their territory any other state which i.a. possess or control 
nuclear weapons [KN 19.03.2001; JEN 20.03.1998]. 
The only country showing its willingness to sign the SEANWFZ protocol at that time was China 
[CNA 24.04.1998]. China was later (re-)joined by Russia which announced its readiness to sign the 
protocol [JEN 04.06.1998]. But until 2001 neither of the two had acceded to the protocol [KN 
19.03.2001]. In the meantime India and Pakistan had tested nuclear weapons in April and May 
1998. Although ASEAN had some difficulty with the wording of any public statement on that devel-
opment [AFP 21.07.1998; VILLAVIRAY 26.07.1998], finally they issued their position, as ‘deploring’ 
the tests. Philippine foreign secretary Siazon on that occasion said that the tests: 
threatened the very principles and ideas we are seeking to achieve through the Southeast 
Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. We should redouble our efforts to gain the ad-
herence of nuclear weapons states to the protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty. [qtd. AP 
25.07.1998] 
                                                 
611 According to DIAMOND the SEANWFZ entered into force on 28th March 1997, when the seventh nation de-
posited its instrument of ratification [DIAMOND 1997]; M.C. ABAD – being at that time head of the ARF Unit in 
the ASEAN Secretariat – states, SEANWFZ entered into force on 24th March 1997 [ABAD 2005:166]. Also 
SURYODININGRAT claims March 1997 to have seen the coming-into-effect of SEANFWZ [SURYODININGRAT 
22.07.1999]. 
612 The Philippines as the last ASEAN member state to ratify the treaty did so in June 2001 [ENG 24.07.2001]. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | SOUTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE 
285 
India – as a new member in the nuclear weapons club – vowed to respect the SEANWFZ [XINHUA 
03.08.1998].  
In face of the accompanying ramifications surrounding their anti-nuclear initiative, the prevailing 
spirit among the ASEAN states was not outright euphoric and it was only in mid-1999 that the 
ASEAN foreign ministers finally met for the inaugural meeting of the SEANWFZ Commission tasked 
to set up the foreseen Executive Committee [JEN 21.07.1999]. 
At the PMC in late July 1999 China agreed to officially accede as the first nuclear weapons state to 
the protocol of the SEANWFZ [JEN 27.07.1999]. One day later India declared its intention to follow 
China’s example as soon as ASEAN would ask it to do so [AFP 28.07.1999]. 
Over the course of the following months however – despite India’s and China’s assurances - no 
progress was made on moving the nuclear weapons states to sign the SEANWFZ protocol. Hence, 
the Executive Committee of SEANWFZ decided to increase its efforts in that regard, specifically to 
study a request by the US on modifying the documents, so as to facilitate Washington’s accession 
[JEN 17.03.2000]. 
When by mid-2000 still no single nuclear weapons state had signed the protocol, ASEAN decided to 
hold a conference by year’s end, inviting all of them in order to finally win their approval [PECK 
29.07.2000]. In the meantime ASEAN held a three-day workshop with experts of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the implementation of the SEANWFZ; however, contrary to widely 
held expectations, no work plan could be agreed upon - albeit future cooperation between the two 
organizations was envisioned [BBC MS 26.08.2000]. 
Another initiative to win over the five UNSC nuclear powers was launched in 2001 when they were 
again invited in March for direct negotiations the following May with ASEAN on the issue. However, 
the media noted the prominent absentees among the invitees, India and Pakistan, that had deto-
nated nuclear bombs in 1998 [KN 19.03.2001; BP 29.04.2001]. However, the meeting resulted in 
no commitment, except China’s repeated pledge of support was given [Xinhua 19.05.2001]. That is 
why the ASEAN foreign ninisters felt it necessary to call on the five recognised nuclear states dur-
ing the annual round of meetings in July 2001 to refrain from sending nuclear material through the 
region and to never unleash nuclear weapons in the area [PARAMESWARAN 23.07.2001]. In re-
sponse China as well as Russia renewed their overall will to support the SEANWFZ [BBC MS 
27.07.2001]. 
The next meeting between the Association and the 5 official nuclear weapons powers was sched-
uled to take place in mid-2002; again, no grand expectations on progress circulated ahead of it 
[OANA 18.07.2002]. In the meantime India once more reaffirmed its willingness to sign the SE-
ANWFZ [XINHUA 26.09.2002]. The latest reaffirmation to soon sign SEANWFZ came again from 
China in October 2006 [MCGREGOR 30.10.2006]. 
In 2007 the ASEAN countries decided to meet in order to find ways of enforcing the treaty more 
strictly. Tabled was the drafting of protocols making it easier for official nuclear weapons countries 
to abide by the treaty; additionally, concrete coordination with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency was envisioned as regards the training of enforcing officials. Moreover a commission was to 
be set up to oversee the enforcement process [GOMEZ 27.02.2007]. One of the main aims of the 
plan - scheduled to be implemented in five years - was that no nuclear material is deducted from 
legitimate nuclear power installations for making nuclear weapons. An early warning system was to 
be established to report any nuclear accidents; moreover a regional emergency preparedness and 
response plan was to be set up [GOMEZ 28.07.2007; KHALIK 29.07.2007]. 
Although the endeavours to make external nuclear weapons states' accede to the SEANWFZ have 
remained unsuccessful613
• The nuclear arms race is still raging and characterized by the original official nuclear weap-
ons states' refusal to abandon their arsenal
 so far, ABAD has worked out five reasons, why the zone still righteously 
can claim relevancy: 
 
614
• Nuclear weapon-free zones continue to contribute to the non-proliferations of nuclear 
weapons; 
, and by the emergence of new declared nu-
clear weapons states; 
• Such zones strengthen the principle that threat or use of nuclear weapons is contrary to 
the rules of international and humanitarian law; 
                                                 
613 ABAD has made some proposals on how to still win the nuclear weapons states' approval, see ABAD 
2005:182-183. At the time of writing (November 2009) still no nuclear weapons state had signed the SEANWFZ 
protocol. 
614 It remains to be seen if the nuclear disarmament drive pushed by the Obama administration will effect 
meaningful and considerable movements toward a reduction of the 20.000 (US: 10.500, Russia: 14.000, 
France: 350, China: 240, Great Britain: 200; Israel: 80; Pakistan: 60; India: 50) or so nuclear weapons 
thought to exists today [OXRESEARCH: 11.12.2008]. However, eventual abandonment of the nuclear option at 
the moments is quite elusive. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | ASEAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
286 
• the SEANWFZ contributes to the maintenance of regional peace and security; and 
• the SEANWFZ functions as a major regional confidence-building measure among ASEAN 
members and vis-à-vis their immediate neighbours [ABAD 2005:173-180]. 
 
Meanwhile, ASEAN has change its strategy; it no longer wants to receive single accessions, but 
rather ‘wants all the big five to sign it at the same time to avoid so-called preferential treatment’ 
[NT 25.08.2009]. 
3.17 ASEAN and the United Nations 
ASEAN traditionally viewed the United Nations quite favourably. In its quest against Vietnam’s oc-
cupation of Cambodia, the United Nations were the diplomatic battleground where ASEAN year 
after year sponsored its respective resolutions successfully. The world body was perceived as com-
plementary vehicle to support ASEAN’s policies – at least in that regard; and especially given 
ASEAN’s reluctance to make rigorous  political decisions and the lack of resources and formal struc-
tures that would have been required to carry them out. Thus it was not an ASEAN mission, but a 
UN mission - the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) - that moved in after the Paris 
Peace Accords were signed to create a neutral environment for the organization of elections [PEOU 
1998:443]. 
Relations between the two organizations were cordial, but not extraordinarily intensive. When the 
UN General Assembly formally endorsed ASEAN’s TAC in 1992 this act was taken to recognize and 
strengthen the importance of the Association [BP 24.10.1995]. In return in the same year, ASEAN 
acknowledged the UN as key instrument for the maintenance of peace and security. Additionally, 
ASEAN vowed to support the strengthening of the UN system. Three years later ASEAN pledged to 
explore ways to enhance its cooperation with the world body with regard to the promotion of peace 
and stability in the region [PEOU 1998:445]. However, those official commitments were left with-
out manifestation. As PEOU highlights: 
…ASEAN has not accompanied by real action its rhetoric about enhancing its institutional 
cooperation with the UN in the security field. [PEOU 1998:446] 
In early 1993 Thailand launched an initiative dedicated to strengthen and tighten the ASEAN-UN 
relationship. Although the project foresaw closer coordination in various fields, one of them was the 
furtherance of ‘preventive diplomacy’, contrasting somewhat with the UNSC’s predominantly reac-
tive activities. Thailand supported the idea that the UN shall rather deal with ASEAN and not with 
the member countries on a bilateral basis [TASKER 25.02.1993]. In the course of this initiative two 
workshops were organized in 1993 and 1994 [PEOU 1998:FN4:455]. 
The importance ASEAN accorded to the UN was also shown when during a preparatory ASEAN 
meeting, the members expressed their wish to invite the UN Secretary General to the first ARF 
meeting [MARUKATAT 26.04.1994]. That invitation, although issued, did finally remain unheeded 
[SRIVORANART 13.02.2000]. 
ASEAN’s Inter-Parliamentary Organisation in 1994 called for a permanent seat in the UNSC for 
ASEAN, thus underlining the increasing importance of the region [REUTERS 23.09.1994]. That pro-
posal as well as the idea – sponsored by Indonesia, that ASEAN shall gain observer status in the 
UN615
                                                 
615 The drive for ASEAN to acquire UN observer status partly emanated from the then UNSG Boutros Boutros-
Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, that aimed at strengthening the role of regional organization in the maintenance of 
peace [BP 24.10.1995]. 
, proved short lived. The proposal was aired in September 1994; however, ASEAN senior offi-
cials scraped the plan in January 1995 [BP 09.01.1995]. It has been suggested that this was due to 
ASEAN members’ unwillingness to forego their possibility to approach the world body on an indi-
vidual basis [BP 24.10.1995], discounting Thailand’s earlier suggestion. 
Shortly after the first formal ARF meeting senior UN official and outgoing chairman of the UNGA, 
stated that he foresaw ASEAN playing a security role and helping the UN tackle regional peace-
keeping tasks [REUTERS 31.08.1994]. 
As if to underline the plausibility of that prospect Malaysia launched the idea to create an ASEAN 
peacekeeping force for assignments under UN auspices. This was in contrast to the shipwrecked 
proposal to send an ASEAN force to Cambodia to watch over the peace process in 1989. Setting up 
such a force was considered to allow ASEAN to increase its impact compared to the effect individual 
contributions would have, as Malaysian defence minister Najib Tun Razak argued. In the middle of 
the 1990s the notion appeared to be acceptable; Singapore, for instance, supported the idea, and 
also Indonesia sent positive signals in that regard [JEN 17.01.1995]. 
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However, to interpret overall acceptance of the idea soon turned out to have been premature. In 
February 1995 even erstwhile backer Indonesia – more specifically its minister of defense and se-
curity Gen. (ret.) Edi Sudradjat -  rejected the idea on the ground that the different military doc-
trines among ASEAN’s member states would make such a force ineffective in carrying out a peace-
keeping mission [JP 16.02.1995; PEOU 1998:444]. 
Nevertheless, the UN itself – in spite of ASEAN members’ lacking unanimous support for a regional 
peacekeeping commitment – did not lose its appeal and continued to be deemed an essential mul-
tilateral vehicle in which to participate actively was still viewed as important. Hence, at the 1995 
ASEAN Summit the heads of state and government agreed that: 
ASEAN shall explore ways and means to enhance cooperation with the United Nations, 
with the view to promoting peace and stability in the region. ASEAN shall also work to-
wards making the United Nations a more equitable, effective and relevant body for pro-
moting peace and prosperity in the region and globally in the post-Cold War era. [ASEAN 
15.12.1995] 
The reform ASEAN had in mind for the UN consisted i.a. in making the membership of the UNSC 
more representative and in “enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of the world body to carry 
out its peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building and preventive diplomacy function” [ASEAN 
15.12.1995b]. 
In the meantime, ASEAN had come to be increasingly perceived as an international actor in its own 
right. For instance, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) in early 1998 called on 
ASEAN to prevent future refugee crises in the region, citing ‘certain political situations’ and in par-
ticular the internal conflict in Cambodia at that time [JEN 07.01.1998]. 
Nonetheless, the ‘subsidiarity model’ of global governance, leading to a task sharing between the 
UN and regional organizations is in the near future unlikely to be realized as regards ASEAN. 
PEOU’s analysis finds that the following three conditions would have to be fulfilled for such a sce-
nario: 
 
• ASEAN would have to be materially competent and politically capable of taking collective 
action in cases of security crises without having to burden the UN; 
• the concept of absolute and exclusive sovereignty would have to be given up by the ASEAN 
nations; and 
• ASEAN nations ought not to perceive their vulnerability to great powers’ influence as high 
[PEOU 1998:454]. 
 
However, UNSG Kofi Annan urged ASEAN in early 2000 to converge to the world body. The Asso-
ciation still did not enjoy – contrary to other regional organizations – observer status at the UN. At 
the same occasion Annan also suggested that the UN should start to participate in the ARF. Upon 
that, Thailand, currently chairing ASEAN’s Standing Committee, announced that invitation to the 
UNSG will be extended for the following ARF meeting [SRIVORANART 13.02.2000]. 
Annan subsequently made known his view of ASEAN, stating: ‘it is a real force to be reckoned with 
far beyond the region’ [qtd. in: BBC MS 16.02.2000]. However, the first ever ASEAN-UN Summit, 
taking place in February 2000, still ended ‘without concrete results’, and no step by ASEAN toward 
acquiring observer status was taken [NT 01.01.2001]. Still, in 2001 the practice of conferences of 
ASEAN and the UN and with the cooperation of Track II institutions616
The Second ASEAN-UN Summit took place in September 2005 and was headed by the Secretaries-
General of ASEAN and the UN, and attended by ASEAN leaders plus the heads of various UN enti-
ties. Finally in December 2006 ASEAN was accorded observer status with UNGA Resolution 61/44, 
a realization of a decision taken two months earlier by ASEAN’s foreign ministers [PNA 23.09.2006; 
XINHUA 17.10.2006]. This strengthened commitment was underlined with the new ASEAN’s Char-
, was adopted [JP 
24.02.2004]. Internal discussions seemed to bring about some gradual progress on the question 
and in March the following year it was announced that the Association planned to eventually seek 
observer status at the UN [AFP 20.03.2001].  
ASEAN’s wish for an enhanced role for the UN on the world scene remained undisturbed as evi-
denced by Indonesia urging the world body to strengthen its ties to regional organizations, among 
them ASEAN in order to handle multilateral problems more effectively [ASIA PULSE 19.09.2002]. 
As one measure on that road Thailand suggested to invite the UNSG together with the heads of 
other UN agencies to the ASEAN Summit scheduled to take place in November 2004 [KN 
05.10.2003]. 
                                                 
616 The first of these conferences took place in January 2001 in Thailand; the second in February 2002 in the 
Philippines, the third in February 2003 in Singapore, the forth in February 2004 in Indonesia [JP 24.02.2004]. 
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ter (2007). The Charter617
...tackle, yet more vigorously, the range of issues that both our institutions will need to 
address in the future.
 establishes that ‘ASEAN may seek an appropriate status with the United 
Nations system’. UNSG Ban also aired his assumption that the Charter would enable ASEAN to 
618
3.18 ASEAN and the Independence of East Timor 1999 
 
The year 2007 saw the signing of an ASEAN-UN MOU which strengthens the cooperation and coor-
dination of both organizations and lists among its purposes: 
cooperation in the implementation of programmes that are geared towards the mainte-
nance of regional and international peace and security (...) [ASEAN-UN 27.09.2007] 
Time will tell how substantial cooperation between both entities outgrowing therefrom will be prove 
to be. 
East Timor – colonized by Portugal - was invaded and forcibly incorporated into Indonesia in 1975 
[WND 07.12.1975; WND 13.12.1975], after the former colonial power had hastily left the territory. 
However, ASEAN - in existence for eight years then - did not voice any substantive opposition to 
the move, nor any criticism of Indonesia’s following harsh rule of the independence hungry East 
Timorese. DUPONT explains that reluctance with what he perceives to have been ASEAN’s raison 
d’être: 
The principal aim of ASEAN’s founding fathers was to ensure that there would never be 
another | ‘confrontation’ between Indonesia and its fellow Southeast Asian states by draw-
ing Indonesia into a limited security community. Open criticism of Jakarta, it was feared, 
would achieve precisely the opposite outcome. Thus, uneasiness over the manner of Indo-
nesia’s incorporation of East Timor in 1975 and Jakarta’s subsequent heavy-handed rule 
over the province have been muted by the dictates of realpolitik. ASEAN’s collective 
judgement has always been that maintaining good relations with Indonesia must take pri-
ority over self-determination for the east Timorese …  [DUPONT 2000:163-164, original 
emphasis] 
Another author, Ralf EMMERSON, explaining ASEAN’s inability to stop Indonesia, remarked that the 
annexation was an ‘act of hegemony’ that pointed to the fact that the “practice of constraint did 
not apply outside the walls of the Association” [EMMERSON 2001:284]. The ASEAN countries rallied 
behind Indonesia instead of condemning it; they argued the move was necessary for Indonesia’s 
national security; the only exception being Singapore. However, also Singapore soon silenced its 
criticism [KAMARULZAMAN et.al. 202:29; NARINE 2005:478]. 
Two decades later political change in Indonesia also spurred the separatist aspirations of the East 
Timorese. East Timor had been occupied by Indonesian forces since 1975. While steps were un-
derway to grant East Timor either autonomy or independence (after conducting a referendum in 
the territory), ASEAN kept itself aback. ASEAN’s Secretary General at the time, Rodolfo Severino, 
clarified the Association’s position when he somehow inconsistently stressed: 
It is for the Indonesians and the international community to resolve (the problems). The 
ASEAN Secretariat has nothing to do with it... but, what we want is a peaceful solution to 
the problem. [qtd. in: XINHUA 12.04.1999] 
Severino added that ASEAN would never send a team to East Timor, like the Australians who did 
send a mission for investigating an incident that cost the lives of five people [XINHUA 12.04.1999]. 
Nevertheless, the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, urged ASEAN to assist in the 
scheduled independence referendum. Specifically he asked that the Association helps in keeping 
the peace during the ballot which was planned to take place on 8th August 1999 [LERTCHAROEN-
CHOK 12.06.1999]. 
                                                 
617 See Charter of the ASEAN as published on the ASEAN homepage: http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf re-
trieved on 18.07.2008. 
618 See UNSG message on the opening of the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007, retrieved on 10.11.2008 
from: http://www.aseansec.org/19488.pdf. 
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Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, stated that although East Timor would probably be dis-
cussed at the upcoming AMM of late July 1999, it had not officially been placed on the agenda of 
the gathering [AFP 22.07.1999a]. In line with this reluctance, ASEAN did not actively support the 
referendum about East Timor’s independence that finally took place on 30th August. Several ASEAN 
countries contributed personnel to the UN mission in East Timor, but merely on a bilateral basis. 
Alexander MANGO, political analyst, commented: 
ASEAN as usual has been slow to respond to dramatic development. … It may be said, 
bluntly, that ASEAN played no role in the birth of a nation in the region over which it is 
supposed to exercise region-state dominion. [SON 09.09.1999] 
The silence also continued when violence erupted in East Timor in the aftermath of the independ-
ence referendum619
B. J. Habibie, Indonesia’s President, officially announced his decision to invite an international 
peacekeeping force at that time, signalling its acceptance of interference in its presumably internal 
affairs
. ASEAN’s passivity then was explained with its ‘ASEAN Way’ of emphasizing its 
non-interference principle [Asia Pulse 09.09.1999; STEWART 10.09.1999]. The South China Morn-
ing Post highlighted the following: 
As leaders around the world reacted with outrage to the bloodshed in East Timor, de-
manding action by Jakarta to halt the army-assisted militias' violence, not a single word of 
condemnation was heard from Indonesia's fellow members of ASEAN (…) 
The East Timor crisis showed that ASEAN governments were too driven by domestic fac-
tors and bilateral considerations to be able to agree on the adoption of realistic measures 
when faced with a difficult regional situation. [STEWART 19.09.1999] 
DUPONT argues comparably that none of ASEAN’s fellow members was ‘willing to risk alienating’ 
Jakarta upon its handling of the East Timorese situation [DUPONT 2000:163]. 
When talks were initiated that underlined the role ASEAN could play in the planned peace-keeping 
force for East Timor, it appeared as belated gesture; Jose Estrada, the Philippine President, argued 
at the time: “I think an ASEAN force is capable of keeping peace in East Timor. I think the Indone-
sian government will prefer people coming from ASEAN” [qtd. in: MS 12.09.1999]. This repre-
sented a position that was immediately taken up by other ASEAN fellow members [THURBER 
12.09.1999]. 
However, the current Chairman of ASEAN’s Standing Committee, Thailand’s foreign minister Surin 
Pitsuwan stressed that such an effort should be carried out inside of the UN framework [APN 
13.09.1999]. And Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong explicitly stated in November 1999 – 
and re-echoing the inconsistency expressed by ASEAN’s Secretary General - that East Timor 
(…) was not a problem created by ASEAN, it was and is an international problem that re-
mains an issue with the United Nations. It never started off as an Asean problem. [qtd. in: 
INBARAJ 31.01.2000] 
620
By late September ASEAN nations had already roughly 2.000 troops in East Timor [APN 
27.09.1999]. However, Australia led the force and ASEAN was not able to participate as an organi-
zation, very similar to the developments in Cambodia in 1993
 [JEN 13.09.1999]. Specifically, the Indonesian foreign minister, Alatas, saw to it that 
Thailand’s foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan met Indonesian Armed Forces Commander, General 
Wiranto. Pitsuwan subsequently obtained Wiranto’s approval that ASEAN troops be deployed to 
East Timor as part of the International Force for East Timor (Interfet) [DUPONT 2000:166]. The 
Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia stated their willingness to contribute troops; Brunei and Singa-
pore emphasized that they would support the mission in other ways [THURBER 13.09.1999]. Later 
Singapore was also reported to be ready to send troops, while Thailand had agreed to provide an 
infantry battalion [REUTERS 15.09.1999]. 
621
                                                 
619 On ASEAN’s inactivity at this stage of the crisis compare VATIKIOTIS et.al. 30.09.1999. 
620 East Timorese independence leader Ramos Horta meanwhile, greeted an ASEAN participation in the peace-
keeping force, but insisted that the US, Australia, and New Zealand take the lead [THURBER 13.09.1999]. 
621 Barry WAIN judged that the member countries responded ‘only tardily to a request for troops’ by Indonesia 
[WAIN 29.10.1999]. 
. In protest to the dominating posi-
tion acquired by Australia inside the force, Indonesia repudiated the Indonesian-Australian 10-year 
defence agreement prematurely [EMMERS 2001:285]. The Thai Foreign Minister, however, con-
ceded later on the part of ASEAN: ‘[w]e have to admit the reality, that none of us was ready to 
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take the lead.’ [qtd. in: WAIN 29.10.1999]. It was at least a Thai who took up the post of Deputy 
Commander [DUPONT 2000:166]. 
In retrospect the following ASEAN countries contributed to Interfet (approximately supplying 2.500 
from an overall 9900 troops [NARINE 2005:479]): 
 
• Thailand: 1.580 personnel, including medical and engineering teams, one naval ship, 1 X 
C-130; 
• Philippines: 600 personnel, including engineer and medical teams, 1 X C-130; 
• Singapore: 254 personnel, including one medial team, logistic spt, and two heavy landing 
ships; and 
• Malaysia: 30 personnel, mainly interpreters [DUPONT 2000:167]. 
 
PURA underlined other than political restrictions, among them ASEAN members’ limited resources 
and their troops’ untested qualifications for peacekeeping activities. Another issue was the loyalty 
conflict ASEAN soldiers could be confronted with, when situations would arise that might force 
them to shoot at Indonesian soldiers [PURA 30.09.1999]. The Bangkok Post furthermore pointed 
out that the planned investigations by the UN Human Rights Commission, delving into the sup-
posed gross human rights violations perpetrated by Indonesian forces in East Timor and using for 
identification and evidence-collection tasks Interfet troops (hence also forces from ASEAN nations), 
might constitute another instance of ‘testing times for ASEAN’ [SPINDLER 06.10.1999]. However, 
the intra-ASEAN solidarity was so much harmed as not to let ASEAN present a united front against 
Australia’s proposal of a Status of Forces Agreement that was designed to limit the competencies of 
Indonesia’s judicial system in cases of erring peacekeeper personnel [GN 12.10.1999]. 
But existing differences came to the fore when the UN-authorized multinational force (Interfet) was 
to be replaced by a proposed UN Transitional Administration in East Timor. Whereas Malaysia which 
was sceptical of the West’s propaganda that it considered to have lured the Timorese away from 
Indonesia, was supporting the idea that ASEAN should spearhead the operation, Thailand insisted 
that the whole international community should bear the respective responsibility [AFP 18.10.1999]. 
The conflict of interest was also expressed by the East Timorese independence leader Ramos Horta, 
who alleged the ASEAN members to be ‘accomplices of Indonesia’ [WAIN 29.10.1999]. 
Not astonishingly this scepticism took effect also on the question of a future ASEAN membership. 
In February it had been announced by Horta that the young nation was to seek ASEAN membership 
as soon as possible. But after months of biased ASEAN behaviour in favour of Indonesia622
In mid-December 1999 UNSG Kofi Annan announced that Jaime de los Santos, a Philippine Major 
General, has been chosen to head UNTAET, in conformity to Indonesia’s wish that the Chief of the 
Mission comes from an ASEAN member state
 – as 
most vocally displayed by Malaysia - the ASEAN membership question was put on the backburner, 
and East Timor henceforth considered the participation in the South Pacific Forum as more desir-
able for the time being [WAIN 12.11.1999]. 
The scope of ASEAN’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping force to replace the interim Interna-
tional Force for East Timor, was to be discussed at ASEAN’s informal summit, scheduled for late 
November 1999. The Philippines and another country reportedly had been asked by UNSG to take 
command of the force. However, Defence Secretary Mercado signalled his country’s reluctance, 
when he explained: 
‘It certainly will be prestigious but sometimes we cannot afford so much prestige.’ [qtd. in: AFP 
18.11.1999]. 
A week later the Philippines stated that six or seven ASEAN nations would probably contribute to 
the UN Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET), but declined to say which those were and 
what kind of contribution (military or civilian) they were planning to extend [AFP 25.11.1999]. 
623
                                                 
622 Solidarity – as one would have been expected – was indeed characterizing ASEAN nations’ behaviour. Thus, 
it was not astonishing that ASEAN countries refused to support the call for a UN Commission of Inquiry to in-
vestigate the atrocities committed in East Timor [HAACKE 2003:70]. Unsurprisingly then, when talks for the 
resolution of another Indonesian secessionist conflict were arranged, Amin Rianom, governmental representa-
tive, explained the stance of the rebels with regard to the venue for negotiations, thus: „[t]hey argue the loca-
tion (in an ASEAN country) is regarded as less neutral because there will be an aspect of solidarity among 
ASEAN members” [qtd. in: KN 27.04.2001]. 
623 Also Malaysia has lobbied to fill that post. But resistance from the East Timorese leadership warned that 
such a step might trigger civil disobedience in the newly independent state averted that move, hinting at the 
fact that Malaysia was among the staunchest supporters of the Indonesian behaviour during the crisis [INBARAJ 
31.01.2000]. 
 [XINHUA 15.12.1999]. 
RÜHLE, commenting on ASEAN’s overall reluctance to support the political process in East Timor, 
pointed out the following: 
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The laudable participation of large Philippine and Thai Interfet and UNTAET-contingents 
mitigated, but could not repair the damage done for the reputation of ASEAN as a regional 
peace broker. [RÜHLE 2002:91] 
ASEAN tabled the Timorese membership issue again in early 2000. The then Thai Chairman of 
ASEAN’s Standing Committee stated that no ASEAN nation would be opposed to a membership of 
the new state after it having been several years under UN administration [JEN 21.01.2000]. The 
East Timorese leadership at that time was reported to be interested to take part at ASEAN meet-
ings as an observer, so as to get acquainted with how the Association is run [JEN 08.02.2000], a 
request that was supported by Thailand, albeit only for the status of an invitee of the host country 
[KUMRUNGROJ 10.03.2000]. East Timor eventually attended meetings as ‘unofficial observer’ 
[PENNINGTON 24.07.2000]. 
During the year 2000 the attitude toward ASEAN membership among the East Timorese leadership 
changed to the positive. Ramos Horta remarked in that regard “ASEAN countries so far have given 
us tremendous assistance within their limitations” [qtd. in: AFP 21.07.2000]. Horta emphasized 
even his wish to start discussions in order to prepare for East Timor’s accession to ASEAN, prefera-
bly beginning as early as 2001 [PENNINGTON 24.07.2000]. However, inside ASEAN Malaysia in 
particular still dragged its feet on the membership question624
Indonesia’s reluctance was given renewed expression when its foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda 
argued, somewhat disconcertingly, that the membership of East Timor would necessitate amend-
ments of the TAC, and he added “[c]ertainly, the amendment will take years to process considering 
all the necessary procedures to be taken afterwards such as ratification and others”, a statement 
designed to dash hopes for a prompt accession by the newly independent nation [ASIA PULSE 
08.10.2002]. In early 2003 Cambodia voiced its view that an accession is away five years at the 
minimum [KN 06.03.2003]. However, at that time this view was also share by the leadership of 
East Timor
. Meanwhile, the Command of UN-
TAET changed in late July 2000 from the Philippines to the Thai [AFP 21.07.2000]. 
During the meetings surrounding the 33rd AMM in July 2000 the membership question was termed 
to be a ‘non-issue’ for the time being, only to gain relevancy after East Timor would attain its full 
independence [APN 31.07.2000b]. 
East Timor itself deemed a 3-5 year-period, starting with its full independence, as the time-frame 
necessary to join the Association [DJIN 23.07.2001]. Consequently, the East Timorese Council of 
Ministers in November 2001 authorized its foreign minister to proceed with plans to sign the TAC 
and to obtain ASEAN observer status [BBC MS 21.11.2001]. 
During a February 2002 Retreat of ASEAN’s foreign ministers, no consensus on the issue of East 
Timor’s observer status was reached. A ‘step-by-step gradual approach’, as Singapore’s foreign 
minister Shunmugum Jayakumar described it, was favoured. East Timor would be Special Guest of 
the Chair at the upcoming ASEAN meeting in July [KN 21.02.2002]. It was only later learned that 
Myanmar in particular had opposed the granting of the observer status to East Timor by citing past 
dealings between the East Timorese leadership with Myanmar’ opposition forces [AFP 28.02.2002]. 
The East Timorese wish was not affected by that refusal, and its leader, Jose Ramos-Horta, broad-
ened the request to also include membership in the ARF. That was viewed to be achievable in the 
near future, well before the ASEAN accession [BBC MS 25.04.2002]. However, also that far lesser 
endeavour of joining the ARF was turned down due to lacking unanimity. Amongst others it was 
argued that this would enable the tiny state to jump the queue, compared to Pakistan that had 
been on the waiting list already for the past 10 years. Moreover, the currently effective moratorium 
on the acceptance of new participants was highlighted. Among the sceptics towards East Timor’s 
membership at that time was also Indonesia [BBC MS 14.05.2002]. 
625
In 2004 Indonesia and East Timor concluded a provisional common border demarcation accord, 
contributing to the smoothening of their relations [KN 30.06.2006]. Another step heading toward 
eventual membership was the announcement that East Timor would become a member of the ARF 
[BBC MS 14.07.2005]. Thus, in mid-2006 the country announced its formal application to join 
ASEAN – a process expected to take around five more years [AFXA 25.07.2006]. However, various 
indications were given making accession more cumbersome. East Timor's proposal to sign the TAC 
met with Indonesia's re-iteration that in case the newly independent country seriously endeavoured 
to join the Association, the TAC would first have to be amended since it defines ASEAN as to be 
constituted by its current members – a step that 'would take some time'. East Timor's request to 
upgrade its status, currently being still only 'guest of the ASEAN Chairman', to become observer, 
 [OANA 13.06.2003] 
                                                 
624 Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid Albar commented on the East Timorese potential membership the 
following: ‘[w]hen the time comes, we will talk about it. Let us not try to prepare them, let them prepare them-
selves’ [qtd. in: AFP 21.07.2000]. 
625 East Timor’s foreign minister reasoned the following way: “There are 200 or more ASEAN meetings every 
year, it is impossible for East Timor” [qtd. in: OANA 13.06.2003]. 
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was likewise rejected. And finally a discussion paper articulated that East Timor's participation in 
ASEAN activities 
will not create any special right for Timor Leste in ASEAN, nor will it oblige ASEAN to con-
sider favorably the future application of Timor Leste for either the observer status or 
membership in ASEAN. [text in: TJANDRANINGSIH 26.07.2006] 
In January 2007 East Timor signed the TAC, a prerequisite for full ASEAN membership. At that time 
it was speculated that the Association could well benefit from East Timor’s large oil and gas re-
serves in turn [YOONG 13.01.2007]. 
 
ASEAN’s overall unconvincing policy taken toward East Timor has certainly not contributed to its 
international standing. CABALLERO-ANTHONY observed the following: 
The crisis in East Timor offers insights into the existing regional mechanisms of conflict 
management in Asia. The crisis showed that ASEAN and the ARF’s mechanisms were in-
adequate to respond to an unfolding humanitarian disaster in their midst. To be sure, 
ASEAN failed to respond to the crisis as a group and whatever individual responses that 
came were muted and sensitive to the issue of Indonesia’s national sovereignty 
And CABALLEOR-ANTHONY subsumes – being not alone on this judgement626
3.19 The Korean Peninsula 
: 
(…) an important repercussion of the lack of action in East Timor was the further weaken-
ing of ASEAN’s value as a regional actor in the promotion of regional political and security 
co-operation. [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 2002:543] 
ASEAN’s dithering, even though understandable in view of the felt need to somehow treat its ‘gen-
tle giant’ with care, in the long run also contradicted the Association’s professed claim of not being 
the battleground for hegemonic ambitions of the major powers (as enshrined for example in the 
ZOPFAN concept) . East Timor was clearly a lost opportunity for ASEAN to bolster its prestige; else 
it could have been a golden chance to substantiate its ambition to be a serious and powerful multi-
lateral actor in its own right. 
As soon as South Korea was admitted as full ASEAN DP in 1991 the conflict between the divided 
Koreas gained – even if, at first, in indirect manner - importance and attention on the Association’s 
agenda. This development was sustained through the establishment of the ARF three years later. 
The official statement of the first ARF meeting included the following paragraph – signifying the 
importance of the conflict to the region - on the issue: 
Bearing in mind the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, the Meeting welcomed the continuation of US-
DPRK [North Korea, my remark] negotiation and endorsed the early resumption of inter-
Korean dialogue. [ARF 25.07.1994] 
The nuclear question regarding North Korea gained additional prominence when Pyongyang made 
its wish known to be also invited to the ARF [KN 14.02.1994]. 
At a special meeting in early 1995 of ASEAN senior officials the position was confirmed that the 
Korean Peninsula situation will be closely watched by ASEAN. The Bangkok Post observed that this 
constituted a break with the organization’s traditions, since concern is expressed about a political 
issue beyond its immediate interests [BP 06.01.1995], although located in its area of influence. 
ASEAN commended at their 1995 AMM the dialogue between North Korea and the US on the nu-
clear question. Moreover both Koreas were urged to restart talks and it was emphasized that those 
are considered essential for peace and security on the peninsula [ASEAN 30.07.1995]. 
Reiterating a call made one year earlier, the US asked ASEAN in summer 1997 to play a more sig-
nificant role in and contribute $ 30 million627
                                                 
626 Compare for example Chin Kin WAH, an ASEAN observer at the National University of Singapore, who holds: 
„Asean has been reduced to playing a secondary, supportive role“ by allowing big states to play a leading role 
[qtd. in: VATIKIOTIS & DOLVEN & CRSIPIN 30.09.1999]. 
 to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organi-
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zation (KEDO); KEDO628
                                                                                                                                                        
627 This overall-target was chosen so as to let the ASEAN states decide among themselves the individual contri-
butions [GIACOMO 25.07.1997]. ASEAN countries had also earlier contributed funds to KEDO over the previous 
two years albeit obviously on a more modest scale [CHONGKITTAVORN 21.08.1997]. 
628 The only ASEAN nation to join KEDO was Indonesia which had done so in 1996 [CHONGKITTAVORN 
21.08.1997]. Also the Philippines, being approached to participate, deliberated membership. For the corre-
sponding considerations preoccupying the government (among them the suggestion that ASEAN should join as 
a member) which might be comparable to those also pondered by other ASEAN nations, see KN 08.07.1996. 
 had been was set up by the US, Japan and South Korea to dismantle 
North Korea’s gas-graphite nuclear reactors and replace them with two light-water nuclear reactors 
[JEN 02.08.1997; GIACOMO 25.07.1997; DY 21.08.1997]. This call, however, remained largely 
unanswered [compare for example: PTFDCH 30.09.1998]. 
This inactivity notwithstanding the Korean Peninsula continued to regularly feature at the ARF 
agenda. Thus, the Sixth ARF expressed concern over the previous missile launch by North Korea 
that could heighten tensions and have serious consequences for the stability of the peninsula 
[ASEAN 2002:195]. Meanwhile, various attempts of North Korea to join the ARF remained unsuc-
cessful, rooted partly in the country’s lack of diplomatic relations with the ASEAN states and partly 
in its irritating approach to the organization (compare chapters on ARF meetings) [APN 
13.03.2000]. 
But after North Korea had intensified its diplomatic efforts, it was agreed to invite it to the ARF for 
late July 2000. That occasion was used not only for the first ever meeting of foreign ministers of 
both Koreas, but also for discussions between the usually reclusive North Korea with the US, Can-
ada, Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union [AFP 10.07.2000]; a move that underlined 
the confidence building quality of North Korea’s admission. 
The AMM of that year hailed the inter-Korean dialogue meeting, held in June, as a step toward 
peace and security on the peninsula and expressed its hope that eventually the two Korea’s might 
reunite [JP 25.07.2000]. 
Although the coming months saw relations between the two Koreas to sour somewhat - including 
the North’ criticism of the South’s announce policy of ‘comprehensive reciprocity’ as being inspired 
by the US -  still the North welcomed the South’s proposal to meet on the sidelines of the upcom-
ing ARF, scheduled for July 2001 [JANG-JIN 23.05.2001]. 
When tensions flared up after North Korea’s pullout from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in April 2003, 
Indonesia came up with the proposal that North Korea’s nuclear crisis be settled by Asian members 
of the ARF; and not by the UNSC [XINHUA 08.04.2003]. The crisis was perceived to pose ‘a matter 
of concern as it affects security in the whole region’, as Thailand’s foreign minister Surakiart Sathi-
rathai highlighted. Shortly hereafter the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Thailand, and Malaysia met 
with the intension of cooling down the escalation; however, it was not planned to offer mediation, 
but only to ‘facilitate’ peaceful negotiations [AP 11.04.2003; REUTERS 11.04.2003]. The meeting 
resulted in the decision to send a diplomatic delegation – headed by Cambodia - to North Korea in 
an endeavour to resolve the crisis. Pyongyang agreed to receive the ASEAN mission. The delega-
tion was planning to also meet the North Korean leader [ITWS 14.04.2003; BERNAMA 
12.04.2003]. However, when the holding of talks between the US, North Korea, and China were 
announced, the trip was cancelled [BBC MN 18.04.2003], since its purpose was considered already 
fulfilled. 
ASEAN’s position was more or less in support of South Korea’s efforts to resolve the crisis within a 
multilateral framework; also the South’s ‘policy of peace and prosperity’ toward the North was 
hailed [OANA 11.04.2003]. This position was underlined, for instance, when the Philippine Presi-
dent, being on a state visit to South Korea, announced the plan to ask ASEAN to issue a collective 
call for denuclearization of the North [AP 03.06.2003c]. Also Thailand reportedly supported the idea 
that ASEAN and/or the ARF be more strongly involved in the settlement of the dispute [KN 
06.06.2003]. Amid the drafting of a respective communiqué, North Korea announced that it is was 
not going to take part in the upcoming ARF meeting [KN 12.06.2003]. 
However, this did nothing to stop ASEAN to express its concern about the tensions arising from 
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons’ drive [AFP 16.06.2003]. In line with that, the ARF which took place 
in mid-2004 reemphasized its support for a denuclearization of the peninsula, herewith once again 
indirectly supporting the South Korean stance [ASEAN 2005:105]. 
While endeavours were underway to keep North Korea at the ARF table and secure its continued 
engagement, the presumed explosion of an atomic bomb as announced by Pyongyang was re-
ported in October 2006. This event prompted ASEAN's protests. The Philippines, as current Chair-
man, declared its deep concern over the explosion and termed the tests to constitute a threat to 
the peace and security of East Asia and called on the country to desist from further tests [NZPA 
12.10.2006]. ASEAN once more offered to open backdoor-talks with North Korea in order to re-
solve the crisis [BBC MS 14.10.2006], as it had intended to do in 2003. Ignacio Bunye, speaker of 
the Philippine President detailed: 
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As ASEAN Chair, the Philippines is ready to offer its good offices as a venue to explore 
means to revive the Six Party Talks and engage North Korea in diplomatic dialogue. [qtd. 
in: DJIN 23.10.2007] 
This offer was reiterated and another one, suggesting to establish Track II talks alongside the six-
party talks, prompted ASEAN's Plus Three Partners China, Japan, and South Korea to hail the Asso-
ciation's efforts at resolving the issue [XINHUA 11.01.2007]. 
When the resolution process seemed to make progress – North Korea vowed to fulfil its commit-
ments and declare all existing nuclear programs and facilities – ASEAN recognized this course and 
welcomed all additional ongoing diplomatic efforts [ASEAN 30.07.2007]; a position repeated also at 
the AMM in July 2008 [ASEAN 21.07.2008]. 
 
ASEAN’s endeavours to assist in resolving the conflict on the Korean peninsula, although inherently 
limited in its potentiality, are still to be classified as noteworthy if one considers that the issue is as 
regards geography completely out of the ASEAN region. Nevertheless, the Association correctly has 
identified the issue to be of concern, not only due to its strengthened cooperation with South Korea 
via the APT framework. However, ASEAN’s efforts were hampered not simply by the modest lever-
age it commands, but moreover due to the content-related position it holds which is more or less 
congruent with the stand taken by South Korea and the wider international community. This does 
little to boost its trustworthiness in the eyes of the North Korean regime. Thus, it is not a conse-
quence of ASEAN’s diplomatic manoeuvres if North Korea at times decides to displays a cooperative 
attitude. However, the decision to regularly put the topic on the agendas of various ASEAN fora can 
be understood as contributing to an environment in which the political support of the Association is 
publicly staked out – instead of creating an attitudinal vacuum that might additionally embolden 
the North to continue on its isolationist pro-nuclear policies. 
ASEAN, by variously offering its services to resolve diplomatic dead-ends on the one hand, and by 
inviting North Korea as participant into the ARF, at least proved not to be ignorant or idle with re-
gard to the crisis, but to contribute what it considered appropriate for dissolving it. 
3.20 Cases of ASEAN’s evanescent Engagement 
ASEAN’s attitude toward arising disputes was frequently quite non-committal. However, while 
choosing to engage in certain hot spots (most notably regarding Vietnam’s occupation of Cambo-
dia), for many instances it opted for limited dedication if not for an outright laissez-faire policy 
course. A brief outline of three such qualified cases of engagement are given below for illustrative 
purposes. 
3.20.1 Philippines 1986 
Political turmoil following the disputed presidential elections of 7th February 1986 in the Philippines 
first made Malaysia express its concerns. Malaysia’s foreign minister declared: “we would like to 
see the Philippines, as an ASEAN member country, being able to continue to contribute towards 
peace and stability in this region by defusing its own internal differences” [qtd. in: XINHUA 
23.02.1986]. Subsequently, the foreign ministries of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand issued a joint statement [SUN 24.02.1986]. The statement read: 
As member states of ASEAN, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand have followed with increasing concern the trend of events following the presiden-
tial election in the Philippines.  
A critical situation has emerged which portends bloodshed and civil war. The crisis can be 
resolved without widespread carnage and political turmoil. We call on all parties to restore 
national unity and solidarity so as to maintain national resilience.  
There is still time to act with restraint and bring about peaceful resolution. We hope that 
all Filipino leaders will join efforts to pave the way for a peaceful solution to the crisis. 
[ASEAN 23.02.1986] 
This statement was unusual for the ASEAN nations, ever careful not to interfere (publicly) in the 
affairs of each other629
                                                 
629 Nevertheless it would be overemphasizing and misleading to interpret the statement of the Thai Foreign 
Ministry spokesman, that the developments in the Philippines ‘reflected the fact that politics in ASEAN countries 
is not like 15 or 20 years ago, when one man could dictate’ [qtd. in: CROSSETTE 26.02.1986] as a sea-change 
via a newly formulated security concept of the Association. 
. Astonishingly then, LEIFER terms the ASEAN statement to constitute only 
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‘a tepid collective call’ to the conflict parties to restore national unity and solidarity [LEIFER 
1999:35-36]. One is more inclined to agree with HAACKE who describes the step as an ‘egregious 
example’ of the ASEAN countries’ involvement in the domestic affairs of one of their fellows 
[HAACKE 1999:583], given the Association’s overall record. 
As regards the political situation certain developments led to the flight of President Marcos and the 
inauguration of Corazon Aquino as new President of the Philippines. Aquino soon afterwards ap-
pealed to the ASEAN nations not to grant asylum to exiled Ferdinand Marcos [JEN 20.03.1986], a 
call that was heeded630
3.20.2 Malaysia vs. Thailand 1997 
 [HC 27.02.1986]. 
Muslim insurgents were active in predominantly Buddhist Thailand since the 1960s. However, dur-
ing 1997 they stepped up their activities remarkably, resulting in some 20 killings. Until then 
mainly Muslim Malaysia was regarded as a safe haven for the insurgents. However, during the in-
formal ASEAN Summit in December 1997, Thailand raised the issue vis-à-vis Malaysia. Subse-
quently, Malaysia organized a crackdown and arrested three suspected separatist leaders to hand 
them over to the Thai authorities [TASKER 12.02.1998]. In that case, although ASEAN as an actor, 
did not play a significant role – the framework it provided helped to find common ground between 
two of its members. Another contributing factor in diffusing the arising tensions was that the Asso-
ciation had helped to firmly entrench the norm of solidarity and national regime consolidation to 
which Thailand could easily and legitimately demand adherence. 
3.20.3 Indonesia vs. Malaysia: Sipadan and Ligatan 
After a failed round of bilateral talks between Indonesia and Malaysia about the two contested is-
lands Sipadan and Ligatan631
3.21 ASEAN’s Inactivity in Face of Conflict 
, Indonesia’s foreign minister, Ali Alatas, called for ASEAN to resolve 
the question about the island’s ownership. Alatas specifically proposed that the High Council, fore-
seen in the TAC, be engaged with the issue and stated that this should yield an objective and fair 
decision and show that ASEAN was able to sort out its differences amicably. However, Malaysia 
insisted to refer the affair to the International Court of Justice [REUTERS 12.09.1994]. Malaysia 
renewed its pressure in favour of the ICJ when talks with Indonesia again broke down without hav-
ing reached a solution [JP 16.02.1995]. 
Both countries renewed their negotiations in October 1996 – however, still both maintained their 
support for their respective bodies of choice [DJTES 03.10.1996]. Finally, Indonesia agreed to en-
gage the ICJ which ruled in 2002 that the two small islands belonged to Malaysia. 
Even so, calm was not to return on a permanent basis. When Malaysia's national oil company 
awarded oil-production sharing to the Royal Dutch-Shell Group in February 2005, this move 
prompted Indonesia to protest – arguing that part of the concession overlapped on concession 
granted to ENI by Indonesia in 1999 and to Unocal in 2004. This row enraged the Indonesian peo-
ple, already angry about Malaysia's harsh treatment of Indonesian illegal migrant workers. Malay-
sia and Indonesia decided to hold talks in order to de-escalate the tensions [TJANDRANINGSIH 
09.03.2005]. Both countries hereafter reaffirmed their intention to solve the issue peacefully, argu-
ing that the navy ships sent to the region constituted routine patrolling only [KN 11.03.2005]. 
As enshrined principle, unanimity was a prerequisite for engaging the as yet very inexperienced 
ASEAN machinery with the dispute among two of its members. Hence, the contribution of the or-
ganization remained quite limited on concrete terms, although both countries on various occasions 
underlined that the dispute will be resolved with the support of and without impairing the ‘ASEAN 
spirit’ [e.g. RAKYAT 16.07.1999; BERNAMA 16.07.1999]. As in other cases extra-ASEAN means 
had to be reverted to for a dispute to be settled. This type of task-sharing is not discount the vi-
ability of the Association per se, especially given ASEAN’s traditional openness vis-à-vis the UN 
system. And while over the decades various tendencies emerged claiming regional autonomy (for 
instance as captured in ZOPFAN), such policies always turned out to be flexible enough to allow the 
accommodation of political realities and the policy choices of single ASEAN members. 
From its inception ASEAN as an institution usually preferred not to broach security issues with 
much fanfare. That is i.a. due to the fact that security issues intrinsically always hold the potential 
                                                 
630 Ferdinand Marcos fled first to Guam and several hours later on to Hawaii [HC 27.02.1986]. 
631 The two islands are located at the Indonesian-Malaysian sea border, 1.100 km east of the Malaysian capital 
Kuala Lumpur [DJTES 03.10.1996]. 
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of touching on if not infringing of the member states’ well-guarded national sovereignty. Philippine 
foreign minister, Manglapus described ASEAN’s tendency, when he said: ‘[w]e were sweeping secu-
rity issues under the carpet’ [qtd. in: BOHAN 24.01.1992]. 
Hence, ASEAN for the most part did not deem itself the primary and proper actor to handle its 
members’ various conflicts. Thus it happened that in 1995 Malaysia and Singapore agreed to send 
their territorial dispute over the island of Pedra Branca to the ICJ; the same venue was agreed 
upon by Indonesia and Malaysia for the disputed islands of Sipadan and Litigan – on which the ICJ 
eventually rendered a judgment in December 2002 [KHOO 2004:44; see chapter]. NARINE under-
lines the significance of ASEAN’s inability to solve those two conflicts as well as the Sabah dispute 
between the Philippines and Malaysia [NARINE 1998b:204 FN20], and she thus arrives at her 
evaluation that ASEAN cannot claim to be a ‘security community’: 
ASEAN works so long as its member states can see the individual advantage in making it 
work. A sense of region interest – that is, a close identification of regional good with the 
good of individual states – has not yet developed. Intra-ASEAN solidarity remains heavily 
dependent upon the unifying effect of an external threat. [NARINE 1998b:208] 
CABALLERO-ANTHONY, on the other hand, approaches the question from a different angle and so 
comes to a markedly different conclusion, when she observes: 
While this mechanism [the ICJ, my remark] is outside the ambit of ASEAN, the use of 
such legal recourse is a significant development to an organization that appears uncom-
fortable with resorting to legal structures and institutions in resolving disputes. Yet it can 
also be argued that because it is outside ASEAN, it ensures that the dispute can be re-
solved objectively without loss of face by any one party. Since settlement of territorial 
disputes is often a zero-sum game, agreeing to use this mechanism has been a big step in 
the ASEAN approach to managing or, in this case, resolving disputes. [CABALLERO-
ANTHONY 1998:62] 
Apart from intra-ASEAN territorial disputes, KHOO cites two recent events were ASEAN failed to act 
successfully: 
 
• the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 
• the violence of pro-Indonesia militia following the overwhelming vote in favour of East 
Timor’s independence [KHOO 2004:43]. 
 
KHOO excoriates the overall operability of ASEAN frankly: 
 … ASEAN is best explained as an institution that has locked its members into a vicious 
pattern of negative interaction. The emergent patterns of interaction are corroding ASEAN, 
and highlight the institution’s continuing irrelevance, as well as the possibility of its even-
tual demise. ASEAN states are reluctant to abandon the organization since that would ex-
pose the member-states to increased vulnerability vis-à-vis external powers. Perhaps 
equally important, discarding ASEAN would reopen the question of Indonesia’s role in the 
region. However, the cost of maintaining ASEAN is that member-states are locked into a 
decaying organization whose raison d’être is continually challenged as the organization 
fails to respond effectively to regional events. [KHOO 2004:43, original emphasis] 
However, another critic, a long-time observer and researcher of Southeast Asia, Michael LEIFER, 
still concedes that: 
Over the past three decades, the Association has played a positive role in providing a 
framework for avoiding and managing contention among member states. 
However, LEIFER continues: 
The point at issue, however, is that ASEAN’s mode of activity, which has been expressed 
primarily in an informal process of confidence building and trust creation, has never | 
been directed to solving specific intra-mural problems. Preventive diplomacy, for example, 
which is best defined in dispute-specific terms, has been the notable exception and not 
the rule in the intra-mural experience of ASEAN, unless one indulges in intellectual licence 
and represents the multilateral structure of the Association as itself a grand exercise in 
preventive diplomacy. [LEIFER 1999:26] 
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LEIFER suggests grasping the security relevance of ASEAN with the concept of ‘cooperative secu-
rity’. In contrast with ‘collective security’, cooperative security abstains from imposing economic or 
military sanctions. Instead, peer-group pressure combined with the assumption of self-interest are 
considered as the cornerstones of suasion. Additionally, adherence to international norms plays a 
role [LEIFER 1999:27-28]. 
Another scholar, CABALLERO-ANTHONY, interprets ASEAN as a success in containing conflicts. It is 
in fact argued that the sole formation of ASEAN, and its longevity compared with the previous 
short-lived attempts at organization building (ASA and Maphilindo): 
(…) could be considered as the first serious attempt by the regional states to institutional-
ize a mechanism for managing regional conflict. Its establishment has provided the overall 
framework for the states to manage their conflictual relationship (…) [CABALLERO-
ANTHONY 1998:45] 
Attention was drawn to the fact that the inexistence of a formal mechanism for resolving disputes 
and conflict that is made use of, leads to the misunderstanding that ASEAN provides nothing at all 
in this regard. However, the confidence-building and conflict avoidance through the style the Asso-
ciation is operating in effect made ASEAN succeed in maintaining peace among its members [CA-
BALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:62-63]. 
More than twenty years ago, Indonesia’s foreign minister, asked if the Sabah conflict might be put 
on the agenda of ASEAN, responded: 
[O]ne of asean's successes so far is due to its members' ability to refrain from bringing 
forward bilateral or internal problems before asean forums. [qtd. in: XINHUA 12.06.1987] 
The third ASEAN Summit made the preferred approach of the organization clear. In the Manila Dec-
laration the ASEAN heads of state and government declared: 
While each member state shall be responsible for its own security, cooperation on a non 
ASEAN basis among the member states in security matters shall continue in accordance to 
their mutual needs and interests. [ASEAN 15.12.1987b] 
As recent developments have illustrated this attitude has remarkably changed. East Timor, or the 
situation in Myanmar, are regularly discussion topics at ASEAN’s meetings. The outlined ASEAN 
Security Community which is expected to be realized in the framework of the new Charter, is the 
latest and clearest indication that ASEAN has accepted it as a requirement to have a decisive say in 
that policy field, at least if it intends to hold on to or even increase its overall political weigh in the 
future. 
Still, the dilemma ASEAN faces has been outlined by AMER. He highlights the inherent limitation 
ASEAN is confronted with regarding the maintenance of peace and security, stating that “conflict 
resolution is both desirable and a goal for ASEAN members, but not when this comes at the ex-
pense of maintaining stable inter-state relations within the association” [AMER 1999:1036]. 
3.21.1 Thailand vs. Burma632
In July 1989 about 200 Burmese troops in their search for and fight of rebels
 - Border 
633 of the Karen ethnic 
group crossed into Thai territory and burnt a Thai village. The Thai foreign ministry handed a pro-
test note to Rangoon634
However, before that plan was put into reality further incidents occurred. Once again Burmese 
troops crossed into Thai territory on 12th July 1989 and there seized a village. The troops also 
clashed with Thai border police which resulted in at least two dead Burmese soldiers [ST 
13.07.1989]. Two days later – on the occasion of a border meeting - the Burmese apologized for 
having intruded into Thai territory [ST 15.07.1989]. In August a Thai-Burmese Joint Co-ordination 
 requesting it to pay compensation for the incident. Subsequently, both 
countries declared their intention to set up a Regional Border Co-ordinating Committee to resolve 
future border incidents [ST 10.07.1989]. 
                                                 
632 For a detailed history of relations between Thailand, Burma, and ASEAN see: GANESAN 2006. 
633 For a sketch of the most important rebellious groups in Myanmar see RAMCHARAN 2000:71-72. 
634 In 2006 the government moved Burma’s administrative capital from Rangoon to Naypyidaw [EIUVW 
28.09.2009]. 
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Office was created to avoid further border clashes [ST 14.08.1989]. Finally, in early October 1989 
after bilateral negotiations Burma agreed to pay $ 1,5m for the incurred damages on Thai soil [ST 
07.10.1989]. 
Although the area of the shared border never was completely calm in the following years, one de-
velopment in 1997 raised eyebrows. Shortly before Burma was to be admitted as a member to 
ASEAN a military stand-off over an islet in the Moei River between to two nations’ armies took 
place. A Rangoon based diplomat commented: “[i]n a normal world it would be incredibly bizarre of 
Burma to confront Thailand now - whoever is in the right over these few metres of mud” [qtd. in: 
BARNES 28.05.1997]. Back then this stance was interpreted to reflect the power of the military 
commanders who obviously did not mind the political ramifications that may be caused in such a 
delicate period [BARNES 28.05.1997]. The confrontational attitude did also not change after Burma 
had been admitted to ASEAN [BARNES 02.10.1997]. 
In early 1998 another tense stand-off between the two countries developed after Burmese soldiers 
had fired on a Thai plane. To ease the tensions the Thai Army Commander in Chief, Gen. Chetta 
Thanajaro, called for a mutual withdrawal of troops from the point of confrontation, located at the 
disputed Manao Island. 
Claims and counterclaims characterized the sour relations of both neighbours. Whereas Burma 
accused Thailand to harbour ethnic insurgents, Thailand protested the various incursions of Bur-
mese soldiers on its territory in search of those insurgents [AFP 01.02.1998]. Bangkok Post, in 
view of the ensuing tensions called for a regional answer: 
Hostilities along Thailand's border with Burma cannot be allowed to continue, and it is in 
this respect that the regional grouping, which has embraced Rangoon, should use its good 
offices to bring to an end family discord. [BP 19.03.1998] 
The considerable friction with Burma and the subsequent Burmese refugee flows - estimated to 
number 100.000 -  resulting from the regime’s crackdowns, was judged to be partly responsible for 
Thailand’s push for a an ‘flexible engagement’ approach as advocated for ASEAN in the late 1990s. 
This concept was deemed to allow its members to discuss matters originating in other countries, 
but impacting on its neighbours [CHANDA & ISLAM 06.08.1998], without automatically be termed 
interference in internal matters. 
For the time being tensions between the two countries continued and Myanmar finally closed the 
border to Thailand; only in late 1999 Rangoon invited the Thai foreign minister for talks to resolve 
the current situation. Thailand responded positively to the offer [BBC MS 16.11.1999]. Nonethe-
less, the two nations’ relations remained shaky on various fronts [CRISPIN & LINTNER 
09.12.1999]. The Philippines took the initiative to offer assistance of ASEAN’s members in finding a 
solution to the dispute, arguing that further exacerbation could easily undermine ASEAN [DJIN 
23.11.1999]. However, that venture did not result in any multilateral endeavours. 
In mid-2000 Thailand announced that it will start to send home around 100.000 Burmese refugees, 
living in five of its border provinces. For that reason it was planned to hold discussions with the 
Myanmar government on the occasion of the Informal ASEAN Summit later in the year. During the 
same period the Thai government pinned its hopes on the UNHCR to open a dialogue with Burma 
on the refugee problem [XINHUA 03.07.2000]. 
A further complication of relations between the two countries emerged with the increasing narcotic 
traffic, originating from ethnic groups that Thailand believed worked with the connivance of the 
Burmese leadership [CUMMING-BRUCE 21.07.2000]. In April 2006 Thailand’s endeavours resulted 
in securing Myanmar’s cooperation on wiping out the drug factories located along their shared bor-
der. The then Thai prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, however, made clear that to his mind the 
issue had clearly a region-wide impact, when he explained that drugs are also ‘ASEAN’s problem’635
The tensions between the two countries did not calm down and Thailand’s assertive campaigning, 
primarily focused on the illegal drug trade at their common border provoked a strongly worded 
 
[qtd. in: AFP 11.04.2001]. Thailand had always been set to engage the Association in its quest to 
fight the illegal drug trade, of which it felt to be among its prime victims [CHONGKITTAVORN 
16.07.2001]. 
Direct talks between the two countries resulted only in short-term solutions, as an exiled Burmese 
students organization pointed out on the occasion of border fighting that left five civilians dead in 
February 2001. The organization’s speaker, Sonny Mahinder, further argued that as long as the 
dictatorship was in place, the border incidences will continue. Thailand, he opined, being the 
strongest democracy in the region was prone to encourage democratic change in Burma; at the 
same time he urged ASEAN to investigate the border clash [AFP 15.02.2001]. 
                                                 
635 In fact, ASEAN had discussed drugs for the first time already in 1972; however, in general the members 
tended to follow their own policies and regional cooperation remained limited. Only in 1997 ASEAN set itself the 
goal to free the region of illegal drugs by 2020 [CHONGKITTAVORN 16.07.2001]. 
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statement by the Burmese government that also hinted that ASEAN solidarity might be jeopard-
ized636
3.21.2 Thailand vs. Laos 
. However, on drug trade common ground was eventually found on a somewhat broadened 
basis, including Laos and China, as part of the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’ in the area. Cooperation 
between them indeed had already inflicted a blow to drug producers; at the fringes of the 2001 
ASEAN Summit they agreed to organize a meeting on the issue, whenever such need arises 
[JEGATHESAN 06.11.2001]. 
As soon as May 2002 Thai-Burmese relations had soured again to their old lows as a result of re-
newed border skirmishes. Tensions additionally heightened when the Burmese expelled Thai work-
ers, denied visas to Thai officials, and instructed its media to tarnish Thailand’s image, among oth-
ers [MACAN-MARKAR 07.06.2002]. Supang Chantavanich, director at the Institute of Asian Studies, 
a think-tank at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University, nevertheless insisted:  
There will not be any third-party intervention or an effort by ASEAN to help resolve the is-
sues troubling Burma. ... The ASEAN way will prevail -- to ignore and avoid taking action. 
[qtd. in: MAKAN-MARKAR 07.06.2002] 
Instructively, recently retired SGASEAN, Rodolfo Certeza Jr. Severino, talking about the limited role 
ASEAN was playing and was obviously also supposed to confine itself to - in an interview with the 
Harvard International Review - explained: 
ASEAN has a certain mechanism that requires the foreign ministers to meet periodically to 
look at situations that might result in conflict. But so far, no ASEAN countries have come 
to the point of actually clashing, and I do not foresee that happening in any case. We have 
all heard about units on the border of Myanmar and Thailand skirmishing, but I do not 
think that qualifies in any way as a threat of major conflict. [qtd. in: HIR 2003] 
Like in various other cases of dispute ASEAN events were utilized for bilateral meetings [compare 
e.g. BBC MS 31.07.2002], which definitely simplified keeping the lines of communication open be-
tween the two countries, without going through the potentially face-losing exercise of arranging 
talks. However, apart from that the Association was cautiously abstaining from any intervention, 
staying true to its restrictive attitude toward bilateral disputes. This approach seems to have been 
appropriate as not provoking one of the conflict parties to feel outmanoeuvred by regional initia-
tives. As matters stand and beside various ups and downs the conflict remained principally con-
tained and was never allowed to substantially or sustainably damage the neighbours’ relations. 
Conceding the merits of the Association’s restraint, Thailand – although generally in favour of a 
regional response – consequently did not push too hard for its eventual engagement. 
The mutual capping of conflict escalation by both parties as practiced and despite confrontation of 
both armed forces and resulting in numerous fatalities, provided for ASEAN’s inactivity. Especially 
with regard to one of its ‘core norms’, as defined by HAACKE, the non-involvement of the Associa-
tion in bilateral disputes [HAACKE 2003:59], ASEAN saw no need to engage itself, and thus acting 
according to its own ‘logic of appropriateness’ [MARCH & OLSEN 1998:949; HATHAWAY 2005:476-
477; ABBOTT 2005:15]. 
In the late 1980s Thailand experienced also a controversy with Laos about their shared border. The 
latter claimed that Thailand had built permanent structures (houses, bunkers) in a disputed border 
village and officially protested to the Thai foreign minister. In early 1988 both countries had fought 
fiercely for the said village. However, both countries agreed later to a joint border committee to 
conduct surveys in the area. It was rumoured that tensions flared up again – amongst others – 
because of Thailand’s policy of turning battle fields into market places637
However, both countries before and after Laos’ admission into ASEAN in 1997 endeavoured to 
maintain friendly relations with each other. Nevertheless, some border incidences continued to 
occur. For example in mid-2000 about 100 men tried to seize a Lao immigration and customs of-
fice. While the Lao border forces killed five of them, 28 were captured by Thai soldiers when they 
fled into Thai territory. While Laos insisted on the immediate extradition, Thailand maintained that 
 which communist Vienti-
ane considered an attack on its economic system [ST 26.07.1989]. 
                                                 
636 The relevant paragraph of the statement read: “Irresponsible actions which can jeopardise the ASEAN's 
unprecedented determination to solve regional matters peacefully in an atmosphere of goodwill, friendship and 
cooperation among the member countries should be seriously considered” [qtd. in: AFP 26.04.2001]. 
637 This was the theme of the Indochina policy adopted by Thailand’s prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan in 
the late 1980s [BP 06.01.2006]. 
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the group would first be prosecuted for illegal entry and for the possession of illegal weapons [BD 
13.07.2000].  
Rapprochement continued and in 2000 both countries agreed to strengthen bilateral relations and 
cooperation. Two years later they had agreed on most of their land border demarcation. Relations 
further improved culminating in a currency agreement in 2004 [YOUNGBLOOD-COLEMAN 
2008a:54; EMMERS 2005:80]. 
EMMERS, in reviewing the dispute and ASEAN’s corresponding inactivity, concludes: 
ASEAN itself is ill-equipped to solve sources of conflict or to deal with pressing matters be-
tween its member countries, as indicated by its non-interference in the Laotian-Thai bor-
der problems and also by ongoing bilateral mistrust and disputes between some of its 
original members. [EMMERS 2005:80] 
As in other conflictual relationships between countries in the region ASEAN decided not to get in-
volved in the dispute between Thailand and Laos. Again, this reluctance is mainly to be understood 
as the Association’s overall hands-off approach to this type of conflict. What is more, neither of the 
parties officially requested ASEAN’s intervention and the non-occurrence of escalation seemed not 
to warrant any extraordinary deviation of the common regional policy of restraint. 
3.21.3 Philippines’ Counter-Insurgency 
Instead of turning to ASEAN, the Philippines on various occasions rather turned to individual ASEAN 
countries, notably Indonesia, for their support in resolving an insurgency on its territory. It so hap-
pened, when Philippine’s President Jose Estrada, asked his newly elected Indonesian counterpart to 
support peace talks with Muslim separatists. The rebellion was located on the island of Mindanao, 
bordering Indonesia. It was obviously hoped that the Indonesia’s president Wahid, heading the 
biggest Muslim country world-wide, would be command some influence over the Muslim rebels. 
Additionally, Indonesia had also been instructive to the accord agreed to in 1996 between the Phil-
ippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) of which the MILF later broke 
away [AFP 08.11.1999; AP 20.11.1999; BBC MS 21.11.1999]. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF)638
3.21.4 Thailand vs. Cambodia 
 warmly welcomed Wahid’s announcement to meet its Chairman in their headquarters, to 
discuss religious issues [XINHUA 21.11.1999]. The Indonesian President had intended to persuade 
the rebels that it was not necessary to set up an Islamic state [AP 29.11.1999]. The worsening 
security situation and certain internal developments in Indonesia however, threw the meeting into 
doubt. In face of increased fighting Estrada also issued a warning to the MILF that if they do not 
stop their attacks, the meeting would be scraped. Upon that the MILF threatened to launch a jihad 
in such an event [AP 25.11.1999]. Eventually, Wahid indeed cancelled the meeting, citing technical 
reasons [AFP 28.11.1999]. Later it was known that MILF leader Hashim Salamat had declined to 
meet outside of his stronghold, not trusting the guarantees given [MS 28.11.1999]. 
However, the following year Philippine’s President, Estrada, endeavoured to gain support for his 
course against the separatists from other ASEAN fellow members, enlarging the legitimacy of his 
campaign to quell the rebellion [BBC MS 08.06.2000]. In April 2001 the Philippine government 
welcomed Indonesia’s offer of asylum to the leader of MILF, Hashim Salamat, viewing it as a show 
of solidarity with a ‚fellow ASEAN country’ [AFP 20.04.2001]. 
Again in mid-2003 two ASEAN fellows with vast Muslim populations, Indonesia and Malaysia, as-
sured the Philippines of their support in resolving the conflict with the MILF secessionists [OANA 
18.06.2003]. 
This case demonstrates that resolve and leverage to mediate in a given conflict were considered to 
be found rather by asking single countries to contribute to resolution efforts, than to by turning to 
the Association. This was partly motivated by the region’s cherished traditions and norms that i.a. 
held highly appreciated values like sovereignty and non-interference. A multilateral body - and 
ASEAN at least at the time was most probably unfit to render the required assistance anyway - is 
also much more incalculable for the regime who asks for a third party intervention. What ought not 
to be lost out of sight in this connection is the fact that ASEAN had never propagated the claim to 
be the right addressee for such assignments in the first place. 
In early 2003 ties between Thailand and Cambodia became strained, resulting in Thailand’s closure 
of the common border and the mutual suspension of diplomatic ties. Starting point was the alleged 
                                                 
638 The 12.500 strong MILF had splintered in 1978 from the MNLF and was not included it the latter’s accord 
with the Philippine government [AFP 20.04.2001].  
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statement by a Thai movie star that the contended Angkor Wat temple belonged to Thailand. Upon 
that protesters set the Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh on fire [XINHUA 30.01.2003], and destroyed 
numerous Thai-owned businesses. However, when the then ASEAN Secretary General suggested 
that ASEAN would seek to rebuild bilateral relations, Cambodia expressly rejected that offer; a 
Foreign Ministry statement read: “The regrettable 29 January incident is already over and no one 
talks about it anymore. Consequently, there is no need for any external help for solving this ended 
matter” [KN 04.03.2003]. 
Thailand had made the restoration of ties contingent on Cambodia's compensation for the incident. 
Cambodia later paid $ 5,9m for the destroyed Thai embassy building, and diplomatic relation were 
re-installed639
3.22 ASEAN’s Expansion 
 [MYDANS 12.04.2003; AP 31.05.2003]. 
EMMERS opines: 
...ASEAN did not get involved in the dispute and made no contribution to its resolution. 
This further questioned its ability to manage intra-regional disputes and deal with pressing 
matters between its members. Ironically, Cambodia was more the focus of ASEAN's inter-
vention in the 1980s and early 1990s than since becoming a member of the Association. 
[EMMERS 2005:83] 
Whereas the Angkor temple issue eventually was satisfactorily settled on a bilateral basis, another 
worshipping monument, the Preah Vihear temple, was another factor for tensions between the 
neighbours. In 1962 the Preah Vihear temple has been accorded to Cambodia in an ICJ ruling, al-
though the complex is easily accessible only via Thailand, as its stairways begins in Thailand 
[CROPLEY 21.02.2004; SE 30.06.2008]. When UNESCO considered the Cambodian submission to 
include it among the World Heritage sites, a Thai court barred the country’s government from sup-
porting the bid [SE 30.06.2008]. With nationalist sentiment among the Thai population running 
high an incident in which three nationalist anti-Cambodian protestors crossed into Cambodian terri-
tory to be briefly detained, led to the deployment of more Thai troops to the border. This brought 
their overall number to 400 confronted by 800 Cambodian forces [CHEANG 17.07.2008]. Although 
the conflict parties held several rounds of talks, the issue’s resolution was still ongoing at the time 
of this writing, and Thailand was voicing the preferred resolution route to be taken by stating 
through one of its foreign ministry officials, Thani Thongphakdi: “... we believe this issue should 
not be internationalised nor raised within the ASEAN framework” [qtd. in: AFP 13.10.2009; XINHUA 
12.11.2008]. 
Similar to other mainly bilaterally structured disputes, ASEAN felt no need to intervene and owing 
to lacking consensus among the direct dispute parties, recourse to it was out of the question. Once 
again, then, inactivity was deemed the most appropriate policy to be adopted. As has been demon-
strated in other cases (notably for those involving the OAS) unrequested intervention by a third 
party frequently aggravated the respective conflict, instead of bringing about its settlement. 
ASEAN’s expansion for the most part was a consolidation policy in its own right with the main aim 
to complete the its founders’ dream of an organization covering the entire Southeast Asian area. 
While this entailed that the Association automatically gains in political and economic weigh, devel-
opments – above all Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia – gave the enlargement vision another 
twist. By propagating the desirability of being part of ASEAN, prospective members geared their 
foreign policy increasingly toward that goal. It is one of the most formidable of ASEAN’s accom-
plishments to have effected alignment, harmonization, and peaceful relations among would-be and 
core members without even applying concrete political conditionality. 
3.22.1 Brunei 
The first-ever enlargement of ASEAN – originally bringing together Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and the Philippines, concerned Brunei. In August 1983 Brunei announced its wish to join 
the organization as soon as it gains full independence from Great Britain, scheduled for the 1st 
January 1984 [WSJ 22.08.1983]. In the early 1960s Brunei’s relations with Indonesia and Malaysia 
had been strained since both countries had supported a rebel force operating in Brunei that had 
also conducted an attempt to topple Brunei’s monarchy in 1962 [GANESAN 1995:217]. Brunei was 
                                                 
639 However, the mood among the population remained characterized by animosity in the following years [com-
pare TNS 24.04.2008]. 
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hoping to achieve some sort of security with joining the Association, still fearing predatory impulses 
from Indonesia as well as Malaysia [LIM 1998:119]. 
When small Brunei with a territory of 5.765 km2 finally joined on 7th January 1984 it had a popula-
tion of merely 200.000 but considerable oil and gas resources. Over the previous years Brunei had 
regularly sent delegates to ASEAN meetings as observers which prompted the Japan Economic 
Newswire to point out that Brunei ‘had been treated as a de facto member of the ASEAN’ in recent 
years [JEN 05.01.1984; XINHUA 07.01.1984]. 
Brunei’s admission was announced by the then chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Indo-
nesia’s foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. On that occasion he commented that Brunei’s 
entry would ‘undoubtedly add to the collective strength’ of the Association. Furthermore, he ex-
pected that the enlargement will enable ASEAN to be ‘more steadfast in facing an increasingly 
troubled world’ [qtd. in: XINHUA 08.01.1984]. Today the mineral wealth together with its ASEAN 
membership is classified to give small Brunei ‘disproportionately large influence in the world in 
relation to its size’ [YOUNGBLOOD-COLE 2008b:8]. 
Brunei at that time was an absolute monarchy640
3.22.2 Vietnam 
. OXRESEARCH alleged at the time of accession 
that the other ASEAN nations had hoped that the monarch would introduce elements of representa-
tive government [OXRESEARCH 12.12.1984]. However, given the wanting democratic credentials 
in some other ASEAN nations, no conditionality in whatever form was heard of on the question of 
Brunei’s invitation.  
Even while Vietnam was still pitted against the ASEAN nations641
The so-called ‘interlocutor’ between ASEAN and Vietnam during the latter's occupation of Cambo-
dia, Indonesia, was the first to explicitly support Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN [JEN 
21.11.1990b]. This policy was based on Indonesia's view of Vietnam as a buffer state vis-à-vis 
China's hegemonic aspirations [EMMERS 2005:77]. In October 1991 Vietnam made known its in-
tention to sign the Bali Treaty, including the TAC, as a gesture of its commitment to join the or-
ganization
 about its occupation of Cambodia, 
Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Mr Nguyen Van Linh, stated that his country 
“would consider participation in ASEAN if it helps to achieve a zone of peace and cooperation in 
south-east Asia” [qtd. in: KIERNAN 13.02.1987]. The following year the Vietnamese deputy foreign 
minister, Tran Quang Co, said that his country was in favour of becoming an ASEAN member 
[TIMES 28.11.1988]. 
But only when the Cambodia occupation seemed to gradually come to an end did the first ASEAN 
member, Singapore – although formerly opposed to softening ASEAN’ stance vis-à-vis Vietnam - 
signal a change of mind. Its prime minister Lee Kuan Yew in September 1989 suggested that mili-
tary cooperation between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries should be installed. He argued: “I am 
a great believer in more interaction between armed forces, both between friends and potential 
enemies … Not to do so is to live in the dark and fantasies can be dangerous” [qtd. in: REUTERS 
19.09.1989]. And soon after Vietnam had officially withdrawn its last troops from Cambodian terri-
tory, ASEAN countries indicated to be eagerly interested to establish stronger relations with its 
strongest regional foe Vietnam [JEN 17.01.1990]. 
642
By 1993 the majority in ASEAN favoured a swift admission of Vietnam, the exceptions then being 
Singapore [VIR 13.12.1993] and Thailand. Singapore expressed its doubts anew in March 1994, 
arguing that it was too early for discussing full Vietnamese membership [AFP 03.03.1994]. Thai-
 [JEN 25.10.1991; EMMERS 2005:73]. Barely three months later, Vietnam already 
applied for ASEAN observer status [AFP 20.01.1992]. Vietnam was subsequently invited to sign the 
TAC; thereafter, Vietnam eventually became ASEAN observer in July 1992 [LIQUICIA 29.05.1992]. 
It has been argued that the end of the Cold War and the USSR’s retreat – materially evidenced i.a. 
by the closure of its air and naval bases in Vietnam at Da Nang and Cham Ran Bay in 1990 -  ‘par-
tially prompted Vietnam into the arms of ASEAN’ [SHARPE 2003:234], and NGUYEN VU TUNG as-
serts that ASEAN membership was instrumental for Vietnam to overcome its ‘identity crisis engen-
dered’ by USSR’s demise [NGUYEN VU TUNG 2007:484]. On top of that Vietnam’s security concept 
showed some considerable over-lapping with the vision prevalent inside ASEAN. Also Vietnam was 
set to attain stability by economic development; and Vietnam’s leadership was eager to benefit 
from and join the Association known as it was for its ability to protect the ruling elite [NGUYEN VU 
TUNG 2007:488-491; see also chapter on security concept]. 
                                                 
640 The governmental system of Brunei is now called „Constitutional Sultanate“, due to various reforms in recent 
years [YOUNGBLOOD-COLE 2008b:9, 46]. 
641 For a sketch of Vietnam's unwillingness to reproach ASEAN prior to its occupation of Cambodia see EMMERS 
2005:72-73. 
642 For a brief but instructive glimpse on the rapprochement between Vietnam and the ASEAN states see HIE-
BERT & VATIKIOTIS 14.11.1991. 
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land at around the same time proposed that Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam shall be in-
cluded in a loose Southeast Asian 10 grouping in order to prepare them to join ASEAN over a pe-
riod of ten years [NISCHALKE 2002:102]. Eventually though, this resistance was overcome and at 
the following AMM in July 1994 it was decided to accept Vietnam and to task senior officials to work 
out the details on Vietnam’s admission [WP 24.07.1994]. 
In February 1994 also the US welcomed the prospective integration of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambo-
dia into ASEAN [AFP 23.02.1994]. Later the same year Vietnam officially applied for full member-
ship in ASEAN [KN 24.10.1994]. About two months later ASEAN decided to accept Vietnam’s appli-
cation and make the country its 7th member in the following year [BP 01.12.1994]. As a first step 
Vietnam was invited to a meeting of ASEAN’s Standing Committee to participate as an observer in 
February 1995 [REUTERS 04.02.1995]. 
Shortly before the admission of Vietnam – being one of the most prominent claimants of area in 
the South China Sea - Singapore’s senior minister, Lee Kuan Yew, opined that membership will 
bolster Vietnam’s position vis-à-vis China: 
It's bound to improve Vietnam's position because then it will not be simply a bilateral 
problem which it has been up to now. … Vietnam will gradually move into a position more 
like the Philippines where ASEAN must take a position on behalf of the Philippines. [qtd. 
in: JEN 31.03.1995] 
In July 1995 Vietnam was finally welcomed by ASEAN as its new member [EMR 28.07.1995]. That 
step naturally had consequences for the security environment of ASEAN, especially with regard to 
China. First, with Vietnam one of the main claimants on the South China Sea was incorporated, 
joining it with all the other claimants against China (with the exception of Taiwan). Secondly, by 
Vietnam’s ASEAN membership its relations with the US were remarkably improved. Vietnam pri-
vately event had hinted that it may invite the US to use the base of Cam Ranh Bay, in order to 
‘make the Chinese more responsible’, as one official stated [qtd. in: STRASSER 17.07.1995]. 
3.22.3 Burma 
In late June 1987, while the Burmese Prime Minister, Maung Maung Kha, was on a trip to Indone-
sia, diplomats stated that Burma had been sounding out interest in the idea of becoming an ASEAN 
member. However, at that time the likelihood of first receiving an observer status was remarkably 
higher than getting outright membership [REUTERS 29.06.1987], as that was the preferred acces-
sion process. It took some years more that the issue was taken up seriously. 
The Philippines lobbied for Burma’s participation in the AMM in July 1992, as part of its ‘construc-
tive engagement’ policy toward the military regime [JEN 04.06.1992]. At that time Thailand indi-
cated that Myanmar may join ASEAN in the future, causing alarm by its Western allies which de-
plored the military dictatorship ruling that country [ALBOR 29.07.1992]. In late 1992 it was ru-
moured that Burma intended to sign the TAC the following year, starting the process in real that 
was to end up with its ASEAN membership [WAIN 17.12.1992]. 
In September 1993 Thailand proposed to its fellow ASEAN members that Burma be granted ob-
server status. As the Thai foreign minister Prasong explained, the idea was unanimously supported 
[AFP 15.09.1993]. However, although Indonesia had no objection to Myanmar’s participation at the 
July 1994 meeting, this was made contingent on Burma attending as a guest of the host govern-
ment [REUTERS 23.02.1994; JEN 21.05.1995]. This objection seemed to have been overcome be-
hind closed doors and in the end Burma was indeed given observer status for this particular AMM; 
its participation, however, was limited to the opening and closing ceremonies [AFP 09.03.1994]. 
The following year ASEAN again abstained from inviting Burma, but supported the then host gov-
ernment – Brunei – to invite Burma once more as a guest to the host government [JEN 
21.05.1995a]. The rumours of 1992 came true three years later, when Burma finally signed the 
TAC in mid-1995 [EMR 27.07.1995]. But although Burma also applied for formal and permanent 
observer status, ASEAN did not automatically confer it. At their summit in December 1995 the 
ASEAN members decided again to shelve the question [JEN 12.12.1995b]. However, at the follow-
ing AMM in July 1996 Burma ultimately gained observer status, amid Western criticism of that 
move. Burma finally handed over a formal application to join ASEAN in September 1996 [AFP 
17.09.1996]. 
After this step preparations to allow Burma the following year to join the Association were made. 
One of those steps was an invitation to participate at the regular meetings of the ASEAN Standing 
Committee in spring 1997 [JEN 03.02.1997]. This step was prompted by vigorous opposition from 
the US, which made clear that it was strictly against ASEAN membership of Burma [REUTERS 
25.04.1997]. The Malaysian daily New Straits Times commented and reflected the mood of defi-
ance prevalent in the ASEAN region: 
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Moreover, the US, living in a glass house itself, should not throw stones. Its own record of 
human rights or civil liberties is not exactly pristine. Even more than a hundred years after 
the civil war on the issue of slavery, racial discrimination and segregation were an ac-
cepted facet of life in that country, humiliating though it was to millions of African Ameri-
cans. [NST 29.04.1997] 
In July 1997 Burma – together with Laos – was eventually admitted to ASEAN [KEYS 23.07.1997]. 
3.22.4 Laos 
Laos notified the organization about its willingness to sign the Bali Treaty in late 1991 but at the 
same time made clear that a formalized joining of ASEAN will still take a couple of years [AFP 
13.12.1991]. Prior to that, Laos had been critical toward the Association and had been unwilling to 
recognize it as a diplomatic entity, based in part on ASEAN's seeming anti-communist stance. Laos’ 
closeness to the Vietnamese regime did also not permit it to sign the TAC [EMMERS 2005:73]. 
However, after the political tide had eventually turned, Laos was formally invited to sign the TAC, 
together with Vietnam in July 1992 [LIQUICIA 29.05.1992]; which it did. Upon that it was subse-
quently given observer status [REUTERS 17.06.1993]. In late 1995 ASEAN’s Secretary General 
confirmed that Laos’ intention of becoming a member by 1997 [REUTERS 15.12.1995], as stated 
earlier by its government on the occasion of the 1995 AMM [EMMERS 2005:74]. 
Finally, in March 1996, Laos submitted its application for ASEAN membership [AFP 27.03.1996]. 
During the Informal Summit of ASEAN leaders in December 2006 it was announced that Laos 
would be admitted in July 1997; the country was moreover asked to take part at meetings of the 
ASEAN Standing Committee from March 1997 onwards [EMMERS 2005:74; JEN 03.02.1996]. In 
July 1997 Laos was finally welcomed into the organization [KEYS 23.07.1997]. 
 
3.22.5 Cambodia 
According to its neutrality-policy Cambodia refused to take part in ASEAN in 1967, viewing ASEAN 
as a pro-US regional body.  Neither the Khmer Rouge regime, having taken over power in 1975, 
nor the puppet regime of Hanoi, installed after Vietnam's invasion in 1978, had any inclination to 
join ASEAN [EMMERS 2005:72-73]. 
Several years after the Vietnamese troops had left Cambodia was the country invited as a guest to 
the AMM for mid-1994 [WP 24.07.1994]; and only months later – in the following October - the 
country submitted already a formal application to receive observer status [XINHUA 30.04.1999b]. 
In early 1995 Cambodia also applied to become a signatory to the TAC [JP 27.01.1995]. Thus, in 
the middle of the same year the country joined not only the ARF but also officially accede to the 
TAC [JEN 21.05.1995b]; a step that went along with becoming an ASEAN observer [AFP 
28.07.1995]. Around the same time Cambodia’s first prime minister, Norodom Ranariddh, ex-
pressed his hope that Cambodia would join by 1997 [REUTERS 27.06.1995], a date which was later 
confirmed by the ASEAN Secretary General [REUTERS 15.12.1995]. 
Cambodia handed over to Indonesia – at that time chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee - 
its application for membership in ASEAN in April 1996, reiterating its wish to join the following 
year. Indonesia’s foreign minister Ali Alatas commented “I am sure that I am speaking on behalf of 
all the members of ASEAN when I say that we all warmly welcome Cambodia's eventual entry as a 
full member of ASEAN next year” [qtd. in: AFP 03.04.1996]. Thus, Cambodia was asked to partici-
pate at meetings of the ASEAN Standing Committee [JEN 03.02.1997]. Cambodia’s entry date was 
then scheduled to be July 1997 [REUTERS 18.02.1997]. 
Different from the other applicants, Cambodia’s membership was eventually postponed. Internal 
political upheavals, resulting in a coup by second prime minister Hun Sen, made ASEAN shelve 
Cambodia’s entry (see Chapter Cambodia 1997). It was only in late April 1999 that Cambodia was 
admitted into the Association643
                                                 
643 For Cambodia admission into ASEAN was beneficial, as demonstrated by its general albeit qualified respon-
siveness to ASEAN’s efforts aiming at resolving the internal crisis. However, the step cost the economically weak 
country dearly: $ 1m  entry fee, opening of four additional embassies, prospective cutting of tariffs and sending 
officials to roughly 300 ASEAN meetings annually [BARDACKE 01.05.1999]. 
. With that admission ASEAN was felt to have fulfilled the vision of 
its founding fathers of covering the whole region under its fold [AFP 30.04.1999a], calling it the 
‘culmination of ASEAN's efforts to achieve regional cohesion’ [ASEAN AR 1999]. While ASEAN offi-
cially emphatically hailed the completion, the local and global media was not unanimous in its out-
right approval [e.g. MARUKATAT & SAWATSAWANG 30.04.1999; DOLVEN 13.05.1999]; especially 
given the political ramifications on the international scene those enlargements were likely to entail. 
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3.22.6 Evaluation of ASEAN's Expansion 
Answering the question why ASEAN opted for enlargement KRAF finds: 
The decision of ASEAN to expand its membership was fundamentally a function of its suc-
cess as a long-standing regional association. [KRAFT 2000:454] 
EMMERS, on the other hand, has analyzed which concrete diplomatic and security benefits the ad-
mission to ASEAN provided for the applicants: 
 
• ASEAN offers its members regional and international recognition, also signified by fora 
reaching out, like the ARF. Its membership promised to soften for example Vietnam's isola-
tion and offers access to international donors and institutions. 
• ASEAN endeavours to manage intra-mural relations and as such to prevent the escalation 
of conflict. The claim to rightful national sovereignty and territorial integrity – principles 
upheld by ASEAN from the very beginning - was to be buttressed by an eventual accession. 
• the regional group enhances the diplomatic leverage in dealing with third countries [EM-
MERS 2005:75-76]. 
 
The rapid expansion of ASEAN in the 1990s has the potential of weakening the unity of the organi-
zation. It has been pointed out that only the lack of any concrete and over-ambitious political or 
economic conditionality attached to accession made such a swift enlargement possible  [EMMERS 
2005:71]. Even countries were accepted (e.g. Burma) that imported political instability to the As-
sociation. Hence, NARINE cautions and highlights the inherent paradox: 
... dealing with potential crisis in those [unstable, my remark] states may undercut 
ASEAN’s ability to function as a coherent international actor. This is especially ironic, as a 
major reason for ASEAN’s expansion was to enhance the organization’s international stat-
ure and effectiveness. [NARINE 1998b:212] 
Also LEIFER assumes that the enlargement indeed resulted in a diverse and cumbersome entity. 
The size of ASEAN today also makes the former intimacy of communication and consultation no 
longer feasible [LEIFER 1999:38], and thus probably will have an effect on the ASEAN Way. 
LEIFER, moreover, argues that an enlarged ASEAN will not easily manage to work by consensus, 
introducing never-known discordance into the Association. For that reason he concludes: “[t]he 
danger, therefore, is that widening membership may lead to a political dilution rather than so-
called deepening. Were that to happen, ASEAN’s reputation and influence would suffer accordingly” 
[LEIFER 30.11.1995]. Still, LEIFER also concedes that the enlargement institutionalized a process 
of reconciliation between the Indochinese states and the Association [compare EMMERS 2005:74].  
However, the main criticism is shared by EMMERS who underlines the consequences the enlarge-
ment had for the Association, indicating that the import of additional rivalries and the undermining 
of relative homogeneity in interests might lead to a watering-down of cherished aspirations [EM-
MERS 2005:85]. 
Also VATIKIOTIS primarily marks out the difficulties that the longed for ‘ASEAN-10’ holds for the 
Association in times to come [VATIKIOTIS 1999]. And EVANS recognizes ‘a de facto two or three-
tiered ASEAN’ after the enlargement to ‘One Southeast Asia’ had been concluded [EVANS 
2001:106, original emphasis]. 
That notion was even acknowledged by the ASEAN Secretary General Severino, who, at the occa-
sion of Cambodia’s admission admitted that ASEAN’s reputation has suffered ‘because of the mem-
bership question’, referring to the enlargements of the 1990s [AFP 30.04.1999b]. Similar concerns 
are voiced by SINGH [SINGH 1997:227]. 
But also Carlyle THAYER, of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, views the ineffectiveness of 
ASEAN to be a result of its enlargement, finding that: 
Asean is in disarray. It has suffered from enlargement ... There are real attempts to re-
store unity and cohesion, but 10 is different from the old five or six and they'll probably 
never get it back. [qtd. in: KAZMIN 23.07.2001] 
By underlining that ‘strength comes from unity, not numbers’ LIM highlights that – beginning with 
the admission of Vietnam – the political compatibility, formerly cementing the members of ASEAN, 
was compromised [LIM 1998:124] However, one should not lose out of sight that the political sys-
tems comprising ASEAN were always quite diverse, and ranged from the absolute monarchy in 
Brunei to the semi-authoritarian regime of Malaysia and the rather liberal political system of the 
Philippines. 
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At the same time there is no denying that the enlargement increased the economic and political 
weight of ASEAN644
Generally, ASEAN viewed the enlargement inter alia as a step furthering peace and security in the 
region. The Association also pronounced its wish to extend the ASEAN Way to its new members 
[ASEAN 15.12.1995b]. Striking the same cord, AMER has figured out that the various border dis-
putes Vietnam entertained vis-à-vis ASEAN countries had a good chance of being successfully con-
tained if not managed after its accession [AMER 2004:539-540, 545]. On the occasion of Cambo-
dia’s entry into the Association, ASEAN also stressed the stabilizing role of its activities (during the 
internal upheavals in the country in 1997-1998), and of the admission itself
. Combining – at the time of Cambodia’s admission – 500 million inhabitants, 
4.5 million square kilometres and a trade volume worth $ 720 billion [MARUKATAT & SAWATSA-
WANG 30.04.1999]. When it was made public that Vietnam and Laos will be accepted as signato-
ries of the TAC the then Philippine foreign secretary, Raul Manglapus declared: 
This is a significant development because... (it) is a manifestation of the fact that ASEAN 
is the only viable vehicle for solidarity in Southeast Asia (…) Before this, there was still 
some doubt as to whether there might be attempts to organise other associations in the 
region. Now, that doubt has been laid to rest. There is no more future in Southeast Asia 
but within the ASEAN. [qtd. in: LIQUICIA 29.05.1992] 
645
With regard to Burma, then, the drive for a rapid enlargement without adequate deliberation has 
backfired for ASEAN. Instead of working toward its economic and political aims in the international 
 [JEN 30.04.1999]. 
AMER formulated similar arguments and outlines the following: 
Bringing countries which were earlier perceived as potential or real threats, and even as 
outright enemies, into the framework of regional cooperation, as developed by the ASEAN 
members, and eventually accepting these into the association as full members, can be 
seen as an exercise in conflict management. This process can also be seen as an attempt 
to expand the ASEAN framework for conflict management within the Southeast Asian re-
gion for the sake of regional peace, security and stability. In fact, expanding membership 
in ASEAN and expanding the acceptance of its conflict management framework can be 
viewed as a process of conflict management brought about by various means which form 
part of a broader policy of constructive engagement towards the Indochinese countries 
and Burma. [AMER 1999:1038, see also AMER 2004:546] 
This evaluation together with what was variously described as ‘ASEANization’ might be the proper 
means to understand the concept of conflict transformation qua enlargement as employed by 
ASEAN. If one looks back this formula was very successful, At least as regards ASEAN’s intentions 
and interests. All additions so far – with the exception of Burma – have contributed to increased 
political and economic weigh for the organization. Extending its frontiers to include countries enter-
taining conflicts with ASEAN nations, with domestic turmoil, or with disputes with third countries 
did not – as could have been expected – mean destabilizing the multilateral body. But rather the 
most significant effect observable was working in the other direction: being part of a the ASEAN 
framework seemingly meant for the new members to find a more composed manner of working out 
political conflicts and paying careful attention to their escalation status not to spin out of control. 
This approach was also partly successful with Myanmar. The tensions with Thailand, for instance, 
remained somehow contained; and also the narcotics trade issue was constructively addressed by 
the Burmese regime. However, as regards the domestic situation ASEAN proved very powerless. In 
its eagerness to fulfil its vision of ASEAN-10, the Association took the risk – a very real risk as 
things turned out – of including a state with considerable domestic struggles. Not this fact, how-
ever, is today ASEAN’s problem. As has been pointed out earlier, ASEAN has no – or only a minimal 
– ideological agenda of democracy promotion or safe-guarding human rights. Hence, as long as the 
local political developments would not gain magnitude that would have effects also for the other 
ASEAN members, the situation on the ground, would pose no reason for the Association to inter-
vene. However, only the international resistance and attendant isolation the Burmese regime pro-
voked with its harsh domestic policies, motivated ASEAN to accept the situation as an issue to be 
dealt with in the first place. Still, the half-heartedness of the approach taken attests to the actual 
unwillingness among most member nations to interfere in Burma. 
                                                 
644 Thus, the ECONOMIST underlined two important arguments in favour of ASEAN’s big wave of enlargement: 
„[o]f course, the idea of an "ASEAN Ten" does have real attractions. Besides having a greedy eye on the unex-
ploited natural riches of the three poverty-stricken prospective members, ASEAN wants to keep them out of 
China's clutches” [ECONOMIST 19.07.1997]. 
645 The Philippines foreign secretary, Domingo Siazon, opined: “[w]e are quite confident that all the political 
players now have learned from the experience to encourage all efforts to resolve whatever problem will occur in 
the future. Within the process of ASEAN, that means no use of force any more” [qtd. in: JEN 30.04.1999]. 
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arena, the Association’s scarce resources had to be spent on numerous diplomatic efforts to defend 
Burma’s membership and to justify it to its Western cooperation partners.  
3.23 ASEAN’s Security Concept 
As has been shown in detail, peace and security as such were no currency which ASEAN ever at-
tached much value in its own right – only insofar as it entailed stability. More specifically, the inter-
est was and is focused on stability for the current government/regime in power as well as stability 
necessary for economic development646. The ASEAN members have frequently expressed their 
view that economic prosperity is part of conflict prevention647
Unlike the developments regarding the security and conflict concepts of the OAS - shifting from the 
conventional state centred to the human centred and finally resulting in the support for democracy 
and so-called ‘human security’, in ASEAN such a evolution did not take place
. ASEAN’s notion on security is of the 
following type: 
Comprehensive security policy at the national level seeks to promote "national resilience" 
nation-building, good governance, and thus political stability. The goal is not least to se-
cure the state against dissident sectors of civil society. [MACK & KERR 1995] 
648
Along the quite imperfect democracy of the Philippines the original ASEAN nations’ political systems 
were not democratically founded at all or displayed features that were designed rather to exert 
repression than to represent the people’s will . Up to the late 1980s in Indonesia and Thailand the 
military had vast powers and in Singapore as well as in Malaysia the dominant parties used a num-
ber of tactics to quash political opposition
. The safeguarding 
of human rights was never perceived as integral part of conflict prevention. Instead, opposition 
toward the ruling governments was regarded as being directed against the ASEAN Way, since dis-
sent was felt to be alien to musyarawat [FEER 22.10.1987]. As was described earlier and as will be 
shown below only very recently have the ASEAN states tentatively agreed on a more comprehen-
sive idea of security, mentioning, even if still not fleshed out, democracy as a goal to be achieved 
in the framework of the ASEAN Security Community initiative, as sponsored by Indonesia [EMMER-
SON 2005:179-180; HAACKE 2005:201]. 
649
                                                 
646 Evidence that economic development and the simultaneously occurring growth of a middle class form a po-
tent force for democratization is mixed. But William EASTERLY has found the size of a country’s middle class is 
inversely proportionate to the indicators of instability such as caused by revolutions, coups, civil war, constitu-
tional changes, or suppression of civil rights [ECONOMIST 14.02.2009]. 
647 As such the ECONOMIST’s assessment in regard of the Association’s dismal record on economic cooperation, 
grossly underestimates the implicit achievement, when it judges: “[e]xcept by providing a degree of regional 
political stability, it cannot claim much credit for its members' soaring growth rates” [ECONOMIST 19.07.1997]. 
648 A vocal critic of Singapore’s government, Joshua Jeyaretnam, put it in a nutshell when he said: “In terms of 
the liberty of the individual, he has no security” [qtd. in: CALLO 14.12.1987]. 
649 It fitted into the predominating pattern that the Malaysian opposition party parliamentarians where excluded 
from the participation in ASEAN’s regional inter-parliamentarian meetings. The argument put forward was that 
one representative of the party (Democratic Action Party) was currently behind bars. He had found himself 
rounded up with another 100 people as part of a strategy to avoid riots between Malays and ethnic Chinese as 
the police explained. The arrest, by the way, took place under a law that allowed for indefinite detention without 
trial [REUTERS 24.01.1988]. 
 [RICHBURG 14.12.1987]. Thus, ASEAN nations were 
frequently criticized from various corners for using various preventive detention laws in order to jail 
opponents without charging or putting them on trial. For instance a conference of lawyers, judges, 
and human rights activists found: 
Preventive detention has a particularly ominous and unacceptable track record within the 
ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) region. [REUTERS 05.03.1989] 
Also SOLINGEN pointed out the nature of ASEAN’s approach to security when he argued that re-
pression against domestic insurgencies was accepted first in order to strengthen the ruling regimes 
and second in order to ‘preclude the diffusion of instability and the potential erosion of ASEAN’s 
appeal’ to foreign investors [SOLINGEN 1999:41-42]. 
As regards the relations between the countries of the region the Thai prime minister Chatichai 
Choonhave paradigmatically stated at the end of the 1980s (probably alluding to the non-ASEAN 
neighbours): 
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[O]ur combat capability must be high under a policy of "good fence, good neighbours." 
Therefore, we need to keep our combat units strong to gain respect from our neighbours. 
[qtd. in: BP 20.04.1989] 
As regards democracy the concept prevalent in the region was quite restrictive in its scope. As a 
case in point the statement of Indonesia’s home affairs minister, Rudini, can be recalled who de-
clared in 1989 that  “… what should be checked is that this political openness does not turn into 
unlimited freedom based solely on the awareness of one's rights without any regard to one's duties 
as a citizen” [qtd. in: ST 10.08.1989]. Political openness, Rudini argued further, may easily dam-
age Indonesia’s democracy which was based on the state ideology of Pancasila. The Pancasila con-
cept encompasses the following 5 tenets: 
 
• belief in one God;  
• humanitarianism; 
• democracy through consensus;  
• social justice; and  
• national unity [ST 10.08.1989]. 
 
Similar comments were made about the value of human rights. Indonesia’s then President Suharto 
explained: 
Our understanding of human rights is not an individualistic one that sacrifices the interest 
of the society, nation and country. We recognize social responsibilities together with hu-
man rights. [qtd. in: JEN 16.08.1990] 
These more declaratory than implemented ideals not in themselves preclude regional tools for 
safeguarding individual rights and freedoms. But as a matter of fact the Asia-Pacific was and is the 
only UN-defined region without a regional human rights machinery in place [CHING 10.06.1993]. 
In reviewing ASEAN’s record of its first three decades, ENG concludes: 
The EU and regional organizations in Latin America and Africa promote democracy as their 
declared principles or through their institutions. ASEAN has none of this – indeed, some 
say the organization has served to preserve Southeast Asia’s authoritarian regimes. [ENG 
1999:63] 
As has been observable also for other issue areas, outside pressure was routinely rejected by the 
ASEAN nations. Thus, ASEAN labour ministers at the beginning of the 1990s vigorously opposed 
trade agreements with the industrialized West that set conditions on labour standards, terming 
them ‘selective import restrictions [JEN 17.09.1990; DJNS 18.09.1990].  
Another instance was when representatives of the EC at the PMC following the 24th AMM made 
clear that in their view security included i.a. democratic values and human rights, while Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi, Malaysia’s foreign minister reflected the Association’s opposing view by remarking 
“[a]ttempts to impose the standard of one side on the other or interpreting it in a selective or nar-
row manner would disrupt the traditional goodwill and cooperation and tread upon the sovereignty 
of nations” [qtd. in: AE 23.07.1991; compare also ISLAM 20.06.1991]. 
In line with that argument the ASEAN foreign ministers upheld at their AMM in 1993 – obviously in 
opposition to pressure from the West – that: 
Development is an inalienable right and the use of human rights as a condition for eco-
nomic cooperation and development assistance is detrimental to international cooperation 
and could undermine an international consensus on human rights. [qtd. in: IHLWAN 
24.07.1994] 
However, the same ASEAN communiqué stated that “[v]iolations of basic human rights must be 
redressed and should not be tolerated under any pretext” and the ASEAN members furthermore 
“agreed that ASEAN should coordinate a common approach on human rights and actively partici-
pate and contribute to the application, promotion and protection of human rights” and to that and 
“agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism 
on human rights” [qtd. in: REUTERS 24.07.1993; ASEAN 24.07.1993]. That definitely marked a – 
however slight – change of mind among the ASEAN members. 
Still, the dominant line was broadly maintained. Thus, the Joint Communiqué of the 24th AMM, re-
flecting the position of Malaysia’s prime minister toward the linkage between democracy and hu-
man rights with trade, stated: 
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He disagreed, however, that democracy has only one definition or that political systems 
qualify as democratic only when they measure up to certain particular yardsticks. There-
fore, when the issue of human rights is linked to trade, investment and finance, ASEAN 
cannot but view it as added conditionality and protectionism by other means. [ASEAN 
20.07.1991] 
However, aside from the ruling ASEAN elites some other voices could be heard. For instance, the 
call from Malaysia’s opposition leader Lim Kit Siang who urged ASEAN to adopt a human rights 
charter and establish a human rights commission [AFP 25.01.1992]. Similarly the ASEAN-ISIS 
network proposed that ASEAN shall set up its own regional human rights commission [VATIKIOTIS 
29.10.1992]. In September 1993 also legislators from AIPO met to discuss an ASEAN human rights 
declaration [AFP 20.09.1993; KN 27.09.1993]. This seems to be an indication that the governmen-
tal systems and administrations of the ASEAN nations were not so much inspired by their cultural 
predisposition; instead they were tailored on the needs of the governing leadership and its longing 
for positional consolidation. 
3.23.1 ASEAN as a Club of Leadership Protectors 
ASEAN – composed of governmental representatives as it is - was most of the time more than will-
ing to provide connivance when one of its members harshly suppressed protest or rebellion. For 
instance, on 12th November 1991 Indonesian troops massacred 50 protesting civilians in Dili, the 
Timorese capital. Portugal650 - the former colonial master which had abruptly left East Timor in 
August 1975 followed by the territory’s annexation through Indonesia [WH ET] - consequently re-
fused to allow further negotiations on a new trade agreement between EC and ASEAN before Indo-
nesia answers human rights violations allegations perpetrated in East Timor651
However, all that did not change the intra-ASEAN solidarity on the matter. Consequently, a follow-
up conference to the one planned for Malaysia, but this time organized in Thailand was curbed
 [ALBOR 
29.07.1992]. Also the US House of Representatives voted to cut off $ 2 million in military aid to 
Indonesia [SHENON 17.09.1992]. In January 1993 Indonesia’s President Suharto – although belat-
edly – reacted in order to improve the country’s tarnished human rights reputation with the an-
nouncement to establish a National Human-Rights Commission [CHING 10.06.1993]. But as re-
gards Indonesia’s fellow ASEAN members they had kept conspicuously silent about the affair. 
Their solidarity with the Indonesian regime was even more far-reaching. Thus, when pro-
independence activist from East Timor came together in Malaysia in 1996 for a three day confer-
ence entitled ‘Second Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor’, the gathering was dispersed by a 
demonstration of the youth-wing of the ruling party. It was argued that such a conference would 
only have damaged the relations between Malaysia and Indonesia. MCNULTY, reporting for the 
Asian Wall Street Journal, commended: 
The demonstration was an ugly display of the depths to which members of Asean are 
sometimes willing to sink to protect fellow members in the name of brotherhood. 
[MCNULTY 12.11.1996] 
However, the position was generally shared by the whole of ASEAN. At an Informal Summit the 
ASEAN leaders ‘reiterated their full support for the Indonesian position on East Timor’ and at the 
same time rejected the EU’s introduction into the ASEAN-EU dialogue of such an ‘extraneous’ issue 
[JP 01.12.1996]. Portugal – still recognized as the administrative power of East Timor by the UN – 
at the following ASEAN-EU meeting in February 1997 vetoed a new economic cooperation agree-
ment, intended to replace the current but outdated one between the two organizations on the 
ground that the discussion of ‘human rights and political issues’ had been rejected [AFP 
13.02.1997]. 
652
                                                 
650 Exemplary for the rather unresponsive ASEAN position toward the West’s request for respect of human 
rights, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, observed about the Portuguese position: “If the Portuguese show 
enough realism and reasonableness, then identifying with international acceptability is acceptable to both 
(countries). (…) But if it continues to cling to the myth that the views of a majority can be reversed by the 
views of a small minority of people who happen to live in Portugal and make a lot of noise and therefore are 
heard by many people, then that myth will destroy any possibility of a quick solution in Timor” [ctd. in: 
REUTERS 28.10.1992]. 
651 However, at a separate EC-ASEAN meeting the Timor issue was set aside to reach a trade agreement [PAS-
TOR 30.10.1992]. 
652 Kamol Kamoltrakul, one of the conference organizers remarked: “We didn't think that something like this 
would happen in Thailand, where we have the right to free association … Actually, we're getting more attention 
this way” [qtd. in: MCDOWELL 02.03.1998]. 
:  
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i.a. legal procedures where taken against 60 foreign participants with the somewhat fabricated 
argument that the conference did constitute work and insofar foreigners with tourist visas had no 
right to attend [MCDOWELL 02.03.1998]. 
This connivance of ASEAN nations was not confined to the claim of territorial integrity only. When 
the Indonesians took to the street to protest President Suharto’s rule, 500 people died. However, 
the then Chairman of ASEAN’s Standing Committee, Lauro Baja, simply commented: “[i]t's an in-
ternal security matter. It's very sensitive and ASEAN will not interfere”, echoing the position of the 
Indonesian government [qtd. in: DJES 18.05.1998]. 
Fellow ASEAN members reacted also only mildly when the Thai government conducted a military 
crackdown, arrested opposition leaders, and shot at scores of demonstrators in May 1992. The 
press and parts of the public voiced their criticism [JEN 20.05.1992; REUTERS 22.05.1992]. Only 
after the crisis has been resolved did Indonesia’s foreign minister comment that he welcomes the 
development because: “Thailand, as an ASEAN member, is part of us. If the country is ill, we also 
feel it”. At the same occasion he made clear that he still considered the issue an internal affair, 
having no effect on the relations with the rest of ASEAN [KN 01.06.1992]. 
That stability was at the heart of ASEAN’s security concept was also pointed out with regard to the 
treatment of Burma. Noordin SOPIEE, chairman of the Institute of Strategic and International Stud-
ies, referring to the controversial up-coming admittance of Myanmar into ASEAN, put it in a nut-
shell when he said: 
The purpose of ASEAN is not to bring in nice guys into a club. The purpose of ASEAN is to 
live at peace among ourselves. [qtd. in: PASTOR 04.06.1997] 
Thus WAIN, reporting for the AWSJ, observed about the predominating attitude among the ASEAN 
states, and the ambivalence it entails: 
The six members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have learned to tolerate 
each other's imperfections and overlook their clashing interests. Whether it is Brunei, Ma-
laysia and Singapore jailing political opponents without trial or Thailand shooting unarmed 
demonstrators, the others insist it's not their business -- for the sake of Asean solidarity. 
[WAIN 10.06.1994] 
The elite-centrism bears also out on another feature of the Association. Its outreach endeavours 
extended mainly to other state actors, but not to people- or issue-focused entities (e.g. NGOs). 
Even the Track II diplomacy propagated by the ARF engages mostly official or semi-official partici-
pants. Contrary to the gradual opening toward bodies with stronger grass roots or support by civil 
society that the UN has undergone in recent years, ASEAN never displayed a noteworthy tendency 
to enlarge its partnerships to actors it did not consider to enjoy (sovereign) parity [JOHNSTON 
2005:1029 FN 35]. 
Instead of democracy and human rights, the dominant security aim in the region was and re-
mained: stability i.a. through economic development653. Even Fidel Ramos, the then Philippine 
President, declared in 1993 echoing the ever cherished ASEAN credo but regardless of mounting 
pressures to broaden the approach654
                                                 
653 This notion has prominence also in other parts of Asia. When Taiwan and China progressed on their way to 
rapprochement by signing agreements on cross-strait travel and investment, Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jeou 
justified this step by arguing that strengthened economic integration will increase security, since China would 
think twice in future about jeopardising the attained stability [ECONOMIST 09.05.2009b]. 
654 For instance, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, argued vis-
à-vis ASEAN at that time: “[w]e also believe security involves more than just arms and alliances ... Democracy 
and human rights are components of a broader definition of security” [qtd. in: TAT 15.05.1993]. 
: 
Regional stability and security in the Asia-Pacific will not be based on military might or al-
liances but on economic strength and cooperation. Security and stability must be built on 
a strong economic foundation. [qtd. in: IPS 10.05.1993] 
The durability of this belief was proven by the retired SGASEAN, Severino, who ten years later un-
derlined ASEAN’s conviction about the connectedness between economic prosperity and peace by 
upholding the following: 
The best way to deal with conflict is to mesh the economies of the region closely together 
so that each country has a stake in the progress of all. [qtd. in HIR 2003] 
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No wonder than that as regards conflicts of economic and trade nature the members showed a 
more encompassing willingness to deal with them collectively, see excursus below. 
 
EXCURSUS: ASEAN’s Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Surveillance Process 
As has already been shown, ASEAN traditionally viewed economic development as part of overall 
security. Thus, when ASEAN concluded a Dispute Settlement Mechanism to handle conflicts arising 
between ASEAN members in trade matters, it was hailed as a deviation of the omnipresent prefer-
ence for informal and bilateral negotiations on thorny, critical questions [AFP 12.09.06]. 
Finally, the agreement, termed ‘Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Coopera-
tion’ was signed in November 1996. The protocol foresees the establishment of a panel within 
thirty days after a dispute among the members has been raised. This panel would review the case 
although the affected parties might appeal for reconsideration. The foreign affairs undersecretary 
of the Philippines, Rodolfo Severino, explained that even though no dispute was currently on the 
agenda ‘the ASEAN Ministers deemed it wise to establish such a protocol for possible future cases’ 
emphasizing the preventive quality of the agreement [qtd. in: BW 22.11.1996]. 
In 2000 ASEAN was requested to put its dispute mechanism in motion. A Singapore business-
woman, Win Win Nu, asked the Association to intervene after a brewery, established as a joint 
venture, was completely nationalized, although she held a 45% stake. ASEAN however, was not 
eager to act [CRISPIN & LINTNER 02.11.2000]. HUND has underlined the intrinsic flaws of the 
mechanism by pointing to non-existence of punitive measures in case of non-compliance; the 
harshest consequences to be faced being only the re-establishment of the status quo ante [HUND 
2002:108]. 
The financial crisis the region plunged in in 1997/98 resulted in ASEAN’s establishment of a Sur-
veillance Process in 1998 that foresaw the disclosure of relevant data that might indicate finan-
cial problems ahead. Moreover, the Surveillance Process was to provide some sort of early warning 
of macro-economic instability and to encourage collective action geared toward preventing eco-
nomic crises [ACHARYA 2004:264]. This step has been viewed as being conducted in the realm of 
the so-called 'enhanced interaction' approach, broadening discussion ranges for events that held 
the potential of repercussions on a regional (or at least trans-national) level [HAACKE 2005:190]. 
However, it was left to the members themselves to decide about the information to be made trans-
parent – on a voluntary and non-binding level. This inhibited the effectiveness of the device, since 
reluctance to disclose sensitive data was omnipresent [AFP 21.03.1999; DJIN 29.04.1999; HUND 
2002:109].  
The administrative unit to manage the Surveillance Process was set up in ASEAN’s Secretariat and 
was to be supported by the Asia Development Bank. In mid-1999 the unit published its first report 
that included recommendations regarding the stimulation and reform of the financial sector, the 
mobilization of financial resources for economic recovery, as well as the protection of the poor 
[XINHUA 05.08.1999]. 
SOLINGEN states that the Surveillance Process was of ‘unprecedented intrusiveness’ [SOLINGEN 
1999:49]. However, keeping in mind that the project was fuelled by the fear of repercussions 
through financial developments on regime security, it is well inside the frame of what ASEAN has 
always considered to be one of its constituting purposes. 
With a view on the ongoing discussions of a reform of the Association’s diplomatic paradigms, 
HAACKE describes the establishment of the Surveillance Process as an act of ‘enhanced interaction’ 
albeit without ‘public recriminations’, although subjecting information formerly deemed domestic 
and thus as off-limits for others, to peer review [HAACKE 1999:605; HAACKE 2003:60].  
When the financial crisis had abated differences arose on how quickly to proceed to lower tariffs 
inside the Association (mainly focusing on Malaysia’s refusal to lower tariffs in the automobile in-
dustry) the members’ Trade and Finance Ministers agreed to endorse a formula (termed draft pro-
tocol for the time being) for settling respective competitive claims [PENNINGTON 04.10.2000]. 
Arrangements were reached for temporary delays, compensation rules, and for the non-compliance 
with tariff reductions in the framework of the ASEAN Free Trade Area [for more details see: XIN-
HUA 05.10.2000]. 
 
As regards the regional approach to security another note was struck in a statement of the Thai 
Foreign Minister, Prasong Soonsiri, at the opening session of the 26th AMM. It, however, rang 
somewhat ambivalent. He said that comprehensive security can only be achieved if ‘people secu-
rity’ issues, like adequate food supply and social development are taken into account [KN 
26.07.1993a]. However, in this context the meaning ‘people security’ was meant to be furthered to 
the detriment of civil rights instead of being taken as the latter’s extension. 
RÜHLE demonstrates what consequences ASEAN’s approach to security via economic development 
has: 
The close relationship between economic growth and security called for a specific concept 
of security: a concept of cooperative and comprehensive security. Cooperative, because 
peace and an economically favorabel international climate depend on congenial neighbors 
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and, hence, joint efforts to address sources of interstate conflict, comprehensive, because 
economic growth was obviously  interlinked with a great variety of social, cultural, and en-
vironmental issue-areas which were basically regarded as domestic risks. [RÜHLE 
2002:85] 
Other authors have worked out the two-pronged meaning economic development is attached to in 
regard to security: 
One assumption seems to be that economic development, by enlarging and consolidating 
a state’s administrative, financial, industrial, technological and military resources, in-
creases the efficacy of the various instruments of national power and thus helps to en-
hance its security. Another seems to be that economic development, by raising people’s 
welfare and standard of living, serves to lessen and ameliorate conflicts within society 
arising from class, racial, ethnic, regional and doctrinal differences [SAMUDAVANIJA & 
PARIBATRA 1987 qtd. in: KAMARULZAMAN et.al. 2002:30]. 
The Association, as was to be expected, showed no haste to establish its own human rights 
mechanism. The item was postponed at the SOM of May 1996. The widespread attitude was mir-
rored by a statement of Izhar Ibrahim, chairing that very SOM: 
We have to be reasonable, human rights doesn't [sic] have a direct link with regional se-
curity. [qtd. in: JP 10.05.1996] 
Tellingly, Indonesia’s foreign minister, Ali Alatas, in the run-up to the 1996 AMM conceded that 
although ASEAN had agreed in 1993 to work on the establishment of a region-wide human rights 
mechanism, the project ‘did not go very far’ [AFP 15.07.1996b]. A new precondition for the setting 
up of a regional human rights mechanism was floated at that time, namely that prior to that re-
gional mechanism, national human rights commissions should be in place. Indonesia, having such a 
national body already in operation (along with Thailand and the Philippines [JP 22.07.1996]), how-
ever argued ‘we cannot force other ASEAN countries into a pace that is according to our desire’, as 
its Foreign Minister, Alatas, made clear [qtd. in: JEN 21.07.1996b]. However, as a step toward the 
project, various human rights activists655 were heard by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Brunei, 
and Malaysia during the annual ASEAN meetings in July 1996 [JP 22.07.1996]. While ASEAN for-
eign ministers accepted a proposal by a working group on the formation of an ASEAN Human 
Rights Commission in 2000, the overall progress on the issue remained still negligible656
                                                 
655 However, some of those activists proved remarkably tolerant toward the slow pace of ASEAN on the issue of 
human rights. Marzuki Darusman for one – representing Indonesia’s national human rights commission – was 
quoted as saying: “If not this year, next year or the year after next year is all right” [qtd. in: JP 22.06.1996]. 
656 In line with that foot-dragging ASEAN’s then chair, Indonesia, described it as a mistake to think that  - al-
though Burma (and i.a. its dismal human rights record) had become a frequently discussed topics at ARF meet-
ings, the subject of human right would now become ‘automatically eligible’ for consideration at future ARF 
gatherings [WALTERS 26.06.1996]. 
 [compare 
MUNTARBHORN 25.04.2001]. 
While law instruments to protect democracy were being created in the Americas, as elaborated 
ASEAN cultivated its distinct approach to the issue of national stability. It has been argued that this 
stance was originally inspired by the fragility of their states and their risk proneness to any political 
domestic upheaval, as young nations only recently released to be independent of their former colo-
nial masters [KASUMATA 2003:113]. However, this argument could be put forward for other areas 
of the world as well. Still, Southeast Asia proved outstandingly robust in its regime consolidation 
emphasis. 
ASEAN’s assertiveness as a conflict transforming actor was originating in its lengthy and intensive 
campaign to oust the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Another boost to foster its position in the 
realm of security was achieved with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum, reaching out 
to the near and farther neighbourhood. That very move can be said to have marked a clear turn-
around from the previous position held inside ASEAN as regards security. The Manila Declaration of 
1987, for example, has had made it clear that each member was responsible for its security, and 
respective cooperation was to be conducted on a non-ASEAN basis [NISCHALKE 2000:96]. Giving 
life to the ARF not only ‘marked a significant break with ASEAN’s ZOPFAN norm’ [ACHARYA 
2004:258], but the ARF’s ensuing success resulted in ASEAN’s conception of itself as significant 
player in its own right that is expected to take on a stabilizing role. Contrasting ASEAN’s approach 
to the one preferred by the West, a Philippine former security adviser, Jose ALMONTE, commented: 
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Our concept of cooperative security differs from the traditional idea of collective security in 
the same way that preventive medicine differs from intensive care. 
Instead of using counter-threats, like e.g. NATO, to deter aggression, ASEAN rather pursues that 
aim by 
enmeshing individual states within a given geographic area in an ever-thickening web of 
cooperative associations. [qtd. in: MS 16.09.1998] 
With the ASEAN’s postponement of Cambodia’s scheduled entry to the organization in July 1997 
and with its offer of mediation in the internal conflict it took a step toward consolidation of its re-
positioning. The following AMM noted: 
Recognizing the increasingly central role of ASEAN in the maintenance of peace and stabil-
ity in the region, the Foreign Ministers underlined their commitment to continue working 
closely together as well as with the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ARF participants to 
enhance peace and strengthen regional stability. [ASEAN 25.07.1997] 
Also long-time ASEAN observer VATIKIOTIS (et. al.) argued that the handling of the Cambodian 
situation was of significance in other respects: 
… Asean's credibility as a security body is also on the line. Caught between a desire to ex-
pand its security function and a deep aversion to interfering in members' domestic affairs, 
the grouping runs the risk of exposing itself to more ridicule as a toothless talk shop. 
[HIEBERT & VATIKIOTIS 24.07.1997] 
And Michael LEIFER sceptically reasoned: “Asean can huff and puff but it lacks the power and will 
not do much other than to legitimize Hun Sen's [Cambodia’s Second Prime Minister, my remark] 
rule once it is stabilized.” [qtd. in: HIEBERT & VATIKIOTIS 24.07.1997]. 
3.23.2 From Non-Intervention to Enhanced Interaction 
Seemingly indirectly confirming LEIFER’s assertion that ASEAN had solid rubber stamp credentials, 
Indonesia strongly rebuffed the concept of ‘constructive intervention’ that was formulated by Ma-
laysia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, for the case of Cambodia in the late 1990s [JEN 
29.07.1997]. After the coup by Hun Sen, Anwar Ibrahim said in Newsweek magazine: 
Asean must now move from being a largely reactive organization to one that is proactive. 
We need to intervene before simmering problems erupt into full-blown crises, like the one 
now unfolding in Cambodia. [qtd. in: WAIN 14.08.1998] 
And whereas Indonesia insisted that ASEAN was to use ‘quiet diplomacy’, not giving too many 
statements to the press [JEN 30.07.1997], “constructive intervention” as devised by Anwar Ibra-
him would have encompassed: 
 
• direct assistance to firm up electoral processes; 
• increased commitment to legal and administrative reforms; 
• development of human capital; and 
• general strengthening of civil society and the rule of law [ACHARYA 2004:262]. 
 
But the discussion on ASEAN’s future approach continued, especially after Indonesia’s long-time 
President Suharto had been forced out of office. In late June 1998 Thailand proposed an initiative 
that was deemed to replace the principle of non-intervention which was felt to increasingly have 
become inadequate. With that venture it was hoped that ASEAN would win back its international 
influence that had suffered due to the financial crisis starting in 1997. 
FLYNN reports that the original idea of ‘constructive intervention’ had foreseen to ‘delve into each 
other’s backyards on matters of regional concern’ resulting in productive ‘peer pressure’. But this 
ambitious project was later described by a Thai foreign ministry spokesman to have constituted a 
mere trial balloon. The overwhelming rejection of it eventually resulted in a watered down version 
– under the heading of ‘flexible engagement’ - which simply held that ASEAN members should dis-
cuss internal affairs of individual countries only if those directly affected the Association [FLYNN 
18.07.1998; BP 26.06.1998]. 
The Thai foreign minister also underlined that ASEAN in future should no longer ‘shy away from 
addressing issues of open society, democracy, and human rights’ [qtd in: APN 29.06.1998]. The 
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Thai position was supported by the then ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino, underlining 
the need for ‘constructive engagement’ as a sign for the increasing interconnectedness among the 
Southeast Asian nations [DJIN 30.06.1998]. Later also the Philippines joined in that chorus, al-
though holding onto the softer concept, announcing: 
a major change in Asean's policy from non-intervention to a more proactive policy of flexi-
ble engagement. [qtd. in: DJIN 15.07.1998] 
HAACKE argues that Thailand’s promotion of the ‘flexible engagement’ approach was intended to 
have the following consequences: 
 
• it was to allow ASEAN to respond to the ever increasing interdependence, as events in one 
country were ever more likely to impact on others; 
• it was thought to confront comprehensive security threats, such as economic disruption 
and cross-border security problems; and 
• it was to enhance democratization and human rights in ASEAN countries [HAACKE 
1999:586-587]. 
 
In another scholarly article HAACKE specifies that 'flexible engagement' was only conceived of as to 
'delimit' the situations in which the norm of non-interference was to be applied. However, the idea 
eventually gained not impetus enough and consequently 'did not amount to the advocacy of a new 
security model' [HAACKE 2005:189]. 
Indonesia – at least at the time – continued to be among the countries remaining closest attached 
to the principle of non-interference [DJIN 15.07.1998]. Nonetheless, the approach was expected to 
be discussed at the upcoming AMM; but in order not to ignore the existing ‘sensitivities’, this was 
to be done in an informal fashion only [JEN 13.07.1998]. 
However, before the annual AMM was taking place Vietnam made its opposition to the policy of 
allowing fellow members to comment on internal developments, clear; citing inter alia the princi-
ples enshrined in the TAC [AFP 16.07.1998]. The cause for ‘flexible engagement’ was not helped 
when the Philippine’s Senate President pro-tempore suggested that ASEAN should push fellow 
members Myanmar and Indonesia toward democratic reforms [AFP 17.07.1998a]. In the run-up to 
the AMM, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister – contradicting Malaysia’s Vice-President’s earlier remarks – 
also rejected the idea, arguing that such an approach would only create ‘uneasiness’ among the 
member countries [AFP 17.07.1998b]. 
At an ASEAN SOM shortly before the eventual AMM, expectedly no consensus could be reached 
[DJIN 21.07.1998]. In many quarters the approach was felt as to threaten regime security and to 
jeopardize intramural stability [HAACKE 2005:189]. Immediately before the regular foreign minis-
ters’ meeting, opposition came from all other member countries, with the sole exceptions of Thai-
land and the Philippines [XINHUA 24.07.1998a]. Finally, the AMM did reconfirm that non-
intervention would remain ASEAN’s cardinal principal. However, Philippine foreign secretary Do-
mingo Siazon, clarified the results reached: 
… growing interdependence among nations, particularly among ASEAN countries, the rule 
or principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of others should not be absolute, but 
should be relative particularly on the issues which have trans-boundary effects. And the 
ASEAN members should be able to express their views clearly and timely and openly. … 
And they (ministers) suggested that this be considered as a policy of ASEAN. [qtd. in: 
XINHUA 23.07.1998] 
A similar comment came from Thailand, naming the new concept ‘enhanced interaction’ that was to 
allow freer discussion about topics like the conduct of the Cambodian election, human rights viola-
tions in Myanmar, Indonesia’s rule in East Timor, and the nuclear tests conducted by India and 
Pakistan [GN 30.07.1998]. HAACKE outlines the difference between ‘flexible engagement’ and ‘en-
hanced interaction’ thus: 
This concept denotes a policy that in practice differs only in so far from flexible engage-
ment as enhanced interaction is a national variant of what would have the corporate policy 
of flexible engagement. Notably, enhanced interaction, like flexible engagement, was con-
sidered to respect the principle of non-interference. [HAACKE 1999:598; compare also 
HAACKE 2005:189-190]  
One of the staunchest supporters of the non-intervention principle, Indonesia’s foreign minister Ali 
Alatas, offered the following differentiated support: 
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[I]f the proposition is, within ASEAN, we should be more frank in discussing issues that 
may originate in one country but have an impact on the other ASEAN countries, then let's 
do it [qtd. in: CHANDA & ISLAM 06.08.1998]. 
Thailand’s position was partly inspired inter alia by its problematic relationship with its neighbour 
Burma. Military confrontation between the two countries, as well as a considerable refugee flow 
originating from Burma’s crackdown along the border, characterized their relations. Thai foreign 
minister Surin Pitsuwan opined that 100.000 refugees could be considered a ‘form of interference’ 
in its own affairs, and he added: 
We do not seek to interfere in the internal affairs of any country but we will voice our 
opinion on any issues that impact our country's ability and our people's well-being. [qtd. 
in: CHANDA & ISLAM 06.08.1998] 
And with regard to gross abuses of human rights in another ASEAN country, Surin Pitsuwan said 
that although that might not ‘directly affect countries across the border’, it definitely posed a seri-
ous image problem for ASEAN [CHANDA & ISLAM 06.08.1998]. In a document prepared by the 
Thai foreign ministry ASEAN members were urged to subject the sacred non-interference principle 
to reality tests since “as the region becomes more interdependent, the dividing line between do-
mestic affairs ... and external or transnational issues ... is less clear” and countries affected by so-
called domestic affairs by one of its neighbours legitimize them to voice their opinion openly and 
constructively [qtd. in: ACHARYA 2004:260-261]. 
Worries about a tarnished image – and about the regime stability of the Association’s ‘gentle giant’ 
-  had also been at work behind the decision of several ASEAN nations to contribute troops on In-
donesia’s request to the international force for East Timor. The atrocities committed by Indonesian 
forces had cast a highly unfavourable light on the standing of the Association, and its decision to 
stay off-limits. The participation in International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was considered to 
ameliorate the poor standing of ASEAN on that matter [HAACKE 2003:66-67]. 
Generally, the winds of change could be felt across the region. Donna GUEST of Amnesty Interna-
tional reported in mid-1998 that there was definitely progress to be witnessed inside ASEAN. How-
ever, hinting at the traditional ‘ASEAN Way’ she explained: 
They've been raising the issue of human rights in a lot more bilateral, private way and 
maybe not announcing it. … They might not be as vocal as the West but I mean, after all I 
think they're just more quiet. [qtd. in: AFP 28.07.1998] 
According to the Philippine President José Estrada, the new approach was tested when the Malay-
sian Vice-Premier, Anwar Ibrahim, was sacked by the Malaysian Premier, Mahathir Mohamad on 9th 
September 1998, and soon afterward arrested on charges of corruption and sexual misconduct. At 
the 30th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in early October 1998, Estrada called on the ASEAN 
fellow members to consider the issue one for the newly adopted policy of ‘enhanced interaction’657
When allies of Anwar escaped arrest through fleeing to ASEAN countries – the Philippines, Thai-
land
 
[GARCIA et.al. 08.10.1998]. Estrada urged Mahathir to give Anwar due process and respect his 
personal human rights [APN 12.10.1998a]. Estrada was joined in his outrage by Indonesian Presi-
dent B. J. Habibie [WAIN 30.10.1998] – based on the latter’s reaction, SMITH consequently con-
cluded: “Habibie has taken the ‘flexible engagement’ idea firmly on board…” [SMITH 1999:255]. 
658, and Indonesia659
Mahathir additionally warned that discussing this internal affair would in the long run undermine 
ASEAN’s overall unity
 – Malaysia’s foreign minister stated the countries misgivings to the press: 
We have told those countries not to interfere in our internal affairs. … They should not en-
courage the actions of those who wish to cause riots in this country. [APN 12.10.1998b] 
660
                                                 
657 However, Estrada’s threat to boycott an APEC meeting, citing the imprisonment of former deputy premier, 
Anwar Ibrahim [JP 03.10.1998], was a potential move going beyond the scope of the ‘enhanced interaction’ 
approach, that was limited to mere discussions of divisive issues only. 
658 Interestingly, when the overthrown former prime minister of Thailand, Shinawatra, was received by Singa-
pore's Deputy Prime Minister in early 2007, this also caused a diplomatic row – even though a limited one - 
between both countries [TNS 30.01.2007]. 
659 On how these three countries applied the newly agreed upon concept of ‚enhanced interaction’ in the case of 
Anwar Ibrahim’s arrest, see HAACKE 1999:599-601. 
 [AP 29.10.1998]. Tellingly, he compared the divergences with other 
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ASEAN countries as hiccups, hinting the following: “One sure way of overcoming hiccups is not to 
talk”. He also emphasized that his country was by far not the only ASEAN member that was against 
discussing internal developments [qtd. in: JEN 29.10.1998]. In the end Estrada did not insist on 
the matter, terming his remarks as ‘personal’ in nature and indicating that the Anwar trial was 
conducted in a transparent manner [AFP 16.11.1998]. VATIKIOTIS et alia nevertheless remarked 
that, with the exception of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, no other ASEAN leader has lent open sup-
port to Mahathir [VATIKIOTIS et.al. 08.10.1998]. 
Still, this specific development did not hinder Thailand to soon renew its call for broadening the 
spectrum of issues of concern to neighbouring countries. Its foreign ministry’s spokesman Kobsak 
Chutiku argued: “Human rights violations in the region and political uncertainty in member coun-
tries have an impact on their neighbors and the image of the group as a whole” [qtd. in: JEN 
09.12.1998]. The next month Thailand called for so-called ‘ground rules’ to implement the newly 
adopted policy of ‘enhanced interaction’. Surin Pitsuwan, the Thai foreign minister later linked the 
new approach to a commitment for a higher degree of transparency, which as such is considered to 
favour democratisation and the respect for human rights [CHIMPRABHA 05.01.1999]. Neverthe-
less, Thailand officially accepted the six-year sentence imposed on Anwar in April 1999, saying that 
internal processes would have to be respected. The Associated Press remarked in that connection 
the essential cooperation Thailand had received from Malaysia in neutralizing armed rebels fighting 
for an Islamic separate state in the southern Thai provinces, insinuating a quid-pro-quo exchange 
of political favours [AP 16.04.1999]. 
HAACKE, reviewing the experience of the ‘enhanced interaction’ approach as regards the case of 
Anwar Ibrahim, provides the following outlook: 
While one should expect more and more issues to become issues for enhanced interaction, 
there are probably still limits to the extent of involvement that ASEAN countries will seek 
to have in the affairs of their ASEAN neighbours. … | … The key question is whether en-
hanced interaction, when it is practised, will be compatible with other aspects of the 
‘ASEAN Way’, which, as we saw, includes the principle of quiet diplomacy. [HAAACKE 
1999:605-606] 
In line with the new, more offensive concept pursued, the Thai foreign ministry, faced with political 
developments in Indonesia, including the manoeuvres to unseat the president and factional vio-
lence which seemed to jeopardize the stability of the region, urged that normalcy should return as 
soon as possible, so that those events would not affect the ASEAN region. The outspokenness of 
the statement was described as another deviation from the non-interference policy [AFP 
01.06.2001]. 
That the position of ASEAN gradually changed also in the realm of ‘human security’ was made evi-
dent when the Association endorsed an ILO declaration on the fundamental rights of workers, albeit 
on a voluntary basis [AEN 17.05.1999]. The Far Eastern Economic Review has pointed out that: 
(…) [t]he Asian economic crisis has left Asean leaders "less arrogant" when discussing 
human rights, and more anxious to forge stronger trade and investment ties. [LINTNER 
et.al. 28.01.1999] 
3.23.3 Test Case Indonesia 
The regime change in Indonesia in the late 1990s prompted SMITH to argue that the new elite was 
in support of the incorporation of the ‘human security’ concept into the ASEAN framework [SMITH 
1999:255] – thus, an essential member of the Association – even though temporarily weakened by 
its internal turmoil – was deemed to cross over into the camp of advocates of a more comprehen-
sively framed term of security. 
However, on another front, appeasement was practised by the presumably ‘liberal’ Thai govern-
ment, when a meeting of unions on the issue of promoting democracy in Burma was banned at 
short notice, with the argument that “holding this conference in Thailand could result in negative 
effects on the good relations between Thailand and its neighbour” as the Thai ministry of labour 
stated [BARNES 22.05.1999]. 
Despite such echoes of the past, ASEAN increasingly felt the dilemma that was posed by traditional 
values on the one side, and new challenges on the other. Shanmugam Jayakumar, Singapore’s 
foreign minister and then Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, reiterating that the cher-
                                                                                                                                                        
660 HAACKE argued that only by ‚threatening the unravelling of ASEAN as a diplomatic and partial security 
community’ did Mahathir put an end to the intrusive behavior of some of its ASEAN fellow countries [HAACKE 
1999:605]. 
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ished principles of consensus, consultation, and non-interference must not be abandoned, ob-
served: 
But without abandoning them, how can the organization and its members face new chal-
lenges that will have to be confronted by ASEAN? … Challenges such as good governance, 
challenges such as democratization, human rights and so on? … These are challenges 
which ASEAN must face, and face it in a way that doesn't abandon established principles. 
[qtd. in: AP 23.07.1999] 
 
When in Indonesia a new president took office indeed a new era seemed to begin. President Wahid 
made his wish known to further democracy in the region generally and in Myanmar specifically. For 
that purpose he solicited support of Thailand during a visit to Bangkok [REUTERS 07.11.1999]. 
Political change in Indonesia also brought about the government’s struggle to the fore to hold its 
myriad ethnic groups together. Especially the break-away of East Timor (occupied by Indonesia 
since 1975), after an independence referendum in 1999, spurred fears in ASEAN that Indonesia 
was to disintegrate. Another vocal call for autonomy and/or secession came from Indonesia’s Aceh 
province. Thailand’ s foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan stated his country’s concern about such de-
velopments and urged Indonesia to strengthen good governance and transparency so that ‘it will 
play that rightful role in leadership of ASEAN more effectively’ [qtd. in: AFP 26.11.1999]. 
Over the notoriously separatist Aceh province former Indonesian President Suharto had imposed a 
so-called military operation zone in 1989. Since then approximately 5.000 people had been killed 
or disappeared as human rights groups claimed. Newly elected president Wahid promised talks 
with Acehnese representatives and signalled his willingness to grant the province far-reaching 
autonomy [SPENCER 26.11.1999]. 
At their November 1999 Informal Summit ASEAN countries urged Indonesia to seek an immediate 
solution for the restive province, employing ‘persuasive dialogue’. Some of its ASEAN fellow mem-
bers feared that the unrest might otherwise adversely affect the investment climate in their own 
countries [MCCARTHY 26.11.1999]. Singapore pressed for the inclusion of a paragraph that was to 
reaffirm Indonesia’s territorial integrity in the Summit statement [JEN 27.11.1999]. Additionally, 
the statement voiced its support for Indonesia’s efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the 
conflict [AFP 28.11.1999]. That position motivated Indonesian foreign minister Alwi Shihab to ob-
serve: “Wahid will go into the talks with the firm backing of world leaders who are against inde-
pendence for Aceh” [qtd. in: EFE 28.11.1999]. But in a reaction to ASEAN’s firm support of Indone-
sia, Muhammad Nazar, chairing the Information Center of Referendum for Aceh, dismissed the 
Association’s commitment, claiming that various other international organization and powerful 
states in future would support their fight for independence [APN 06.12.1999]. 
However, Indonesia's proposal of an ASEAN Security Community, originally including the idea of a 
regional peacekeeping force to monitor also internal situation, indicated a general liberalization. 
This development culminated in Indonesia's readiness to welcome monitors of ASEAN and EU661 
countries to observer the reached peace agreement662 for Aceh in mid-2005 [XINHUA 03.06.2005]. 
For setting up an ASEAN monitoring team, Indonesia's foreign ministers sent letters to the ASEAN 
countries, urging them to contribute to the regional team [XINHUA 19.07.2005]. However, Indone-
sia felt the urge to re-emphasize its wish, that ASEAN shall play the key monitoring role. There-
upon the Association's foreign ministers informally agreed to send military officers and legal ex-
perts, mainly contributed by Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand – later also Brunei 
announced to sent personnel663
                                                 
661 The EU mission was to number around 200 observers [XINHUA 19.07.2005]. 
662 On how this venture was classified inside Indonesia see KELIAT 08.06.2005. 
663 For details on the tiny contingent contributed by Brunei see MOHAMMAD 09.09.2005. 
 [AP 27.07.2005b]. This prompted Ramos Horta, leader of the newly 
independent former Indonesian colony of East Timor, to say: 
Five or 10 years ago it was unthinkable that Indonesia would agree to outside involvement 
in what they considered to be their internal problem. This reflects a leap forward in the 
sophistication in the way Indonesia deals with certain issues [qtd. in: AP 26.07.2005]. 
As if the East Timorese and the Acehnese developments would be not be enough of a challenge for 
the Indonesian state, violence also erupted in the Maluku islands among Muslims and Christians, 
resulting in more than 3.000 deaths between January 1999 and July 2000. The Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Shihab, although willing to inform his ASEAN counterparts as well as some external par-
ties, underlined that the issue is to be classified a purely domestic affair – not requiring outside 
intervention in any form [JEN 19.07.2000]. 
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Upon this request the ASEAN foreign ministers at the following AMM refrained from mentioning the 
situation on the Maluku Islands, in contrast to the ones in Aceh and Papua. Instead, the commu-
niqué voiced the support for the political unity and the territorial integrity of Indonesia664
Accepted as the de facto leader of Asean since its inception in 1967, Indonesia isn't going 
to be in a position to contribute meaningfully again for years. Wracked by religious and 
ethnic strife and torn by separatist sentiment, it is, in fact, at the forefront of countries 
preoccupied with their own interests at the expense of regional concerns.
 [BBC MS 
22.07.2000]. The sorry state of Indonesia was commented on by WAIN in August 2000: 
665
However, the domestic situation was not settled immediately. By 2003 the Indonesian government 
decided to launch a major offensive against the rebels in Aceh
 [WAIN 
04.08.2000] 
The political instability of Indonesia also caused worries that refugees would flood its neighbouring 
countries [KN 29.09.2000]. The internal turmoil of Indonesia moreover provoked doubts over the 
stability of ASEAN itself; Jusuf WANANDI, a long time researcher of Southeast Asia, opined: 
If Indonesia goes down the drain, the entire ASEAN will go down the drain. How can you 
not comment on the internal affairs of Indonesia? ASEAN will become irrelevant if it con-
tinues with this policy. [AFP 23.11.2000b] 
Although the Indonesian regime held on to its policy of transparency, informing its ASEAN counter-
parts of the internal developments, that did not in essence change anything on the proposition of 
non-interference [AFP 23.11.2000c]. 
666
Meanwhile no progress was made on the human rights concerning the establishment of a regional 
body to protect and further them. Although tabling the issue in 1993, and again mentioning it in 
their 1998 and 1999 communiqués, this bore no tangible results [MUNTARBHORN 12.08.2000]. At 
their 33rd AMM the foreign ministers were confronted with proposals from the non-governmental 
Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism
. ASEAN’s position was unques-
tioningly in favour of Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, expressing the recognition of 
efforts by the government to restore ‘peace and order in Aceh’ [AFXA 16.06.2003]. Additionally, 
the other ASEAN foreign ministers pledged their ‘support to deny the separatist movement access 
to means of violence through the prevention of arms smuggling to Aceh province’, as the 36th AMM 
communiqué read [qtd. in: XINHUA 18.06.2003]. 
667
Meanwhile Indonesia – having transformed itself into being the prime supporter of a progressive 
and comprehensive security concept – detailed its plans as presented by the core concept of 
ASEAN Security Community, proposed in autumn 2003. Among others it foresaw the creation of a 
- an informal coalition of individuals and 
groups within the region, cooperating with governmental and non-governmental bodies to promote 
human rights. All foreign ministers but one (from the Philippines) did reject the input [APN 
31.07.2000a]. 
Thus the spokesman of the NGOs that had submitted the draft proposal found it surprising to have 
been welcomed warmly by the ASEAN governmental officials in July 2001, being well aware that 
the issue was ‘sensitive’ [AFP 21.07.2001b]. 
In their statement of the 34th AMM the ASEAN Foreign Ministers ‘acknowledged the efforts of the 
Working Group’ and decided that ASEAN-ISIS should be involved in the further discussions on the 
human rights topic [ASEAN 24.07.2001]. The Working Group continued to have a role to play. This 
was documented for instance when Malaysia's foreign minister aroused attention when he proposed 
to set up an institution to promote human rights in Southeast Asia by way of creating human rights 
programmes in the Association's member countries while taking part in a workshop of the Working 
Group [AP 29.06.2006]. 
Gradual movement was also discernible with regard to the ‘enhanced interaction’ approach which 
was re-tabled in 2004 by the former Indonesian foreign minister and current envoy to help settle 
the internal upheavals in Myanmar, Ali Alatas. Alatas argued that ‘enhanced interaction’ shall con-
tinuously be honoured and ‘refined’ since there would exist the need for ASEAN to reinvent itself 
and be flexible [ABBUGAO 07.01.2004]. 
                                                 
664 The ASEAN Secretary General, Severino, at the eve of the 33rd AMM in July 2000 said correspondingly: “In-
donesia is a very important component of ASEAN, and any threat to the territorial integrity of Indonesia has to 
be taken very seriously by ASEAN as a whole” [qtd. in: XINHUA 23.07.2000]. 
665 Similarly reasons PENTSY, calling Indonesia in 2000 the weakest member of ASEAN [PENTSY 09.08.2000]. 
666 Indonesia sent 40.000 police and troops to fight the 5.000 fighters of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM); apart 
from that it imposed a six month martial law on the province [AFXA 16.06.2007]. 
667 For details on the proposed draft see MUNTARBHORN 12.08.2000 who himself had contributed to the docu-
ment. 
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regional peacekeeping force and the drafting of a human rights charter and an associated human 
rights commission [LKBNA 01.03.2004]. Although the original proposal had been accepted by the 
2004 AMM in a watered down version only, also Malaysia raised its voice in favour of ASEAN estab-
lishing common guidelines for human rights and democracy [SINGH 07.08.2004]. 
However, a major setback for any approach deviating from strict non-interference was encoun-
tered, when Thailand's premier sternly refused that ASEAN discuss its internal insurgency668
As regards the adaptability, ASEAN’s security concept proved remarkably resistant to change. 
Whereas the OAS witnessed a profound alterations by opening up for instance to democratization, 
ASEAN was more than reluctant to any form of comprehensive modification or extension. This re-
sistance is partly attributable to the regional modes of conduct generally employed, and to the 
characteristics of the political systems in place in many of the region’s countries. These parameters 
unquestionably impact as limiters for incorporating issues like human rights into the security 
agenda. Still, in spite of those limitations ASEAN showed its willingness to take regional security 
, taking 
place in the country's south. Prime Minister Shinawatra even went so far as to threaten to walk out 
of the November 2004 ASEAN Summit, if the issue was raised there [DJIN 25.11.2004]. Shi-
nawatra argued that to internationalize the issue would be equivalent to handing over weapons to 
the insurgents [TNS 01.12.2004].This announcement was quite surprising coming from a country 
hitherto prominent for its explicit liberal position on the matter. However, it was obvious that Thai-
land overreacted somewhat, since the general position in ASEAN was anyway a conservative pro-
sovereignty one, even in late 2004. Malaysia – when clarifying that all the Association's other 
members wanted was to be properly informed, thus underlined the continued validity of the non-
interference policy of the Association [BBC MS 27.11.2004]. 
It was further remarkable that Shinawatra suggested that the topic might be discussed bilaterally, 
insisting that it did not fit multilateral handling [TNS 29.11.2004]. Consequently, Thailand met 
Malaysia and Indonesia – the ASEAN countries with the biggest Muslim populations – to inform 
them on the situation, and on that occasion reportedly received the assurance that non-
interference is going to remain one of the most essential ASEAN tenets [AFXA 29.11.2004]. Not 
surprisingly both countries offered their understanding for what Thailand did 'to stop … the vio-
lence' [qtd. in: TNS 02.12.2004]. 
Still positions were meandering, depending on the current and most pressing political interests. 
Thus, when Malaysia encountered problems on its border with Thailand in connection with actions 
of Thai Islamic insurgents in 2005, its foreign minister Syed Hamid called on his ASEAN colleagues 
to soften the non-interference posture: 
We cannot just limit things that happen within our borders as our internal affairs. ... We 
have to look at external effects because sometimes (events) outside the region can be 
used by some extremist groups as an excuse to commit terror or acts of violence beyond 
their borders [qtd. in: SINGH 05.08.2005]. 
This position was reemphasized in September of the same year by Malaysia's education minister, 
Hishammuddin Hussein, who underlined: 
We would like to remind the Thai authorities that whatever happens in southern Thailand 
will be felt here. (...)  It is not that we are interfering but being so close geographically, 
we will inevitably feel the effects. [qtd. in: AP 27.09.2005] 
And although the situation brought the two countries' ties to a long-time low [CUMMING-BRUCE 
28.10.2005], Thailand continued to reject to internationalize the issue [AP 27.09.2005]. 
 
In retrospect, ASEAN’s security concept has been adapted over the years, but only in a very quali-
fied fashion. Regime consolidation and economic development remained the mainstays of the re-
gion’s approach to what constitutes security in the first place, and what needs to be done to ensure 
it. However, the establishment of ASEAN as a multilateral mechanism for cooperation can be 
viewed as a concession that regional collaboration was not only in the interest of the individual 
nations, but was also a necessity for stability. Moreover, by creating ASEAN as a platform the traits 
and characteristics of the so-called ASEAN Way had a forum to flourish and foster as the dominant 
style of diplomacy. The increasing frequency of meetings in diverse policy areas also added to the 
trust between the neighbours. Coupled with the Association’s enlargement, this development sup-
ported the tendency to handle disputes and conflicts in a non-violent manner. 
                                                 
668 The South China Morning Post opined that Thailand gambled away its potential leadership role in ASEAN by 
being 'seriously tarnished by criticism of his hardline approach to his country's southern insurgency' [SCMP 
28.11.2004]. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS | ASEAN’S SECURITY CONCEPT 
320 
and thus also conflicts seriously by creating (even if somewhat under duress) a number of mecha-
nisms that allow to avoid escalations of disputes. With the APT and the ARF the Association docu-
mented its commitment to shoulder responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the region. Es-
pecially the ‘enmeshing’ of China into the security framework of Southeast Asia and beyond, is one 
of its most important achievements.  
3.23.4 ASEAN’s Security Performance Assessed 
EMMERSON, reviewing the first twenty years of ASEAN pointedly formulates a possible evaluation: 
In the eyes of a cynic ASEAN succeeded for its first ten years by doing nothing, and can 
thank Vietnamese actions for a second decade of success. But the same assessment could 
be reversed in ASEAN’s favor. It was precisely by closing diplomatic ranks behind Thailand 
against Vietnam that ASEAN managed to strengthen its political integrity. [EMMERSON 
1987:16] 
Michael LEIFER’s judgement strikes a similar note by taking account the underlying expediency: 
Asean has achieved its regional standing through an ability to manage problems rather 
than solving them. For Asean governments, a personalized process of consultation and 
cooperation has become more important than formal procedures for problem-solving. In-
deed, Asean is not directly about problem-solving, but about creating the milieu in which 
they either do not arise or can be readily managed. This facility has been demonstrated in 
a multilateral context to accommodate the differences in strategic perspective during the 
Cambodian conflict, and in bilateral relations in coping with territorial disputes. [LEIFER 
30.11.1995] 
Both scholars seem to accord too less importance to the fact what the establishment and mainte-
nance of ASEAN in itself contributed immensely to an overall peaceful behaviour among its mem-
bers. But many roads do lead to Rome and to achieve conflict transformation in a way that is bar of 
violence is not achieved through one method only. ASEAN is a fine example how disputes can be 
dealt with in more subtle and indirect ways – modes that, it is true, are far more difficult to capture 
for social scientists than the mere record reviews of formal conflict resolution mechanisms. This 
feature – the difficulty to track and illustrate the permanently ongoing de-escalation of existing 
conflicts – together with a deep seated conviction that only formal conflict resolutions methods are 
valid means on the path to peace, are explaining why the ASEAN Way is so often the object of 
harsh criticism. And idealism of another brand also plays a not insignificant role: the lack of across-
the-board commitments to democracy and human rights makes the Association prone to moralistic 
chiding. Understandable as that might be, those tendencies do little to help ascertain the most 
effective ways of handling peace-threatening clashes of interests and as such betrays every scien-
tist’s duty to distance her/himself of personally chosen ideals. This obligation is supposed to do a 
service for the benefit of tracing the world as it is, instead of prescribing as it should be. 
Some scholars, however, subject ASEAN’s methods to a more differentiated evaluation. For exam-
ple TENORIO points out that whatever one may say about the ASEAN Way of containing conflicts, it 
can be observed: 
(…) that the seemingly evasive nature with which the ASEAN dealt with sensitive intra-
association issues only betrays a low regard for formal institutions and structures. Not-
withstanding appearances of evasion, the ASEAN tactic of dealing with conflict has re-
sulted in a very stable atmosphere within the association, and has helped create a rela-
tively peaceful Asia-Pacific region. [TENORIO 16.05.1997] 
This view is also supported by Carolina HERNANDEZ, president of the Philippines’ Institute of Stra-
tegic Development Studies, when she argues that “[b]ecause of ASEAN, the intra-ASEAN territorial 
disputes and other differences have been sidelined for 30 years” [qtd. in: APN 30.06.1997]. 
Similarly argues ALMONTE, who arrives at the following conclusion: 
The basic lesson ASEAN teaches is that differences or even disputes should not stop coun-
tries from promoting mutually beneficial relationships – because the very act of sitting 
down together can begin mutual trust and confidence. And this is no small accomplish-
ment since, in societies without mutual trust, any individual player’s refusal to cooperate 
for mutual benefit can be a rational recourse. [ALMONTE 1997/98:81] 
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3.24 The ASEAN Troika 
As has been described, ASEAN had established a diplomatic Troika to negotiate with Cambodia 
after the postponement of its accession due to the bloody coup the country witnessed (see respec-
tive chapter). The Troika concept had gained appeal in the process of the negotiations and at the 
Informal Summit of November 1999 ASEAN agreed to the setting up of a similar Troika. The initia-
tive was reportedly sponsored by Thailand. The Troika was to further the aim of addressing issues 
affecting peace and security more effectively. Especially the Association’s failure to act adequately 
to the East Timor crisis was the spur to design a new multilateral equipment. HAACKE outlines the 
detrimental effects the Association’s inertia had produced: 
Importantly, the key ASEAN member-states’ initial failure to respond early and collectively 
to the bloodshed in East Timor not only cost the Association more of what remained of its 
international standing, but also virtually ensured that Australia was asked to manage this 
problem concerning regional order in Southeast Asia. [HAACKE 2003:71] 
Hence, this development contradicted long held regional claims (even if never seriously substanti-
ated ones) of self-reliance and neutrality, putting in doubt the ability of the Association to manage 
its own affairs properly. 
At the time Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam were thought to constitute the Troika, acting on a 
ministerial level. The most likely case for eventual intervention was deemed to be the restive Indo-
nesian province of Aceh where rebels fought for independence [LUGO 29.11.1999; AFP 
16.03.2000]. 
In early 2000 the idea of the conceived Troika was gradually taking shape, although no consensus 
existed yet. Two proposals were on the table: 
 
• the Troika would be constituted similar to the EU Troika, consisting of the previous, the 
current, and the future chairing country; or 
• the Troika would be set up only on an case-by-case basis, if regional peace and stability 
was threatened [KUMRUNGROJ 10.03.2000]. 
 
After an SOM in March 2000 it seemed as if both proposals would be taken up to establish the new 
body. A Thai official on that occasion emphasized that the Troika was to ‘promote solidarity and the 
efficiency of ASEAN, based on ASEAN principles, especially consensus’. Additionally, it was meant 
to be quite flexible, and thus to be adaptable to the individual cases that would require its good 
offices [qtd. in: AFP 16.03.2000]. 
That flexibility was to include the right to invite any other ASEAN member to participate in the 
Troika. It was decided that – as previously suggested – the Troika was to comprise the past, cur-
rent, and future Chairmen of the ASEAN Standing Committee. The body would be headed by the 
present Chairman and alternated according to the annual rotation in that office. No representa-
tional or decision-making competencies were intended to be conferred upon the Troika – instead it 
was to merely assist and consult the ASEAN foreign ministers on issues that might affect the peace 
in the region. The procedures guiding the Troika were to be discussed at the upcoming AMM, 
scheduled for July 2000 [JEN 16.03.2000a]. 
With Thailand as its sponsor the rather ambitious plan to form a permanent body stirred some con-
cern among several of ASEAN’s other members. Unsurprisingly Burma – fearing to be one of the 
earliest Troika targets – was one of the most vocal critics [HAACKE 2003:72]. Additionally, the 
initiative was widely perceived to be another route for Thailand to promoted its  ‘flexible engage-
ment’ approach. An ASEAN official commented: 
Very few members want to see ASEAN have a permanent body to handle a temporary cri-
sis. We should give birth to a troika when a specific situation calls for it and kill it when 
the difficulty is over. … On the top of it, we don't want any member to use the troika as a 
tool to get involved in the domestic affairs of other members. [qtd. in: JEN 17.05.2000] 
As outlined the Troika proposal had originally been given indirectly birth by ASEAN’s disappointing 
and inadequate handling of the East Timorese situation. However, as a diplomatic source warned, 
the Troika seemed to be, in the envisioned form, no more than ‘a swollen body for missions impos-
sible due to its complex procedures’; an allusion to the strict limitation of the body’s powers [JEN 
17.05.2000; compare also BP 20.05.2000]. 
In that phase a draft was circulating that detailed the timing and right of summoning of the Troika; 
it foresaw the following: 
Should an issue or situation arise that is likely to disturb regional peace and harmony and 
has the potential to affect ASEAN in political or security terms and requires collective ac-
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tion by ASEAN, the ASEAN foreign ministers, upon the request of the ASC chairman or any 
other ASEAN foreign minister, could, on the basis of consensus, establish an ASEAN troika 
and determine its mandate. [qtd. in: JEN 07.07.2000] 
This proposal seems to have been designed in order to bring the other sceptical ASEAN members 
on board. The requirement of consensus ruled out that any contentious issue or situation would 
ever be managed by the Troika if only a single nation was opposed to that. 
The said draft additionally laid emphasis on the importance on the principles of ASEAN treaties, 
specifically the ones enshrined in the TAC which would have to be applied to the work of the Troika 
[JEN 07.07.2000]. 
However, asked about the limited leverage of the envisioned body, arousing some speculation 
about its overall feasibility669
3.24.1 The Troika as Put on Paper 
, a Thai official explained: “[y]ou need to read between the lines. The 
significance is not in the words on paper, it’s how we are starting to think about responding more 
quickly” on issues that affect ASEAN member states [qtd. in: CUMMING-BRUCE 21.07.2000]. 
In an effort to defend the Troika proposal from the accusation of being a tool to intervene in do-
mestic affairs, its sponsor, the Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan, listed the following thematic 
areas – thought to be far less controversial than typical cases of conflict - to be covered by the 
body: forest fires, drug dealing, trafficking in women and children, and piracy [ABBUGAO 
24.07.2000]. Across the board issues that belonged to the so-called non-traditional security 
threats, and not harbouring too much explosive potential for disrupting intra-ASEAN relations. 
When the draft, as proposed by ASEAN Senior Officials, was accepted at the 33rd AMM, it was em-
phasized that this step brings about an enlargement of powers for the Chairman of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee. Thailand’s foreign minister delineated: “[w]e agreed that the Chair should be 
given more latitude, more room for his creativity in carrying out the mandate on behalf of the 
ASEAN ministers” [qtd. in: JEN 24.07.2000]. 
The agreed purpose of the Troika was framed as to enable the Association to address urgent and 
important regional political and security issues and situations of common concern likely to disturb 
regional peace and harmony, in a timely manner. As suggested in the draft version specific men-
tion was made of the principles of the ASEAN treaties, i.a. the TAC and the ‘core principles of con-
sensus and non-interference’. Additionally, it was explicitly underlined that the Troika “shall refrain 
from addressing issues that constitute the internal affairs of ASEAN member countries”. 
As regards its composition, the Troika – now only given birth to in the form of an ad-hoc body - 
could be ‘adjusted’ upon consensus if the situation warrants that move. The initiative to establish 
the Troika was to come either from the Standing Committee Chairman (and thus the would-be 
Troika Chairman) or any other ASEAN foreign Minister, even in case of existing opposition to that 
move among the ASEAN nations. Thus, the Chairman would have to face much of the burden and 
due to the rotation the timing for action would be another crux, if the up-coming Chair is unfavour-
able to the move. What is more, the effective inception of the Troika will still hinge on consensus 
since, the ASEAN foreign ministers would thereafter collectively make the eventual decision to set 
it in motion. And whereas the Troika was free to meet as often as deemed necessary, it would also 
bear the cost of its activities [ASEAN 25.07.2000; JEN 17.05.2000; CM 14.08.2000]; a condition-
ality which was not designed to make the Troika popular in any way. 
3.24.2 The Troika Proposal Scrutinized 
Taking a general view on the proposal of the Troika as such, HUND finds three criteria that made 
the initiative a precedent: 
 
• ASEAN is built on the principle of equal participation rather than representation. The notion 
to invest three representatives with the power to decide and act on behalf of all ASEAN 
governments was seen by many as a deviation from the ASEAN Way; 
• Many governments doubted that ASEAN relations were mature enough to endure the ex-
tension of ASEAN’s role and scope in the areas of conflict resolution; and 
• The idea that ASEAN should assume superiority vis-à-vis individual member countries, es-
pecially in areas of vital national interest [HUND 2002:112]. 
 
                                                 
669 For instance Eric TEO, honorary secretary of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs Council, an inde-
pendent think-tank, opined “[p]ersonally, I think that the troika is a good idea but don't think it will go through 
easily. … Unlike the EU, ASEAN may not be quite ready for it” [qtd. in: PENNINGTON 23.07.2000]. 
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Alluding to ASEAN’s activist approach vis-à-vis Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, WAIN com-
mented on the Troika proposal the following: 
This is progress? Well, it is today's reality, even if it seems to represent a giant leap 
backward over the past couple of decades. [WAIN 04.08.2000] 
Negative evaluations also came from one of the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of ASEAN, the Thai 
foreign minister at the time of the Association’s establishment, Thanat Khoman: 
It cannot work because no countries would like anyone to interfere, even Thailand itself, 
so the ASEAN troika would not be accepted. People will forget the troika in a few months. 
[qtd. in: KN 08.08.2000] 
The sceptics seemed soon to be proved right when the proposal of the UNSG Kofi Annan, that 
ASEAN should set up a Troika to handle the tense internal situation in Burma in September 2000, 
was reportedly not received well by the majority of the Association’s member states [KN 
21.09.2000]. And although the violent Depayin incident in Myanmar in May 2003 that led to the 
'custody' of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, made Indonesia to propose the invocation of the 
Troika mechanism, this never happened due the Burmese regime’s rejection [HAACKE 2005:193]. 
Similarly, the clashes between the Thai and Burmese military at their common border in 
2000/2001 while seemingly warranting action, never triggered the activation of the Troika [for 
more details see HAACKE 2003:75-79]. 
Also another incidence - the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 – which prompted the Philippines to 
call for the activation of the Troika, remained unheeded, notwithstanding the proposal’s support by 
Thailand [KN 31.10.2001]. 
The enthusiasm to make use of the Troika remained generally quite limited if not non-existent670
3.25 ASEAN’s military Cooperation 
. 
That notwithstanding, the Philippines repeated their long-held position on the importance of the 
Association, when the then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo said that she expected ASEAN to 
assume an increasingly active role in maintaining the security and stability in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion [Asia Pulse 06.06.2001]. For the immediate future, however, the ECONOMIST’s sombre out-
look was confirmed: 
There is a possibility that the troika could, one day, make ASEAN bolder. But for the next 
few years nobody's expectations are very high [ECONOMIST 29.07.2000]. 
Although being left largely unimplemented, the Troika notion was revitalized on the broader ARF 
level, namely in the shape of the so-called Friends of the Chair. The 14th ARF meeting in mid-2007 
adopted the prepared Terms of Reference of that entity, which was to be composed of the incoming 
and previous ARF Chair together with a non-ASEAN ARF member. Its main responsibility was to 
provide advice in cases of conflict but only on a case-to-case basis (see chapter 14th ARF Meeting). 
Meanwhile in ASEAN-proper, the Troika tool remained dormant despite potential cases for its acti-
vation. Thus, a proposal put forward by Thailand and also supported by Indonesia to convene a 
Troika after the violent crackdown by Myanmar’s regime on Buddhist monks in 2007, was left un-
heeded [HAACKE 2008:358, 363]. Partly thanks to overall scepticism about its intrusiveness, but 
also to more concrete qualms as for instance that the Troika might act unevenly due to its rota-
tional membership, seem to impede its practicability [HAACKE 2008:363] also for the foreseeable 
future. 
As has been demonstrated earlier, ASEAN was always reluctant to form a military alliance in what-
ever form. Instead, bilateral or trilateral cooperation war prioritized, encompassing joint military 
exercises [see SAN 2000:286-287]. 
Explaining this predisposition SIMON has argued that the lack of unanimity concerning the exis-
tence or identity of an external threat and the subsequent absence of a perceived need to erect a 
region-wide defence community is responsible for the incompleteness of ASEAN as a security 
mechanism [SIMON 1998:63]. The same author points out that the enlargement of the Association 
                                                 
670 Late in 2002 CABALLERO-ANTHONY observed about the ASEAN Troika: “Since its inception, nothing much 
has been said nor reported about its progress” [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 2002:534]. 
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makes the quite modest prospect of any viable defence arrangement even more improbable 
[SIMON 1998:70]. 
SOLINGEN on the other hand argues that it was in the interest of his ascertained ‚internationalist 
coalitions’ that originally fostered ASEAN’s creation and evolution, that military expenditures were 
and remained rather modest, and defensive in nature [SOLINGEN 1999:38]. 
ACHARYA on the other hand asserts that ASEAN’s fear of provoking its Cold War enemies – China 
and Vietnam – was responsible for the Association’s foregoing of military-security cooperation. 
Moreover, ASEAN worried that such cooperation would be too controversial and thus inhibit eco-
nomic and political cooperation as a consequence [ACHARYA 2004:256]. 
However, after military contacts were increased through the interactions in the farther framework 
of the ARF, shifts were also recognized concerning the cooperation among ASEAN member states. 
During 21st and 22nd November 2000 ASEAN army chiefs671
• Review, strengthen and share our respective army's mechanism to combat terrorism; 
 were schedule to meet for the so-
called: ‘ASEAN Chiefs of Armies Multilateral Meeting’. The meeting was meant to strengthen mili-
tary ties between the participating states and to increase familiarity between the participating 
armed forces. However, in order not to give the impression that a military pact was in the making, 
emphasis was put on cooperation in disaster relief and the cultivation of bilateral military ties. Gen. 
Surayud Chulanont, Royal Thai army commander-in-chief, as host was eager to clarify: 
It's not our duty to propose that it's time for ASEAN to form a regional security arrange-
ment. It's up to the government leaders to decide on security matters since it's a matter 
of international politics. [qtd. in: KN 06.11.2000] 
At the meeting it was underlined that security dialogue and cooperation among ASEAN states has 
the potential of effectively supporting regional peace and security [AFP 21.11.2000]. It was also 
hoped that the meeting would initiate the establishment of a network of links among ASEAN Chiefs 
of Armies, conceived as a ‘safety net for regional security’ [KN 21.11.2000]. Robert KARNIOL of 
Jane’s Defense Weekly observed that the meeting constituted a first-time ‘push within ASEAN to 
develop multilateral military cooperation’ [qtd. in: LEKIC 22.11.2000], notwithstanding political 
statements to the contrary. 
The only - expectantly modest - concrete result of the meeting was an agreement to cooperate in 
disaster relief operations, albeit on a voluntary and non-binding basis. The requisite MOU was to be 
worked out until January 2001. Former Thai prime minister Anand Panyarachun, as a guest 
speaker at the meeting underlined that such non-controversial cooperation was to pave the way to 
enhance ‘camaraderie and concrete cooperation’ between ASEAN’s military chiefs [AEN 
27.11.2000]. 
The second annual meeting was dominated by the terrorist attacks in the US of 11th September 
2001 and took place on November 15th under the motto: „ASEAN Armies’ Evolving Role in Counter 
Terrorism“[ASIA PULSE 30.10.2001]. The Chiefs of the ASEAN armed forces on that occasion 
agreed on the following: 
 
• Enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the smooth and efficient flow of in-
formation regarding terrorist activities and/or organizations; 
• Develop regional building programs to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN armies to de-
tect, monitor, and counter terrorist acts; 
• Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN armies' role in an in-
volvement with the international community, including extra regional partners within exist-
ing frameworks; 
• Strengthen cooperation at bilateral and multilateral regional levels in combating terrorism 
on a holistic and comprehensive level; and 
• Consider to undertake such steps are necessary to conduct  multilateral simulation activi-
ties on emergency responses to terrorism [ASIA PULSE 15.11.2001]. 
 
However, ASEAN’s Secretary General was eager to clarify that such steps are not to be taken as a 
prelude to any type of formal and permanent military pact; saying: ‚[a] military structure is not in 
the works’ [qtd. in: SANDS 28.06.2002]. 
Terrorism continued to be the basis for military cooperation as Indonesian army chief General 
Ryamizard Ryacudu explained: 
                                                 
671 The army chiefs of Myanmar and Laos gave notice that they will not be able to attend the meeting [KN 
06.11.2000]. Eventually also Vietnam declined to send its army chief [AFP 21.11.2000]. 
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It [terrorism, my remark] is a major concern and, therefore, the army must be prepared 
to deal with it by conducting exercises and exchange of information. [qtd. in: AFXA 
07.09.2004] 
Hence, military cooperation was from the outset approached only cautiously. Nevertheless May 
2006 witnessed the first-time ever ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), moving the relevant 
discussion on a higher political level. Only Burma had refused to send a delegation, explaining that 
all defence official simply would be too busy. Understandably, the step was termed a 'boycott' by 
the Bangkok Post [BP 15.05.2006]. On that occasion it was once more made clear that the Asso-
ciation is not aiming at anything resembling a military alliance; instead the ADMM henceforth was 
assigned the task to tackle transnational issues like terrorism and illegal trafficking [RAHIL 
08.05.2007]. The defence ministers issued a statement outlining the main aims of the ADMM: 
 
• promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and se-
curity; 
• give guidance to existing senior defence and military officials' dialogue and cooperation in 
the field of defence and security within ASEAN and between ASEAN and dialogue partners; 
• promote mutual trust and greater understanding of defence policies, threat perceptions and 
security challenges, as well as enhancement of transparency and openness; and 
• contribute to the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community [TNS 15.05.2007]. 
 
In March 2007 the first ADMM Retreat was convened [ARF 02.08.2007], preceding the formal third 
annual full ADMM in November 2007. There the host defence minister from Singapore, Teo Chee 
Hean, explained the formal gathering’s function: 
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting must aspire to be a useful component in the regional 
security architecture that is robust, effective and inclusive.  
It is therefore imperative for the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting to look at forging prac-
tical cooperation to address transnational security issues and in shaping the evolving re-
gional security architecture. [CA 14.11.2007] 
The participating ministers signed a Joint Declaration in which they pledged to increase cooperation 
among ASEAN nations as well as with the Association’s partners. While underlining the principles of 
non-interference, consensus based decision-making, national and regional resilience, as well as the 
respect for national sovereignty cooperation between the militaries was to be increased through 
various efforts. Among them activities like seminars, workshops, training, exercises – all that “with 
a view of enhancing ASEAN’s capacity to address transnational security challenges” [ASEAN 
14.11.2007]. 
The Work Programme the 3rd ADMM adopted on that occasion was extensive and surprisingly ambi-
tious. It included i.a. issues like the establishment of an ASEAN early warning system ‘to prevent 
occurrence / escalation of conflicts’ or under the heading of conflict resolution the exchange of 
peacekeeping experiences with “the view to developing a regional arrangement for the mainte-
nance of peace and stability” [ADMM 3YWP]. The ADMM moreover agreed to the creation of a regu-
lar meeting with Defence Ministers of ASEAN partners (ADMM Plus), as outlined in a concept paper 
[ADMM CP]. And while Burma this time sent its Deputy Defence Minister to attend the meeting, it 
used the occasion to reject anew external interference in its affairs [REUTERS 14.11.2007].  
However, for the moment it remains to be seen if ASEAN indeed shows the will and ability to tran-
scend its traditional reluctance to shift military cooperation above non-controversial emergency 
cooperation and the issues of tackling transnational crime and terrorism. 
3.26 ASEAN’s Response to Terrorism & transnational Crime 
3.26.1 Terrorism 
It was only after the turn of the century that terrorism was put attention to as a concern for the 
organization, although ABAD has argued that in retrospect, the establishment of SEANWFZ (which 
entered into force in 1997) had already “given Southeast Asia a framework for cooperation in pre-
venting terrorist organizations from acquiring materials to develop and use nuclear weapons or 
from transporting them through the region” [ABAD 2005:183]. Terrorism was conceived by ASEAN 
to belong to the category of 'transnational crime' [CHOW 2005:304]. 
In February 2001 an informal meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers announced their joint intention 
to act against international terrorism, giving support to a meeting of ASEAN Interior Ministers on 
the subject scheduled for the upcoming April [TNS 25.02.2001]. 
The terrorist attacks in the US of 11th September 2001 did send a ripple effect through the regions 
of the world, and thus also ASEAN felt the necessity to react. With the 9/11 attacks the ASEAN 
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members had to realize that ‘national security has come to require international cooperation’ 
[SIMON 2008:270]. Thus, on September 18th 2001 ASEAN Secretary General Severino announced 
that the ASEAN countries will have to cooperate on the matter; however, at the time he was not 
yet in the position to provide any concrete details [Xinhua 18.09.2001]. 
Not surprisingly it was the Philippines, a traditional ally of the US, which backed a strong statement 
relating to terrorism. In the meantime, the US action against suspected Bin Laden sites in Afghani-
stan was making other ASEAN countries rather reluctant to follow that diplomatic path. Instead, 
they intended to have what they considered to be the root-causes of terrorism mentioned in 
ASEAN’s respective statement [AFP 10.10.2001]. Thus, also Singapore’s call that ASEAN ought to 
support the global fight against terrorism, did not in any way assuage the Muslim publics of the 
member countries against the US battle on Afghan soil [ABBUGAO 11.10.2001]. 
Still, the member nations announced that a meeting on the fight against terrorism was to be or-
ganized, providing a possibility to find common ground [KN 11.10.2001]. Meanwhile a meeting of 
Interior Ministers and Home Affairs Ministers issued a statement that 
(...) strongly condemned all acts of terrorism, in particular the terrorist attacks of Sept. 
11, 2001, on the U.S. [text in: KN 11.10.2001] 
3.26.1.1 Anti-terrorism Drive Gathers Momentum 
The Philippines’ had prepared a draft ‘Declaration on Terrorism’ which inter alia also included the 
activation of the ASEAN Troika for the purpose of recommending appropriate counterterrorism 
measures. Thailand supported the initiative to establish the Troika for that matter, arguing that the 
body could fulfil a monitoring and early warning function [KN 31.10.2001]. 
The most critical countries as regards the air-strikes campaign led by the US against bases in Af-
ghanistan were the Muslim-majority nations Malaysia672 and Indonesia, which opposed them on the 
grounds that they did nothing to root out terrorism, but instead indiscriminately killed civilians [AFP 
03.11.2001]. Malaysia673
The general feeling was that the document incorporated main parts of the pro-US initiative of the 
Philippines
 urged to hold a UN conference on terrorism that would define what con-
stitutes terrorism in the first place and that would also consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
[MCDOWELL 05.11.2001]. The bid to include the pledge for a halt on the air-strikes remained un-
successful. ASEAN instead adopted a declaration termed ‘ASEAN Declaration On Joint Action To 
Counter Terrorism’, that ‘unequivocally’ condemned the terrorist attacks in the US. CHOW has ar-
gued that the declaration took a 'decidedly uncontroversial stance', calling, for instance, for 
strengthened cooperation, sharing of intelligence, reviewing of national mechanisms to combat 
terrorism, and an increased role for ASEAN in the fight against terrorism. The main points of divi-
sion, like the methods for combating terrorism through multilateral cooperation, remained unad-
dressed [CHOW 2005:309]. 
674
Only a few days later the Philippines announced a plan that it would host a five-country (with Ma-
laysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore) simulation exercise on emergency responses to terror-
ist attacks
 [MCDOWELL 04.11.2001]. Still, without mentioning the Afghanistan campaign in their 
statements, Brunei’s Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah as ASEAN’s Chairman at that time, said that ASEAN’s 
leaders had expressed their concern about the high number of civilian casualties [AFP 05.11.2001]. 
The eventual declaration, adopted by the ASEAN Heads of State and Government at their 2001 
November Summit not only listed steps to be taken in the fight against terrorism but also stated 
that ASEAN nations: 
View acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever 
and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security which re-
quire concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the 
world. [ASEAN 05.11.2001; see also: AFP 04.11.2001b] 
675
                                                 
672 AFP reported that when asked if ASEAN was finding common ground on the question of condemning the US 
bombings, the Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid responded: ‚[e]ach individual country is making its own 
position’ [qtd. in: AFP 04.11.2001a]. 
673 On how Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahatir acted on the issue during the 7th ASEAN Summit compare the 
somewhat euphemistically worded article of Malaysia’s official news agency Bernama in: BBC MS 07.11.2001. 
674 That notion was later confirmed when the Philippine’ President Arroyo expressed her pride that her country 
provided the original draft of the declaration [MS 07.11.2001]. 
675 The simulation was entitled: ‚Multilateral Seminar Game on Emergency Responses to Terrorist Threats’ 
[OANA 04.11.2002]. 
 [MS 07.11.2001]. The Philippine president described it as a practicum in security 
cooperation. However, the implementation dragged on and in late 2002 the simulation was re-
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scheduled again to take place ‘this year or early next year’ [qtd. in: OANA 04.11.2002]. In a re-
lated development the ASEAN armies met later in November under the theme ‘ASEAN Armies’ 
Evolving Role in Counter Terrorism’ [ASIA PULSE 12.11.2001]. ASEAN’s overall reaction, however, 
seemed to some as insufficient. The South China Morning Post opined in mid-January 2002 in that 
regard: 
The threat of global terrorism has highlighted Southeast Asia's inability to tackle regional 
security problems. [SCMP 16.01.2002] 
Still, inside ASEAN will to cooperate in the face of the terrorist threat existed. At a meeting of 
ASEAN + 3 tourism ministers, Thailand and other ASEAN members agreed to work out a mecha-
nism that would provide for information exchange in view of safety and security of travellers 
against terrorist acts [XINHUA 28.01.2002]. The following six ASEAN members agreed to share 
even more sensitive intelligence on terrorism: Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, 
and the Philippines [TNS 01.02.2002]. Only weeks later followed the announcement that Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Indonesia (and Thailand was to possibly join the effort) had concluded an arrange-
ment - Trilateral Agreement on Terrorism and Transnational Crimes - that would establish proce-
dures for communication to fight terrorism and other cross-border crimes. The arrangement fore-
saw extraterritorial legislation, allowing the police to arrest terrorists wanted in another country 
[JOSHI 21.02.2002, OANA 09.06.2002]. Communication cooperation was guided by the ‚Agree-
ment on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures’ [for the docu-
ment see ASEAN 07.05.2002; OANA 04.11.2002]. 
According to Malaysia which later issued a plea that other ASEAN nations should join the pact, 
stated that alongside Thailand also Laos and Singapore had expressed their general interest to do 
so [AFP 21.06.2002, compare also: SCMP 24.07.2002]. 
The ongoing search for a universal definition of what constitutes terrorism was not easily accom-
plished. Especially Malaysia insisted that the definition would have to honour the fact that also 
states were in some cases terrorist-like perpetrators; a case in point being in Malaysia’s view the 
Israeli government in the occupied Palestinian territories. Opinions were too far apart for consensus 
on a definition to emerge at a SOM in May 2002 [LLOYD-SMITH 22.05.2002]. 
In June 2002 the Philippine President called on its anti-terrorism pact partners to assist her in ap-
prehending members of the Abu-Sayyaf Group. Those should be denied refuge; instead, support 
should be extended so that they could be brought to justice [OANA 09.06.2002]. US and Philippine 
officials claimed that Abu Sayyaf had ties with the Al-Qaida network [WAE AQTU]. 
Shortly before the 2002 annual meetings, ASEAN announced its willingness to sign an anti-
terrorism declaration with the US – to be called ‘Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Inter-
national Terrorism’ - providing for intelligence sharing and the beefing up of legal and administra-
tive policies to fight terrorism as well as for support in the training of officers. Each country was to 
designate an agency to coordinate with counterpart enforcement bodies and other government 
agencies [KN 26.07.2002; WAIN 31.07.2002]. The US in return would also increase the technical 
and financial help in fighting terrorism [MCDOWELL 28.07.2002]. After some negotiation about the 
exact phrasing the US and ASEAN signed the declaration676
(...) because of their economic concerns. Southeast Asian countries are very dependent 
on both investment and tourism. And perceptions that the region is unstable or some sort 
of haven for terrorism have had very serious economic consequences
 [BBC MS 01.08.2002]. Vicky O’HARA, 
for the National Public Radio, on one of the main reasons why terrorism was taken up as a topic by 
ASEAN leaders: 
677
                                                 
676 For the text see: USSDPRT 05.08.2002. 
677 For the type of economic headache terrorist activities provided for ASEAN compare also: KN 02.11.2002. 
. [qtd. in: NPR 
01.08.2002] 
In the meantime, Cambodia made known its intention to join the anti-terrorism pact as the forth 
ASEAN country [AP 27.07.2002]. Later also Thailand reiterated its plan to follow suit [HUNT 
03.11.2002; AFP 05.11.2002b]. In September 2003 also Brunei voiced its will to accede to the pact 
[XINHUA 26.09.2003]. 
However, after a terrorist attack killed almost 190 people on Bali, the Philippines strongly urged the 
other ASEAN members to sign the pact as well; at the same time it expressed its wish that the 
provisions of the pact be made fully operational as soon as possible [XINHUA 17.10.2002]. After 
the Bali bombings the  Chair of the Association issued a statement that called those attacks 'cow-
ardly and heinous', pledged ASEAN’s support to Indonesia, and vowed that the Association would 
further intensify cooperation to root out the terror threat [ASEAN 2006:41]. 
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At the time it was felt in some quarters – voiced most strongly by Malaysia - that Indonesia did not 
enough to quell its home-grown terrorism, among them the group Jemaah Islamiyah [GRAY 
31.10.2002]. 
KHOO has argued that the Bali bombings transformed terrorism emanating from radical Islam into 
the central issue for the region in the early 21th century (in the so-called 'post-Bail era') [KHOO 
2004:138 FN 2]. 
When ASEAN’s leader signed another anti-terror declaration on the occasion of their Summit in 
November 2002, WAIN opined the following: 
Southeast Asian officials concede they face a dilemma. They recognize they must address 
the terrorism issue, which could scare foreign investors as well as tourists and impede the 
region's gradual recovery from economic crisis, but at the same time they protest that 
Southeast Asia is being unfairly singled out. [WAIN 04.11.2002] 
The declaration included not only the vow to strengthen cooperation to prevent, counter, and sup-
press terrorist acts, but at the same time called “on the international community to avoid indis-
criminately advising their citizens to refrain from visiting or otherwise dealing with our countries, in 
the absence of established evidence to substantiate rumours of possible terrorist attacks” [qtd. in: 
NG 04.11.2002]. The declaration moreover deplored ‘the tendency in some quarters to identify 
terrorism with particular religions or ethnic groups’ [qtd. in: CHOW 2005:315]. CHOW finds that 
the ambivalent and 'lukewarm' declaration: 
…stands as strong evidence of intramural indecision and an unwillingness to acknowledge 
fully the existence of a regional threat. [CHOW 2005:319]. 
At the Summit it was decided that ASEAN will set up a regional anti-terrorism Centre in Malaysia - 
an immediate measure, planned to implemented in the same month [GOLOVNIN 04.11.2002]. The 
‘Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism’ (SEARCCT) was subsequently established in 
July 2003 with the purpose, amongst others, of serving as a clearinghouse for information on re-
gional terrorism [CHOW 2005:317]. The Centre was ‘quietly funded by the United States’ [SIMON 
2008:271]; but also the ARF welcomed this development at the 10th ARF meeting [ARF 
18.06.2003]. However, five years into its existence CHAU notes that the SEARCCT “is neither in-
volved in regional operations nor serves as an intelligence collection agency. In fact, its main re-
sponsibility is to organize conferences, seminars, workshops, and training courses” [CHAU 
2008:630].  
Given the terrorist threat’s acuteness, David SHAMBAUGH, a professor at George Washington Uni-
versity, called on ASEAN that it ‚converts itself from an economic to a security grouping’ in order to 
face the terrorist threat more effectively [qtd. in: AFP 05.11.2002a]. 
However, an assessment by Kornelius PURBA sounded somewhat over-optimistic: 
With a common enemy, member nations will wake up and stay alert to confront any im-
minent danger. A case in point is the recent terror attacks on the Indonesian island of 
Bali, after which ASEAN members drew together, willing to face the regional threat. The 
terrorists have now awakened ASEAN. In their eighth summit in Cambodia last week, 
ASEAN leaders demonstrated a strong sense of unity in their objective to eradicate terror-
ism, because their failure would endanger the lives of their citizens, and no less important, 
their own political careers. [PURBA 12.11.2002] 
That ASEAN was not unanimous on the measures to confront terrorism was evidenced once more 
in late 2002 when it was announced that only Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia were 
to hold a meeting on the prevention of terrorist attacks. The idea that ASEAN ought to hold regular 
meetings to mull regional security and to address the issue of terrorism was circulating at the same 
time [OANA 22.11.2002]. In mid-January the following year a meeting of security officials from the 
anti-terror pact countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia was an-
nounced, aiming at enhancement of information ex-change and implementation of a regional anti-
terror accord [CA 14.01.2003]. The meeting lasted three days and was also attended by observers 
from Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, and Singapore rendering Burma the sole absentee. It was proposed 
that such meetings should be held annually [ASIA PULSE 15.01.2003]. The meeting was followed 
by an ASEAN Workshop on Combating Terrorism held in Indonesia and it was planned that a re-
gional joint task force to combat terrorism would be set up [XINHUA 20.01.2003]. However, the 
only concrete endeavour of a joint combat force turned out much more modest when Indonesia 
and Malaysia announced they would henceforth form a special force to track down Jemaah Islami-
yah terrorists [AFP 22.01.2003]. Instead, it was agreed that each country individually shall estab-
lish national task forces, which again should cooperate with each other if need arises [DJUHARI 
22.01.2003]. The workshop participants vowed to assist each other in related law enforcements 
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tasks, covering i.a. “identification, hot pursuit and arrest efforts, witness examination, search and 
confiscation of evidence, evacuation and treatment of victims, forensic and crime laboratory tests 
and others” as Indonesia's National Police Chief General Da'i Bachtiar explained to reporters [qtd. 
in: OANA 22.01.2003]. 
In March 2003 the scope of discussion was enlarged to include the ARF. Counterterrorism experts 
from ARF678
3.26.1.2 Transnational Crime
 participating countries met, discussing the movement of terrorists and the forging of 
travel documents [YOONG 22.03.2003]. 
ASEAN and the US endorsed in 2003 a counter-terrorism work plan, amongst others aiming at the 
safeguarding of the Malacca Strait. The work plan was a result of an agreement reached in July 
2002 that foresaw to devise mechanisms for the prevention, disruption, and combat of interna-
tional terrorism [PARAMESWARAN 16.06.2003]. 
Another terrorist attack in August 2003 on a hotel in Jakarta, made Thailand speak out for 
strengthened counter-terrorism cooperation of ASEAN [AP 06.08.2003]. 
To broaden its approach, ASEAN inked a counter-terrorism declaration with Australia in mid 2004, 
vowing to cooperate in the fight terrorism [AFP 01.07.2004]. 
In 2004/2005 ASEAN concluded additional declarations on the joint combat of terrorism with vari-
ous countries of the Asia-Pacific, among them Japan, Pakistan, and New Zealand [ASEAN 
2006:60]. 
The region took another step enhancing cooperation in early 2007, when ASEAN members signed 
the legally binding ‘Convention on Counterterrorism’. The Convention was intended to simplify ex-
traditions of terrorist suspects, speed up intelligence on impending terrorist attacks, curb terror 
financing, and to enable cooperation on counterterrorism training [GOMEZ 13.01.2007]. Coopera-
tion on tracking the movements of suspected people and funds within the region was another fea-
ture of the convention. Unusual for such documents was it also addressed the rehabilitation and 
social integration of arrested terrorists [SIMON 2008:271]. The convention additionally foresaw the 
setting up of a terrorism database that was to provide immediate access to relevant information to 
the participating countries [GOMEZ 15.01.2007].  
However, SIMON arrives at the following appraisal of the convention: 
While the convention is undoubtedly a step towards greater anti-terrorist cooperation, 
there is little reason to believe that significant changes in ASEAN behaviour are imminent. 
The Association does not have a good record in taking such obligations seriously. [SIMON 
2008:271] 
CHAU’s assessment is similarly critical. Although terming the document a ‘landmark convention’ he 
highlights its limitations, for instance the Convention’s reiteration of the sovereign equality, territo-
rial integrity, and non-interference. What is more 
The convention does not apply in cases where a terrorist offence is committed within the 
territorial domain of another party, which hinders the monitoring of known terrorist opera-
tions within another state. [CHAU 2008:633] 
The author thus concludes: 
...in practice, ASEAN plans for counter-terrorism cooperation lack effective application. 
[CHAU 2008:634] 
As a sign of the region’s insufficiently palpable commitment much material and practical support for 
many ASEAN nations and their individual anti-terrorism measures still comes from external na-
tions, chief among them the US [CHAU 2008:637-646]. Most tangible multilateral counterterrorism 
measures, moreover, could only be agreed by single ASEAN members. Given lacking unanimity, 
mainly pitting old versus new members, ASEAN was incapacitated on the issue. Thus, the re-
sources usually available for cooperation, eluded main parts of the battle against terrorism. 
679
The most prominent area apart thereof giving the most headache to the nations of the Southeast 
Asian region was the prevalence and trafficking of illegal drugs. ASEAN’s Vision 2020, adopted in 
 
                                                 
678 All except four countries (Myanmar, Mongolia, North Korea, and Papua New Guinea) sent delegates to the 
meeting [YOONG 22.03.2003]. 
679 ASEAN at times subsumes also terrorism among transnational crime; thus, some redundancies in relation to 
the foregoing chapter are inevitable. 
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1997, formulated the goal of a drug-free region. The same year saw the inaugural ASEAN Ministe-
rial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)680
• drug trafficking;  
, bringing together the interior ministers of the 
region. They adopted the ‘ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime’, underscoring the Associa-
tion’s commitment to a comprehensive approach in fighting transnational crime. 
One year later the 6th ASEAN Summit adopted the ‘Hanoi Plan of Action’, calling for strengthening 
regional capacity to address transnational crime. The second AMMTC adopted the ‘ASEAN Plan of 
Action to Combat Transnational Crime’, for the purpose of establishing mechanisms in the combat 
of transnational crime. 
As regards ASEAN’s fight against illegal drugs, the ASEAN foreign ministers at their 31st AMM in 
July 1998 eventually signed the ‘Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN’, committing themselves to 
eradicate the production, processing, traffic, and use of illicit drugs by 2020 [PUSHPANATHAN 
1999]. 
The ASEAN nations met in March 2001 to discuss transnational crime; the aim of the gathering was 
to find ways to fight crimes like trafficking in drugs and humans, arms smuggling and money laun-
dering, illicit trade in artefacts, endangered flora and fauna, vehicle smuggling as well as forgery 
scams [AFP 22.03.2001]. 
During the following round of meetings between ASEAN and its DPs the issue of transnational crime 
was also tabled. On that occasion the Vietnamese Chairman, foreign minister Nguyen Die Nien, 
argued that poverty will have to be eradicated, which was considered the root-cause for transna-
tional crime which in turn jeopardized regional peace and stability [XINHUA 26.07.2001]. 
An ASEAN meeting addressing the issue of transnational crime took place in October 2001 and was 
heavily overshadowed by the terrorist attacks that had taken place in the US in the previous 
month. Besides dealing with terrorism as a transnational crime, the participants also discussed the 
earlier defined areas, ranging from cyber crime to sea piracy. They concluded with the proposal to 
convene a meeting of a group of experts in the immediate future to discuss ways to combat trans-
national crime. [KN 11.10.2001]. 
Earlier, six ASEAN nations had agreed to share sensitive intelligence on arms and drugs smuggling, 
piracy and illegal immigration at a formal meeting of military intelligence chiefs of Malaysia, Indo-
nesia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, and the Philippines [TNS 01.02.2002]. 
In mid-May 2002 a SOM on transnational crime took place. On that occasion the Malaysian deputy 
home minister urged the ASEAN countries to harmonize their legislation. Provisions should be 
made to enable confiscations of property from criminal organizations; additionally, a witness pro-
tection program was proposed. 
 
The following eight priority areas in countering transnational crime were identified as: 
 
• terrorism; 
• arms smuggling; 
• money laundering; 
• human trafficking; 
• piracy; 
• international economic crime; and  
• cyber crime681
 
ASEAN’s corresponding work plan included the following: 
 
 [KN 16.05.2002b]. 
• exchange of information;  
• compilation and dissemination of relevant laws and regulations of ASEAN member coun-
tries;  
• compilation and dissemination of bilateral and multilateral agreements and information on 
relevant international treaties where feasible;  
• development of multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate apprehension, in-
vestigation, prosecution, extradition, inquiry, and seizure in order to enhance mutual legal 
and administrative assistance among ASEAN member countries where feasible;  
• enhancement of cooperation and coordination in law enforcement and intelligence sharing; 
and 
• development of regional training programmes for law enforcement officers [BBC MS 
21.05.2002; AWSJ 22.05.2002]. 
                                                 
680 Naturally also other ASEAN bodies directly or indirectly touched the issue of transnational crime; among 
them are the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting, the meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police and the 
ASEAN Senior Officials on Drugs Matters [PUSHPANATHAN 1999]. 
681 Indonesia in mid-2006 proposed to include corruption among transnational crimes [TNS 12.06.2006]. 
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At their May 2002 meeting ASEAN also agreed on the holding of various workshops; moreover 
ASEAN also vowed to designate principal contact points on counter-terrorism matters [BBC MS 
21.05.2002]. 
Further steps followed in August 2002 when ASEAN announced that it was to establish the ASEAN 
Network Security Coordinating Centre aimed at potential cyber-terrorism that aimed at destroying 
information infrastructure [DJAER 28.08.2002]. 
In November 2002 ASEAN signed a declaration with China on non-traditional security threats; both 
sides therein vowed to strengthen cooperation, exchange information and personnel, and join 
hands in training [KN 04.11.2002b]. 
During 2003 ASEAN worked on a treaty, the initiative being mainly sponsored by Malaysia, regulat-
ing legal procedure in cases of transnational crime. The proposal was envisioned to smooth coop-
eration on sharing evidence and bank records, on freezing foreign assets of suspects, in conducting 
searches and seizures as well as to simplify procedures for witnesses to testify at trials abroad 
[YOONG 02.07.2003]. In order to tackle transnational crime more effectively the Jakarta Centre for 
Law Enforcement Cooperation was established in mid-2004; however, while cooperating with many 
ASEAN nation, the initiative was going back to Indonesia and Australia [ARF 02.07.2004; see also 
the Centre’s homepage at: www.jclec.com as retrieved on 19.10.2009]. 
While ASEAN promoted intra-ASEAN inter-sectoral cooperation on counter-terrorism [ASEAN 
2005:17],  the Association also extended its cooperation to third countries. ASEAN signed a respec-
tive Memorandum of Understanding with China during an ASEAN + 3 Meeting on the same subject 
[XINHUA 10.01.2004]. Progress was also achieved by holding regular AMMTC Plus Three meetings. 
At this type of meetings held in November 2005 the participants of an AMMTC Plus Three vowed to 
foster cooperation, especially in the legal implementation and human resource training fields [BBC 
MS 30.11.2005]. 
Most ASEAN countries signed the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in November 
2004; the remaining countries - Malaysia and Thailand - followed in January 2006. The treaty was 
designed to strengthen regional cooperation regarding transnational crime, including mutual legal 
assistance, evidence gathering, and pursuit [MILLS 17.01.2006]. 
Malaysia's initiative in September 2005 to conclude a region-wide extradition treaty – first con-
ceived by the Association as part of its ASEAN Concord Action Plan in 1976 – reportedly was well 
received by the other members [AFXA 26.09.2005]. 
While ASEAN acknowledges the need for cooperation on transnational crime – be it internally, for 
instance with the linkage of the electronic ASEAN database system (e-ADS) to fight transnational 
crime to INTERPOL in June 2007 – or with its numerous external partners [CA 04.06.2007; TNS 
13.11.2007], its drive over the past couple of years has lost some impetus. Thus, the last ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, while originally conceived to take place each second 
year, had been organized in November 2005 at the time of this writing (October 2009). Since that 
time also no further international treaties dealing with countering transnational crime have been 
signed (compare http://www.asean.org/18799.htm).   
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4 Conclusions 
As has been shown the OAS as well as the ASEAN over the years expanded their activities beyond 
their original mandate682
4.1 Approaches in Flux 
, increasingly covering more issue areas – among them such with con-
flict/security relevancy. For this thesis the emergence of an agenda that is part of the 'human secu-
rity' or non-traditional-threats complexes has been especially noteworthy. This evolution is partly 
attributable to IOs’ ability to fix meanings [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 1999:711-712]. However, as 
has been most clearly demonstrated in the case of ASEAN and its establishment of the ASEAN Re-
gional Forum, outside pressures and developments (e.g. looming irrelevancy) have also played 
their part in introducing new subject matters. 
For both organizations, one of the most crucial variables determining their conflict transformation-
approach, -capability, and eventual -performance is and has been how the members collectively 
define and understand security. 
The OAS was confronted with a multiplicity of bilateral conflicts between two or more of its mem-
bers and provided recourses to address them, for example through the Inter-American Peace 
Committee. And while being fairly well equipped to handle this type of conflict, the OAS and its 
conflict relevant means also came to witness devastating blows. Those were in the main due to the 
overarching anti-communism drive nurtured and promoted by the US. Generally, due to the US’ 
primacy, impartiality and the principle of the rule of international law was frequently compromised 
and occasionally outright sacrificed in order to achieve politically and ideologically desired results. 
The US – occupying not merely regionally, but globally a position of hegemony – was never willing 
to allow a regional organization to tamper with its interests. Thus, the OAS was on various occa-
sions used as a tool to further Washington’s agenda. Still, the existence of the regional organiza-
tion also had a constraining effect in as much as it thwarted excesses of US’ power politics. So 
while the potential of the OAS becoming a decisive force in its own right were frequently frustrated, 
by engaging the heavyweight into the multilateral body compelled it also to justify its actions. Be-
ing a member of the OAS – which was at least formally structured as in institution of equals – re-
quired a permanent trading of arguments and balancing of interest, and thus provided a certain 
behavioural framework, albeit one that was characterized by considerable elasticity. 
Still, as the record of the last two decades reveals, the US ended the practice to militarily intervene 
according to its exclusive foreign policy’s expediency. Being devoid of its archenemy, the US’ case 
for removing political leaderships in its ‘backyard’ was no longer strong enough to be acceptable by 
other OAS members. Today even the US acquiesces to the most fundamental norms and principles 
of the inter-American body: non-intervention, sovereign equality, peaceful resolution of conflicts. 
Even though it would be overstating the OAS’ impetus to attribute this development to it alone, it is 
doubtlessly responsible for part of the hegemon’s socialization.  
The OAS – in review – seems to have made its biggest impact by being the very forum of the 
Western Hemisphere that undertook regional fixing of meanings, as outlined by BARNETT and FIN-
NEMORE. By way of offering a platform to find common understanding, by drafting constitutive 
documents of international law, and serving also as the basis for the creation of various functional 
bodies (for example the Human Rights Court) it shouldered the main responsibility of codifying the 
relevant meanings, and thus, also of setting and defining the region’s underlying norms and values. 
The introduction of human rights as an issue of multilateral concern is among the most ostensible 
and far-reaching undertakings. At the 1948 conference that approved the OAS Charter, also the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Men was signed. And while this document’s le-
gally binding quality was disputed, the creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights in 1960 by the OAS members renewed and buttressed the region’s corresponding commit-
ment. Thus, a body was established that henceforth was to monitor and report on the human 
rights’ record of the OAS members. 
Meanwhile the shift away from traditional mediation between states continued. This trend was ac-
centuated when various actors started to replace the OAS in the role it had traditionally played. 
Thus, due to OAS’ political weakness and lack of resources, the United Nations in the 1990s started 
to increasingly replaced the OAS as main provider of resources and diplomacy in Haiti. There or in 
Venezuela in 2002 also the Carter Center was helping in facilitating mediation. However, this de-
velopment was discernible as early as in the 1980s, when the Contadora group had supported the 
resolution of conflicts in Central America. 
                                                 
682 It has been pointed out that such progression constitutes a general trend for IOs [ALVAREZ 2006:328]. 
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Today the OAS’ self-image and identity are based in being the region’s primary guardian of repre-
sentative democracy. The harbinger of this evolution was the decision to send election monitors to 
observe the general election in Costa Rica in 1962. But only three decades later the OAS consoli-
dated its approach sustainably. During the 1990s the OAS gave itself practicable institutional 
means for making its impact felt on the process of democratization and democratic consolidation in 
the Hemisphere. The establishment of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy was the first step. 
However, politically more daring was Resolution 1080 which followed one year later. As will be re-
called Resolution 1080 foresees that the SGOAS acts in the “event of any occurrences giving rise to 
the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legiti-
mate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organizations’ 
member states” [AG/Res. 1080 (XXI-O/91)]. Thus, the OAS defined the conditions pertaining to 
the democratic constitution of its members as warranting automatic action. This was a truly radical 
step given the traditionally sacrosanct claims of national sovereignty among the member states. 
Still, this move was even topped when the 1992 Protocol of Washington furnished the Organization 
with the power to suspend a member in case a ‘democratically constituted government has been 
overthrown by force’ [OAS PW]. Suspension of one (or more, if that may be the case) of its consti-
tuting parts is among the most severe measures available to an International Organization. But to 
make the application of such a strict sanction dependent on the domestic democratic conditions is 
revolutionary indeed. 
Granted, the overthrow of a democratically elected government is itself a significant event with 
potential reverberations for the body and for the region. For that reason there may be enough 
ground of justification for equipping the Organization with strong procedures to answer such drastic 
developments. 
However, the OAS did not stop there but instead continued to broaden the fundament on which it 
erected itself as the region’s democratic ward. The adoption of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter in 2001 was the next milestone, and once again broke ground untouched so far. As may be 
recalled the IADC establishes that “an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an 
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order 
in a member state” is to be regarded as an ‚insurmountable obstacle‘ to the state’s government to 
further participate in the OAS. This carries with it the automatism to not only include cases when 
governmental power is usurped through violent means, but also developments which might be 
more subtle and thus intrinsically disputable if not controversial. It remains to be seen how often 
and decisive the mechanism designed to protect democracy in the region will be applied. The re-
cord so-far does not yet allow for a comprehensive judgment, although it points in the direction of 
a rather cautious use. 
At the same time what has to be underlined in spite of the somewhat questionable operability of 
the democracy protection machinery, is the impact such commitments and institutions have, with-
out being necessarily applied. As BARNETT and FINNEMORE have detailed, IOs’ power often derives 
from their ability to ‘fix meanings’, and consequently to shape and set norms that do effect actors’ 
behaviour [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 1999:712-713]. The OAS’ paradigmatic shift toward adopting 
safeguarding representative democracy also entails that henceforth democratic governance is en-
shrined as a regional principle to which the members’ behaviour will ultimately be held to account 
in future. 
International Organizations’ one of several major functions is to provide the venue, procedure, and 
means to facilitate enhanced interaction among – first of all – its constituting member states, but 
secondly between various actors of international society (e.g. representatives of NGO’s, of the sci-
entific community, of business, other IOs). Especially in case of ASEAN increased contacts demon-
strably have contributed to transforming relations, notably in making the escalation of disputes 
more and more unlikely. CUNAN highlights the following: 
Through the process of social interaction, and presumably the acquisition of new knowl-
edge (...) actors transform their understanding of each other, and of the world around 
them. States that regard themselves as enemies may alter that identification to one of al-
lies through repeated amicable interaction, if these states come to share a sense of com-
mon fate and exercise restraint in their reciprocal actions. [CUNAN 2001:351] 
BA i.a. explains that such regular ‚friendly‘ interaction contributes to creating a community and 
hence is part of formulating what it is like to ‘be ASEAN’ [BA 2000:396]. Thus, one can conclude 
that frequent contact among participants among ASEAN’s different ‘in-groups’ (ASEAN, ARF, APT 
etc.) triggers and inspires identity formation. Like others BA also argues that ASEAN regionalism is 
only secondarily about material cooperative gains, but primarily about maintaining stability and 
harmonious relationships among its members [BA 2000:393-394]. 
 
On the whole and as has been shown, both organizations adopted markedly different modes to 
tackle disputes and controversy. While the OAS mostly went for concrete influence exerted by its 
own bodies or established mechanisms solely designed to render support in the very case before it, 
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ASEAN opted for the transformation of disputes with a potential of escalation (for example the 
South China Sea claim-complex) via behind-the-scene manoeuvring and long-time approximation 
and/or integration. 
In retrospect, especially with regard to the OAS the overall conflict transformation record at times 
was mixed, given the dominance of US foreign policy interests. On various occasions the OAS was 
used (and was taking no initiative to prevent this) as multilateral fig-leaf for furthering US causes, 
drawing accusations of connivance. In such events the OAS clearly failed to provide impartial and 
equitable services to the parties of a conflict and thus occasionally facilitated the freezing of the 
status quo if not the aggravation of the dispute at hand. Hence also those conflicts witnessed con-
flict transformation, although not of an alleviating or easing kind. For example the rift between the 
US and Havana was perpetuated and additionally entrenched by actions the OAS took or failed to 
take (e.g. credible resolution initiatives). The most outstanding decision in this regard is resolution 
I the Organization approved in 1964. Section 5 holds that in case the Cuban government continues 
its policies, the member states “shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use 
of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed 
force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and 
security of the hemisphere” [OAS 1964:6]. Thus, instead of promoting the resolution of ongoing 
conflict by peaceful means, the OAS instead issued an authorization for the use of armed force. 
Still, it seems fair to say that the contribution both IOs delivered to ameliorating tense situations 
and mitigating escalating conflicts has been beneficial on the whole, at least if one makes the re-
duction of force the judging yardstick. Both organizations – albeit in quite differing shapes – of-
fered socialization services. As regards the OAS, the Latin American countries were at least partly 
successful at containing the North American hegemon. However, in turn the US similarly used the 
multilateral body to further acceptance of its own value pyramid. In this context also the revamp of 
the OAS into the protector of representational democracy reflects mainly a disposition of the US’ 
ideological corpus. The same holds – but to a lesser degree – for the introduction of anti-terrorism 
into the remit of the OAS. However, the unilateral force behind this norm distribution was less 
strong due to two reasons. First, also Latin countries viewed terrorism as a threat to their stability; 
thus, they entertained a comparable, although much weaker, ideational tendency to multi-lateralize 
counter-terrorism. Second, though the OAS was judged by the US to be a helpful appendix in its 
global anti-terrorism drive, the regional body was still never seriously considered to be more than a 
flag-bearer in what the US considered to be a crusade battling a threat if not to its existence, but 
arguably to its identity. The US was making sure that the substance of her campaign would not be 
determined by any other actor. But there is nevertheless more to it than meets the eye. 
The OAS member states met ten days after the 9/11 attacks had taken place and convoked an 
MCMFA, a mechanism that had hardly been deployed in the preceding decade. By acclamation the 
OAS countries condemned the attacks and called for effective measures to be taken to prevent 
terrorist activities. But revitalization of the inter-American machinery did not stop there. At a sub-
sequent meeting the foreign ministers invoked the Rio Treaty and resolved: 
That these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks against all 
American states and that in accordance with all the relevant provisions of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the principle of continental soli-
darity, all States Parties to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to 
address such attacks and the threat of any similar attacks against any American state, 
and to maintain the peace and security of the continent. [OAS 24. MCMFA] 
Such a measure strongly emphasized the common bond of the OAS member states and highlighted 
the proclaimed willingness to stand up for one another. The step’s significance was added weigh by 
the fact that at the time the Rio Treaty had already come under fire by various OAS countries, no-
tably Mexico, for being outdated and not fit to respond to the current most pressing security needs 
of the region. However, the atmosphere was described by Chile’s foreign minister Maria Soledad 
Alvear Valenzuela who pointed out that 
“... in times of crisis such as the one we are in, it is urgent for us to seek recourse in what we 
have, however much we recognize its limitations” [qtd. in: CONAWAY 2001]. 
In contrast to the OAS, socialization in the case of ASEAN was observable not only to be at work 
among the member states. By gradually involving future member states ASEAN smoothed the way 
for integrating also states with strong isolationistic tendencies, most notably Myanmar. Being con-
tinuously criticized for allowing a country with such a dismal human rights record into the Associa-
tion, ASEAN still chose to stretch out its hand to the military regime. And while the West claims 
that its predictions have proven true, given the widely absent progress in regard to democratiza-
tion, ASEAN applies other standards to measure the usefulness of its policies. Notwithstanding pub-
lic statements which officially disprove of the regime’s behaviour, all-in-all the Association is aware 
that it is far better served with Myanmar in its fold, as it would be had it decided to ostracized the 
country. ASEAN thereby not only fulfilled its mission to bring together all of Southeast Asia’s coun-
tries. With bringing this international pariah under the ASEAN tent, it established routes for access-
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ing the political establishment to solve problems ranging from drug trafficking to territorial dis-
putes.  
But ASEAN extended advanced levels of interaction also to its most powerful neighbour, China. 
Being apprehensive of a myriad of conflicts, chief among them overlapping territorial claims be-
tween China and many ASEAN nations, the Association established ever more regular meetings and 
fora. Frequent contacts then set the stage not only for broadened understanding among the par-
ticipants, but also increased the stakes to be risked by eventually escalating disputes. 
One of the milestones of this convergence and epitomizing the growing common understanding of 
permissible behaviour is the conclusion of the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, agreed in 
2002 by ASEAN and China. First, the Code of Conduct also refers to other documents that lay down 
principles and norms to be heeded, among them the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea or 
ASEAN’s TAC. Although being no legal instrument, in the past most state actors in the region have 
demonstrated that this need no automatically reduce its effectiveness given the area’s affinity for 
informality. The Code underlines the signatories’ willingness to act in a spirit of cooperation, self-
restraint, peacefulness, and respect for navigational and aerial freedom. Especially, given China’s 
regular muscle flexing with regard to Taiwan, which in her view is to be deemed merely a renegade 
Chinese province, the Code can justifiably be seen as a major concession ASEAN was successful in 
wresting from this powerful nation. As will be remembered China had originally staunchly refused 
to discuss its contested territorial claims multilaterally. Insisting on bilateral resolution was natu-
rally considered a more promising route for the region’s heavyweight. 
ASEAN tried to extend its pattern of enhanced involvement also to North Korea. After considerable 
difficulties and delays North Korea agreed to attend ARF meetings. On several occasions those 
meetings were used for bilateral contacts between representatives of this extraordinary reclusive 
regime and its most outspoken adversary, the US. However, North Korea remained rather unap-
proachable. Part of this can be explained by ASEAN’s position taken in the conflict between the two 
Koreas, which was similar to that of South Korea. ASEAN – having put in place the Southeast Asia 
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone was bound to be unhappy about North Koreas nuclear ambitions. 
Thus, ASEAN’s record in involving North Korea is mixed, to say the least. 
However, the Association’s performance with regard to pass on its distinct style of procedure, en-
capsulated in the so-called ASEAN Way is convincing. Even if one takes into account that main 
elements of this modus operandi have been derived from existing cultural patterns from the mem-
ber states, it is to be classified an achievement to have successfully transferred it to an overarch-
ing, multilateral institution. Additionally ASEAN was faced with the disconcertment of the West 
which continuously urged it to embrace a more rules-based and formal way of doing business. 
However, ASEAN for many years withstood such pressures and even went on to extend its ASEAN 
Way to dialogue arrangements including also other (even extra-regional) countries. Thus, the As-
sociation imparted its norms and values not merely to its regular members, but also made other 
international actors into subjects of its socialization endeavours. 
In retrospect both organizations can be credited for providing their members with what has been 
termed as a ‘common lifeworld’ by Edmund HUSSERL. The concept was later elaborated by Alfred 
SCHUTZ and Jürgen HABERMAS. Lifeworld encapsulates the ongoing stream of routines, interac-
tions, and events. Such lifeworlds provide arenas in which ‘new’ common experience is generated. 
Such experience can then be given a certain degree of permanence by clothing them into narra-
tives. Thus, HABERMAS has also depicted lifeworlds as memories of preceding interpretative 
achievements, on which the current lifeworld participants draw [HILLMANN 1994:477-478, 
SCHMIDT 1995:552-553, CALHOUN 2002d]. 
Before I assess the validity of the constructivist claim for the two discussed IOs more thoroughly, 
this may be the right spot to concede that although this dissertation up to a point confirms 
LEVITT’s claim that due to constructivism's more fundamental epistemological and ontological as-
sumptions it is inherently 'difficult to test (it) empirically' [LEVITT 2006:99], it still achieved to cast 
more light also on the more indirect and rather subtle impacts IOs exert (voluntarily and con-
sciously as well as involuntarily and unconsciously) on conflicts; effects which until recently have 
been unduly misapprehend and generally under-valued. 
4.2 Constructivism and the OAS 
Looking at the early, pre-OAS period of cooperation in the region (as outlined above) SHAW points 
out that although no consensus on substantive issue areas was attainable at that time the frequent 
and continuous debating led to an increased familiarity among the states. Furthermore, these 
meetings set the stage for shared ideas to evolve in the first place [SHAW 2000:53], and as such 
offered the space for coming assimilation between the countries of the region. However, the reason 
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for the nations’ potential to cooperate can be seen partly in a shared identity, traceable i.a. to their 
common colonial past. 
Similarly, LÉGER argues, that the long-lasting endeavour to create structures for cooperation at-
tested to the concerned states’ existing ‘shared common values’ [LÉGER 1974:2]683
4.2.1 Norms and Rules 
. Looking at 
today’s collaboration of the nations of the hemisphere, SPEHAR argues the quantitative increase of 
cooperation as witnessed in the framework of the OAS does not fail to have an impact on the con-
flict susceptibility of the region:  
Ultimately, this ever-greater collaboration and exchange among peoples and countries of 
the Americas within the framework of the OAS, in a variety of fields, may prove to be one 
of the most promising forms of longer-term conflict prevention in the hemisphere. [SPE-
HAR 2001:70] 
Thus, although the general records of the activities of OAS’ organs dealing with security matters 
(GA, PCOAS, MCMFA) in retrospect appear at times to have been not much more than dismal, 
PECK draws attention to their socializing impact, when she underlines: 
For the most part, all three of these forums for peace and security issues pass resolutions 
condemning or commending member states for their actions. Their primary function, in 
terms of peaceful resolution of disputes, is, therefore, one of socialization, in which norms 
are shaped and governments are encouraged to conform by the social sanction or ap-
proval of peers. [PECK 1998:143] 
While for constructivism norms are by far not limited to those codified in statements explicitly car-
rying this term or equivalents, most scholars nevertheless attribute significance to such formula-
tions – as customarily inserted in founding documents. 
The COAS (1948684
International law is the standard of conduct of States in their reciprocal relations [a];  
) defines in its article 5 as ‘principles’ i.a.: 
International order consists essentially of respect for the personality, sovereignty and in-
dependence of States, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and 
other sources of international law [b];  
Good faith shall govern the relations between States [c];  
The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it re-
quire the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of rep-
resentative democracy [d];  
The American States condemn war of aggression: victory does not give rights [e];  
An act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all the 
other American States [f];  
Controversies of an international character arising between two or more American States 
shall be settled by peaceful procedures [g];  
Social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace [h]. 
Apart from those principles other norms are enshrined in the COAS (1997) text. Chief among them 
– frequently found also in other documents of the Inter-American system685, is the non-
intervention principle. Article 19686
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle 
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat 
 states: 
                                                 
683 In his concluding chapter LÉGER, however, finds that the encountered problems with settling conflicts peace-
fully stems from the fact that there was no authority operating with enough leverage for implementing the 
‘commonly accepted values’; thus he implies that the OAS failed to provide such an agency for the region 
[LÉGER 1974:205]. 
684 Text of the 1948 COAS available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad062.htm#art4 re-
trieved on 23.01.2008. 
685 Compare for example the Final Act of the Fifth MCMFA, stating: “[t]he Organization of American States shall 
not have the power to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of its members, 
unless this principle contravenes the application of the measures and procedures provided in Chapter V of the 
Charter of the Organization, and defined in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance” [text in: AJIL 
1962b:502]. 
686 The non-intervention doctrine is moreover enshrined in Articles 1, 2, 3e, 19. 
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against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural ele-
ments. 
Another normative mainstay is the principle of equality. The original COAS (1948) establishes the 
equality of the member states and holds that “[t]he right of each State to protect itself and lead its 
own life does; [sic] not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another State”. This provision is 
of very diffuse nature since requiring that an entity would have to decide on the justness of an 
action, consequently such a term seem to of very limited usefulness in a legal text. The institu-
tional structure of the OAS is, however, designed on the basis of an egalitarian premise: one coun-
try, one vote. Equality is also enshrined in article six which states that states are ‘equal’. 
On various occasions the OAS laid down expressis verbis what it considers to be its principles, 
apart from the existing founding documents and treaties. Thus, when the OAS was in the process 
of excluding the Cuban government it cited the following as being among its ‘objectives and princi-
ples’: 
 
• respect for the freedom of man and preservation of his rights; 
• the full exercise of representative democracy; 
• non-intervention of one state into the internal or external affairs of another; and 
• rejection of alliances and agreements that may lead to intervention in America by extra-
continental powers [see DIL 1968:247]. 
 
However, as the historical analysis above demonstrates even the most sacred principles could be 
overridden when the members’ overwhelming majority was in favour of it. For instance, the sanc-
tions against the Dominican Republic decided upon Venezuelan charges of subversion, touched on 
the non-intervention principle. On that BARLIANT observed: 
Since the policies and interests of the United States coincided with those of the Latin 
countries, collective action was possible without obvious violence to regional values. [BAR-
LIANT 1969:1170] 
As we have seen on various occasion in the OAS history this case was by far not the only event 
that principles formerly declared deer and untouchable, were not respected and/or even in effect 
overruled. This leads to the conclusion that, while norms enshrined explicitly do play a role, their 
status is one which is at times flexibly interpreted and all in all they are far from constituting an 
inviolable standard of conduct. 
While the spelled out norms do co-define the given behavioural framework, it nevertheless follows 
from the above analysis, that instead of always heeding a rather abstract principle like non-
intervention or the rule of law, the prioritization of values to be honoured is formed on a case-to-
case basis, and depends on variables like political will, expediency, feasibility, desirability, and far-
reaching if not complete consensus among the actors in question. The OAS’s records regarding 
(legal and political) enforcement are rather dismal. This can i.a. be attributed to the fact that the 
Organization was in the first place never furnished with the means to seriously put it in the position 
to coerce one of its members to comply with its decisions and obligations. However, it is one of the 
undeniable achievements of the OAS that it furthered the exchange of opinions and in many cases 
also approximation of divisive positions.  
It shall moreover be pointed out that norms and rules are also generated by way of the existence 
and operation of the OAS itself. They contribute significantly to an evolving organizational culture 
that in turn influences the actors’ behaviour – be that implicitly or explicitly so [BARNETT & FIN-
NEMORE 2004:35]. Senior OAS officials thus continuously acquire and create a shared identity. It 
follows that their way to react to certain situations – for example in the event of serious conflictive 
situations – do indeed converge. Thus, for example, for many years it developed into a routine to 
send an inquiry commission (see above) to the conflict parties in question. However, identities also 
exist on state and group levels.  
Following part of the approach developed by WENDT [compare: FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 
2001:399], the OAS member states have gradually come to identify themselves as democracies 
over the past decades, in their majority as liberal and representative democracies to be more spe-
cific (Venezuela under Chávez deviates from this category). Today, this sort of ‘type identity’ is 
regarded as a regime form with a very high degree of legitimacy. This legitimacy is enjoyed both 
on the local/national level as well as on the international level. Thus, being a democracy nowadays 
leads to positive ‘collateral consequences’ [HATHAWAY 2005]. This effect is further amplified when 
the OAS is able – on various grounds – to present itself as a ‘Club of Democracies’. Especially with 
regard to representative democracy various developments, among the most recent the approval of 
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the Inter-American Democratic Charter, have additionally strengthened the significance of this 
norm687
4.2.2 Power of IOs 
 and given it institutional materialization, thus laying the ground for their endurance.  
The same holds true for the OAS’ propagation of human right, being pursued in earnest even 
longer than the one for democratic governance, and again lifting the individual as well as the col-
lective moral standing internationally and on the domestic scene. 
For the rise of both norms – democracy and human rights – not coercive or persuasive influence 
mechanisms where at work, but rather what GOODMAN and JINKS [GOODMAN & JINKS 2004] 
have termed acculturation. As has already been mentioned this concept has as its driving force 
pressure arising from others or the self aimed at adopting beliefs and behavioural patterns of the 
environment in order to fulfil certain psychological needs. To this approach fits that while many 
countries publicly claim to honour those values, no authentic acceptance is automatically estab-
lished and hence implementation of them is sometimes very weak compared with the lip service 
rendered to them. This phenomenon was witnessed most frequently in the early period following 
the adoption of the norms, and was partly due to their incomplete internalization as well as to the 
dominance of instrumental calculation of self-interest [HARRISON 2004:526 referring to internali-
zation degrees defined by WENDT]. 
In retrospect the OAS and/or its member states has/have generally and in the events of conflicts 
mainly applied the ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than acting purely in line with earlier estab-
lished principles. As has been pointed out earlier, this concept underlines that actors give prefer-
ence to those norms that converge with their internalized roles and values which they regard as 
having legitimacy (for example self-concept, sense of duty) [FINNEMORE & SIKKING 1998:912; 
HARRISON 2004:532 by drawing on the approach developed by MARCH and OLSEN 1998]. Thus, 
many of OAS’ actions, among them also those having transformative effects on conflicts, can be 
understood as a result of employing the logic of appropriateness. Still, since actors always face 
various norms and consequent behavioural alternatives, the logic of appropriateness is far from 
deterministic; especially so because neither are states or IOs unitary actors, nor are they ever 
aware of all their internalized values and roles, and much less of all theoretically thinkable behav-
ioural options. This all impedes conscious and rational decision-making. 
Although it is clear that the OAS was never much of a enforcing authority, there can be no denying 
that it indeed had some impact – even a hard-core realist scholar will concede as much; however, 
as the emergence of constructivism as a relatively new school of thought itself attests, power 
ought to be defined much more comprehensively, leaving behind classical narrow reductionist ap-
proaches that are content with comparing the proclaimed will of two actors and thereupon ascribing 
power to the one whose will was later allegedly implemented. Although it is near impossible to 
trace satisfyingly all forces at play, the rise of, for example, the democratic paradigm in the hemi-
sphere is hardly imaginable without the existence of a region-wide institution. In this regard the 
OAS was not only the forum that brought together representatives of the individual members, but 
offered the moral and expert authority required to prepare and make possible the breakthrough of 
various ideational structures. 
As noted earlier BARNETT and FINNEMORE [BARNETT & FINNEMORE 1999] have distinguished 
three types of power an IO is able to engage: norm diffusion, classification, and fixing of meanings. 
As concerns the first, we have seen that the OAS was heavily involved in formulating and subse-
quently in disseminating the norms of safeguarding human rights and upholding democratic gov-
ernance. 
Another case in point is the redefinition and broadening of the OAS’ security concept to include so-
called non-traditional threats and the concept of human security. Here again, with taking up issues 
like countering trafficking in persons or transnational organized crime, the framework for collective 
action and intervention is re-set, creating possible avenues which prior to that had been deemed to 
be national ‘no go zones’. It is certainly true that such developments would have been unlikely if 
not considered valuable and of region-wide importance by the individual members. Still, as has 
been mentioned earlier, national inputs are without exception subjected to changes by way of re-
drafting through OAS bureaucrats. These content-relevant processes result in an idiosyncratic sur-
plus value, otherwise not obtainable.  
However, apart from those achievements of changing the status of norms, the OAS was from its 
very beginning an actor that was very influential in regard to classification and fixing of meanings. 
Take, for example, the definitional ambitions displayed by deciding what is to be considered an 
‘aggression’ in the framework of the Rio Treaty. One can hardly overestimate the impact of decid-
ing about what is going to constitute an act that legitimizes actions by the collective body, not only 
                                                 
687 For a depiction of the emergence of the democratic governance norm see LAGOS & RUDY 2004:287-290. 
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encompassing the levelling of sanctions – which in itself might have serious consequences for the 
state in question – but even going as far as to allow for the use of force. The publishing of informa-
tion – which intrinsically is a measure of classification and fixation of meanings, is surely one route 
which gave and gives the OAS the possibility to make its influence felt, whereby the impact varies 
according to the type of communication and style of phrasing. Whereas public relations information 
are at the bottom, the effect of press statements carries more significance, which again is even 
higher for resolutions and is certainly climaxing in the conclusion of treaties. 
 
However, besides those influences which are located in a more abstract dimension, the OAS also 
demonstrated its power in a more concrete form. While agreeing on sanctions (e.g. Dominican 
Republic) or suspending a member government (Cuba), the Organization and/or some of its sub-
units made itself/themselves asserted themselves also through more subtle ways. For instance, 
CERNA has observed that the IACHR during its lifetime has created some leeway, unintended by 
the original creators of the body: 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was not given explicit authority to carry 
out on-site visits; it created that competence by dint of its own initiative. The Inter-
American Commission's Statute, which is prepared by the member states of the OAS, au-
thorized it to hold meetings in any state in the hemisphere, and the Commission con-
verted that authorization into a mandate to conduct monitoring and the preparation of a 
report on the human rights situation in the country visited. These reports dominated the 
agenda of the OAS General Assemblies for many years, especially during the long period 
of military dictatorships in the region, when the Inter-American Commission critically re-
viewed the behavior of these states as regards their failure to respect human rights 
norms. [CERNA 2004:199] 
The supervisory function the IACHR came to fulfil is much in line with what constructivism regards 
to be one of the main powers of IOs: reporting and monitoring. As has been shown – although 
lacking enforcement power – the mere stating of deplorable conditions frequently exerts enough 
pressure for governments to act, motivated by a mix of domestic and international pressure as well 
as by worries regarding the country’s international standing. CERNA concludes: 
The Inter-American Commission's greatest contribution to the inter-American system has 
been in de-legitimizing nondemocratic governments by means of the monitoring con-
ducted during its on-site visits, and as a result of the presentation of its country reports to 
the OAS political organs and to hemispheric public opinion in general. These country re-
ports are presented to the political organs and have dominated the agendas of the OAS 
General Assemblies for many years. The documentation presented by an intergovernmen-
tal organization of human rights violations committed by states against their own popula-
tions has a credibility not achieved by reports issued by nongovernmental organizations, 
and every state will fight not to be censured by its peers. [CERNA 2004:201] 
On top of that IOs are ascribed what BARNETT & FINNEMORE have termed ‘expert authority’, 
‘delegated authority’, and ‘moral authority’ which often seem to go hand in hand. For instance the 
IACHR as well as the Inter-American Court on Human rights both constitute not only bodies with 
presumable noble mission; they moreover fulfil delegated tasks in the realm of the protection of 
human rights. Additionally, both entities create and maintain specialized expertise. 
Election monitoring is another field which was gradually handed over to the OAS; in later years the 
OAS was furthermore furnished with a institutional structure to support and enlarge election rele-
vant activities with the establishment of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. Also in this case 
the OAS acquired a moral authority which is associated with serving purposes that are above nar-
row national interests and bring a high degree of legitimacy, especially given the fact that safe-
guarding democratic elections is a means to preserve the participation of the masses in decision 
making. 
4.2.3 Criticism 
As the historical records demonstrate, the OAS has frequently been utilized as a tool for the foreign 
policy goals of the US. As the presented cases have shown the US channelled its hegemonic influ-
ence and made use of the OAS often only to clad its actions into multilateral legitimacy. This fig 
leaf function over the years undermined the credibility of the organization. It was a self-
perpetuating effect that various Latin American nations’ fear of being overthrown themselves by 
communist revolutionaries, contributed to their support for the US in its confrontation with the 
USSR. At the same time the US saw to the strengthening of those regimes, frequently authoritarian 
in nature, only to consolidate its ideological backyard (compare for example the Fifth MCMFA in 
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1951) As a consequence, the OAS’s reputation was considerably damaged. BERNDT  cites SLATER 
in this context: 
The capacity of an international organization to legitimate national policies may vary 
widely from case to case, function to function. Since its legitimacy depends on its being 
perceived as a repository of the general will, its capacity to bestow collective legitimization 
is inversely related to the degree to which the organization is used by member states to 
implement their traditionally defined national interests rather than to seek consensus (...) 
The organization may not so much legitimize the policy as the policy delegitimize the Or-
ganization. [BERNDT 1995:33] 
The position of the US in the inter-American system has been judged to be of such magnitude that 
no direct pressure on other member states would have to be applied. For example, when in 1974 
the lifting of sanctions on Cuba was discussed at the 15th MCMFA the US had followed a low-profile 
policy. Although indicating that it would probably abstain in the vote on the corresponding resolu-
tion, it deliberately did not choose to announce that it would do so under any circumstances – leav-
ing open the possibility of voting in favour of it. Assistant secretary Rogers later explained that this 
posture formed part of the US’ intention of a ‘non-arm-twisting policy’: 
Because that [announcing to abstain in any case, my remark] might have had an effect on 
certain delegations and committed them to a position of abstention before they had heard 
the views of the other member states. [qtd. in: USDSB 1975:11] 
While in this case pretending its readiness to ensure unbiased voting, a telling demonstration of the 
US’ clout and willingness to force its will on the OAS stage came along when the Organization was 
facing a financial crisis in 1989 which had been caused by the US’ decision to withhold substantial 
dues. The OAS Secretariat had to fire 300 staff, and was not certain to be able to pay the rest of its 
other 600 employees. Although being not alone in late payments to the OAS, the withholding of 
funds by the US was excruciating, given that it accounted for 2/3s of the total. John GOSHKO’s 
comment, reporting for the Washington Post, was most revealing, finding the following explanation 
for the US’ position: 
Those frustrations are due largely to the OAS’ inability to balance tensions resulting from 
past U.S. efforts to act as a hemispheric policeman and the insistence of resentful Latin 
American members that OAS actions must be based on the cornerstone of non-
intervention. [GOSHKO 16.05.1989] 
Only after the end of the Cold War was the OAS in a position to regain some of its stature, al-
though being very short of its founders’ aspirations. The worldwide political situation on the one 
hand, and the political structure of the member states moved the OAS into henceforth unchartered 
waters. Conflict-proneness was increasingly located rather in domestic realms with the potential of 
resulting in unrest and instability, instead of more traditional confrontations between two or more 
states. However, the OAS’ tarnished image and eroded credibility as promising conflict transformer 
also led – as amply demonstrated for example in the Haiti intervention - to the increased impor-
tance of other actors, among them the UN on the upper level, but also sub-regional groupings, like 
Contadora. The OAS gradually took to assisting those other actors, thereby proving its own general 
willingness and commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and at the same time attesting 
its incapacity to contribute significantly to it. This development did not take the OAS by surprise, 
however. Instead, it was well anticipated, not to say introduced, by the member states themselves. 
Such was indicated, for instance, by the COAS amendment approved in 1985 that abandoned the 
“Try-OAS-First” principle, hereby giving up the regional bodies claim to primacy in settling dis-
putes. 
On an institutional basis the OAS’ decline as addressee for handling traditional conflicts was also 
testified by the non-ratification of the amended Rio Treaty, as well as through the abolition of the 
till then very active and successful Inter-American Peace Committee. 
However, although the era of anti-communism might form part of the hemisphere’s past, the Cu-
ban government’s decades-long exclusion remains a telling symbol of the US dominance, since the 
overwhelming part of Latin American countries have made it abundantly clear that they prefer the 
re-integration of the island nation. Since friendly ties with Cuba have been carrying ‘symbolic im-
portance’ for many Latin American governments [ECONOMIST 11.04.2009]. Only in early June 
2009 the OAS announced that agreement had been reached to eventually end the suspension of 
the Cuban government. However, aware of the fact that outright re-admission would fly in the face 
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of the Hemisphere’s democratic paradigm, strings were attached to that step of normalization 
which revolve around democratic and human rights requirements. This compromise solution re-
portedly was an outcome of a stand-off between the US688 and left-leaning Latin governments689
As such the OAS was designed with the aim of containing the dominance of the US. While many 
scholars will underline the various instances in which the US nevertheless contravened several es-
sential norms and principles upheld by the regional organization, one still will have to agree that 
the existence of a corpus of norms as set up by the OAS considerably impeded the US’s hegemonic 
aspirations and policies. Again, whereas the OAS was unable to force the powerhouse of the hemi-
sphere to comply with prior commitments, it exposed the latter to severe argumentative attacks
, 
in whose course Venezuela and Nicaragua had even threatened to quit the OAS, thus threatening 
to do lasting damage to the multilateral body. Although Cuba viewed the decision as a victory, it 
signalled that for the time being it was not prepared to re-join the organization [SHERIDAN 
05.06.2009]. 
But despite all the Organization’s dispositions to act according to US preferences, the OAS was at 
the same time conceived and used as a interest-pooling-device by smaller states vis-à-vis the US 
and also for underpinning their postulate of non-intervention by rooting it in a legal corpus ex-
pected to be guarded – at least to a particular extent – by the inter-American system. Such policy 
appeared as a much more promising route to aggregate interests since individual countries feared 
to be simply overwhelmed by the US. As might be recalled article 6 of the COAS (1948) explicitly 
states: 
States are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal capacity to exercise these rights, 
and have equal duties. The rights of each State depend not upon its power to ensure the 
exercise thereof, but upon the mere fact of its existence as a person under international 
law. 
690. 
This exposure frequently forced the US in the defensive691
4.3 Constructivism and the ASEAN 
. It is obvious then, that the prospect of 
facing such widespread opposition, channelled and synthesized through the institutional structure 
of the OAS, inhibited and constrained the principal submissiveness towards US policies’ and ulti-
mately transformed the physiognomy and dynamics of conflicts subjected to the inter-American 
system. 
As outlined earlier, contrasted to realism, constructivism692
If ASEAN's actions are viewed through the neo-realist lens of power as coercion or domi-
nance then the Association is not seen as powerful. If, however, ASEAN's actions are 
viewed in constructivist terms as the ability to act, including the ability to generate norms 
that define and regulate the behaviour of the Association and its members, then ASEAN 
can be thought of as relatively powerful. [EATON & STUBBS 2006:151] 
 sees the determination of human be-
haviour not confined to the framework of a rational actor. Instead, rules, norms, institutions, and 
identities besides interests determine behaviour. Thus, states are conceived as collective social 
actors. Instead of employing solely logical rational arguments prevalent social, cultural, and histori-
cal norms influence how and which  decisions are taken. 
Comparing neo-realist with constructivist approaches and their evaluations as applied to ASEAN, 
EATON & STUBBS point out that both perceive their worlds from different angles and consequently 
arrive at quite different judgements: 
                                                 
688 The US’s change of mind was part of a general overhaul of its foreign policy toward Cuba, having earlier 
already resulted in easing travel and remittances restrictions. 
Moreover the more liberal and pro-multilateral approach chosen by the new Obama administration was gener-
ally more receptive to correct unbalanced and predominantly unilaterally based decisions of the past. 
689 In the same period the restoration of diplomatic ties between El Salvador and Cuba left the US to be the only 
American country without ties to the island nation [ECONOMIST 06.06.2009]. 
690 Also LÉGER – while not reasoning from a constructivist corner – points out, that although OAS principles 
have variously been disregarded and contravened they ‘are generally impressed in the conscience of Latin 
American statesmen’ [LÉGER 1974:200]. 
691 SHAW argues that the following variables determined the degree of opposition the US had to face inside the 
OAS: if there was consensus among the Latin American nations in opposing the US; the resource intensity of 
the available alternative options; and if the matter in question entailed common threat perceptions [SHAW 
2000:209-211]. 
692 GANESAN provides a synopsis of both theoretical approaches, finding that both can contribute to elucidating 
the security relevancy of ASEAN [GANESAN 2003]. 
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Constructivism also places emphasis on the process of socialization, leading to convergence of be-
haviour, interests, social identities, and worldviews. For instance with regard to the clear improve-
ment between ASEAN and its giant neighbour China, socialization has often been judged to be a 
driving force of that rapprochement. BA notes: 
In this relationship, ASEAN states, individually and collectively, have emphasized an en-
gagement approach to China that involves important assumptions about the socializing 
properties of engagement processes and regular interaction. Best described as complex 
engagement, ASEAN's approach is characterized by a multiplicity of interactions – eco-
nomic, political, and social; informal and formal; bilateral and multilateral – on a variety of 
issues. Most important, ASEAN states also tend to see their interactions and exchanges 
with China more in terms of an ongoing negotiation of relations, less predetermined inter-
ests of the kind emphasized by traditional approaches of International Relations (IR) [BA 
2006:158, original emphasis]. 
'Complex engagement', BA explains, is a process of searching for points of consensus aiming at 
persuading another to change attitudes and beliefs about particular issues – constituting so-called 
'argumentative persuasion' [BA 2006:161]. The frequency of actors having face-to-face communi-
cation markedly increases the likelihood for cooperation [RISSE 2000:13]. As JOHNSTON has em-
phasized persuasion works especially good if the sender and receiver of information ‘like’ each 
other; and increased exposure, contact, and familiarity all make for a higher degree of this liking 
[JOHNSTON 2001:496]. Part of their strengthened relationship also consisted in mediatory activi-
ties by ASEAN between China and the West: exemplified by Singapore's endeavours to 'explain' 
China or ASEAN' elites' efforts to downplay the so-called China threat693
However, in order not only to initiate, but to make those processes permanent they require the 
prevalence of confidence – making it possible to go beyond everyday reckoning and transcending 
egoistic identities as being the sole basis for decision-making [NABERS 2003:115]. The myriad of 
meetings ASEAN is convening on a multiplicity of issues further fosters this confidence. It follows 
 [BA 2006:168]. 
Constructivism argues that state identities are the basis for state interests. And identity in turn is 
rooted in norms; they prescribe what one does in specific circumstances. In an overarching context 
a group of actors, e.g. states, can share a so-called ‘collective identity’. BUSSE explains: 
A collective identity means that states positively identify with the fate of others. They de-
fine their interests with regard to other states and they may also develop a feeling of 
community. [BUSSE 1999:45] 
And while one of the most essential ASEAN documents, the TAC of 1976, underlines the mutual 
respect for 'national identities' [compare KHONG 2005:30], generally the Association is eager to 
propagate a shared identity. For instance, on the occasion of Bangladesh’s and Sri Lanka’s acces-
sion to the TAC, the Philippine foreign secretary, at the time chairing the ASEAN Standing Commit-
tee, underlined that such acts of accession “demonstrates the widening of the ASEAN family based 
on shared values” [qtd. in: XINHUA 01.08.2007]. 
In this context, ACHARYA underlined what he observed to be ASEAN's 'quest' for regional identity: 
…[I]nstead of being presented as a given, regional identity is seen as an evolving phe-
nomenon, something that has been aspired to and striven for by the region's govern-
ments. And these efforts towards identity have shaped the regional order of Southeast 
Asia. [ACHARYA 2005:104] 
However, prior to the formation of a regional identity, ‘communicative processes’ with the potential 
of ushering in international institutionalization have to be initiated. NABERS identifies the following 
preconditions as necessary for those processes to occur in the first place: 
 
Interdependence: single actors are affected or determined by the forces of another actor. 
Common fate: single actors share a common fate if their existences or interests depend on what 
happens to the group as a whole. 
Homogeneity: obvious similarities of actors viewing themselves as being alike with regard to the 
features that define a group [NABERS 2003:114-115]. 
 
                                                 
693 Malaysia's Prime Minister Badawi for instance made the point that China is a friend of ASEAN and ' We ought 
to do away with this talk of the China threat, there is no such thing as a China threat' [qtd. in: BBC MS 
27.01.2007]. 
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that member countries which feel to share a (gradually increasing) part of their identity start to 
regard themselves as members of the same in-group. In-group members among themselves tend 
to be more accessible for arguments and more likely to be persuaded, thus common ground will be 
found more easily in cases of controversy [compare JOHNSTON 2001:497]. 
ASEAN envisioned in its paper ASEAN Vision 2020, agreed upon at their 2nd Informal Summit in 
December 1997, that “the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN community conscious of 
its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity” [ASEAN 
V 2020, my emphasis]. 
Identity, along with other ideational structures, offers values and norms which inform behaviour. 
For the case of ASEAN BUSSE derives the following general behavioural norms from the principles 
enshrined in one of the most important regional documents, the TAC694
• respect for the sovereignty
: 
 
695
• non-interference in the internal affairs of one another
 and territorial integrity of all nations; 
696
• settlement of disputes by peaceful means; and 
; 
• renunciation of the threat or use of force [BUSSE 1999:46]. 
 
ACHARYA added to those the norm of regional autonomy as well as the rejection of military 
pacts697
It should be noted that the principle of non-interference along with the one of sovereignty have 
witnessed some erosion. Mention shall be made for instance on the treatment of aspirant Cambo-
dia
 and preference for bilateral defence cooperation, and termed them ASEAN's 'legal-rational' 
norms alongside the so-called 'socio-cultural' norms as captured under the modus encapsulated in 
the so-called ASEAN Way [see NARINE 2006:204]. 
In this regard KATSUMATA has underlined that those principles were derived from prior norms of 
international interaction as laid down – among others – in the UN Charter, and incorporated also by 
other regional organizations [KATSUMATA 2003:111-112]. 
Indeed, many scholars agree with ACHARYA and hold that much of the explanatory arsenal of con-
structivism as applied to understanding ASEAN is packed into the concept popularly known as 
ASEAN Way (see corresponding chapter). Drawing on this notion, HAACKE establishes the following 
six ‘core norms’: sovereign equality, non-interference, non-resort to the threat or use of force, 
quiet diplomacy, non-involvement of ASEAN into the resolution of bilateral disputes, and mutual 
respect. Those core norms inspire the practices but also all other norms of the Association 
[HAACKE 2003:59]. 
698
                                                 
694 The code of conduct as enshrined in the TAC has been termed ‘the strongest identity marker to define the 
ASEAN community’ [NISCHALKE 2002:110]. 
695 It has been pointed out that the principle of sovereignty was rooted in the historical experience of the mem-
ber countries, all having been colonized (except Thailand) and having been victim to various attempts of inter-
ference [KASUMATA 2003:112]. For elucidating discussion of the present day sovereignty concept see NARINE 
2005. 
696 The intensive debates about ‚flexible engagement’ and ‚enhanced interaction’ (see chapter on ASEAN’s secu-
rity concept) led NISCHALKE to controversially argue that the principle of non-interference ‚has weakened if not 
disappeared’. [NISCHALKE 2000:106]. KHOO reasons similarly when he claims that at various times a contrary 
norm - to interfere in other states' affairs -  was frequently acted upon; a case in point being ASEAN's policy 
towards Myanmar [KHOO 2004:144]. 
697 ACHARYA is in this case joined by SIMON who deems the ‚avoidance of military pacts with one another‘ one 
more ASEAN norm [SIMON 2008:269]. 
698 Although occurring in a period in which Cambodia was still far from becoming an ASEAN member, Thailand’s 
allowing of China to transport weapons across its territory to support the Cambodian resistance to Vietnam's 
occupations [NARINE 2005:476], clearly contradicted the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, as 
prescribed in the UN Charter and hence applicable also to non-ASEAN countries. 
, when internal tensions erupted, or of some endeavours concerning the domestic politics in 
Myanmar. This change was also mirrored during the discussion of the ‘flexible engagement’ ap-
proach as sponsored by Thailand and the Philippines, which resulted in a watered-down concept 
called ‘enhanced interaction’ One off-spring of the Thai initiative of flexible engagement was also its 
venture to establish an ASEAN Troika – a body composed of past, present, and future ASEAN 
Chairman and conceived as to be consulted in case of arising conflict. HAACKE presents the follow-
ing evaluation: 
...the Troika proposal went far beyond the (spurned) advocacy of flexible engagement. It 
suggested not merely the possibility and legitimacy of greater flexibility in the application 
of the norm of non-interference among members, but also a more sustained – and institu-
tionalized – effort at preventive diplomacy in the name of ASEAN. [HAACKE 2003:72] 
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In this connection ACHARYA has highlighted that norms have positive as well as negative conse-
quences; and also that norms are subject to change and might be transformed over time. He cites 
non-interference to originally have been part of ensuring the moral higher ground, when directed 
against imperialist intentions; but nowadays the same norm makes for sanctioning state repression 
in Burma [ACHARYA 2005:103]. 
Indonesian Elder statesman Ali Alatas in early 2004 – functioning as envoy to Myanmar at the time 
- programmatically stated: 
Respect for sovereignty will remain a basic principle for ASEAN, but increasingly we realize 
that we have to be flexible, that we have to be non-doctrinaire in some of these things. 
[qtd. in: ABBUGAO 07.01.2004] 
This incipient spirit notwithstanding CHOW makes the following observation: 
Examining ASEAN norm adherence in this context [counter-terrorism, my remark], it is 
possible to conclude that even though individual states ignored regulatory norms of con-
sensus, they ultimately subordinated these to the higher constitutive norm of preserving 
sovereignty whenever an action threatened to undermine it. [CHOW 2005:320] 
However, the above list of guiding norms for ASEAN is judged not to be comprehensive by NIS-
CHALKE who points to the procedural norms contained in the concept of musyarawah (consulta-
tion) and mufakat (consensus) together with the preference of informality and non-confrontation, 
as complementary [NISCHALKE 2000:90]. One defining characteristic of consultation among 
ASEAN members has been described to constitute ‘moral suasion’ – “the belief (and hope) that 
member states will do the right thing so as not to embarrass the collectivity” [SIMON 2008:267]. 
Thus, it was not Burma’s repressive policies themselves that have been perceived as parlous but 
rather the regular international condemnation it prompted. Referring to the international outcry 
provoked by a crackdown on Buddhist monks in 2007 and the relatively stern statement ASEAN 
issued thereupon, HAACKE underlines: 
The statement was issued because ASEAN countries felt that they had no option but to 
clarify their collective position on developments in Myanmar and the significant regional 
and international outrage the latter caused. [HAACKE 2008:354] 
Another principle governing the Association is the a considerable measure of prevalent self-
restraint [KAMARULZAMAN 2002:32]. Thus, GANESAN arrives at the conclusion that the particular 
modus vivendi of ASEAN – as captured in the phrase ‘ASEAN Way’ – is indeed a central element of 
constructivism’s interpretation of the Association [GANESAN 2003:234]. While the ASEAN Way 
might also have been partly based on constraints and incentives, still 
the engagement and reassurance that are part of ASEAN diplomacy today can be seen as 
a product of both the material and the social, whereby the material set up the initiative in-
centive structure, followed by social experiences that affirmed and established particular 
ways of engagement as appropriate and distinct ASEAN's. [BA 2006:165] 
Thus, the aimed at accommodations of various viewpoints before a decision is made ‘transcends’ 
the sphere of policy process and affects policy outcomes. From that follows that the yardstick to 
measure norm observance is to be assessed by: 
…firstly, evidence of a process of consultation and consensus-building and, secondly, pol-
icy outcomes that take into account previous ASEAN positions and the vital interests of 
other members. [NISCHALKE 2000:91] 
The same author furthermore explains that there exists another unwritten principle, that is: to 
always support the ‘front-line state’ [NISCHALKE 2000:100]; be it Thailand during Vietnam’s inva-
sion of Cambodia, be it the Philippines after Chinese activities on Mischief Reef. With regard to the 
principle of non-interference the importance of assurances that no threat emanates from fellow 
members in the first place, has also been underlined. The principle – which results in a sort of 
community solidarity - is acted on in concreto –amongst others through: 
 
• refusing to offer sanctuaries to armed dissidents from other member-states; 
• ignoring the cross-border calls for support from the same ethnic group or religious follow-
ers; 
• refraining from criticising what a member-state is doing within its own boundaries; and 
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• actively supporting the incumbent government of a member-state in time of its internal 
turmoil [KAMARULZAMAN 2002:31]. 
 
Another distinct feature was revealed by ASEAN’s effort at bringing global powers under its (dis-
cussion-) fold. By reviewing the formation of the ARF, KATSUMATA draws attention to what he calls 
the 'the norm of security cooperation'. This norm encourages to be concerned not about the secu-
rity of individual states, but instead about the security of the region as a whole [KATSUMATA 
2006:188]. 
4.3.1 Discourse Analysis Qualified 
When the reform scheme termed ‘ASEAN Security Community’ (ASC) took shape, concretized by 
the ASC Plan of Action agreed to in late 2004, some of the most important and longest upheld 
principles to guide the ASC process were enumerated: 
 
• non-interference; 
• consensus-based decision making; 
• national and regional resilience699
• respect for the national sovereignty; 
; 
• renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
• peaceful settlement of differences and disputes [ASEAN 2005:51]. 
 
Those are supplemented by so-called 'fundamental principles' that are to inspire norm setting ac-
tivities: 
 
• non-alignment; 
• fostering of peace-oriented attitudes of ASEAN member countries; 
• conflict resolution through non-violent means (not completely equivalent to peaceful set-
tlement); and 
• renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and an arms race in the region [ASEAN 
2005:52]. 
 
The general absence if not declination in the ASC concept regarding any type of military alliance is 
explained by BUSSE with the fact that such an endeavour would have contradicted the Associa-
tion’s norms, even if such a step would have been regarded as useful, e.g. in face of Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia: 
Not only did these [norms, my remark] explicitly stigmatize the threat of the use of force, 
they were also based on a deep seated cultural dislike for confrontational social behaviour. 
The ASEAN countries saw an alliance as an invitation for open confrontation and more 
conflict. [BUSSE 1999:50] 
BUSSE finally concludes that “ASEAN states see military pacts as providing less than more security” 
[BUSSE 1999:55]. 
 
If one puts the ambitious ASC plan - at least as it is put down on paper – to the test of one of con-
structivism’s main tenets, the significance of discourse, evaluation will be most promising with a 
reasonable measure of qualification. NISCHALKE makes a fruitful observation in this regard. He is 
critical of constructivism’s tendency to overemphasize the analysis of rhetoric: 
Communicative action can be deceiving if taken at face value. This point is particularly 
pertinent to the ASEAN context. Southeast Asian cultures have an inherent tendency to 
conceal disagreement in public. However, if political action is influenced by the need to 
save face and display consensus in public, any analysis that focuses on discourse alone 
can be expected to show a bias towards community, as this is what is publicly proclaimed. 
Yet, rhetoric and underlying rationales for behaviour may differ substantially. [NISCHALKE 
2002:91] 
                                                 
699 National and regional resilience being mentioned as a ‚principle‘ attests to Indonesia’s success in anchoring 
this norm, starting in the 1970s. The doctrine was meant to establish a basis for a multilateral security ap-
proach [ACHARYA 2004:258]. 
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The same scepticism is highlighted by GANESAN who cites the realist school of thought that “policy 
pronouncements of élites are often crafted to suit the contextual requirements for specific situa-
tions and are not to be confused with actual policy output” [GANESAN 1999:228]. Referring to that 
type of criticism other scholars have made clear that ‘discourse analysis’ does not stipulate that 
what is said, is automatically convergent with what is meant: 
Whether or not political actors really mean what they say is of minor importance because 
they will always put forward their arguments strategically; both opportunistic and honest 
arguments have real consequences for their advocates and for the outcome of the debate. 
[NABERS 2003:117] 
NABERS underlines also another issue of concern: various discourses exist at the same time and it 
is not until one of these discourses “reaches the stage of establishing a dominant perception of 
reality for all those participating in the communicative process” and if “it is reflected in the speech 
acts of all interacting agents” then one can recognize something approaching a ‘collective identity’ 
[NABERS 2003:117]. 
In order to capture both, rhetoric and policy output or of discourse and behaviour NISCHALKE sug-
gests to assess three elements encapsulating collective identities: 
 
shared meaning structures and values: are in evidence when perspectives on the principal 
problems and objectives that inform interpretations of and responses to given situations converge. 
Via problem representation – highlighting or down playing certain facets of a given situation – it is 
discernible which values and principles have been or are shared by decision makers, thus mirroring 
shared social identity. 
 
mutual identifications among community members in the sense of a so-called ‘we-feeling’ and 
indicated as ASEAN relations are given priority over those with other external actors. 
 
compliance with the norms and practices accepted by the group, embodied i.a. by the commit-
ment to the ASEAN-Way [NISCHALKE 2002:92-93]. 
4.3.2 ASEAN’s Compliance with its Norms 
Compliance with norms among ASEAN members is – while generally honoured in many explicit and 
implicit respects – by far not a given. As regards norm compliance NISCHALKE highlights that dur-
ing the first years of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia in March 1980 
deviated from former positions of ASEAN with advocating the so-called Kuantan Principle. Kuantan 
implicitly accommodated Vietnam’s position to a particular extent (see Chapter on Vietnam’s occu-
pation) and thus contradicted the stern opposition stance as formulated by the regional body. He 
also observe that the ASEAN partners were not consulted nor informed of an earlier ‘de facto alli-
ance’ between Thailand and China [NISCHALKE 2000:93]. 
Another instance of wanting compliance can be viewed in the security agreement that Indonesia 
concluded with Australia in 1995. Also in this case consultation with ASEAN fellows was avoided, 
constituting a clear rejection of procedural norms practiced in the Association [NISCHALKE 
2000:100-101]. The security agreement had its origins in Indonesia’s failure to obtain China’s rec-
ognition of its sovereignty over the waters around Natuna Island – a volatile issue given China’s 
gloves-off approach regarding its claims in the South China Sea [NISCHALKE 2002:102]. Although 
the arrangement might have contravened merely the spirit, if not the letter of the ZOPFAN concept 
– so relentlessly and fervently supported by Indonesia in the past - the other ASEAN partners did 
not voice opposition to the bilateral agreement. Instead, shared security perspectives, focusing on 
the balance-of-power principle, characterised their reaction [NISCHALKE 2002:103].  
Those instances evidence a certain lack of norm observance. But the most severe disregard of 
ASEAN’s norms came in early 1989 when the newly elected Thai Prime Minister, Chatichai Choon-
havan devised and pursued a completely different policy vis-à-vis Vietnam. He coined the slogan to 
turn Indochina ‘from battlefield into a marketplace’ and to that aim sent a Thai delegation to Viet-
nam and visited Cambodia’s ruler Hun Sen, who formerly had been viewed as illegitimate proxy of 
Hanoi. This step was taken without the knowledge let alone consent of the other ASEAN members; 
expectedly, Chatichai’s move was widely resented and classified to be a contravention of the Asso-
ciation’s procedural norms [NISCHALKE 2000:94]. Thailand - with its policy change implicitly gave 
preference to a mainland Southeast Asia identity over an ASEAN identity [NISCHALKE 2002:94]. 
Another example of questionable norm adherence and regional identification occurred when Singa-
pore offered to the US the use of its military facilities; this prompted unease among other ASEAN 
neighbours, most clearly voiced by Indonesia and Malaysia. It was felt that the step was in contra-
vention of the ZOPFAN concept that aimed at independence and autonomy. NISCHALKE comes to 
the following conclusion: 
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Judged against the yardsticks of community, the episode revealed that the notion of an 
ASEAN identity had little substance on the occasion of the first major security debate in 
the post-Cold War era. The lack of shared perspectives on security problems and objec-
tives was compounded by the lack of norm compliance on Singapore’s side and the fact 
that Singapore identified its security with the United States, an external power, not ASEAN 
partners. [NISCHALKE 2002:95] 
As an additional case in point for testing the collective identity assumption one can screen the con-
troversy arising after the Malaysian vice premier, Anwar Ibrahim, was sacked and consequently 
arrested. The move aroused the criticism of some ASEAN members. Malaysia’s prime minister Ma-
hathir rejected such comments as interference in Malaysia’s internal affairs. When Indonesia’s Peo-
ple's Consultative Assembly speaker Amien Rais criticized the treatment of Anwar Ibrahim, Malay-
sia’s foreign ministers asserted that such a statement not only was offensive, but claimed that Rais 
had also demonstrated not to understand the ‘spirit’ of ASEAN [BBC MS 18.05.2000]. 
Viewed from another perspective, the treatment of Anwar Ibrahim – he was obviously beaten in 
custody and charged with sexual misconduct – was classified by WAIN as contradicting ‘an unwrit-
ten regional code in the treatment of fallen political leaders’. As such the humiliating treatment of 
Mahathir’s former heir apparent was judged to offend the ASEAN counterparts. WAIN concludes: 
“Dr. Mahathir’s problem is that he has crossed the line in the eyes of Southeast Asia” [WAIN 
09.06.2000]. 
In the early 2000s Thailand provided another example of wanting ASEAN norm commitment. The 
hitherto progressive and liberal-minded Thailand refused to talk about its own insurgency taking 
place in the Muslim South in late 2004. When asked by Indonesia on the issue, Thailand responded 
that this constituted an internal matter. The Prime Minister even threatened to walk out of the cur-
rent ASEAN Summit, shall the issue be taken up there [DJIN 25.11.2004; VATIKIOTIS 
25.11.2004]. 
 
NISCHALKE, in reviewing past norm conformity, concludes that “ASEAN functioned best as a com-
munity if regional norms are challenged by outsiders”. As evidence he recounts the cohesive 
ASEAN stance toward China in the South China Sea and the opposition to the West’s pressure not 
to invite Myanmar to join the Association [NISCHALKE 2002:110-111]. Another case in point in 
that regard is Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. 
4.3.3 Evaluating the constructivist Claim 
Naturally depending on the school of thought scholars’ call their theoretical origin, evaluations are 
varying widely. Thus, the usefulness of concepts as propagated by constructivism, is discarded by 
some, only to be confirmed by others. 
Some scholars are not finding themselves in an argumentative position as to detect an ASEAN 
identity in the first place. VATIKIOTIS, for example, argued, that what is generally talked about as 
ASEAN identity, is rather similar to a so-called ‘imagined political identity’, lending a term specified 
by Benedict ANDERSON [VATIKIOTIS 1999: 82]. Also JONES and SMITH can make out no facts 
that would allow speaking about a ‘community’; instead, all that is discernible results in an ‘imita-
tion community’, as they chose to coin it. Their criticism is directed against the constructivist claim 
in regard to assessing ASEAN. Thus, they reject also the idea about the power of norms. Hence, 
ASEAN’s cherished principle of non-interference – in their view - only camouflages the indifference 
to the trouble of one’s neighbours and robs the Association of any basis on which a community 
would be founded: 
To be sure, ASEAN possesses all the paraphernalia that regional organizations require: 
annual ministerial meetings, a secretariat, a bureaucracy, and even a new ‘troika’ to take 
the lead in dealing with regional problems. Yet the organization makes no decisions and 
enforces no rules. It is a classic imitation community. [JONES & SMITH 2002:108] 
Taking into account the ambivalent commitment of member states to the Association, SAN found it 
useful to use the concept of a Neighbourhood Watch Group (NWG) to describe its functionality 
while striking some sort of a theoretical middle ground: 
The NWG idea borrows from the municipal crime prevention concept in which the residents of a 
locality claim an active role in assisting the police to eliminate crime from their neighbourhood, in 
looking out for each other, and in improving safety in the neighbourhood [SAN 2000:280]. 
SAN further outlines the following as the major original motivations of ASEAN to create a NWG as 
to: 
 
• promote bilateral relations; 
• manage intramural conflict; 
• pre-empt the spill-over of domestic issues; 
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• give collective endorsement to the legitimacy of the government of the day; and 
• endorse the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs [SAN 2000:285]. 
 
However, constructivism’s explanatory potential is seen as strong when assessing ASEAN’s reform 
drive which manifested itself in the early years of the current millennium. It has been observed 
that this reformist undertaking was nurtured in part by motivations clearly to be located in a con-
structivist explanatory approach. After years and decades of refusal to address the subject of hu-
man rights on a regional basis, ASEAN grudgingly moved to include the establishment of a human 
rights body in its Charter. After discussions on the Charter draft during the Retreat of ASEAN For-
eign Ministers in March 2007, Thailand’s Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram commented on the 
idea of ASEAN eventually adopting a human rights body, when he said: 
We addressed the human rights problem because we want international recognition. If we 
had not addressed it, our region would not be accepted. [qtd. in: BP 03.03.2007] 
This approach mirrors the region’s intention to find approval among other international actors – 
without necessarily being convinced in its own right that such a measure is warranted – a process 
described as acculturation, as detailed earlier. 
With regard to the acculturation function of IOs, CROPLEY commented on ASEAN’s offspring, the 
ARF meetings the following: 
Diplomats concede that the security-focused forum, which for the last 12 years has given 
the relative minnows of southeast Asia the chance to rub shoulders with the big boys, has 
always been most valuable as a networking opportunity. [CROPLEY 02.08.2005] 
Of course constructivist explanations for the behaviour of states are not confined to analyze solely 
cooperative efforts. As outlined earlier, the prospect for positive amplifiers of self-esteem and repu-
tation, are held to be motivational factors in choosing one’s behaviour. However, this might also 
result in single nations following extra-ASEAN strategies, above all if the Association entertains no 
such explicit strategy in the first place. Thus, the hoped-for increases for self-esteem and reputa-
tion are said to have informed also Thailand’s leading role in the INTERFET force sent to East 
Timor. Behind the country’s vigour was seen to be “the aim of elevating Thailand to a higher 
ground of international morality, responsibility and credibility which would allow Bangkok to be-
come a new standard-bearer in Southeast Asia” [HAACKE 2003:68]. 
Similar forces were behind Vietnam’s surprising about turn in heading toward membership of the 
Association. This shift was explained by the country’s need to nurture an alternative identity after 
the current one had been compromised by the end of the Cold War. And reviewing the first decade 
of membership the same author finds that Vietnam ‘derives a great deal of satisfaction from being 
a member’ [NGUYEN VU TUNG 2007:498]. 
 
Especially with regard to the security maintenance ability of the Association, some proponents draw 
on constructivist logics to explain how ASEAN works. For instance, ASEAN’s understanding of bring-
ing about peace has always focused on creating circumstances conducive for the upholding of sta-
bility. R.C. Severino, a former Secretary General of ASEAN, underlined that approach. In a letter he 
wrote to the Financial Times in response to an article the daily had published citing the ‘irrelevancy’ 
of ASEAN and of the ARF, Severino highlighted one feature of the so-called ASEAN Way as being 
responsible for the absence of violent conflict: 
as a result of the constant dialogue, both among Asean members and with external pow-
ers, south-east Asia has been an area of peace and stability for four decades [SEVERINO 
09.08.2006]. 
HAACKE reasons that it is exactly the Association’s success in ensuring a peaceful climate, that 
makes the likelihood of changes to the overall paradigmatic norm-structure of ASEAN – as en-
shrined in the ASEAN Way – to be very limited indeed. Amongst other factors, the author explains 
this reluctance with the member states’ conviction that the ASEAN Way in its present shape had 
‘contributed enormously to stable relations’ among ASEAN nations. And whereas being attentive to 
the “possible depth of resentment and ensuing suspicion that might arise as a consequence of un-
warranted interference” ASEAN nations opt for adhering to the ASEAN Way for ‘mediating and pre-
venting estrangement and insecurity’ amongst themselves [HAACKE 2003:80]. 
 
SIMON highlights the Association’s impact on third parties and calls it “an impressive example of 
ASEAN’s ability to bind outsider to an ASEAN norm” that it was successful in convincing external 
powers to sign up to the TAC, which enshrines to settle conflicts in a peaceful manner [SIMON 
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2008:267]. Early support of the TAC and the behavioural rules it encompassed dates back to 1994, 
when the first ARF meeting officially had endorsed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.  
Thus, this is a case where ASEAN showed its power in the framework of the ‘life cycle of norms’ by 
succeeding to persuade other actors to sign up to the norm-set covered by the TAC, which is a 
decisive step to accomplish the norms’ overwhelming acceptance and subsequent internalization 
[compare: FINNEMORE & SIKKINK 1998:895-905]. 
4.3.3.1 ASEAN – A Security Community700
The question if ASEAN qualifies for a 'security community' has been variously debated, resulting in 
quite polarized scholarly positions [see: EMMERSON 2005:166-168]. 
The theoretical concept of security community was originally drawn from Karl W. DEUTSCH's ap-
proach developed in the 1950s to characterize the relations between states in the North Atlantic 
area. DEUTSCH set out the following essential conditions to be fulfilled for successful community 
building: 
 
? 
• the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision making; 
• the capacity of the participating units to respond to each others’ needs, messages, and ac-
tions quickly and adequately without resort to violence; and 
• the mutual predictability of behaviour [LEWIS 1999:10]. 
 
While at the face of it ASEAN seems to fulfil the first and last condition, the same cannot be said of 
the given capacity of member states to answer needs of its partners. Lacking resources and politi-
cal will, as well as historically rooted scepticism between several of ASEAN constituent parts, all 
play a role to make such service unlikely if not outright impossible701
ASEAN can be understood as a regional cluster of “internationalist” coalitions
. However, the probability to 
resort to violent means is very low as the records attest. Taken together this makes for a qualified 
only consistency with DEUTSCH’s concept. Another limitation was registered by KHOO, underlining 
his general doubts if it is adequate at all to transpose this Western concept to the Southeast Asian 
region [KHOO 2004:141-142]. 
SIMON, on the other hand, argues that ASEAN in fact is a security community. Its TAC commits the 
signatories to ‘norms of diffuse reciprocity’ – herewith creating a particular sense of community. 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation contains the criterion of ‘abnegation or threat’. 
SIMON justifies the classification of ASEAN as security community moreover with the general ban 
on the use of force [SIMON 1998:63]. 
 
A more nuanced evaluation was given by SOLINGEN. Although conceding that ASEAN has devel-
oped a cooperative regional regime based on the principles of respect for state sovereignty, non-
intervention, and the rejection of the threat and use of force in resolving disputes, SOLINGEN 
overall concludes: 
ASEAN has not relied on formal dispute-resolution mechanisms, is not a collective security 
arrangement, and does not yet amount to a security community either. [SOLINGEN 
1999:45] 
But in order to still analyze ASEAN’s characteristics, SOLINGEN chooses to operate with the con-
cept of so-called ‘internationalist coalitions’: 
702
                                                 
700 At times ASEAN has also been described as ‚diplomatic community’; compare for instance THAYER who uses 
this term for the Association due to its activities during Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia [THAYER 2000:3]; 
similar reference is made by SAN when using the terminology [SAN 2000:288]; SMITH argues that ASEAN was 
'constructed' as a ‚diplomatic community’ in the first place [SMITH 2004:418]. Also Michael LEIFER, one of the 
most distinguished scholars of Southeast Asia, termed ASEAN a ‘diplomatic community’ [compare: ACHARYA 
2005:107]. 
701 In contrast LEWIS finds also this condition fulfilled [LEWIS 1999:239]. 
702 SOLINGEN later substantiates that ASEAN has to be understood rather as approximation instead of ideal-
type internationalist cluster, with some member states falling under the hybrid category [SOLINGEN 1999:35]. 
 that co-
operate with one another to advance their grand strategy, encompassing domestic, re-
gional, and international objectives. [SOLINGEN 1999:31]. 
SOLINGEN works out two features that characterize such internationalist coalitions in the sphere of 
security: 
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• internationalist dyads and clusters must reduce territorial or ethno-religious disputes since 
their ‘grand strategies’ eschew militarized conflict. Armed conflict and military build-ups are 
viewed as threats to economic and political fundamentals of those strategies, namely fiscal 
conservatism, macroeconomic, political, and regional stability, access to capital, technol-
ogy, and markets; 
• the mutually reinforcing domestic and interactive inducements to allay conflict decreases 
transaction costs. Agreement on controversial issues is more easily attained and there is 
less need to monitor or punish compliance. Internationalist coalitions are thus more self-
sustained than externally-imposed, making dense institutionalization less essential. [SOL-
INGEN 1999:33-34] 
 
After assessing the activities of ASEAN in the field of foreign policy NISCHALKE comes to the fol-
lowing conclusion: 
Overall, non-compliance with the “ASEAN way” has been too common and external influ-
ences too strong, to support the community idea. While ASEAN’s external cohesion has 
been impressive, the same cannot be said about adherence to due process and decision-
making or the existence of a shared policy outlook. The norms of the “ASEAN way” have 
by far not played the role for co-operation that observers have often attributed to them. 
Consensus has repeatedly been the function of external pressure and not the result of 
gradually converging views as a result of consultations. [NISCHALKE 2000:106] 
The same author, after reviewing the extensive web of military relations of ASEAN states with out-
side powers, argues that such “effectively negates the idea that relations among ASEAN partners 
are privileged vis-à-vis those with external parties, one crucial element of community” [NISCHALKE 
2002:110]. 
Testing the two core security principles of non-intervention and non-use of force SHARPE finds: 
Without a strong degree of institutionalization legally binding members to agreements, 
ASEAN’s strength relies heavily on a common identity. Identity is a central component in 
any security community… But to argue that ASEAN has a significant security identity 
based on the principle of non-use of force would require evidence that that principle is 
consistently affirmed in practice. The comparison of these two case studies [Vietnam’s in-
vasion of Cambodia and China’s construction activities on Mischief Reef 1995, my remark] 
calls into doubt the significance of this security identity. [SHARPE 2003:248] 
SHARPE then seems to test the immediate neighbourhood with the yardsticks of ASEAN proper. 
The relations among the Association’s members have been overwhelmingly been of peaceful where 
not amiable nature. Even in situations pitting one country against another (for instance Thailand-
Burma), both parties have displayed sufficient restraint not to let the dynamics spin out of control. 
Hence, there seems to be enough ‘evidence that (...) non-use of force (...) is consistently affirmed 
in practice’. 
An assessment provided by ACHARYA seems to strike a scientifically somewhat courageous, if not a 
simplistic note; he postulates: 
Indeed, the minimalist claim for an ASEAN security community rests on this simple em-
pirical fact: the original members of ASEAN had not fought a war against each other dur-
ing the period. [ACHARYA 2005:101] 
Also KAMARULZAMAN et. al., arrive at a similar conclusion, when they find: 
ASEAN is a mechanism to prevent conflicts among its member-states from posing threats 
to each other. [KAMARULZAMAN et.al. 2002:38] 
However, CABALLERO-ANTHONY, is careful to point out that ASEAN has routinely eschewed any 
active conflict-management role: 
Firstly, in ASEAN’s history as a corporate, inter-state organization, it has not resolved any 
regional conflict. All ASEAN has done thus far has been to prevent conflict. Secondly, no 
dispute has been brought to ASEAN as a corporate entity to resolve. [CABALLERO-
ANTHONY 2002:534] 
The effects on disputes it bred, then, have been achieved secondarily, although – as amply elabo-
rated elsewhere – they have been nonetheless intended and calculated. Hence, AEAN is termed a 
mechanism for ‚dispute management’ by the same scholar [CABALLERO-ANTHONY 1998:47] or as 
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a ‘confidence-building mechanism. In a sense it prevents conflicts by managing interdependence 
and promoting integration giving its members’ stakes in each other’s peace, stability, and prosper-
ity’ [ABAD 2003]. That is in line with what HAACKE has emphasized by stating: 
(...) for ASEAN governments, the ‘ASEAN way’ is not only significant in terms of its poten-
tial to prevent disputes. It is equally significant as a rallying point once its norms have 
been breached, to contain the conflict and to allow for a relatively speedy normalization of 
ties. [HAACKE 2003:80, original emphasis] 
NGUYEN VU TANG even finds that Southeast Asia enjoyed a period of ‘ASEAN peace’ during the 
Association’s first forty years of existence [NGUYEN VU TANG 2007:499]. EMMERSON, drawing on 
DEUTSCH's original notion, adapts the security community concept and to find that ASEAN merits a 
classification of a pluralistic Security Community, thinly defined as: 
[A] group of sovereign states that share both an expectation of intramural security and a 
sense of intramural community. Security is the presence of the durable peace among 
these states, reflecting a lasting prior absence of war among them. Community is the 
presence of a cooperative identity among these states, including a commitment to abstain 
from using force against each other. [EMMERSON 2005:171, original emphasis] 
Still, various developments might be cited posing as evidence how far away the Association is from 
constituting an fully-fledged security community. A case in point is Thailand's – being until then 
famous for its liberal approach to non-interference – refusal to discuss the Muslim insurgency in the 
country's South. Thus, Michael MONTESANO, a professor of Southeast Asian studies at the National 
University of Singapore, commented on the Thai president’s stance: 
What Thaksin is calling into question with such a strident comment is Asean's image of it-
self as working in a gentlemanly, consensual way.  
It seems as though he is talking about Asean as a collection of rivals . . . rather than as a 
collection of friends. [qtd. in: KAZMIN 27.11.2004] 
Even with growing assertiveness (epitomized inter alia by the birth of the ARF, or an ongoing re-
evaluation of the non-confrontational features of the ASEAN Way) scepticism of the Association’s 
enduring commitment to take on conflicts in a more sustainable manner are still justified. Also 
HAACKE, reviewing the participation of ASEAN nations in the international force for the former In-
donesian territory of East Timor, cautions to interpret that measure as a lasting reformist develop-
ment, holding the following: 
(...) ASEAN members are still some way from collectively embracing new understandings 
about the norm of humanitarian intervention. [HAACKE 2003:71] 
The argument is strongly supported by KHOO who makes his position quite clear: an 'ASEAN secu-
rity community, has arguably never existed' [KHOO 2004:139]. 
 
This review and analysis demonstrates that – with convincing argumentation -  an overwhelming 
majority of scientific scholars shares the opinion that ASEAN in its form and by its past as well as 
current performance is not qualifying as a full-blown ‘security community’. Evidence suggests that 
ASEAN – in contrast to satisfying any definitional and behavioural rule book in order to fit a given 
concept, as for example encapsulated in the term ‘security community’ - followed its own, distinct 
mode. This entailed among others to set up cooperation umbrellas. The most dense of those con-
tains the ASEAN members themselves. However, the overarching, out-reaching umbrella extending 
beyond ASEAN’s geographical limits, consists of several, partly overlapping nets. Those nets indi-
rectly provide a sustained, non-materialist, informal, and flexible commitment, fuelled by enhanced 
inter-connectedness, to uphold and maintain regional security. These nets have differing member-
ship (e.g. ARF, EAS) and subject areas; their procedural texture increase interaction between the 
participants to such a degree as to incrementally ensure that it becomes ever more ‘natural’ that 
conflicts are solved in a peaceful, matter-of-fact fashion. Thus, conflicts are increasingly framed 
technically, instead of on terms of friend-and-foe or with zero-sum vocabulary. 
That is why it is understandable that although providing no formal contract-based procedures or 
mechanisms to handle arising conflicts, ASEAN membership was even viewed by the region’s ‘black 
sheep’ Vietnam to be equivalent to subscribing to a kind of soft-security-insurance. This very well 
exemplifies that the Association gained strong corresponding relevancy in the security realm. 
ASEAN had not merely showcased to be able to uphold and maintain stability in its membership-
area; on top of that its cultivation of friendly and sustainable relations with most of the major pow-
ers was convincing proof of being a club well-worth joining. Vietnam, after having seen its Cold 
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War friendships wane, thus considered membership of ASEAN as a way to benefit from the good-
will sphere the Association had established. Ultimately Vietnam thought the security ASEAN ema-
nated so solid as to even hope by joining to come into a position permitting it to cut its military 
spending [NGUYEN VU TUNG 2007:485]. 
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6 Acronyms 
6.1 General Acronyms 
AA Auswärtiges Amt (Germany) 
ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting 
AE Agence Europe 
AEMM ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting 
AHMFM Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers (OAS) 
AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Annual Meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters) 
AMMTC ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime 
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APT ASEAN Plus Three 
ASEAN-ISIS  ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and Security Studies 
ASPC ARF Security Policy Conference  
AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market 
CASEAN Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CCJ Central American Court of Justice 
CEP Provisional Electoral Council (Haiti 2002) 
CHS Committee on Hemispheric Security 
CIAV Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación - Interna-
tional Verification and Support Commission, OAS 
CICTE Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo – Inter-
American Committee against Terrorism (OAS) 
COAS Charter of the Organization of the American States 
CSBM Confidence- and Security Building Measure 
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (ARF) 
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
DCC Democratic Constituent Congress (Peru) 
DOCPSCS Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea (ASEAN) 
DOTSCS Declaration on the South China Sea (ASEAN) 
DP Dialogue Partner 
EAC East Asia Community 
EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus 
EAS East Asia Summit 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EEPs Experts/Eminent Persons (ARF) 
ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
EPG Eminent Persons Group (ASEAN: for supporting the creation 
of an ASEAN Charter 
FARC  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
FOC Friends of Cambodia 
GAOAS General Assembly of the OAS 
GAUN General Assembly of the UN 
GOC Good Offices Committee (OAS) 
HC High Council (TAC, ASEAN) 
IACAT Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism  
IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
IADC Inter-American Democratic Charter 
IAPC Inter-American Peace Committee 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
IGO Inter-Governmental Organization 
ILM International Legal Materials 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INTERFET International Force for East Timor 
IO International Organization 
ISG CBMs Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures 
(ARF) 
ISM PO Inter-Sessional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations (ARF) 
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JIOG Joint International Observer Group (Cambodia) 
JMM Joint Ministerial Meeting (ASEAN) 
KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 
MCMFA Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
MICAH International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (UN) 
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines) 
MINUSTAH Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti - 
United Nations Stabilization Force in Haiti 
MNLF  Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines) 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MPC Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NLD National League for Democracy (Burma) 
NMD National Missile Defense (US) 
NSA Non-State Actor 
NWG Neighbourhood Watch Group 
OAS Organization of American States 
OAS/AZ Mission OAS Adjacency Zone Mission (between Guatemala and Be-
lize) 
PAU Pan-American Union 
PCOAS Permanent Council of the OAS 
PMC Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN) 
POC Provisional Organ of Consultation (OAS) 
PROPAZ Programa Cultura de Diálogo: Desarrollo de Recursos para 
la Construcción de la Paz - Culture of Dialogue: Resource 
Development for Building Peace in Guatemala (OAS) 
RAMSI Pacific Islands' Forum Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands 
SCCS Special Consultative Committee on Security (OAS) 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
SCUN Security Council of the United Nations 
SEANWFZ  Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
SEARCCT Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism 
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
SGASEAN Secretary General of ASEAN 
SGOAS Secretary General of the OAS 
SOC Senior Officials Committee (ASEAN) 
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 
SOM Senor Officials Meeting (ASEAN) 
SVN Satzung der Vereinten Nationen 
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (ASEAN) 
TAN Transnational Advocacy Network 
ultra vires beyond one's legal power or authority 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor 
UPD Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (OAS) 
WB World Bank 
ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ASEAN) 
 
6.2 Source Acronyms 
 
A The Australian 
AA Asian Affairs 
AAR American Asian Review 
ACT Arms Control Today 
AdG Archiv der Gegenwart 
AE Agence Europe 
AEJ Asia Europe Journal 
AEN Asian Economic News 
AFP Agence France-Presse 
AFXA AFX Asia 
AFXIF AFX International Focus 
AJIA Australian Journal of International Affairs 
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AJIL American Journal of International Law 
AJPS Asian Journal of Political Science 
AP Associated Press 
APN Asian Political News 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ARPS Annual Review of Political Science 
AS Asahi Shimbun 
ASIL American Society of International Law 
ASILP American Society of International Law Proceedings 
AT Asia Times 
AWSJ Asian Wall Street Journal 
BB Borneo Bulletin 
BBC MN BBC Monitoring Newsfile 
BBC MS BBC Monitoring Service 
BD Business Day (Thailand) 
BDMN Bernama Daily Malaysian News 
BJWA Brown Journal of World Affairs 
BP Bangkok Post 
BTS Business Times Singapore 
BW Business World 
BYIL British Yearbook of International Law 
CA Channel News Asia 
CACA Central American & Caribbean Affairs 
CDT Chicago Daily Tribune 
CJIL Chinese Journal of International Law 
CJTL Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
CM Country Monitor, New York 
CN China News, Taiwan 
CNA Central News Agency, Taiwan 
CRIA Cambridge Review of International Affairs 
CSA Contemporary Southeast Asia 
CSM Christian Science Monitor 
CST Chicago Sun-Times 
CT Chicago Tribune 
CU Caribbean Update 
DC Dhaka Courier 
DD Daily Defender 
DIL Digest of International Law 
DJAER Dow Jones Asia Equities Report 
DJES Dow Jones Energy Service 
DJIN Dow Jones International News 
DJNS Dow Jones News Service 
DJTES Dow Jones Telerate Energy Service 
DLJ Duke Law Journal 
DY Daily Yomiuri 
EC Energy Compass 
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit 
EMR Emerging Markets Report 
FEER Far Eastern Economic Review 
FJIL Florida Journal of International Law 
FOC Friends of Cambodia 
FP Foreign Policy 
FT Financial Times 
G&M Globe and Mail, Canada 
GG Global Governance 
GIDA Global Insight Daily Analysis 
GN Gulf News 
HC Houston Chronicle 
HIR Harvard International Review 
HRB Human Rights Brief 
HS Herald Sun 
HT Hindustan Times 
IA International Affairs 
IACPWP Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace  
IALR Inter-American Law Review 
IHT International Herald Tribune 
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IJMGR International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
IO International Organization 
IOD International Oil Daily 
IP International Politics 
IPG Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 
IPS Inter Press Service 
IRAP International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 
ISP International Studies Perspectives 
ISQ International Studies Quarterly 
ITWS ITAR-TASS World Service 
JAAS Journal of Asian and African Studies 
JAH Journal of American History 
JCA Journal of Contemporary Asia 
JCR Journal of Conflict Resolution 
JD Journal of Democracy 
JEI Japan Economic Institute of America 
JEN Japan Economic Newswire 
JIA Journal of International Affairs 
JIRD Journal of International Relations and Development 
JJPS Japanese Journal of Political Science 
JOINS Joins.com (selected articles from the major South Korean 
newspaper, Joongang Ilbo) 
JP Jiji Press 
JPR Journal of Peace Research 
JT Japan Times 
KBS KBS World News 
KH Korea Herald 
KHMW Longman Handbook of the Modern World 
KN Kyodo News 
KT Korea Times 
LA Lawyer of the Americas 
LAAGR Latin American Andean Group Report 
LABSCR Latin American Brazil & Southern Cone Report 
LACCAR Latin American Caribbean Central American Report 
LAMNR Latin American Mexico and NAFTA Report 
LAN Latin American Newsletters 
LAND Latin America News Digest 
LANS LANS English Abstracts Service 
LAPS Latin American Politics and Society 
LAT Los Angeles Times 
LAWR Latin American Weekly Report 
LKBNA LKBN ANTARA 
LND Latinnews Daily 
MB Manila Bulletin 
MH Miami Herald 
MP Marine Policy 
MS Manila Standard 
NF Noticias Financieras 
NI New Internationalist 
NP News Press 
NPR National Public Radio (US) 
NR Nikkei Report 
NST New Straits Times (Malaysia) 
NT The Nation (Thailand) 
NYT New York Times 
NZPA New Zealand Press Association 
NZZ Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
OANA Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies 
OCT Oklahoma City Times 
OD&IL Ocean Development & International Law 
ODJCW Oster Dow Jones Commodity Wire 
ORO Oxford Reference Online 
P&PM Presidents & Prime Ministers 
PA Pacific Affairs 
PGDT Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 
PIR Peacekeeping & International Relations 
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PNA Philippines News Agency 
PPI Pakistan Press International 
PR Pacific Review 
PRNW PR Newswire 
PRSCR Political Risk Services Country Reports 
PTFDCH Political Transcripts by Federal Document Clearing House 
PTI Press Trust of India 
SAA Southeast Asian Affairs 
SAEN San Antonio Express-News 
SAJSS Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 
SCMP South China Morning Post (Hongkong) 
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
SJILC Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 
SLR Stanford Law Review 
SMH Sydney Morning Herald 
SNS States News Service 
ST Straits Times 
STD Saigon Times Daily 
STPT St. Petersburg Times 
SZ Süddeutsche Zeitung 
TI Times of India 
TLCP Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 
TNA Trend News Agency 
TNS Thai News Service 
TT The Times (London) 
TW Tulsa World 
TWQ Third World Quarterly 
UCLR University of Chicago Law Review 
UMHRL University of Minnesota Human Rights Library 
UMIALR University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 
UN United Nations 
UNBL United News of Bangladesh Limited 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UPD Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, OAS 
UPI United Press International 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USDS United States Department of State 
USDSB United States Department of State Bulletin 
USDSD United States Department of State Dispatch 
USFN United States Fed News 
USSDPRD United States State Department Press Releases and Docu-
ments 
UTLJ University of Toronto Law Journal 
VAPRD Voice of America Press Releases and Documents 
VIR Vietnam Investment Review 
VNAB Vietnam News Agency Bulletin 
WA World Affairs 
WAE World Almanac Encyclopedia 
WCD World Court Digest 
WMRCDA WMRC Daily Analysis 
WND World News Digest, Facts on File database 
WP Washington Post 
WPS What the Papers Say 
WQ Washington Quarterly 
WSJ Wall Street Journal 
WT Washington Times 
YEN Yonhap English News 
YS Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan) 
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